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[English]

The first century BC was a time of great men in Rome.

Great, but destructive men such as Sulla, Marius, Cicero, Cato, Crassus, Pompey, and

Caesar.

Each individually had the skills and abilities to bring glory and prosperity to Rome, but

they were often in conflict and the conflict between Caesar and Pompey would lead to the

destruction of the Republic which had lasted for almost 450 years.

This is the story of the Great Roman Civil War.

In order to fully understand how the Great Roman Civil War, also known as Caesar’s

Civil War, began, we need to grasp the cultural and historical background.

Since the mid-2nd century BC the Roman Republic had started fracturing with the assassination

of the Gracchi brothers, who had campaigned for land redistribution.

Their deaths underlined the growing social divide between the upper and lower classes

in Rome, and the instability carried on into the following decades with revolts in Sicily,

the Social war with Italian allies, and ultimately the civil wars of Sulla and Marius at the

start of the first century BC.

Those two showed the political rift between those who believed power came from the plebs,

the Populares like Marius, and those who believed power came from the Senate, the Optimates,

such as Sulla.

Moreover, their war had exposed flaws in the Roman Republican system, proving that politics

could be easily subverted through military power.

Though after his victory Sulla had, as Dictator, introduced legislation to try and stop anyone

following in his footsteps, the precedent had already been set; a general could march

on Rome, take it by force, and impose his own will on the Republic.

If enough soldiers were personally loyal to an individual general, the Senators could

do little to curtail that man's power.

Furthermore, the Republic’s constitution, with its numerous checks and balances, was

proving to be one of the crucial factors in its destruction: powerful politicians were

able to paralyze the government by blocking the legislation they disagreed with.

Often it took either a dictatorship or martial law to break the stalemate.

It was in this political environment that the first triumvirate had emerged.

Consisting of Crassus, Pompey and Caesar the triumvirate dictated political life for the

majority of the era.

Crassus was an established politician and the richest man in Rome, bankrolling the triumvirate

and paying bribes as necessary.

Pompey was Rome’s most accomplished general.

Following the Social War, he fought alongside Sulla in his Civil War and later led campaigns

in Sicily, Africa, Pontus and Syria.

This brought him large amounts of wealth, numerous political allies, and the loyalty

of thousands of veterans.

Caesar, at 41 years old, was the youngest and least established of the 3.

He had held the positions of quaestor and aedile, and had shown promise as a praetor

in Spain.

However, Caesar was pontifex maximus, the highest religious official in Rome.

Through this office, Caesar had the power to pass divine laws and to postpone elections

due to signs from the gods.

Additionally, as one of the leaders of the Populares, Caesar had already established

himself as a populist, and had significant clout with the masses.

By 59 BC the Triumvirate was established.

Caesar was already indebted to Crassus, and his alliance with Pompey was solidified by

marrying his daughter Julia to Pompey.

Though never an official coalition, these three men controlled almost every aspect of

the Republic.

Crassus influenced the Senate and aristocracy, the Optimates, with bribes.

Pompey's military prestige effectively gave him control of the veterans and the way they

would vote.

And Caesar could control the masses.

With the support of Pompey and Crassus, Caesar was elected to the consulship in 59 BC, and

immediately passed land reform legislation to provide land to Pompey's veterans, and

ratified Pompey’s Eastern conquests.

Initially, following Caesar’s consulship, the Senate made him an overseer of woods and

pastures in Italy rather than a governor of a province as was the norm for an ex-consul.

However, the Triumvirate was able to overturn this decision: Caesar was given the governorship

of Illyria, Cisalpine Gaul and Transalpine Gaul, along with four legions, for the extent

of 5 years as opposed to the usual one.

Though it is clear that the Triumvirates did abuse their power to achieve their own means,

it did benefit Rome in some ways, pushing through much-needed laws, such as the settling

of veterans, without risk of the Senate creating a stalemate.

In this same year, Clodius Pulcher became Tribune of the Plebs.

Clodius had given up his patrician status to hold the position, and used it to push

a number of populist reforms with the support of the Triumvirate, such as the establishment

of a grain dole.

Clodius had also learned how effective violence could be in politics and had put together

trained gangs who would harass and assault any politicians who got in his way, and he

was even able to force the influential Cicero into exile.

After just one year of Clodius and his gangs ruling the streets of Rome, it became clear

that the Triumvirate would not be able to control him.

Clodius had even gone so far as to attempt to assassinate Pompey when the latter suggested

recalling Cicero from exile.

In response, Pompey allowed another tribune, Milo, an Optimate, to raise his own gangs

to counter Clodius’.

No weapons were meant to be allowed in Rome, but each side secretly armed themselves with

daggers and swords, employing thugs and even gladiators.

For the next few years, the two tribunes and their gangs battled regularly in the streets.

Rome was in chaos.

In 56 BC Pompey and Crassus forced the extension of Caesar’s governorship by another 5 years

meaning that his term would now total 10 years, from 59-49BC, while Caesar sent his veterans

to Rome to ensure their election to the consulate for the year 55-54BC.

However, soon after, the Triumvirate began to fracture.

In 54 BC Julia died in childbirth, severing the personal connection between the two triumvirs.

In 53 BC Crassus embarked on his disastrous Parthian campaign, subsequently dying at the

Battle of Carrhae.

Moreover, the following year, Clodius was killed by Milo.

With Clodius dead and the Triumvirate broke, Pompey and Caesar were left as the two most

powerful men in Rome.

Chaos in the city only increased, as during Clodius’ funeral, his supporters started

a riot.

His body was taken to the Senate house to be burnt on a pyre, and the Senate building

itself was destroyed.

In desperation, the Senate turned to Pompey.

In 52BC Pompey was named sole Consul and given extraordinary powers.

Soldiers were marched into the capital, trials held under armed guard, and executions made.

This was ruthless but effective, and order was restored.

The Senate awarded Pompey with an extended term of governance of Hispania, as well as

powers similar to those that Caesar held in Gaul.

Pompey decided to leave the governance of his provinces to lieutenants.

His quelling of the riots had bought him the adoration of the Senate and Optimates, and

he was not willing to give up such power and influence by leaving Rome.

The Senate had their own ambitions.

With Clodius dead, Caesar was left as the leader of the Populares.

Cato and other Senators were becoming increasingly worried that Caesar might choose to exploit

his popularity and march on Rome.

He was, in the Senate’s mind, a threat to the Republic.

The more this was said, the more Pompey agreed.

When the Triumvirate was first formed, Pompey had little to fear from Caesar.

However, Caesar's Gallic Wars allowed him to accumulate wealth, popularity with the

masses, and a core of loyal, battle-hardened veterans.

Caesar had grown his army to around 10 Legions, approximately 50,000 men, more than double

what he had originally been assigned.

Moreover, the majority of these legions had been raised by Caesar personally, led by Caesar

in battle, and thus would undoubtedly be loyal to him.

It had taken Sulla only six legions to march on Rome, and there was every chance that Caesar

could do the same.

As a result, the Senate, and in particular the prominent Cato the Younger, begun rallying

an anti-Caesar alliance in the Senate, mainly consisting of Optimates.

With Pompey and Caesar already positioned to confront each other as the two most powerful

men in Rome, the Senate turned to Pompey to lead the Optimates and remove Caesar as a

threat.

Caesar was simply too powerful: His army was too large to be confronted head-on, and his

popularity was too great for him to be defeated in an election.

At this time in 52 BC Caesar was still governor of Gaul, and had applied to run for the office

of consul in absentia for the year 48BC, his term as governor ending at the end of 49BC.

With 52BC being such a chaotic year with riots in Rome, Caesar’s application had been allowed

with little thought, but now presented a problem.

Holding the office of governor or consul gave Caesar legal immunity.

If he ran in absentia for the consulship, he would certainly win due to his vast popularity,

and his legal immunity would continue.

Moreover, he would be able to use this term as consul to push legislation to protect himself.

It was undeniable that Caesar had committed crimes as consul, including stirring political

violence against a fellow consul, as well as crimes as a governor by instigating wars

in Gaul and Britain that were not authorized by the Senate.

The Senate could not defeat Caesar militarily, nor could they defeat him in the voting booths.

A solution was needed.

Cato had already made it clear that given an opportunity, he would put Caesar on trial

himself.

All that was needed was for Caesar to be a private citizen.

To achieve this, in 52BC Cato ran for consulships for the year 51BC, hoping to use consular

power to deprive Caesar of his command.

Cato lost, however, and Caesar’s governance continued.

For the next two years, the Senate, headed by Cato, increasingly demanded Caesar’s

resignation, whilst the Caesarean, headed by Curio and Mark Antony, both Plebeian Tribunes,

blocked and vetoed such legislation.

Through a somewhat contrived reading of the law that Pompey and Crassus had passed extending

Caesar’s term, the Senate insisted that Caesar’s term ended in 50BC, ordering him

to relinquish his command.

Caesar refused, knowing that as soon as he lost his legal immunity the Senate would have

him put on trial.

He also knew that his governorship was, in fact, legal, and that he had the right to

continue it until the previously agreed date at the end of 49BC.

In December 50BC, Pompey offered to resign his command if Caesar would first.

The Caesareans opposed this, insisting that Pompey be first to resign.

Neither side was willing to be exposed.

That same month, Caesar marched with one Legion to Ravenna, and wrote a letter to the Senate

attempting to negotiate, again insisting that if Pompey resigned his command first, so would

he.

Whether Caesar marched his Legion to Ravenna simply to winter there, or if he meant it

as an actual threat, is not clear.

However, rumours spread that Caesar, in fact, had 4 Legions with him, not just one.

To the Senate, it appeared Caesar was attempting to threaten and blackmail them.

In response, they again ordered him to step down immediately, and authorised Pompey to

start amassing legions to defend Rome.

Caesar, once again, attempted to negotiate.

He offered to resign his governorship of Transalpine Gaul, Cisalpine Gaul and the majority of his

Legions, but requested to keep governorship of Illyricum, along with two Legions, until

the original deadline - the end of 49BC - and that he be allowed to run for consul for 48BC,

hoping to extend his legal immunity.

However, this was still a reasonable deal for the Senate, and it would achieve their

aim of severely limiting Caesar’s power and influence.

Cicero acted as a mediator for the deal and negotiated Caesar down to just one Legion

and one province.

Pompey was willing to accept, however, key Optimates, including Cato and the consul Lentulus,

refused the deal.

Not an idealist, Pompey was viewing the Optimate as useful political allies, but hard-line

Optimates like Cato and Lentulus hated the idea of the Senate being pressured to negotiate.

On the 7th of January, the Senate voted again to immediately strip Caesar of all his powers

and armies.

Once again, Caesar’s Tribunes in the Senate, Curio and Antony, vetoed the legislation.

The Senate had expected as much and passed the Senatus Consultum Ultimum, the Final Act,

an un-vetoable act that suspended all laws and gave all powers to the Consuls, effectively

declaring a national emergency, and they declared Caesar an enemy of the state.

The Consuls for the year, Lentulus and Marcellus, both hard-line Optimates, immediately passed

all their powers to Pompey, effectively giving Pompey full control of the Roman Republic.

That same night, Caesar’s allies in Rome fled to Ravenna to join him.

The stage was now set.

After years of attempted negotiations, a complete impasse had been reached.

The division between the two parties, the Populares and Optimates, was the same division

that had led to the deaths of the Gracchi, and the wars of Sulla and Marius.

The Populares largely consisted of younger men from less established families, such as

Mark Anthony, Trebonius and Curio, or lesser members of noble families, such as Decimus

Brutus.

The Pompeiian Optimates, on the other hand, were mainly aristocrats of noble families,

including Pompey's two sons, Gnaeus and Sextus, Ahenobarbus, Metellus Scipio, a descendant

of the famous Scipio Africanus, Cato the Younger, and Cicero.

The societal rift between these two groups, which had first become apparent almost 100

years ago with the deaths of the Gracchi, was about to plunge the Republic into chaos

once again.

On the 10th of January 49BC, Caesar left Ravenna with the 13th Legion and his allies from Rome.

They halted at a small river that marked the border of the province of Italy; the Rubicon.

It was forbidden for any general to cross this boundary with arms or an army; to do

so would be a clear declaration of war.

Caesar spent a long time weighing his options.

Caesar’s own family had been persecuted and hunted in the aftermath of Sulla’s Civil

War, he knew well how destructive such wars were.

However, he also knew that if he disbanded his army, he would be likely exiled or executed.

After almost a day’s deliberation, Caesar made his choice.

Alea iacta est - the die is cast.

The Great Roman Civil War had begun.

Following the crossing, Caesar had moved with his tell-tale swiftness and quickly seized

key locations in Northern Italy in a matter of days.

There was little resistance; these cities had not been garrisoned to defend against

any significant force, and there were many who sympathised with Caesar against Pompey

and the Optimates.

As he went, he sent orders to his Gallic Legions for reinforcements to march south and join

him.

In Rome itself, there was mass confusion.

Pompey may have thought that if Caesar was to go to war, he would wait for his Legions

from Gaul.

He hesitated and did not know whether to defend Rome, abandon the city and fight in Italy,

or abandon the peninsula altogether.

If Pompey had reacted quickly, he may have been able to levy enough troops to defeat

Caesar, stopping the war before it truly began.

However, conflicting reports kept Pompey in the dark, and he had no idea that Caesar had

just one under-strength Legion with him.

Though Pompey could levy large numbers in Italy, he currently only had two full Legions

in the area: the veteran 1st Legion and the 15th.

Both had recently been handed over by Caesar to the Senate to fight a planned war in Syria.

The 1st, having been raised by Pompey could be trusted to fight on his behalf, but the

15th was raised by Caesar and its loyalty was questionable.

Most of Pompey’s best Legions were abroad in either Hispania or the East.

Pompey knew he could not risk being trapped or forced into a battle he wasn’t prepared

for.

He had the resources of the Republic at his disposal and could afford to fight a prolonged

war.

As a result, Pompey made the difficult decision to abandon Rome.

With him went the majority of the Senate, including the two Consuls.

Plutarch wrote that many Romans considered wherever Pompey went as their country.

Cassius Dio gives a much more divisive picture of the Roman mentality, saying that in doing

this Pompey had made an enemy of his supporters.

Moreover, in the rush to evacuate the city, the treasury of Rome and the temple treasures

were abandoned.

For Caesar, this was ideal.

With the city and treasure undefended, he was content to bypass it and claim it later,

focusing instead on trying to catch Pompey, and capturing other cities in Italy to cut

off support for the Pompeians and rally more men to his cause.

Despite this fortuitous start, Caesar also suffered a blow in these early stages of the

war.

When the Final Act had been passed by the Senate, the majority of Caesar’s supporters

in Rome, including Mark Anthony and Curio, had fled to join their general.

However, one of Caesar’s lieutenants was not so eager to abandon the Senate's cause:

Labienus.

Labienus was still in Gaul when Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and it’s likely that Caesar

would have wanted Labienus to march his Gallic Legions to Italy and join the fight with him

there.

Instead, Labienus disavowed Caesar, promising his allegiance to the Senate, and fleeing

Gaul with a personal bodyguard to join Pompey.

This was a blow to Caesar personally and militarily, as Labienus was Caesar’s right-hand man

and a highly capable general, who was familiar with his tactics, and comparable even to both

Pompey and Caesar.

Despite Labienus fleeing Gaul, Caesar’s Legions still followed their orders to move

towards Italy.

Two of the closest Legions, the 8th and 12th, were already beginning to cross into Italy

to support their general.

As Caesar continued his push south, Pompey began to rally the defences around Capua and

raise an army in the South.

He still had the veteran 1st Legion, the 15th Legion had remained loyal to him, and he had

ordered many cities to raise levies against Caesar, quickly building his numbers.

However, one man, Domitius Ahenobarbus, decided to take the initiative against Caesar.

Counter to Pompey’s orders he took 30 newly levied cohorts, equivalent to around 3 Legions

to Corfinium, an important crossroads town.

By the time Caesar reached Corfinium, the 8th and 12th Legion had caught up with him,

giving him 3 battle-hardened Legions.

Faced with such a formidable force, the Pompeian levies lost all desire to fight.

They implored Ahenobarbus to surrender, and he reluctantly agreed.

Caesar showed clemency to both the levies and Ahenobarbus.

Ahenobarbus was pardoned, but he quickly returned to Pompey in Southern Italy to continue the

fight.

The levies, on the other hand, were made to swear allegiance to Caesar, forming the 15th,

16th and 17th Legions, swelling his numbers even further, and reducing Pompey’s without

a battle even being fought.

He immediately sent these men to prepare for an invasion of Sicily and Sardinia whilst

he continued south.

Caesar’s leniency at Corfinium gained him popularity across Italy, ensuring that there

would be no popular uprising against him on behalf of Pompey, and he was able to raise

a further 3 Legions, the 18th, 19th and 20th, as he marched.

Pompey now had to change his plan.

He knew that he would no longer be able to fight Caesar in Italy any time soon.

He abandoned his plan of fighting Caesar in the South, and instead marched his force to

Brundisium, preparing to evacuate from the peninsula.

He would go across the Adriatic and into Greece, where Legions from the East, battle-tested

and loyal, would join him, and he would be able to muster even more men from allies and

cities of the East.

Moreover, he had numerous legions in Hispania, and with their help could encircle Caesar

in Italy.

But first, he had to escape.

Caesar needed to move fast.

If he could catch Pompey in Southern Italy, he would be able to corner and defeat him,

much as had happened to Spartacus decades earlier.

As he pursued Pompey into the South, he continuously sent envoys, insisting he would step down

from command if Pompey would do the same.

All such offers were refused: Pompey legally had the authority to command armies, and Caesar

was now a criminal.

The time for negotiations was long gone and it is likely Caesar himself knew this, so

the envoy's true intention was likely to continue to buy him favour with the populace as he

continued to chase the Senate.

In early March, Caesar and his 6 Legions caught up with Pompey at Brundisium.

By the time that Caesar arrived, Pompey had already managed to transport half his force

across the Adriatic.

Caesar wasted no time, immediately besieging the city and beginning construction of a breakwater

across the harbour to block it.

In response, Pompey built large towers on merchant ships that could fire down on Caesar’s

engineers to hamper their progress.

The strategy was effective, and Caesar’s engineers were unable to complete the breakwater

in time.

Pompey’s navy returned from Greece and, at night, Pompey was able to evacuate his

remaining force from the city.

Once in Greece, Pompey marched to Thessalonica.

He established his base, levying new Legions and sending envoys to all the client kings

he had made in the East, gathering Roman Legions and foreign soldiers alike to his banner.

Meanwhile, he sent subordinates to Sicily, Sardinia and North Africa, the three key grain

suppliers of Rome.

Pompey would mobilise forces from across the world to effectively besiege the whole of

Italy, cutting off the grain supplies and starving Caesar into submission.

It had taken Caesar just 3 months to force Pompey out of Rome and take Italy.

Despite this, Caesar’s initial plan to end the war quickly by capturing Pompey and the

Senate, had failed.

With Pompey’s escape, and with no ships to pursue him, the chance for any quick resolution

disappeared.

Caesar began preparing for a prolonged war.

He first marched on Rome, entering in a triumph.

Quickly, he convened what was left of the Senate in Rome, professing his ambition to

save the Republic and declaring Pompey an enemy of the state.

He also plundered the treasury and temples of Rome, allowing him to fully equip the 6

newly acquired Legions, and issued orders for ships from all the provinces loyal to

him to gather at Brundisium.

These ships would take at least a year to muster though, and Caesar could not linger

for long.

He realised that he could not risk being trapped in Italy and resolved to secure his western

flank.

Spanish Legions constituted a significant number of Pompey’s best soldiers and posed

a threat to Gaul.

Furthermore, with Pompey in the East, the Spanish Legions, though well trained, were

in Caesar’s words “an army without a leader”.

Caesar would attack Pompey’s force in the west individually, attempting to defeat them

in detail before turning to Pompey.

To achieve this, he sent one of the newly raised Legions, the 16th, under his Legate

Valerius to Sardinia, and two Legions, likely the 15th and 17th, under Curio to Sicily.

Together, they were to take control of the islands and then push into Africa, securing

the grain supply.

Sardinia was currently held by Cotta on behalf of Pompey, and Sicily by Cato.

Cotta had no real force to speak of, and as soon as the citizens of Sardinian capital

of Caralis heard that Valerius was en route with a Legion, they ejected Cotta, seeing

no sense in attempting to resist the Caesareans.

Cotta fled to Africa, and Valerius quickly took control of the province.

Cato in Sicily had attempted to make better preparations, raising levies across Sicily,

but had also not been provided with any Legions by Pompey.

He too saw a fight against two Legions with his levies as a fruitless task, also deciding

to abandon the province, joining Pompey in Greece.

With the islands taken without any resistance, Valerius and Curio gathered their force in

Sicily and prepared for the attack on Africa.

Meanwhile, Caesar, after spending less than a month in Rome, took the newly raised 18th

and 19th and began his march to Spain, leaving Mark Anthony in charge of Rome and the 8th,

12th and 13th Legions in Italy to recover, with the 20th ready to support Curio if needed.

Caesar himself aimed to march through Gaul to Spain and meet 7 of his Legions along the

way.

However, Ahenobarbus, who had previously attempted to stall Caesar at Corfinium, had already

been dispatched by Pompey to Gaul and he was currently on his way to the city of Massilia,

an important city on the route to Spain.

Caesar arrived at the city before Ahenobarbus sometime in early April, but found the gates

already closed and the Massilians preparing their defences, calling on local tribes for

help and collecting in grain.

Caesar attempted to negotiate with the Massilians who, perhaps stalling for time, stated their

neutrality in the war.

However, once Ahenobarbus did arrive they became more proactive, attacking nearby shipping

in order to bolster their supplies.

With their force numbering approximately 8,000 men, this could have developed into a prolonged

siege, something Caesar simply did not have the time for.

He needed to be in Spain, not bogged down in a siege in Gaul.

As such, he left the 3 legions with Trebonius in control, while Decimus Brutus, who had

proved his knack for naval command against the Venetii, was to command 12 ships.

Caesar then continued to Spain with a bodyguard of approximately 900 cavalry.

Another Legate of Caesar’s, Fabius, had been sent with 3 Legions in advance to make

a foothold in Spain, taking control of the Pyrenean passes.

Soon another 3 legions from Gaul, as well as auxiliaries, joined them.

Caesarion forces would have been approximately 25-30,000 legionaries, 5,000 auxiliaries and

6,000 cavalry, all veterans of the Gallic Wars.

Now united, they began to push past the Pyrenees and into the Iberian Peninsula.

The Pompeian forces in Spain were just as formidable.

Spain had been assigned to Pompey as his province to govern, but he had left this responsibility

to three of his Legates: Marcus Varro was more a scholar than a soldier, but Lucius

Afranius and Marcus Petreius each had almost 30 years military experience behind them,

as well as experience fighting in Iberia during the Sertorian Wars.

Afranius and Petreius would take 5 Legions plus auxiliaries to confront Caesar, while

Varro would defend Further Spain with two Legions as a reserve.

In total, by Caesar’s account, Afranius and Petreius commanded approximately 27,500

legionaries, 8,000 auxiliaries, and perhaps 10,000 cavalry.

The Pompeian forces had encamped in a strong position on high ground on the west side of

the River Sicoris, just outside the hilltop town of Ilerda which controlled a stone bridge

- a key access point into the peninsula.

When Fabius arrived with Caesar’s Legions, he saw that crossing the bridge would be nigh

impossible given the Pompeians strong position, and so constructed two new wooden bridges

across the river, 6km apart, and also encamped on the western bank.

As the Pompeians had arrived beforehand, they had already stripped the western bank of most

supplies, forcing Fabius to send foraging parties across the bridges to the eastern

bank.

These foraging parties and their escorts often skirmished with the Pompeian cavalry, but

there was no major conflict.

However, on one of these occasions, Fabius sent two Legions across to the east bank to

forage, with a strong cavalry escort to follow and protect the foraging parties, when a sudden

storm swept in, destroying the bridge nearest to the Fabian camp.

The cavalry was stuck on the western bank, with the Legions and foraging party on the

eastern bank.

Afranius wasted no time in seizing upon such an opportunity, immediately sending 4 Legions

and all his cavalry across the stone bridge to attack the beleaguered Caesareans.

The Caesarean Legions were well trained and experienced, quickly forming a defensive square

on high ground with the foraging party in the center.

Heavily outnumbered, the Caesarean forces held their formation while being assaulted

from all sides by Pompeian infantry and cavalry.

Despite their discipline, it would only be a matter of time before the formation broke

and the soldiers were slaughtered.

Fortunately, Fabius had also reacted quickly to the situation, sending another 2 Legions

across the river via the second bridge 6km away.

Upon their arrival, the Pompeians broke off their attack, not wanting to wholly commit

without their full force.

They returned to camp, allowing the Caesareans to make an orderly retreat back to theirs.

The sources do not give us an idea of how many casualties the Caesareans sustained,

but it is likely given the situation that they would have been significant, and certainly

more than the Pompeians.

A couple of days after this engagement, sometime in June, Caesar arrived at the camp with his

bodyguard.

Fabius, despite the prior engagement, had fulfilled his duties well; he had pushed through

the Pyrenees, established a foothold, and kept Afranius in place until Caesar arrived.

Nonetheless, Caesar quickly took control of the situation, finishing the repairs on the

first bridge started by Fabius and then going on the offensive.

Leaving just 500 men in the first Fabian camp, Caesar marched the rest of his force nearer

the town of Ilerda, offering battle to Afranius.

Afranius did bring his force out of camp, but held them on the high ground refusing

to attack.

He was no fool, and would not sacrifice his strong position so easily.

Seeing that Afranius would not be drawn into a pitched battle, Caesar deployed his Legions

in three lines just 200m from Afranius’ camp.

The first two acted as a screen whilst the backline dug trenches as the start of a fortified

camp.

The plan worked, and Caesar’s force was able to retreat behind these defences for

the night.

The next day, he expanded on the defences, assigning one Legion to each side of the camp,

the other 3 acting as a defensive line.

Afranius tried to use his force to harass the workers, but Caesar’s 3 defensive Legions

were able to prevent them from doing any real damage.

With the camp now fully fortified, Caesar ordered the 500 men and baggage from the Fabian

camp to join him in the new camp.

Caesar soon noted a mound between Afranius’ camp and Ilerda, and determined to take and

fortify it, thereby cutting off Afranius from the supplies in the town.

Starving out an enemy by such tactics was a favoured strategy of Caesar, and he had

tried something very similar at Gergovia against Vercingetorix.

Gathering 3 legions, the 9th, 14th and likely the 10th, he drew them up for battle.

Caesar first sent the vanguard of the 14th to charge the mound, hoping to take it quickly

and hold it while the rest of Caesar’s Legions followed up in good order.

However, Afranius was quick to react, sending his own force to charge the mound.

Afranius’ men gained the top first and with the advantage of the high ground, forced the

men of the 14th to retreat back to their standards.

Afranius reinforced his men and attempted to push his advantage, chasing Caesar’s

men and beginning to push the now shaken 14th Legion on Caesar’s right flank.

Caesar himself notes how fiercely Afranius’ men fought.

Long campaigns against Iberian tribes had made these men battle-hardened and fierce

fighters, who fought in a looser formation than Caesar’s Legions.

Caesar’s right flank began slowly giving ground, the 14th attempting to retreat to

higher ground.

Seeing his line on the brink of breaking, Caesar ordered the 9th legion to support his

right flank, pushing back the Pompeian forces.

The Pompeians quickly retreated to a stronger defensive location, taking up positions on

the high ground outside the walls of Ilerda.

The 9th Legion, thinking the Pompeians were routing, pursued them, but quickly found themselves

caught in a precarious situation.

The slope of the hill that Ilerda was situated on was narrow, funneling the 9th, and exposing

them to a hail of missiles from the Pompeians on the high ground.

The fighting was bitter, with each force sending reinforcing cohorts to refresh the front lines.

For 5 hours the two forces struggled on the slope below the town.

In a last bid to salvage the situation, Caesar ordered his infantry to charge the lines,

pushing over the crest of the slope and forcing the Pompeians against the walls of the city.

With the crest of the slope gained, Caesar’s cavalry was finally allowed room to maneuver,

and charged between the forces, allowing Caesar’s Legions to retreat in good order to their

camp.

In Caesar’s account, he portrays this as a draw, saying 70 of his men died, with 600

wounded, compared to 200 Pompeiians dead.

The reality is that Caesar lost the day.

Given the situation that Caesar’s Legions were fighting in and their need to retreat,

it is far more likely that Caesar’s men suffered more casualties.

Moreover, Caesar had failed to take the mound as he had originally hoped.

Instead, by the end of the day, the Pompeians held and fortified the mound.

This was Caesar’s first fight against other Roman Legions.

He had underestimated them, overcommitted his forces, and paid the consequences.

Caesar’s situation then continued to worsen.

A second storm brought a huge flood down the river, destroying both the bridges constructed

by himself and Fabius.

Caesar was cut off from his supply line, and the supplies he did have were dwindling.

Afranius, on the other hand, had an abundance of supplies he had collected in Ilerda prior

to Fabius’ arrival, as well as control of the Ilerdan stone bridge.

Caesar did have supplies and almost 6,000 auxiliary reinforcements of archers and cavalry

en route from Gaul, but with control of the bridge, Afranius was able to send 3 Legions

to attack them, killing 200 and forcing the rest to make camp on high ground.

Caesar’s campaign in Spain seemed to be on the edge of disaster.

He was stuck in the middle of enemy territory, cut off from his almost 6,000 auxiliary reinforcements

and the precious supplies they were bringing, and was days from being starved out.

If he was to reclaim the situation, Caesar would need to retake control of the eastern

bank of the river Sicoris and secure his supply line.

With the bridges unable to be repaired due to high water and marauding Pompeian forces,

Caesar came up with a different plan.

He began construction of several small boats of the kind he had seen in Brittany, made

of lightweight timber and animal hides.

He then ordered a small detachment to take these boats by wagon at night almost 34km

up the river.

These men then crossed the river, fortifying a small hill, giving Caesar a small foothold

on the eastern bank.

Once this was established, a Legion was sent from the main Caesarean camp up the river

to construct a bridge from the western bank, while the initial detachment assisted from

the eastern bank.

Within days of beginning, they had the bridge constructed, providing a route between the

eastern bank and Caesar’s camp, stabilising his supply line and allowing the reinforcements

from Gaul to meet up with his Legion encamped on the west side.

With this influx of troops, particularly the prized Gallic cavalry, Caesar was finally

able to harass Pompeian foraging parties on the Eastern bank and begin to regain control

of the situation.

While the Ilerdan campaign was underway, the Siege of Massilia was still being fought.

For the most part, the siege had thus far been uneventful; Ahenobarbus had largely spent

his time amassing a larger navy, and the Romans had been building siege equipment while Brutus’

ships blockaded the port.

But once his fleet was suitably built up, Ahenobarbus sailed his force out of harbour,

hoping to break the blockade and thus bring supplies into the city.

He had managed to put together a force of 17 warships, as well as several smaller vessels

manned by archers, against Brutus’ 12.

The Massilian ships were also lighter and more navigable, compared to the rather cumbersome

ships that the Legions had built.

However, Brutus did have the advantage in quality of fighters.

Ahenobarbus’ men were largely farmers and local Massilians pressed into service, alongside

allied archers, while Brutus’ ships were crewed by legionaries who had specifically

volunteered for the task.

If Brutus could catch Ahenobarbus in close quarters fighting, the battle would be his.

As the fleets met, the Massilians used their agility and range to their advantage, circling

the Caesarean ships and peppering them with missiles, or sailing past to sweep Brutus’

decks with arrows and smash his oars.

But when the Massilians got too close in this manner, the legionaries would throw across

grappling hooks, pulling the Massilian ships close, holding them fast and boarding them.

In these situations, the Legions had a clear advantage.

Their heavy armour and training allowed them to cut through the Massilians on board, on

occasion even boarding two Massilians ships at once, one on either side.

Though Caesar notes the bravery of the Massilians, they were simply not equipped to fight hand

to hand with legionaries like this.

The Massilians were forced back into port having lost more than half their ships, and

the blockade continued.

This victory at Massilia coincided with a continuous change of fortune at Ilerda.

With the new bridge completed Caesar’s superior Gallic horsemen were able to harass the Pompeian

foragers, and were even able to force them to resort to foraging at night.

The odds were turning in Caesar’s favour.

As a result, numerous local tribes began supporting him with grain, as well as some more auxiliaries.

Seeking to apply even more pressure to Afranius, he began construction of a number of ditches

to divert the river Sicoris and create a ford close to his camp, which would allow even

more of his men easy access to the eastern bank, rather than taking the circuitous route

to the bridge up the river, thus completely removing the Pompeians’ chances of foraging.

Afranius recognised how precarious his situation was becoming.

Running out of food and with local tribes pledging allegiance to Caesar threatening

to surround his position, he decided to make a tactical withdrawal to Further Spain to

continue the fight on his own terms with the advantage of Varro’s two extra legions.

Afranius ordered a few ships on the River Ebro to construct a pontoon bridge 30 miles

to the south, providing an escape route.

At the same time, Afranius ordered two Legions across the stone bridge to the eastern bank,

establishing a fortified position in preparation for the evacuation of the rest of the army.

When Caesar learned of this, he saw his opportunity to catch Afranius.

He ordered his men to work day and night on the river works, managing to lower the water

level enough to move his cavalry across the Sicoris to try and harass the Pompeians.

However, the Pompeian Legions had been quick and were already dug in, leaving little for

the cavalry to do.

Afranius then moved his full force across the Sicoris into the new camp, leaving just

two auxiliary cohorts to garrison Ilerda itself.

In the early hours of the following morning, Afranius and Petreius began moving their entire

army out of camp and to the south, heading towards the Ebro and the pontoon bridge.

Caesar needed to act fast.

If the Pompeians could reach the pontoon bridge, they would be able to escape to Further Spain,

merging with Varro’s legions and prolonging the Spanish campaign.

He first sent his cavalry to harass the Pompeians, attacking the rear of their column, slowing

the Pompeian Legions to a crawl as they fended off the attackers.

Though the ford was not wholly completed, Caesar ordered pack animals to wade into the

river to help slow the current, and marched five of his Legions across, leaving one to

guard the camp.

Taking these legions, Caesar marched quickly to try and cut off his enemies’ escape,

and, thanks to the harassment of the Caesarean cavalry, by mid-afternoon his army had caught

up with the Pompeian Legions.

Both armies were now camped on the eastern bank, the Pompeians slightly further south

than the Caesareans.

Scouts for both sides reported that the only way south to the Ebro was through the mountain

passes, just under 8km away.

Whoever controlled these passes would easily be able to defend them from the other, and

a brief standoff ensued.

Afranius did not want to risk attempting to march his army through the narrow defiles

with Caesar pursuing him, and Caesar did not want to try and force a way through the Pompeians

to the mountains.

Afranius did consider attempting a night march to the mountains but decided that, with Caesar’s

cavalry patrolling the area at night, they would quickly be found out.

Night battles were extremely risky and difficult, and so Afranius decided that it was better

instead to attempt a fighting retreat the next day.

Caesar, meanwhile, had also concocted a plan.

At first light, he feigned a withdrawal to the Sicoris and Ilerda, then rapidly changed

direction, marching quickly for the mountains.

Seeing this maneuverer, the Pompeians immediately broke camp, racing towards the mountain passes.

The Caesarean route was a harder march, with the terrain slowing down the Legions, but

the Pompeian forces found themselves constantly harassed by Caesar’s cavalry, and this proved,

once again, to be the difference.

Caesar reached the passes first, drawing his army into a line, cutting off the Pompeian

escape.

Afranius tried sending light auxiliaries to quickly seize high ground ahead of his main

force, but the Caesarean cavalry was quickly able to surround them, and, without support,

they were easily cut down.

With his opportunity to escape cut off, Afranius saw little choice but to encamp on a small

hill and contemplate his next move.

Caesar was happy to let him do so and saw no point in risking the lives of his men in

another battle.

With the road south now blocked, it would only be a matter of time before Afranius ran

out of food and water.

The Pompeians could try and retreat back to Ilerda, but Caesar’s Legion left in the

camp would be able to cross the ford and block the stone bridge, whilst Caesar’s main force

could attack them from behind.

If the Pompeiians stayed, they would eventually run out of supplies.

If they retreated, they would be caught in a pincer.

Caesar fortified his position, setting up outposts in the mountains, and awaited his

enemy’s next move.

Afranius’ priority was to secure his water supply.

He had sent men to the river to gather water, but they had faced constant harassment from

the Caesarean cavalry.

In response, his Legions had built a rampart from his camp to the river, allowing his men

to collect water from behind the defences, bringing the fighting to a pause.

As the Caesarean troops also came to the river for water, men from both sides began talking

to the other.

Caesar’s Legions contained many Iberians, and they began to ask the Pompeian Legions

about family, friends, and discussed the politics of the war.

Old friends and acquaintances from both sides met, bringing them back to their camps to

drink and reconnect.

Some of Afranius’ Spanish allies, and even some officers, went over to Caesar’s camp

to speak with Caesar personally.

Caesar attributes these actions to his not having committed to a full pitched battle

the day prior, and that the Pompeians saw this as an act of leniency.

While this might be true to an extent, the main motivator was more likely that the Pompeian

forces understood the situation they were in; it was only a matter of time before they

would be starved into defeat, and they were losing the will to fight.

Afranius did little to quell such stirrings.

It seems that he too had lost the desire to continue the battle.

Petreius, however, had not.

To restore discipline in the camp, he demanded oaths of loyalty from Afranius and the entire

army, and then ordered any Caesarean soldier found in the camp to be executed.

There had been a brief moment of peace in the chaos of the Civil War where men, who

just the day before had been fighting each other, had come together in peace.

But now the peace was broken.

The soldiers returned to their respective camps and prepared once again for battle.

In a last-ditch attempt to retake control of the situation, Petreius attempted to retreat

back to Ilerda.

The entire way the Pompeians were harassed by Caesar’s cavalry, and shadowed by his

legions, blocking them from crossing the Sicoris at every turn, and slowing them down to a

gruelling pace.

On the third day of this harassment, the Pompeians were forced to set up camp on unfavourable

terrain.

Caesar saw his opportunity and began work on his own earthworks surrounding the Pompeian

camp, a similar tactic to Alesia, cutting off any possibility of foraging.

Blockaded on all sides, devoid of water and having been harassed for days, the Pompeians

finally sued for peace.

Caesar, never one to miss out on a public relations opportunity, promised leniency for

all the men and officers, including Afranius and Petreius, in exchange for the complete

surrender of the army and the promise that none of them would take up arms against him.

The Pompeians gratefully accepted.

With the surrender of this main Pompeian army, Caesar assigned 4 legions, the 6th, 9th, 11th,

and 14th, to accompany the Pompeians to a safe location and disband them, before heading

back to Italy.

Caesar, meanwhile, took the 10th and 7th into Further Spain to confront Varro.

Varro, who had initially been encouraged by the early reports of Afranius’ success at

Ilerda, had been gathering more forces, raising another two legions, giving him a total of

four.

When news came to him of Caesar’s victory at Ilerda, he began to march 2 legions to

Gades, where he planned to hold out and prolong Caesar’s war in Spain.

However, news of Caesar’s victory at Ilerda had spread fast and the locals had seen the

writing on the wall.

The chiefs of local tribes met Caesar at Corduba and pledged allegiance to him, and the chief

of the Gades closed the gates of the city to Varro.

To make matters worse, one of Varro’s legions that was with him mutinied, striking their

colours.

Having lost the support of his army and the locals, Varro sent word to Caesar that he

was ready to surrender.

Quintus Cassius Longinus was assigned as governor of Spain by Caesar, and assumed command of

Varro’s four legions, making them the 21st, 22nd 23rd, and 24th.

Pompey’s entire Spanish army had now either been disbanded, or had sided with Caesar,

after just a couple of months.

Taking his two veteran Legions, the 7th and 10th, Caesar left Hispania to re-join his

forces at Massilia.

The siege of Massilia was still ongoing.

Trebonius, who had been left in command of legions during the siege, had constructed

trenches, walls and towers blocking off the peninsula upon which the city stood.

Brutus maintained the blockade from the sea, so together they effectively surrounded Massilia.

The city would not be easy to take though.

Its position was ideal for defence, funnelling any land forces on to one front, and the city

was protected by high, strong walls, topped with ballistae.

Trebonius had ordered the construction of a siege ramp, as well as a battering ram,

but the Massilian ballistae and numerous sorties had been effective in slowing the Romans’

construction of their engines and had, so far, dissuaded any serious assault on the

city's walls.

The Massilians had also made repairs to their fleet following their previous defeat, bringing

the number of warships back up to 17.

However, most of these ships were refitted merchant vessels or old warships, crewed by

lightly armed archers.

The Massilians simply could not afford to move their best infantry from the walls to

the ships.

Fortunately for them, however, Pompey had sent a fleet of 16 ships to reinforce them.

These were commanded by Lucius Nasidius, and though most were hastily built smaller ships,

some had bronze rams, presenting a serious threat to Brutus’ navy.

A small vessel was sent to the Massilians to alert them of the coming reinforcements,

and Ahenobarbus seized the opportunity.

Sending the Massilian navy out, they slipped Brutus’ blockade and met Nasidius’ fleet

at Taurois, just down the coast from Massilia.

Brutus too had increased the size of his fleet, having captured 6 ships in the previous battle,

and manned them with legionaries.

Although outnumbered almost 2:1 by the combined navies of Nasidius and the Massilians, Brutus

had the distinct advantage in quality when it came to hand to hand fighting.

Buoyed by his previous victory, Brutus gave chase and set sail for Taurois.

The Massilian ships were stationed on the right, with Nasidius and his fleet on the

left.

Knowing that the Massilians would favour a missile battle, Brutus determined that it

would be best to engage the Massilians first, catching them in close quarters, before facing

Nasidius’ ships.

He therefore determined to focus almost all his ships on the Massilians.

As they had done previously, the Massilians attempted to use their agility and superior

seamanship to outmanoeuvre and separate Brutus’ ships.

This was an effective tactic, and when they could separate a Caesarean ship, they would

pepper it with javelins and arrows, inflicting numerous casualties.

However, once again, whenever they drifted too close, Brutus’ men would cast their

grappling hooks, pulling their foes close and boarding them.

Once boarded, despite the bravery and determination of the Massilians and their allies, they were

simply outclassed by Roman discipline and weaponry and were butchered on the decks.

In a frantic attempt to win the engagement in one decisive move, the Massilians targeted

Brutus’ own ship, distinguished by its standard.

Two Massilians ships attempted to ram the ship from either side, catching Brutus in

a pincer.

Just as they closed in though, Brutus’ ship darted forward, the two Massilian vessels

colliding into each other head on.

Now disabled, they made easy prey for Brutus’ ships who quickly set on them, sinking them

both.

It was at this point that Nasidius abandoned the battle, taking his entire fleet with him.

Seeing there was no chance of victory, the Massilians quickly followed suit.

Brutus had won without losing a single ship and sustaining only light casualties, while

the Massilians lost a total of 9 ships; 5 sunk and 4 captured.

It is unknown why Nasidius did not commit his men.

Caesar blames it on cowardice, however, given that he and the fleet sailed to Spain immediately

following the battle, it is possible that Nasidius, upon seeing the Massilians being

decimated by Brutus’ men, thought it better to pick a later engagement where the odds

would be more in his favour.

Whatever the reason, he had not lost a man, never having engaged in the battle.

The remainder of the Massilian fleet limped back to its home port and would not emerge

from it again.

Caesar was consistently complimentary of the Massilians who manned their ships, most only

being citizens wanting to fight for their city, and he admired their bravery and determination.

Against the skill and heavy arms of Roman legionaries however, they simply did not stand

a chance.

With the naval battle won, the Romans turned in earnest to the land assault.

A way was needed to assault the walls without risk of missile fire, and without risk of

the siege engines being burnt during a sortie.

As such, Trebonius began work on a huge tower.

The tower was 9 metres each way with walls almost 2 metres thick of brick and clay.

The Romans built the first layer of this tower, topping it with a lid with long screens attached

to the sides.

They then used screws and levers to raise this lid, the screens hanging down to cover

the gap between lid and wall and would then build the wall up to the height of the lid.

They continued this process until the tower was 6 stories, building in shooting platforms

for archers and ballistae as they did, allowing their men to fire down on the enemies on the

wall.

With this completed, Trebonius’ men next began work on a 20m long gallery, starting

from the base of the tower, which provided protection.

In effect, this was almost like a huge, covered sledge.

It could be pushed forward and backward and was topped by a sloped roof covered in tiles

and clay to prevent it being burnt down.

When it was completed, it was pushed forward from the base of the Roman tower, to the base

of a tower in the Massilian wall.

Under this protection, legionary engineers began the work of undermining the Massilian

tower, removing bricks with crowbar and chisel.

The Massilians attempted to throw rocks and pitch down onto the engineers, but the Roman

defences proved sturdy and the men were protected.

In due time, the undermining began to pay off; the Massilian wall began to crumple and

tilt.

The Massilians quickly came out of the city.

They acknowledged that Trebonius had now won the siege, realising that as soon as their

tower collapsed, the Legions would flood the city.

They requested a truce, asking if they could await Caesar’s arrival to negotiate with

him personally.

Trebonius, seeing little reason in risking his men’s life, accepted, and the Legions

pulled back from the walls to wait for Caesar.

But the Massilians were bluffing.

Once the Romans’ guard was down, they sallied out at night, burning down the Roman siege

ramp and battering ram.

Though Trebonius’ and his men quickly caught on to what was happening and tried to fight

back the sortie, missiles from the Massilian walls prevented them from doing so effectively.

The Massilians were even able to set fire to the Roman tower from the inside, as well

as the gallery, destroying months of work in a single night.

However, this was only a small success for the Massilians.

The siege had been going on now for 4 and a half months.

With their navy destroyed, they had no means of bringing in fresh supplies into the city.

The supplies they did have were running low, and disease had begun to spread among the

populace.

Moreover, the Romans had once again started constructing siege works, this time building

a gallery extending to the walls made of brick.

To make matters worse, Caesar arrived with his two extra Legions.

His arrival also made it clear to the Massilians that Spain had indeed fallen to Caesar, and

that they would not be receiving any reinforcements or supplies.

Diseased, starved and now horrifically outnumbered, the Massilians finally surrendered.

Just before they did, however, Ahenobarbus escaped.

He was still not ready to give up the fight and, commandeering 3 ships, made a daring

dash past Brutus’ blockade during a storm.

Brutus’ ships pursued, catching 2, but the one Ahenobarbus was on slipped away in the

storm.

He would live to fight another day.

Caesar left the 18th and 19th legions to garrison the city, while he marched to Italy with the

5th, 7th and 10th to rejoin his main army.

In 7 months, Caesar had chased Pompey from Italy, secured his western flank, disbanded

5 of Pompey’s Legions and absorbed a further 4.

So far, the war was going very much in Caesar’s favour.

But this was still just the start.

Ahenobarbus had managed to escape to Greece to re-join Pompey, and was soon followed by

Varro, Afranius and Petreius, despite the latter two’s oath to Caesar.

Pompey was amassing a vast army in Greece, and he still held the lucrative territories

in the East, as well as the important grain hub of North Africa.

The war in the West might have been over for now, but the war for the rest of the Roman

world was about to begin.

While Caesar was on his way to confront Pompey’s Legions in Spain, his Legates were fighting

the Civil War in the Mediterranean and African theatre.

Before Caesar even reached Spain, Valerius had taken Sardinia with the 16th Legion, and

Curio had claimed Sicily with the 15th and 17th.

Together, around the end of April - early May of 49BC, they combined their forces in

Sicily, along with the 20th Legion from Italy, making a total of 4 Legions and about 1500

cavalry, and began preparing to invade North Africa.

Alongside Sardinia and Sicily, North Africa, specifically, modern Tunis, was one of the

biggest suppliers of grain feeding the Roman Republic at the time.

Taking North Africa would, therefore, give Caesar control of all the major grain centers,

ensuring he could supply his armies throughout the war, and robbing Pompey of any opportunity

to starve him out of Italy.

Command of this invasion was assigned to Curio, who was a skilled politician, but lacked military

command experience.

He had been crucial to Caesar in the Senate, however, and this was his reward.

To compensate for his lack of experience, he was assigned a body of talented Legates,

including Rebilus, a Legate who had served with Caesar in Gaul and fought with distinction

at Alesia.

The Legions Curio commanded were largely raw, all having been raised just a few months earlier

while Caesar was pushing south through Italy.

However, Caesar knew that Pompey’s best troops were in Spain and the East, and so

any Pompeian troops in Africa would be equally raw.

It was thought that, with four Legions, Curio had enough men and talented advisors to invade

successfully.

However, Curio did not want to invade Africa without first hearing news from Spain, just

in case his men would be needed to support Caesar, so, for now, he remained in Sicily.

Africa was under the control of the Pompeian Publius Attius Varus.

Varus had previously been propraetor of the province, and was dismayed to find it woefully

unprepared for war with only 1 Legion present in Hadrumetum.

He immediately took control and strengthened the province, raising another 2 Legions and

encamping them outside Utica.

Furthermore, he requested the aid of the nearby client king, Juba of Numidia.

Juba was an old ally of Pompey, who owed his kingship to Pompey’s earlier campaign, and

had a personal hatred of Caesar and Curio as both had insulted him in the past.

He readily agreed to side with the Pompeians, and would prove to be a crucial ally for Varus.

It wasn’t until August, after receiving word of Caesar’s victory in Spain, that

Curio began his crossing into Africa.

Curio did not think much of his opponents, disdaining both Varus and Juba, and so instead

of bringing his full force across, he only brought 2 Legions, likely the 15th and 16th,

and 500 cavalry, along with a sizable navy.

Landing at Anquillaria, between Utica and Hadrumetum, Curio decided to engage the larger

force first, and so began his march to Utica, reaching the River Bagradas 2 days later.

Here, he left Rebilus in charge of the Legions while he took the cavalry ahead to scout the

Castra Cornelia, an old Roman fort on a small, elevated peninsula that was left over from

the Punic Wars.

This camp was just 5km from Utica, and from the higher ground, Curio reconnoitered Varus’

camp.

The Pompeian camp was in a strong position, using the walls of Utica as part of its defences

on one side, and the outdoor amphitheatre of Utica blocking another, making any approach

to the camp narrow and difficult.

When observing the town Curio saw a large number of supplies being brought into the

city on the roads from the local populace seeking refuge.

Looking to hamper Varus’ supplies and take some for himself, Curio sent his cavalry to

attack them.

Varus was quick to react though and sent his own force of 600 Numidian horsemen and 400

Numidian infantry to defend them.

The Numidian cavalry, which had raced ahead of the infantry, clashed with the Roman horse

first.

But the Numidians were lightly armed and best accustomed to skirmishing rather than melee

fighting.

Curio’s men were able to inflict significant casualties in the fight, forcing the Numidian

cavalry to flee back to the town and camp, quickly followed by the infantry.

Traders and their goods were seized by Curio and taken back to the Castra Cornelia, which

he planned to use as his main base for the invasion.

Meanwhile, Curios’ navy had moved into position outside the port of Utica, which harboured

possibly as many as 200 merchant ships with no military ships for protection.

Curio sent a proclamation declaring that any merchant ship that did not transfer their

supplies to the Castra Cornelia would be treated as an enemy, and boarded by his navy.

With no naval protection, the merchants saw little choice and sailed their goods to the

Castra Cornelia, providing the Caesareans with a further abundance of supplies.

Curio’s campaign was off to a good start.

Leaving a small force in the Castra Cornelia to guard the supplies, he returned to his

troops at the Bagradas with news of his achievements, where they recognised him as Imperator.

Bolstered by this success, the next day he moved his army to go on the offensive, aiming

to encamp just outside the town of Utica, displaying a similar kind of aggression to

Caesar.

While this camp was being constructed, Curio received word from the pickets that a large

Numidian force was approaching.

Curio had failed to scout the area properly and was surprised by this sudden new force.

Quickly, he ordered his men to abandon the construction of the camp and form battle lines,

while he sent his cavalry to engage the Numidians in a delaying action.

The Numidians did not march in a tight formation and so were vulnerable to cavalry charges.

As soon as Curio’s cavalry made contact, the Numidian cavalry fled into Utica, followed

swiftly by the infantry.

The Roman cavalry harassed the Numidian infantry, inflicting some casualties, but the bulk of

the Numidian force successfully made it into the camp.

Caesar describes the Numidians as having been routed, but it seems more likely that this

was a tactical withdrawal.

The Numidians likely had not been seeking an engagement in the first place and prioritised

combining with Varus’ forces rather than being drawn into a pitched battle.

Though Curio had, so far, been largely successful, the following day, 2 of his centurions and

22 of their men defected to Varus.

They told Varus that Curio’s army did not have faith in him, and that Varus would be

able to win them over to his side.

Their motivation for doing this is not known.

Curio had performed well so far, aside from poor scouting, and had apparently been hailed

as Imperator, so it is unlikely that Curio’s men lacked confidence in him as is portrayed.

The more likely reason is that Curio’s men were still effectively raw recruits.

They had not fought a pitched battle before, and some of the officers in Varus’ army

had trained and led Curio’s men at Corfinium.

It is likely, therefore, that the men were motivated more out of either fear, or an unwillingness

to fight former comrades, than dissatisfaction with Curio.

Nevertheless, the next day Varus marched his force out of camp, Curio following suit.

An officer in Varus’ army, Sextus Varus, who had been one of the officers at Corfinium,

appealed to Curio’s men.

He reminded them that they had previously sworn oaths to Pompey, Ahenobarbus, and to

himself, and that they should not fight the men they trained with and had been prepared

to fight alongside.

Though Curio’s army showed little reaction, Varus withdrew his force back into camp, confident

that, given time, this appeal would strike a chord with Curio’s men.

Though the message had been received in silence at first, when Curio’s Legions were back

in camp, the men began to talk amongst themselves.

Oaths held a strong religious connotation, and they were not broken easily.

The more the men talked, the more they began to fear that they had made a mistake by switching

their allegiance from Pompey to Caesar.

Rumour likely exaggerated the number of men who were of this mindset, though some certainly

were, and Curio was soon worried that his whole army was on the brink of mutiny.

Curio gathered his officers and sought advice for how to address the situation.

The officers suggested two options.

Firstly, that they attack the Pompeian camp immediately, thinking that keeping the men

busy would be best, rather than allowing any rumours to circulate; or secondly, to withdraw

back to the Cornelia Castra to try and calm the men there.

Curio was not convinced of either option.

He saw an all-out attack on the camp as foolhardy, and a retreat as a show of cowardice.

Furthermore, he believed the number of men who were genuinely feeling disloyal had been

overplayed.

As such, he gathered the soldiers and addressed them.

He gave a rousing speech, pointing out that Ahenobarbus had surrendered at Corfinium,

voiding any oaths the men had made to him, and that their oaths to Caesar now took precedent.

He espoused the achievements of Caesar in Spain, saying that they were on the winning

side, so why join the losing one?

Finally he listed his own achievements in Africa so far, and that they had hailed him

as imperator.

The men were moved by the speech and acclaimed Curio, putting to rest any ideas of mutiny.

It’s possible that not a lot of men felt that way in the first place, but either way,

Curio was continuing to show himself as a man with leadership potential; with a simple

speech he had regained full control of the army without needing to resort to any harsh

discipline or excessive time wasting.

Determined to draw Varus into a pitched battle, Curio marched his men out of camp the following

day.

Varus followed suit, the two armies facing off with each other across a large ditch.

The ditch was not particularly deep, only around 2.5 meters, but its sides were steep

and would present a disadvantage to any trying to scramble up.

Varus made the first move, sending his Numidian cavalry from the left flank supported by light

infantry to flank Curio’s force.

Curio countered by sending two cohorts of the 16th along with all his cavalry.

The Numidian cavalry charged the Roman legionaries, but lightly armed, they were easily repulsed

and routed.

The light infantry was left exposed and, surrounded by Curio’s heavy infantry and cavalry, were

slaughtered.

Rebilus urged Curio to capitalise on this success and charge Varus’ force to instigate

a mass rout.

Curio heeded the advice and led his men across the ditch, but even as they were scaling the

other side, Varus’ force, seeing that Curio now had a cavalry advantage and could easily

outflank them, had begun to flee the battlefield.

They did not retreat in good order, and Varus himself was wounded and almost killed in the

retreat.

As his army tried to push through the narrow pass to their camp, they became caught in

a bottle neck and many were slain by Curio’s pursuing force.

Indeed, more of Varus’ men died here than in the battle.

However, when Varus’ men had made the safety of the camp, Curio did not push any further,

not having the equipment needed to siege the camp.

Caesar gives Curio’s casualties as being just 1 man; this is surely not accurate, but

it is likely that his casualties were minimal, while Varus had lost almost 600 dead and 1,000

wounded.

This battle might seem unbelievable in how quickly Varus’ men broke, but there are

a few points to consider.

Firstly, Varus misused his Numidian cavalry.

The Numidians were light cavalry and skilled skirmishers, but due to their light arms and

armour, were not equipped for melee fighting against heavy cavalry and infantry.

Secondly, Varus’ whole army had only recently been levied, less than 6 months ago.

Likely, very few of his men had any military experience, which explains why they were so

quick to rout.

Compare for instance, the actions of Caesar’s Legions in Spain who, when cut off from the

army and in risk of being surrounded, retreated in order to high ground and formed a defensive

square.

That is the difference between veterans and raw recruits.

Under the cover of darkness, Varus moved what was left of his force into the city of Utica,

leaving just a small detachment of men, trumpeters and tents in the camp to give the illusion

it was still garrisoned.

Curio was quick to discover the ploy and began the creation of earthworks around Utica to

besiege the city.

Initially, the citizens of Utica appealed to Varus to surrender, not wanting to go through

the gruelling experience of a siege.

However, a messenger arrived in Utica with information that Juba, king of Numidia, was

on his way and nearby to support Varus.

It is not known how large Juba’s army was, aside from 60 elephants, but given that this

was the royal army, it surely numbered in the 10s of thousands.

With these reinforcements on the way, Varus soothed the citizens' concerns, confident

that he would be able to defeat Curio.

Curio soon discovered the same information.

Initially he did not believe the reports, confident that he was on the brink of victory,

and continued the siege.

More reports came in, however, verifying the information and saying that Juba was now just

36km miles away.

Upon learning this, Curio abandoned his plans of besieging Utica, withdrawing to the Castra

Cornelia instead.

He began further fortifying the fort and sent word to Sicily to send over the 2 Legions

and all the cavalry left in Sicily.

This was a good plan; the Castra Cornelia could be easily defended, and with access

to the sea, Curio could maintain a supply line and safely await reinforcements.

Juba was a cunning opponent though.

He sent men from Utica under the guise of deserters to Curio, saying that Juba had had

to redirect his force to suppress a rebellion, and that the Numidian force was only a small

force commanded by his lieutenant Saburra.

Curio, still riding the wave of his previous victories and keen to prove himself, believed

these reports and sought to crush the Numidians in a pitched battle.

Abandoning his defensive position around 3am, he marched his force to the Bagradas to confront

them, leaving 5 cohorts in the Castra Cornelia.

Having learnt his lesson previously, Curio sent his cavalry ahead of his Legions as a

scouting party, and they quickly discovered Saburra’s own advanced units.

Curio’s cavalry fell upon the Numidians who, taken by surprise and with no encampment,

suffered heavy casualties before retreating back to Saburra’s main force.

However, instead of staying to hold the area or scouting further ahead, Curio’s cavalry

headed back to Curio’s main force with a few prisoners to tell him of their success.

Curio had already marched 10km from the Castra Cornelia when his cavalry returned.

He questioned the prisoners as to who their commander was, and they replied that Saburra

was, confirming in Curio’s mind that he was only facing a small portion of the Numidian

army.

Determined, Curio pushed his men to march on.

In the meantime, however, Saburra had sent word to Juba about the night battle and in

response, Juba had sent ahead 2,000 Spanish and Gallic cavalry, part of his personal guard,

and his best infantry to bolster Saburra’s army, while Juba continued his advance with

the main force.

Saburra kept withdrawing his force, feigning retreats and pulling the Romans after him.

Curio was being lured into a trap.

Curio’s army had now marched almost 28km since breaking camp, and his men were exhausted

from the early start.

They now found themselves a large, flat open plain.

This was what Saburra had been waiting for.

He lined up his infantry for battle but kept them a fair distance from the Roman force:

enough to be a threat but far away enough to not be caught by the Romans, and left most

of the fighting to his cavalry.

The previous engagements had already depleted Curio’s cavalry, and still more had paused

to rest and water their horses, leaving Curio with just 200 horsemen when the forces engaged,

and the Numidians used this to their advantage.

Their heavier Gallic and Spanish cavalry would charge the Roman flanks and rear, while the

lighter Numidian cavalry skirmished and harassed them.

Curio tried to use his cavalry to chase away the enemy charges, but they were too tired

to pursue and Saburra’s men would simply withdraw and then strike in another place.

When the Numidians could draw a cohort into breaking ranks and charging, the cohort would

find itself utterly surrounded by horsemen and cut down.

Fighting in such a manner and on such open and flat terrain was ideal for the Numidians.

By this point, the whole of Curio’s army was surrounded by Saburra’s force and more

of Juba’s men were trickling in, providing a constant supply of fresh reinforcements

against the exhausted Romans.

Desperately, Curio ordered some of his men to take the Legion’s standards and to fight

their way out of the encirclement to some nearby hills.

The Numidians allowed them to break through the ring at first, but soon quickly surrounded

them and cut them down to a man.

The battle was a disaster.

Curio’s army had lost all hope, some men broke down and cried to the gods or their

mothers, others simply abandoned their weapons and waited to die.

Gnaeus Domitius, the prefect of horse, gathered what little cavalry was left around Curio

and urged him to try and save himself and retreat to the Castra Cornelia.

Curio replied that he would never be able to face Caesar after such a disaster.

He died fighting alongside his men.

Both the 15th and 16th Legions were completely destroyed, around 11,000 men.

The Roman cavalry that had been watering their horses had watched the destruction from a

distance and raced back to the Cornelia Castra to inform the 5 cohorts and the quaestor left

in charge, Marcius Rufus, of the disaster.

He tried to organise an evacuation by sea back to Sicily of the men left, but panic

had already taken over as rumour spread that Varus might be closing in for the kill.

Men pushed past one another to scramble onto the ships, and some became so overburdened

that they sank.

The captains of the ships grew equally as nervous and, in the end, only a few high-ranking

officers, including Rebilus and Rufus, made it onto the ships before the captains set

sail.

The men that were left in the Castra Cornelia sent centurions to Varus and surrendered.

The African campaign had been an unmitigated disaster and Africa would remain in Pompeian

hands.

So far, Caesar himself had been largely successful in the Civil War.

His campaign in Spain had secured the west as well as neutralising some of Pompey’s

best Legions, and he had been recruiting in Gaul and Italy, adding at least another 6

Legions.

However, his subordinates had not been as effective.

Curio had lost 2 Legions in North Africa, and his inability to take the province meant

that supplies of grain in Rome would still be stretched.

Around the same time, Gaius Antonius, the brother of Mark Antony, had lost a Legion

and a half in Illyria to defection.

To make matters worse, the veteran 9th, dismayed at their recent heavy casualties in Ilerda

and lack of promised pay, had mutinied.

Consular elections were due in Rome and, with both the consuls having fled with Pompey,

there was no one to oversee them, threatening the legitimacy of Caesar’s cause.

His first priority was the 9th Legion, as he wanted to stop mutiny from spreading to

other legions in similar position.

Rushing to their camp, Caesar made an impassioned speech, pointing out that as a general renowned

for his quick action he could not be blamed for prolonging the war.

He then chastised the men, saying that he had brought them fame and fortune and they

now repaid him by mutineering; the only suitable punishment for the Legion would be decimation.

The legion begged Caesar to reconsider.

Magnanimous as ever, Caesar only executed 12 of the ringleaders and brought the legion

back into the fold.

Caesar needed to maintain an air of legitimacy, but with no consuls in Rome the elections

could not be held.

Lepidus, a praetor and close ally of Caesar, suggested Caesar be named Dictator so that

he could preside over the election.

This was done and Caesar was appointed Consul, alongside another ally, Publius Servilius.

With consular power, Caesar no longer needed the position of Dictator and resigned after

just 11 days.

With these issues now handled, Caesar gathered his force at Brundisium to finally confront

Pompey.

The latter was gathering a huge force from all corners of the Roman world in Thessalonica.

In total, Pompey had around 60,000 men; 9 full Legions, approximately 4,000 archers

and slingers, 7,000 cavalry, plus some auxiliaries.

There were a further 2 Legions en route from Syria under the command of Metellus Scipio.

Pompey had spent time drilling and equipping his men.

However, only 4 of his Legions were veterans.

Cicero, who was with Pompey, described the bulk of the force as raw recruits.

Mixed cultures and languages made organisation difficult.

Trusting in his numbers though, Pompey marched to the west of Greece, preparing to create

a defensive line down the coast.

Caesar, in Brundisium, had gathered his 10 veteran legions, all understrength due to

years of campaigning, and 2 newly recruited ones.

However, he only had enough ships to move half his force across, and the Adriatic was

being guarded by Pompey’s vast navy under the command of Bibulus.

With the path through Illyria being too mountainous for rapid movement, Caesar would have to find

a way of crossing the sea.

However, he did have one key advantage.

The Roman calendar drifted over time and needed to be constantly updated by the Pontifex Maximus.

Caesar had not performed this duty due to his constant campaigning, but he nonetheless

knew the true date – it was late Autumn.

Bibulus was operating under the impression that it was Winter, and had therefore kept

his ships in port, confident that Caesar would not attempt a winter crossing.

Ordering his men to leave slaves and baggage behind, Caesar set sail with 7 of his veteran

legions.

By the time Bibulus found out, Caesar and his men had already landed.

Frustrated, Bibulus began a blockade, capturing and burning 30 of Caesar’s ships as they

returned to Brundisium, and preventing the rest from transporting the remainder of Caesar’s

army.

Soon after his landing Caesar was able to take both Oricum and Apollonia.

He then sent Vibullius Rufus, a man who Caesar had captured twice, once at Corfinium and

once at Ilerda, to treat with Pompey.

With his force divided, Caesar was possibly having second thoughts and was seeking a truce,

offering the same terms as before.

Nonetheless, Caesar continued marching his force towards Dyrrhachium, an important supply

center for the Pompeians.

Caesar’s sending Vibullius was a mistake, as the latter met Pompey and informed him

of Caesar’s location, army composition, and strategy and Pompey would exploit it.

He could not allow Dyrrhachium to fall into Caesar’s hands, and pushed his men on a

forced march.

Caesar still had 70 miles and 3 rivers to cross before reaching the city, and Pompey

could still beat him there.

The march took its toll on his more inexperienced men, with some of his Epirote allies deserting

due to this push and their fear of Caesar, but he was ultimately successful, reaching

Dyrrhachium first.

Labienus quickly restored morale by publicly swearing to follow Pompey at whatever cost,

and the army encamped outside Dyrrhachium, forcing Caesar to stop his advance, withdrawing

to a defensible position on the southern bank of the river Apsus.

Pompey knew that Caesar had legitimacy as consul and could force his claim to be the

rightful leader of Rome, so he had to defeat Caesar in the field.

He moved his army south, encamping on the opposite side of the river to Caesar.

Once again though, Pompey proved indecisive.

Caesar had just around 30,000 men, compared to Pompey’s 60,000.

But Pompey did not trust his less experienced men to be able to defeat Caesar’s veterans

in a strong defensive position.

A standoff continued for weeks.

Caesar used this time to his advantage.

Bibulus’ navy had to constantly come ashore to resupply.

Caesar dispatched small raiding parties to attack these men whenever they came ashore,

forcing Bibulus to go further and further afield to get supplies.

Bibulus knew he could not abandon his position, but after weeks of harassment, his men were

resorting to drinking the dew collected on leather awnings.

In desperation, he tried to parley with Caesar, offering to send peace envoys on his behalf

to Pompey if Caesar would stop.

Caesar countered by saying that he would want to send his own envoys, and that if Bibulus

wanted to resupply unmolested, he would have to allow Caesar’s transports to pass.

All these talks had done was reveal to Caesar how effective his strategy was.

Soon after, old and now in increasingly poor health, Bibulus died, leaving the fleet leaderless.

Antony had tried numerous times to break the blockade, but had been stopped every time.

The Pompeians had kept him under significant pressure, even taking a small island in the

harbour to try and trap Antony even further.

However, Antony was a talented lieutenant, and quickly retook the island and kept his

men on alert for any opportunity.

It came in January 48BC.

Antony only had enough ships to transport the three remaining veteran legions and one

newly recruited.

He made a dash for Caesar with these ships, and was almost intercepted by Pompey's ships,

being forced to land at Nymphaeum.

Both Pompey and Caesar had to rush to Antony’s position, Pompey to cut him off, and Caesar

to unite his forces.

Pompey had a head start and a shorter route, Caesar having to march a considerable distance

in order to be able to ford the river, and Pompey got to Antony’s position first.

He ordered his men not to light any fires and lie in wait to try and ambush Antony as

he moved to meet Caesar.

However, some locals sympathetic to the Caesarean cause alerted Antony, and he set up camp,

sending a messenger to inform Caesar of his location.

When Pompey found Antony encamped and Caesar closing in, he realised he was in danger of

being attacked on two sides and withdrew to a safer position near Asparagium.

With his full army now joined, Caesar started to be more aggressive.

Hearing that Scipio was now in Macedonia with his Syrian legions, Caesar sent two Legions

under Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus to cut him off.

The Thessalians and Aetolians had sent envoys saying they’d support Caesar in return for

garrisons, and so Caesar sent the rookie 27th Legion under Cassius Longinus to Thessaly

and G. Calvisius Sabinus with 5 cohorts to Aetolia to acquire more grain.

Scipio did march his force towards Thessaly, threatening Longinus, but Calvinus and his

Legions were able to apply enough pressure to stop him uniting his force with Pompey.

Meanwhile, one of Pompey’s son, Gnaeus, attacked Caesar’s ships, destroying his

whole navy in the area, leaving Caesar stranded in Greece and cut off from Italy.

With his navy destroyed, Caesar knew he had to force an engagement with Pompey soon.

He first attempted to do this at Asparagium, drawing up his army for battle.

But Pompey, on the high ground, refused to commit.

In order to force Pompey’s hand, Caesar decided to march on Dyrrhachium.

By threatening this crucial supply centre, Pompey would be forced to respond.

However, he did not want to reveal his strategy to Pompey, and so planned on taking a circuitous

route to hide his intentions.

He struck camp early in the morning in April.

The plan worked: initially Pompey thought Caesar was withdrawing due to lack of supplies,

and it was only after his scouts reported Caesar’s movements that Pompey realised

what Caesar was planning.

He then gave chase.

Caesar marched through the night, only giving his men a brief break, and was able to reach

Dyrrhachium first, setting up his camp on high ground outside the city.

Pompey arrived soon after and encamped his force on high ground just south of Caesar’s

position.

Pompey’s army outnumbered Caesar’s considerably.

Having sent part of his force to stall Scipio and part to southern Greece, Caesar had just

35,000-40,000 men and 3,000 cavalry.

Pompey, on the other hand, had around 53,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry.

Though Caesar’s men were more experienced, Pompey did have the crucial advantage of having

a better supply line.

Using his navy, he could ship supplies from Dyrrhachium to his camp, whereas Caesar would

be forced to live off the land and requisition food from local tribes; even this would be

difficult as Pompey’s forces had already plundered the area in the previous months.

Noting the particularly hilly topography of the area, Caesar decided to fall back on one

of his most favoured tactics and fortify the hills around Pompey’s position, encircling

his enemy and cutting off their supplies.

This would be a difficult task considering the size of the armies but the natural topography

simplified the task.

When Pompey realised what Caesar was doing, he countered by constructing his own defences.

He ordered his men to fortify as many hills as possible, forcing Caesar to extend his

own fortifications further and further, stretching his army.

Frequent skirmishes broke out between the two forces, each harassing the other to try

and slow their build.

On one occasion, the 9th legion, attempting to fortify a camp on a hilltop, came under

intense masses of missile fire from the Pompeians on a nearby hill.

Caesar, who was with the 9th at the time, ordered them to abandon the construction and

retreat down the slope, commanding legionary engineers to place wattle screens to dig trenches

behind to hinder the enemy from pursuing the legion.

He then placed slingers in commanding positions to cover the withdrawal.

The 9th was pursued by the Pompeian missiles and light infantry who pushed the screens

into the trenches to cross them.

Caesar, fearing a rout, ordered Antony, commander of the 9th, to charge the Pompeians.

In a brilliant display of discipline, the 9th immediately turned, flung their javelins

and charged back up the slope.

The Pompeians, only being lightly armed, retreated and the 9th was able to withdraw in good order.

Soon after, Caesar’s defences were complete; it was now late June.

Due to his men’s greater experience and discipline, he now had Pompey’s force pinned

against the sea.

This was a great achievement.

A smaller, less supplied force had never done this before against superior numbers.

Though low on grain, Caesar did manage to level the playing field by having control

of all the sources of fresh water in the area.

Pompey was now forced to dig wells and rely on supplies from the sea.

Furthermore, Caesar could now send his men further afield to gather supplies without

fear of harassment.

Pompey, however, was a skilled general and had his own strategies to keep Caesar under

pressure, sending missile units to harass Caesar’s lines at night, targeting the light

of their campfires.

He also attempted to bring his cavalry into play which, stuck behind the fortifications,

had done little so far.

Boarding them onto ships, he sent them up the coast to Dyrrhachium; from here they would

be free from the confines of the fortifications and could forage without putting a burden

on Pompey’s supplies, as well as attack Caesar’s line from the rear.

Around this same time, in early July, Caesar received word that there were citizens of

Dyrrhachium who were willing to be bribed and give him the town.

Looking to capitalise, Caesar went to the town with a small armed escort, leaving Publius

Cornelius Sulla in charge.

However, when he reached the outskirts of the city, he was attacked by the Pompeian

cavalry who attempted to surround Caesar, and he only just managed to cut his way out

with his men and survive the ambush.

While Caesar was away from the main line, Pompey had also launched three simultaneous

offensives on the fortifications.

He ordered 4 Legions to concentrate on a point in the center of the line, and one Legion

each to attack two other points in the line.

The point the 4 Legions were attacking was atop a hill, and well-fortified, but only

defended by 500 men of the 6th Legion.

The cohort was hard pressed, thousands of missiles being fired into their position,

but the men held on doggedly, confident that reinforcements would be arriving soon.

They were correct; quickly as he could, Sulla had marched two Legions to their relief, and,

upon seeing this new force, the Pompeians’ retreated.

According to Caesar, every man of this unit suffered some kind of injury.

The other two attacks had also been repelled, one by 3 cohorts, and another by Caesar’s

German auxiliaries, who sallied out taking heavy losses.

In total, Caesar claims that the Pompeians lost 2000 men, and the Caesareans just 20,

though his own losses were surely much higher.

It is likely that the citizens of Dyrrhachium were Pompey’s agents who had lured Caesar

into a trap.

Pompey was proving a worthy and cunning enemy, but Caesar’s veterans had proved their mettle.

Bolstered by the confidence of their victories, Caesar marched his army out in battle formation

to offer battle to Pompey, as a sign of strength.

Pompey also drew his army up for battle so as not to lose face but refused to engage.

He would need to orchestrate a situation where he could use his overwhelming numbers in order

to contend with Caesar’s veterans.

Meanwhile, Longinus and Sabinus had been successful in taking Aetolia and had taken all the towns

between Epirus and Corinth.

They now planned to push past the Isthmus of Corinth and into the Peloponnese but found

their path blocked by a Pompeian force.

Nonetheless, their success was crucial in giving Caesar an abundance of supplies from

these new Greek territories.

With more successes under his belt, Caesar again sent a peace delegation, this time to

Scipio, hoping to convince the latter to talk to Pompey.

But even though Scipio at first listened with interest, his officers were having none of

it.

At Dyrrhachium, Caesar fortified the two approaches to the town, cutting the Pompeian cavalry

in the area off from the supplies there.

With the cavalry now unable to sustain themselves, Pompey withdrew them by sea back to his entrenchments.

But Pompey’s food was still running low and he knew he would have to soon force a

breakout.

To try and achieve this, Pompey’s men occupied the original fortifications of the 9th, which

were between the two armies’ fortifications, and expanded on them, making a second larger

camp that encompassed the first.

He also added a long wall from the camp to a nearby river to secure a water supply.

This would act as a forward base from where Pompey could strike.

Pompey suddenly had a stroke of luck when two Gallic officers who served Caesar during

the Gallic Wars deserted.

They had detailed intel about Caesar’s defences and knew where the weak points were, and they

now passed all this information to Pompey.

At the southern end of Caesar’s defences, where the fortifications met the coast, Caesar’s

9th legion was stationed under Marcellinus.

After having been forced to withdraw from their original camp, they had constructed

a second camp and fortifications that stretched to the coast.

Behind this, they had constructed a second line of defences facing south, preventing

Pompey landing troops behind and attacking their rear.

To complete the defences, an extra line of defences would need to be made between the

2 walls, linking them together and blocking any attack from the sea.

But these defences were incomplete.

Pompey formulated his plan.

He would attack the inner wall with his legions, landing light infantry and missile troops

to the south to attack the outer wall, while even more troops would be landed between the

2 walls.

In doing so, he would attack the 9th from 3 sides.

This took a lot of careful planning and timing, and he withdrew his legions from the 9th’s

old fort and behind his own lines to coordinate.

After a couple days of preparation, he was ready.

He moved 60 cohorts of legionaries, around 30,000 men, to attack Caesar’s inner fortifications,

while the light infantry was moved by boat behind the outer wall.

As they began their attack, more men were simultaneously landed at the gap between the

entrenchments.

There were only 2 cohorts of the 9th present at the time, the rest still being in camp.

These 1,000 men now found themselves under furious attack from 3 sides by overwhelming

numbers.

Desperately they tried to form a line and sent word to Marcellinus for help.

But the numbers were too much and the men broke and ran.

As they did, they ran into the reinforcing cohorts sent by Marcellinus, causing chaos

in the narrow gap between the walls.

The Pompeians closed in on Marcellinus’ camp, which was now only defended by a couple

of cohorts.

Luckily, Antony, who was close at hand, managed to organize 6000 men, and came to their aid,

stopping the Pompeian advance.

He was soon joined by Caesar, alerted by smoke signals, and another 6500 men.

Both forces now had most of their men committed to this part of the line.

While Pompey's main force had been pushing onto the 9th’s camp, more men had already

begun construction of a fort outside of Caesar’s fortifications to the south; the blockade

had been broken.

Caesar ordered his men to begin construction of a trench plugging the gap between the two

walls.

While this was being done, Caesar’s scouts spotted a Pompeian Legion moving back into

the 9th Legion’s old fort.

If Pompey took this fort, he would be able to make a link between his new fort in the

south and his old fortifications.

Caesar was determined to stop this from happening.

Gathering around 17,000 men and leaving 1000 to continue entrenching, Caesar took a circuitous

route, concealing his force as long as possible, and then launched the attack.

His left wing, where Caesar himself was, pushed into the fort, forcing the Pompeian Legion

back into the inner camp.

Caesar’s right wing however, had stumbled across the Pompeian entrenchments that lead

to the river.

Thinking these were part of the fort, they followed them looking for a gate through.

When they reached the river and realised their mistake, they managed to break down points

in the defences, breaking through followed by the cavalry, but they had wasted precious

time.

Pompey had seen what was happening and sent all his heavy infantry - 25,000 men - to assist

the Legion in the fort.

The cavalry rode ahead of the legions and fell upon the Caesarean cavalry of the right

flank, routing them almost instantly.

The infantry around them, seeing their comrades fleeing and Pompey’s men closing in, also

ran.

The narrow passages they had made through the entrenchments became clogged and some

men took to jumping from the ramparts into the ditches to try and escape.

Many were trampled to death.

Inside the fort itself, Pompey’s legion was fighting back with renewed courage.

Caesar’s left, afraid that they were about to be trapped inside the narrow confines of

the fort, also began to break, retreating through the gate.

Caesar tried to stop the rout, grabbing onto fleeing standard bearers and ordering them

to stand their ground.

One, overcome by panic, even tried to stab Caesar but he was saved by his bodyguards.

Caesar’s entire force that had been committed to the attack had retreated, broken.

But Pompey, fearing Caesar had laid a trap, did not pursue, and the narrow breaches in

the defences stopped his cavalry pursuing further.

If he had, he may well have been able to to destroy Caesar’s army.

In total, Caesar gives his dead as being 32 officers, centurions and tribunes, almost

1000 legionaries and 200 hundred horsemen.

He had also lost many men as prisoners, perhaps as many as 1,000.

On the orders of Labienus, all of these men were killed.

Pompey was hailed as imperator, but as a sign of respect, refused the symbolic bay leaves

that went with the title, due to his victory being over fellow Romans.

Caesar, after having committed almost 3 months to the battle, pulled away his full force

from Dyrrhachium, defeated.

The Pompeians took this as a full retreat, and word was sent to eastern kings that the

war was already won.

However, Pompey had failed to strike a killing blow.

He had done well to break out of Caesar’s encirclement, but had missed the opportunity

to use his overwhelming numbers.

Caesar was a dangerous enemy who could not be left any space to regroup.

Nonetheless, Caesar was able to carry out an ordered withdrawal of his army with only

light harassment from Pompey’s forces, pulling back to Apollonia.

As he did so, he comforted his men, saying that just as Gergovia had preceded Alesia,

so too would this defeat at Dyrrhachium would be followed by a far greater victory.

Still, Caesar was in a precarious position.

The army under his command was by now heavily depleted, and his other Legions were scattered

around Greece; two under Domitius Calvinus around Macedonia, and one in Southern Greece

under Longinus and Sabinus.

Caesar’s defeat also meant that his supporters would be wavering.

He needed a victory soon, and it would need to be decisive.

Caesar’s priority was to get his army back into fighting condition, so he first marched

to Apollonia where he left his wounded, and sent 7 cohorts to garrison various towns and

cities under his control.

Longinus’ legion would be safe in Southern Greece, but Domitius and his two veteran Legions

of Gallic campaigns, who had been stalling and pinning Scipio Metellus during Dyrrhachium,

were now exposed.

All of Caesar’s plans now revolved around merging his depleted army with Domitius: if

Pompey marched on Italy, Caesar would meet up with Domitius and march through Illyria

to attack Pompey from the rear; if Pompey marched on Caesar, Caesar would march to Domitius

and fight a battle with the merged army; if Pompey besieged Caesar’s allied towns in

Greece, Caesar would march to Domitius and attack Scipio, forcing Pompey to react or

lose an ally.

Before any of these plans could be put into effect though, Caesar had to get to Domitius.

He began his march at full pace from Apollonia.

Pompey, however, had also come to a similar conclusion: If Scipio was caught unsupported,

his legions would surely be lost.

Both Caesar and Pompey were once again in a race with each other, each hoping to reach

their ally before the other.

Leaving Cato in control of Dyrrhachium, Pompey began his march to Scipio.

As he did, he took measures to slow Caesar, spreading the word of his defeat at Dyrrhachium

and as a result, Caesar found little support on his march, and his scouts and messengers

found it impossible to reach Domitius.

When both armies were just 4 hours from the positions of Domitius and Scipio, Caesar had

a stroke of luck.

Some of the Gauls who had defected to Pompey at Dyrrhachium had yet another change of heart,

racing to Domitius and warning him of Pompey’s approach and Caesar’s location.

Armed with this knowledge, Domitius was able to safely reposition and merge with Caesar.

Caesar’s whole army in the region, aside from the 27th, was now united.

Nonetheless, Pompey still held the upper hand; he had more local support and supplies and

so his intention was now to avoid another confrontation with Caesar.

Despite his numbers, he was still aware of both how much more experienced the enemy forces

were compared to many of his own, and how dangerous Caesar was in the field.

In Plutarch’s words: “Caesar and that army, who had stormed a thousand cities, subdued

over 3000 nations, gained numberless battles of the Germans and Gauls, taken a million

prisoners and killed as many in the field”.

Pompey was confident that, in time, Caesar would run out of supplies and that his army

would break down.

This was known as the Fabian strategy and had been used to great effect by Fabius Maximus

against Hannibal in the Second Punic War.

Many high-ranking members of Pompey’s army, however, were pushing for a decisive battle.

Ahenobarbus, Scipio, Afranius, and Cicero applied pressure to Pompey, accusing the general

variously of cowardice and even of having been bribed.

Pompey would have to act soon or risk his army fracturing.

Caesar, on the other hand, had wasted no time.

He marched quickly to Gomphi, an important town with many supplies and home to the praetor

of Thessaly, Androsthenes.

Andrsothenes had previously promised his and Thessaly’s support for Caesar but following

Dyrrhachium had defected to Pompey, closing the gates of the city to Caesar.

Caesar did not have the supplies or time to conduct a prolonged siege, so he decided to

storm the town.

The attack started at 3 in the afternoon and was all over by sunset; a number of nobles,

likely including Androsthenes, committing suicide.

Despite their defeat at Dyrrhachium, Caesar’s veterans were still a force to be reckoned

with.

After resupplying, Caesar marched to Metropolis, which surrendered upon hearing the fate of

Gomphi.

Many other towns soon followed suit, and Caesar soon had enough local support to resupply

his army for the time being.

Pompey knew that if he could keep Caesar pinned in Thessaly, he would still eventually run

out of supplies and be starved out.

But the pressure from his officers was continually mounting.

Finally, Pompey relented to their demands and marched his army to Pharsalus to give

battle, setting up his camp on the high ground.

Morale amongst Pompey’s men was high and his officers were confident of victory; they

had a huge numerical advantage and had already defeated Caesar once.

Already, talks were being had about who would be the consuls and praetors after the war,

who would get the property of Caesar and his allies, and who would hold Caesar’s position

of pontifex maximus after his defeat.

According to Caesar, “they were not concerned with the means by which they could gain the

upper hand, but with the way in which they ought to use their victory”.

Their confidence was not unfounded: Pompey’s army numbered around 47,000 infantry and 7,000

cavalry.

Caesar’s army, on the hand, now numbered only around 21,000 infantry and 500 cavalry,

according to his own account.

It is likely that Caesar underplayed his numbers, and Appian suggests he had nearer 30,000 infantry

and 2,000 cavalry, as Caesar failed to add his auxiliaries to his total.

Caesar was equally confident though.

His army was not as numerous, but it was more experienced and disciplined.

Only a handful of Pompey’s Legions were true veterans, most having been recruited

specifically for the war and only having seen their first action at Dyrrhachium.

Furthermore, while the bulk of Pompey’s infantry were Roman Legions, they were supported

by auxiliaries and allies from the East making up the majority of light infantry and cavalry.

These men, though all skilled warriors, would not have been trained to fight in the Roman

style, and the multitude of languages spoken in Pompey’s army would have made coordination

difficult.

The men Caesar had under his command were from his 10 veteran Legions, all of whom had

fought with him since his Gallic campaigns, some for as many as 12 years.

Every day, Caesar would march his army out of the camp to the base of Pompey’s hill,

offering battle.

Pompey each time refused to commit, pulling his men out of camp but never moving from

the high ground; it is clear that he was still not wholly committed to a pitched battle and

did not want to give up his advantageous position, only being willing to commit to minor skirmishes.

While these manoeuvres were going on, Caesar also mounted some of his infantry, drilling

them each day to increase his cavalry to 2,000; it was still much less than Pompey’s, but

enough to at least stall them.

It had been almost a month now since the Battle of Dyrrhachium and Caesar eventually decided

that if Pompey would not give battle, his best strategy would be to keep his army on

the march, moving camp every day, forcing Pompey to shadow him and wearing out Pompey’s

less disciplined force.

On the 9th August 48 BC, Caesar was about to put this plan into action and had his army

prepared to decamp, when Pompey’s army suddenly moved off from their position on the hill

to the plains to give battle.

It is not entirely clear why Pompey chose to do this.

The most likely answer is that he was pressured by his supporters who, upon seeing Caesar

ready to move, were worried Caesar would slip away and had pressed Pompey to seize the opportunity

and give battle.

Whatever the reason, Caesar took it as a blessing and also prepared his army for a battle on

now even terrain.

Pompey knew that his key advantages were his cavalry and his numbers, and he drew up his

army to best maximize their effectiveness.

His infantry was formed into the classic Roman triplex acies, but slightly deeper than the

usual 10 men depth order to better hold a defensive line.

On his left wing, he stationed two Legions under the command of Lucius Lentulus.

These were two of Pompey’s most experienced Legions, one raised by himself, and the other

having been raised by Caesar for the Gallic Wars and later handed to Pompey just before

the Civil War.

In his centre, he stationed Scipio and his Syrian Legions, while the right would be held

by two legions combined into one with a river to their right protecting their flank.

Within this Twin Legion were veterans from Cilicia and from Spain, likely survivors from

the Battle of Ilerda.

They were commanded by Ahenobarbus, one of Caesar’s most active opponents.

All these Legions were Pompey’s best men; they would take the brunt of the attack while

Pompey’s less experienced Legions, allies and auxiliaries, would form the two back lines.

On Pompey’s extreme left were his 7,000 cavalry under the command of Labienus, supported

by Pompey’s skirmishers and archers.

A further 2,000 infantry were held in reserve in Pompey’s camp under the command of Afranius

and Pompey’s son, Gnaeus.

Pompey positioned himself on the left.

His plan was to use the tactic of his hero, Alexander the Great; with Ahenobarbus and

the river guarding his right flank, Pompey’s infantry would hold the line, while the entire

cavalry force would flank left, destroying Caesar’s cavalry before falling on his Legions

from behind, becoming the hammer to the anvil of the defending legions.

Caesar also drew his army up in the triplex axis formation.

The 10th Legion, Caesar’s personal favourite and some of his best troops, were stationed

on his right opposite Pompey.

These men were commanded by Sulla, who had distinguished himself at Dyrrhachium, and

this was also where Caesar positioned himself.

On the left, Caesar positioned two of his other most experienced Legions, the 8th and

9th, with the river to their left.

These two Legions had suffered so many casualties over recent campaigns that they were ordered

to work as one Legion under the command of Antony.

The centre would be held by the 11th and 12th under the command of Domitius.

Caesar’s remaining Legions filled the second and third lines, the third having strict orders

not to engage until Caesar gave the signal.

In order to match Pompey’s line, Caesar had to stretch his own thin, only 6 men deep.

Caesar’s cavalry was stationed opposite Pompey’s.

They were hopelessly outnumbered, and Caesar was well aware that they would not be able

to stall Pompey’s horse for long.

As such, he also pulled 3,000 men from various Legions, arming them with spears, forming

them into a 4th line.

Caesar was the one to begin the engagement, ordering his front two lines to charge Pompey’s.

Caesar’s men expected Pompey’s infantry to counter-charge, as was standard military

custom, but they instead stood fast holding their line.

In a brilliant display of discipline, Caesar’s men spontaneously halted mid charge and reassembled.

After a brief pause to regain their stamina, they moved slowly forward only breaking into

a charge once again when nearer to Pompey’s line.

Javelins were hurled from both sides, and Pompey’s men, braced and with interlocked

shields, held the line.

An intense melee ensued with brutal close-quarters fighting.

Pompey now put his plan into action.

Labienus led the Pompeian cavalry to Caesar’s right flank supported by the skirmishers and

archers, smashing into the Caesarian cavalry.

Caesar’s men could not hold off the onslaught for long, gradually being forced back, before

retreating entirely.

They had, however, performed their role.

Whilst Pompey’s cavalry had been fighting with Caesar’s, Caesar had given the order

for his 4th line of spear-armed infantry to wheel around to face Labienus and his cavalry.

The Pompeian cavalry had been preparing to charge Caesar’s Legions in the rear, but

with Caesar’s cavalry acting as a screen, they hadn’t seen Caesar’s 4th line move

into position and they now found themselves being attacked by 3,000 heavily armoured spearmen.

Pompey’s cavalry, though numerous, were not heavy cavalry and many were young nobles

with little experience of warfare; fighting veteran spearmen head-on was not something

they were cut out for.

They were routed quickly, being forced to retreat to distant high ground to try and

regroup, but the damage had already been done.

Caesar’s fourth line pushed on into Pompey’s missile troops, easily crushing them.

As they pushed on, it was now Pompey who was being flanked.

His left flank legions, both who had previously fought alongside Caesar and his Legions, now

found themselves attacked on multiple fronts by their old comrades, the 10th Legion from

the front, and the 4th line from the left flank and rear.

It was at this point that Caesar committed his 3rd line of fresh troops, throwing every

man he had into the battle.

Under this huge pressure, Pompey’s line began to break, starting with the 1st and

3rd.

This was also where Pompey had stationed himself and, almost becoming surrounded, he had little

choice but to flee the battlefield and retreat to his camp.

The rest of Pompey’s line broke in quick succession, Caesar’s 4th line rolling up

the flank while his fresh 3rd line pushed from the front.

Some attempted to follow their general and retreat to their camp, others simply fled

the battlefield.

Caesar, knowing his victory needed to be complete, stormed the camp, easily overwhelming the

few thousand reserves and men who had retreated.

Those that had retreated from the battlefield were soon surrounded on a hill and forced

to surrender.

Caesar had won.

By the time Caesar stormed the camp, however, Pompey had already gone, fleeing with 30 bodyguards.

Many other high ranking Pompeians, such as Labienus, Afranius, Scipio, and Pompey’s

son Gnaeus, had also managed to escape.

Nonetheless, not all had been so lucky.

Ahenobarbus “brave but ill-starred” had been cut down in the retreat, possibly by

Antony himself.

Many others had been captured in Pompey’s camp and in the immediate aftermath.

Among these was a young man, Marcus Junius Brutus.

The son of Caesar’s mistress, Brutus was held in high regard by Caesar, who had given

his men orders not to kill Brutus.

When Brutus surrendered, Caesar was overjoyed, welcoming him with open arms.

Caesar showed his customary leniency to Pompey’s soldiers as well, with more than 24,000 surrendering

to him.

In total, Caesar claims to only have lost 200 men and 30 centurions in the battle while

giving the Pompeian losses as 15,000 dead and the 24,000 surrendered.

These numbers seem suspiciously exaggerated and Appian suggests it was more likely 1,200

of Caesar’s men dead, and 6,000 of Pompey’s, the rest surrendering or fleeing.

Whichever is closer to the truth, the fact remains that Caesar’s victory was decisive.

Aside from having broken Pompey’s largest army, he had scattered the Pompeian officers,

many fleeing to North Africa, and absorbed many of Pompey’s surrendered men into his

army, almost doubling its size.

Pompey himself sailed first to the Greek islands of Lesbos and Mytilene meeting his wife Cornelia

and his youngest son, Sextus.

His intent was to get his family far away from Caesar and use his connections in the

East to rebuild an army to resist Caesar.

By the time he reached Cyprus, he had taken out private loans and put together a fleet

along with 2,000 men.

His defeat, however, had cost him much public support.

Pompey had initially planned to head to the province of Syria, but they turned against

him and he was forced to look elsewhere.

He decided on Egypt.

The boy-pharaoh, Ptolemy XIII owed his throne to Pompey; Pompey having supported Ptolemy’s

father, and guaranteeing his will that made Ptolemy pharaoh.

Pompey had also lent a number of officers and soldiers from his Eastern command to the

pharaoh’s army.

Confident he would find support there, Pompey sailed to Egypt.

He was met off the coast by a small rowing boat which would take Pompey to shore.

Aboard were a man called Savius, the head of the Egyptian army Achillas, and an ex-officer

of Pompey’s, Lucius Septimius.

Pompey’s wife was worried about this lack of pomp and suspected something was not right,

but Pompey was reassured by the presence of Septimius.

Stepping off his ship, he quoted a line of Sophocles to his wife: “He who enters a

tyrant’s door becomes his slave, even if he leaves a free man”.

As the small boat rowed to shore, Pompey tried to alleviate the tense atmosphere, telling

Septimius he was an old comrade; he received only a nod of recognition in response.

Septimius then struck, stabbing the old general, quickly followed by both Achillas and Savius.

Septimius then beheaded his corpse, throwing the body naked into the sea.

Ptolemy, upon the counsel of his advisors, had betrayed Pompey in order to try and win

approval from Caesar.

Pompey the Great, 3 times consul, conqueror of the East and one of the Roman Republic’s

most prolific generals was dead.

It is worth noting how revered Pompey was.

Plutarch despaired that he and Caesar had gone to war: “Had they been willing to enjoy

the fruits of their labours in peace and tranquillity, the greatest and best part of the world was

their own.

If they must have victories and triumphs…what Scythian horse, what Parthian arrows, what

Indian treasures could have resisted 70,000 Romans, led on by Pompey and Caesar?”.

Though arguably past his prime at Pharsalus, Pompey had not at all fought badly; his plan

was solid and the best that could be done.

The reason for his defeat was not poor generalship, but the skill and experience of Caesar and

his infantry, and the lack of experience of Pompey’s cavalry.

Pompey and Caesar were both incredibly talented generals, and it is telling how often the

two decided on similar strategies.

When Caesar reached Egypt having pursued Pompey, he was first presented with Pompey’s head.

Disgusted, he turned away.

He was next presented the seal of Pompey, at which point Caesar broke down in tears.

Though enemies in later life, it is worth remembering that Caesar and Pompey had been

political allies for around 8 years, had effectively ruled Rome together and had even been related

by marriage.

Caesar was well aware that, despite being his enemy, Pompey had been a titan of his

time, worthy of his respect.

Caesar’s victory marked a turning point in the war.

It was now the Optimates who would find themselves on the back foot.

Nevertheless, the war was far from over.

Pompey’s staunchest supporters, Cato, Scipio, and Pompey’s sons Gnaeus and Sextus, had

all fled to North Africa to continue the resistance.

With them also was Labienus, now undoubtedly the best commander amongst the Optimates.

The war against Pompey was done, but the Civil War was still ongoing and there were external

enemies daring to challenge Caesar.

In our next video we will talk about Caesar’s battles, military and political, that took

place after the death of Pompey, so make sure you are subscribed and pressed the bell button

in order to be notified.

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Key Vocabulary

Vocabulary	Meanings
war /wɔːr/ A1	noun - A state of armed conflict between different countries or groups within a country.
power /ˈpaʊər/ A2	noun - The ability to do something or act in a particular way, especially as a faculty or quality.
Senate /ˈsenət/ B1	noun - An assembly or council of citizens having the highest deliberative functions, especially in ancient Rome.
general /ˈdʒenrəl/ B1	noun - A commander of an army or army division. adjective - Affecting or concerning all or most people, places, or things; widespread.
political /pəˈlɪtɪkəl/ B1	adjective - Relating to the government or public affairs of a country.
military /ˈmɪləteri/ B2	adjective - Relating to or characteristic of soldiers or armed forces.
Republic /rɪˈpʌblɪk/ B2	noun - A state in which supreme power is held by the people and their elected representatives, and which has an elected or nominated president rather than a monarch.
legislation /ˌledʒɪsˈleɪʃən/ B2	noun - Laws, considered collectively.
dictator /dɪkˈteɪtər/ B2	noun - A ruler with total power over a country, typically one who has obtained power by force.
ally /ˈælaɪ/ B2	noun - A state or person that is allied with another.
veteran /ˈvetərən/ B2	noun - A person who has had long experience in a particular field.
violence /ˈvaɪələns/ B2	noun - Behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something.
constitution /ˌkɒnstɪˈtjuːʃən/ C1	noun - A body of fundamental principles or established precedents according to which a state or other organization is acknowledged to be governed.
triumvirate /traɪˈʌmvɪrət/ C1	noun - A group of three men holding power.
exploit /ɪkˈsplɔɪt/ C1	verb - Make full use of and derive benefit from (a resource).
stalemate /ˈsteɪlmeɪt/ C1	noun - A situation in which further action or progress by opposing or competing parties seems impossible.