[English]
After another major Russian strike
lasting 12 hours last weekend, Vice
President J. D. Vance's revelation that
the US is considering a Ukrainian
request for long range Tomahawk missiles
was interpreted by some as the latest
sign of Washington's waning patience
with Moscow. But despite Kev's
insistence that the ability to strike
deep inside Russia could give the
Kremlin more incentive to pursue a peace
deal, the conversation around Europe in
recent weeks has been of a growing war,
not a conflict approaching its
conclusion. And ahead of an informal
summit in Copenhagen on Wednesday, the
Danish Prime Minister Meta Frederickson
was clear Russian aggression is not only
a problem for Ukraine. I think we have
to leave our national perspective
talking about security in Europe and
look at the pattern with the hybrid war
going on and look at the war on Ukraine
not as a war in a European country
Ukraine but as a Russian attempt to
threaten all of us. Though, as NATO
allies continue to emphasize their
long-term will to defend one another,
has the West exhausted its diplomatic
efforts to talk Putin down? As always,
our team are here to answer all of your
questions.
I'm James Waterhouse.
I'm Laura Godzy.
And I'm Lucy Hawings. Welcome to
Ukraine.
Ukraine cast from BBC News.
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Hi Laura, great to have you with us. Hi.
Can you explain what you do here at the
BBC?
I am a senior journalist on the BBC's
Europe digital desk. Um, so I work on
European stories with a big focus on
Russia and Ukraine.
And James, you're just back. How was it
in Kev this time in Ukraine?
It was it was difficult. I think as an
environment, it's more oppressive than I
remember. I saw friends and colleagues
who were visibly exhausted and that 12-h
hour air raid you mentioned last
weekend. I mean, it was just
extraordinary. You know, they typically
come on a Saturday night, but the the
volume of drones being launched and
Russia's missiles evolving, outpacing
Ukraine's air defenses
exist, you know, existing in Kiev is as
hard as it's been. We saw some troops in
a southern base who, you know, are
they're a rare breed really. They're
still very extremely patriotic, very
motivated, but broadly there is huge
fatigue. Um, but the Ukrainians still
see as having as having no other choice
but to to defend themselves.
And psychologically, how do people cope
in those 12 hours? What do people do to
calm themselves?
They have to drag themselves out of bed
or they have to learn how to sleep in a
bathtub or a corridor. Um, you know, we
woke up on last Sunday, uh, and we
headed to a suburb of Kiev, this kind of
new build estate, and you you you sadly
get used to noticing the the symptoms of
what kind of strike it's been, and this
was unmistakably a ballistic missile. A
whole block had imploded and every
window had been blown through. So, if
you can imagine sitting in a small
apartment, the force of that energy
going through such a narrow space. I
mean, there are people that just look
shell shocked with all of their
belongings strewn everywhere, glass
falling from the sky, and that is one
day.
One day. Wow. It's uh the first week
that we've had in a while where there
hasn't been just one overwhelming
headline story uh on Ukraine. So, we've
had a varied list of questions this
week. And we're going to start with what
feels like a pretty significant domestic
development in Ukraine. And it's
something that we haven't spoken a lot
about on the podcast, but uh listen to
Deborah. She's been in touch.
Hello, Ukraine cast. As of the 26th of
August, the Ukrainian government passed
a resolution allowing men aged 18 to 22
inclusive, to cross the state border
during martial law. Few questions. Why
the change in martial law? How long will
these young men be able to be away from
Ukraine legally? And what are the
implications regarding visa applications
and home for Ukraine?
Thanks very much. That's Dev and
Colchester.
It's a great question, isn't it? I mean,
we are talking about a mobilization law
that is deeply unpopular. Um, there is
no cap on service. It means men between
18 and 60 can't leave the country until
now. We've had this relaxation. But if
you're 25 and over without exemptions
such as having three children, a
vulnerable relative, you will be
eligible for for conscription. You can't
leave the country. So what Zalinski has
done with in the face of growing
political pressure is say look those
under 25 this cohort of men you can go
you can come back as you wish there'll
be no hassle for you at the border um
and you'll be welcome back what he is
trying to do is relieve some of that
pressure but also he's having to keep
half an eye on the future of his country
because Donald Trump is pressuring him
as well saying you're not mobilizing
enough men why he argued should we do
anything for you if you're not doing as
as much as you can be doing. And what
Zalinski is saying is I can't wipe out a
generation. So this is a, you know, a
major concession in that sense, but
you've also got Ukrainian universities
trying to offer concessions,
scholarships. They're trying to lure
their talent back to prevent any kind of
brain drain.
Has there been one? I mean, has there
been an exodus of young men leaving?
Yeah, I mean, it's hard to get an exact
number on those who've swerved the
draft. I know people who have done it,
who have had the money to to pay for it.
Um, but we are talking tens of
thousands. More broadly, Ukraine's
population has dropped by 10 million
from externally and internally displaced
people. And you know, this is the course
that wars take. And I think what was
what was interesting as well, one of the
ways that Zilinski explained this
decision back in August was that, you
know, he talked about the phenomenon of
um 18 year olds, so school seniors um
being taken out of school by their
parents before they finished school and
be sent abroad so that they could get
out of the country before they turned 18
and then dodge, you know, conscription.
And and I think he said, you know, that
is such a crucial time in which people
form an attachment to their country, a
connection to Ukraine.
Deb, thanks for that question. Well, I
mentioned earlier that the US is
considering supplying long range
Tomahawk missiles to Kev. We've had a
question from Jacqueline who is in
Florida in the US and it's all about the
mechanisms that the US is using right
now to provide that sort of aid.
Hello Ukraine cast. My name is
Jacqueline. The Biden administration
passed the Ukraine Democracy Defense
Lenley's act in 2022, but it was never
enacted before it expired. Do you
believe a similar aid mechanism could be
revived or implemented under Trump?
Before I ask you about that, Laura, can
you just explain where we're at right
now? What mechanism is in place at the
moment?
So, um, as of July, um, Donald Trump has
basically, um, entered an agreement with
NATO, um, after receiving the NATO chief
Mark in Washington, whereby NATO
countries, um, will be allowed to buy US
weapons to then send on to Ukraine. Um
so clearly what matters to to Donald
Trump as and his base as he's always
said is that nothing is given for free.
So um as long as somebody pays for these
weapons then the understanding is that
more or less anything can be sent with
great limitations as we know on long
range but that's another another topic.
But at the moment the US is providing um
or is saying it will provide uh some
defense systems like Patriots but
there are big issues with delivery of
course hearing that constantly.
Yes. Yes. and delays and then the
expense of them etc. And it is providing
intelligence as well but that's at the
moment that's as far.
So what was this lend lease act that
Jacqueline's asking about?
It it was partly symbolic because the
idea was that the US would provide
Ukraine with defense equipment um
without asking for immediate payment. So
um it it was meant to streamline the
delivery of these weapons to bypass
bureaucracy and red tape. Um but I guess
at the time the situation was so urgent
and critical that what they decided to
do instead was to send Ukraine money. Um
so you know huge um you know billions
and billions of dollars in in um in aid.
Um and that took precedence over this
lend lease scheme that never really um
came to fruition in the end. So could
Trump um agree to something like this
again as we were saying? Um, I mean,
maybe the idea of a scheme under which,
you know, payment is delayed wouldn't
quite appeal to him as long as it's
payment. But, you know, when would
Ukraine be able to pay this back?
Unclear. So, maybe this wouldn't be
really his preferred option at the
moment.
Yeah. And I think that there are those
growing Democratic voices, aren't they,
saying, "Look, you're growing
frustrated, Mr. President,
with Vladimir Putin. Let's let's bring
this back. Let's streamline this." But
there's a bit of baffle, isn't there?
because you had this lendley scheme.
It's they the US did it in the Second
World War to help Britain. Uh they said,
"Look, we'll talk about paying it back
down the line." Um and Ukraine never
really sort of jumped on it. They sort
of trusted America, I think, with um the
conventional routes they took, but
certainly if you look back at the Biden
era and how they helped Ukraine, you
talk to Ukrainians, they'll say, "Well,
yeah, it's great, but it was too slow,
too infrequent, and that's why we are
where we are." If you had given us the
weapons we'd asked for in January 2022,
if you had imposed the sanctions we
demanding on Moscow to put it off from
invading in January 2022, we wouldn't be
here. There was a hope at the start of
this year that Donald Trump would be a
change in tone and approach. Uh and I
think as he loses patience with Vladimir
Putin, perhaps that hope is reignited.
We're going to turn now to another side
of diplomacy and I'm really pleased to
say that Lee is joining us from Stoke on
Trent. Thanks for joining us, Lee. I
understand you're a veteran. That's one
of the reasons that you're getting in
touch with us today.
Yeah, that's right. I um I served
throughout the 1990s when the Bosnian
conflict the ex Yugoslavia and um I'm
really frustrated about the whole
situation with the UN and I wanted to
ask Ukraine cast firstly why do Russia
get a veto? Why why is the aggressor
allowed to prevent supporting action? I
think Lee's probably expressing a
frustration there that a lot of people
feel actually when they look at what's
happening at the UN. James, what's the
answer?
Well, I mean, the answer is that the
likes of Russia, the US, China, the UK,
France are founding members of the
United Nations, Lee. So, you know, these
were the strongest nations at the end of
the Second World War and they were able
to say, right, we will form the United
Nations. we will be a part of it. But on
these terms, we will get the power uh of
veto. We've seen America use its own
veto to protect and support Israel with
the war in the Middle East. But you
know, it is ultimately, isn't it, it's a
global platform where the premise is
that all sides will have their say. And
it's been a source of huge frustration
for Kev and its European allies. when
you see uh you know senior Russian
officials uh justify the continued
invasion, you see um uh you see its
allies back it up in that kind of
sentiment. Um but that that is that is
the chessboard that that the United
Nations is formed upon. Um but yes it's
not without frustration is a
and that disconnect when you see the
difference between what can happen at
the UN General Assembly where there can
be this sort of condemnation of Russian
aggression and uh reaffirmation of
Ukrainian sovereignty and then it gets
to the security council and that becomes
diluted because of Russia.
Yeah. And if we're talking about
legalities of war, you know, you can,
you know, if we talk about, you know,
Russia's invasion is often called
illegal. Well, it's because it's not
within the confines of a of a UN
resolution or or a vote by the Security
Council. For example, Ukraine will say,
"Well, we're in self-defense." So, that
is legal. But, yeah, I think I think
that's why you're frustrated, right,
Lee? You're kind of you're seeing sort
of the power of uh of the vote, the
power of veto
um fail to sort of halt this full-scale
invasion in military means. But of
course the world is still wary of of
Russia's nuclear power as well and that
as as ever has played a huge part in
this as well.
Um from serving in in the early '9s and
um reading some of the the UN charter
and understanding that one of the the
key things in that's written in the
charter is about um respecting and
allowing other countries their
sovereignty. And what the Russian um
military have done is invaded another
another European country's sovereign
ground and that's just been let to
slide. I think the same sort of thing
with as you were saying before with
what's happening in Gaza. The the
Americans have vetoed any sort of um
restrictions. But what's the point in
having United Nations if they can't
actually get out there and put a police
in force in it? I think from talking to
a lot of veterans when um the Ukraine
was first invaded and even the feeling
now it it just feels like the bully is a
prefect and the prefect doesn't get
checked and unfortunately it just means
that lots of people have lost their
lives lost their home and ultimately
lost their lives.
Lee, thank you so much for your
question. Good to have you with us on
Ukraine Cast.
Thank you. Cheers, Lee.
Thank you.
As Lee mentioned there, he was a member
of a peacekeeping force and deploying a
peacekeeping force is actually one of
the responsibilities of the UN Security
Council. And that's the subject of our
next question from An Marie and she sent
it to us on Discord. I keep hearing how
Russia will categorically refuse to
accept any foreign peacekeeping force on
Ukrainian soil. Can anyone explain to me
how Russia can possibly call the shots
on the future of Ukraine security as it
remains a sovereign country and no part
of Ukraine is democratically recognized
as Russian? It's highly concerning that
Russia already appears to consider
Ukraine as having no independent
political or militaristic agency
separately to Russia. So why, James, are
international forces in Ukraine like
such a red line for Russia when it comes
to any deal at all?
Well, Russia doesn't want to have too
much trouble in keeping hold of the
territory it's taken. Um, there's no
evidence suggesting that Vladimir
Putin's ambitions have been diluted in
any way. It's the military reality that
has forced him to reassess. that he
doesn't want well a well-trained
collection of Western troops, not least
America
to have boots on the ground in Ukraine
after a ceasefire is agreed. Europe and
Ukraine is saying well we'll be the one
Ukraine will be the one to decide that
and we'll decide if um you know if we
want to send them if Ukraine asks for
it. But it's America that is the portal
here. If Putin can impress enough his
demands uh coupled with Donald Trump's
impatience to end this war, then those
kind of conditions could gather pace.
And I think that is why Europe and
Ukraine is working so hard to kind of
just keep momentum with Donald Trump.
They're working so hard to try and get
anything out of him uh as Russia
continues
and they come up against somebody in
this case Putin who um whose demands are
so intractable. I think because they are
so rooted in his ideology and ideology
is something very difficult to fight
against because you know it's so for him
it's it's at the core of his vision for
Russia and for the postsviet world
but it feels like a concession right you
remember when he said oh we'll we'd like
complete control of four provinces
I mean that that's land he hasn't got
close to taking but if you if you as you
say don't backtrack you say it enough
this maximus you know we've seen Steve
Wickoff the US senior envoy start to
repeat it earlier on to the horror of of
of Kiev, it starts to feel like, okay,
we'll just take these four provinces.
It's the illusion of a back of a of a
concession and it's not
of a compromise. Yeah,
there has been a lot of discussion over
the past few weeks about the commitment
of NATO members to defend each other.
But what about Russia's commitment to
defend its allies? Well, we've had this
question in from Tim, who asks, "What
would the ramifications be if NATO
invokes Article 5 against Bellarus
rather than Russia?" In the light of
Russian drones entering Poland from
Barus or if there was a similar future
incursion, do Russia and Bellarus have
defensive treaties? Laura?
Um, okay. So, let's explore this for a
second. Um, we're speculating, but say
that um uh drones are launched from
Barus and NATO countries deem it um an
act of aggression that requires a quick
reaction. So what they could do first of
all is trigger article 4 as Estonia did
a couple of weeks ago when um uh Russian
jets made an incursion into its
airspace. Article 4 basically just um
means that NATO members are called in
for an urgent consultation. Now, if they
then decided to escalate this to article
five, which as we know is um you know
the mutual assistance um clause, this
still wouldn't mean automatic war
because even article 5 leaves it up to
members to decide in what way to
respond. And also, let's just remember
that only once has article 5 been called
and that was after 911 when when the US
required um uh the assistance of its
allies. Um
what would happen if NATO um then
attacked Barus? Um what it would be very
cautious um to do so because of the
incredibly close ties between Barus and
Russia. They have maintained the closest
ties um um out of all the former Soviet
um countries um and they have a mutual
defense pact as well. In theory this
could trigger um uh a reaction from
Russia defending its ally. In reality,
you know, it's it's always the same
question. Would Russia really want to
enter a direct confrontation with NATO
or vice versa?
But there is an agreement like on paper
between the two countries to
Yes. But but as always, I mean, it's
it's open to interpretation because it's
um I think it talks about um you know,
proportionate response to any
aggression. So again, it it's a gray
area because nobody wants to
accidentally end up dragged into any
sort of
they commit to taking appropriate
political, military, and other measures
in response to any threats to the
security of either country or the union
state as a whole. What do they mean by
union state, Laura? Um the union state
is this deep partnership that Barus and
Russia have which is made up of uh
bilateral treaties and agreements. And
um
I think I if if um you consider how much
Vladimir Putin has invested in trying to
restore what he sees as lost influence
and lost territory, the collapse of the
Soviet Union, I doubt it very much that
NATO would want to test Moscow's resolve
when it came to coming to Barus's aid.
It's where Russian troops train. It's
where missiles are launched. It's where
Russia la first launched a full-scale
invasion when they advanced to our south
to Kev. You know, those relationships
have not just suddenly evaporated.
And I don't think anything will ever be
launched from Bellarus without direct
Russian involvement. So again, that
would mean that Russia has, you know, is
is preparing for the possibility of
retaliation against Barus. So we're back
where we started from.
Well, uh, last week we talked about
assassination attempts. This was also
something that a lot of you were really
interested in, particularly on Vladimir
Putin. Uh, and we think that this might
have inspired this question from Carrie
and Norfick. Hi, Ukraine cast. It's
Carrie from the East of England here.
Conspiracy theories aside, what would
actually happen if and when Putin dies?
Thanks for the podcast. It's always so
informative. Bye. when we were talking
about this question a short time ago and
Laura you said you've spent a long time
considering this very question um I
think I've been uh in debates about um
Putin's potential successor ever since I
started studying Russian 15 years ago so
um so Putin has now been in power for 25
years and uh in over the last couple of
years he amended the constitution to
allow him to remain in power until 2036.
So that's another 11 years for now. So I
don't think the idea of succession is is
um you know sort of at the forefront of
his mind because he very much intends to
stay on himself. Over the years we have
had figures that we've thought were
getting more or less close to him. Um
but they they tend to come and go and
none of them have ever solidified into
somebody you know like a crown prince
type of figure. At the moment, uh, the
possible candidates that we do talk
about, you know, potential successes
are, um, Prime Minister Mikail Mishin,
uh, Security Chief Nikolai Petrushev,
um, Moscow Mayor Serge Sabanin. But
again, will they still be around
tomorrow? Will they have fallen out of
favor? And if nothing else, you know,
they're also, you know, getting on with
age. They're not, you know, in the in
their early 70s like Putin, but they are
in their mid to late 60s. So in 10 years
time when if Putin goes, you know,
there'll also have, you know, be over
Sanin.
I think you always get the impression
that he's surrounding himself with
blackis, no one that could ever
challenge him. You would imagine if you
want to stay in power for a while,
that's what you'd do.
It's quite a binary approach, but when
it's come to rivals, Putin has allegedly
either eliminated them uh or he
certainly promoted them. Uh and we've
seen with his control of the security
forces, the media, um how he's been able
to successfully consolidate his position
and quash descent, um he's, you know,
his issuing of lucrative military
contracts to far-flung places of Russia,
uh have also been able enabled him to
overcome criticisms of the over the
extraordinary human loss um incurred by
his invasion. But I mean, you'll know
more than me, Laura, but the pendulum of
Russian politics, you know, since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, it hasn't
swung much, but you know, the 90s it
swung towards the west catastrophically,
some might argue, for Russia. Then with
Putin, it sort of went away from the
West. Um, there was a fleeting moment
with Medvidev when he got got in the hot
seat where they sort of tried to come
back. But there is no evidence to
suggest that the fall of Putin or the
replacement of Putin would alter things
because we just don't know. But I think
it's certainly wishful thinking and
certainly Kev argues that you know there
are not enough pressures or incentives
for the Russian elite to to reconsider
its full-scale war in Ukraine. But the
fact is the moment the story becomes
bigger in Russia
uh is when the war stops in Ukraine. Is
that what Russian watchers would say,
Laura, that even if Putin goes,
everything will pretty much remain the
same?
Um, I think a lot depends on how he
goes. Um, you know, does he die suddenly
and then there's a power vacuum and the
elite, um, it turns out, um, you know,
it turns out the elite all that they
wanted this entire time was to pull out
of the war and they ended immediately. I
mean, it seems unlikely, but I don't
know. um does he you know go at the end
of a long illness uh during which he's
had time to prepare his succession you
know that will change things as well um
I think what we can assume is that he's
he's not going to go because he's been
voted out
I think in that sense his um when he
does go it will be it will be momentous
and it will be dramatic and it could
land Russia in a potentially more
difficult situation than it even is Now,
I think
thanks so much to you for watching.
We'll be back next week with another
Q&A. So, do keep sending us your
questions. But in the meantime, why
don't you also check out our Ukraine
cast feed wherever you get your BBC
podcasts. See you next time. Bye-bye.
Ukraine cast from BBC News.
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