– Bilingual Lyrics Chinese/English

Lyrics & Translation

[English]

Hello everyone, I’m Hui-Chun from Business Weekly.

Understand business, read Business Weekly.

Today’s episode is a special one.

We’d like to talk with you about

what people have been passionately discussing lately: the “Taiwan disease.”

You may have already seen that

The Economist has once again called out Taiwan by name.

It says we’ve come down with something called the Taiwan disease.

But this time, what’s being called out is not about geopolitics.

It’s about the central bank holding down the New Taiwan dollar exchange rate for a long time.

The Economist’s wording is very straightforward.

It says that in order to protect export industries,

the NT dollar has been kept undervalued for a long time.

Although this has made Taiwan’s exports very strong,

and the tech sector very profitable,

it has also led to soaring housing prices and stagnant wages.

In this episode, the focus is not just the exchange rate.

We want to talk with you about the real “Taiwan disease.”

Business Weekly believes the real Taiwan disease is not the NT dollar itself.

The exchange rate is just the tip of the iceberg.

Taiwan’s real illness is actually that we have

a “let the government handle everything” disease.

Every time the government steps in,

it always seems like it’s trying to protect everyone.

But the cost is actually borne by the silent majority.

High housing prices, low wages, drug shortages, Taipower’s losses,

low birth rate, labor shortages, and so on—

behind all these seemingly unrelated issues,

they actually all point to the same Taiwan disease.

After watching this video, you will understand:

First, what exactly The Economist means by Taiwan disease.

Why is it that the stronger our exports become,

the less Taiwanese people can afford to buy a home?

The answer is surprisingly hidden in the NT dollar.

Second, the exchange rate is only the tip of the iceberg.

What exactly is the real Taiwan disease?

Frozen electricity prices and cheap health insurance—

are they really protecting you and me?

Or are you actually paying an even higher price?

Third, why can’t the Taiwan disease ever be cured?

Why do reforms always get stuck?

So what exactly is the Taiwan disease that The Economist talks about?

Taiwan has long been an export‑oriented economy.

In the second quarter of 2025, exports as a share of GDP

even reached as high as 75.9%.

So whenever the NT dollar appreciates even a little,

two problems show up.

First, exporters feel a lot of pressure.

Because once US dollars are converted back into NT dollars,

their profits on paper get eaten away.

Second, a stronger NT dollar makes exporters’ products

more expensive when converted into foreign currencies.

Their price competitiveness drops immediately.

As a result, our central bank has long adopted

a “weak NT dollar” strategy.

When large amounts of foreign capital flow in and Taiwan stocks surge,

and the NT dollar has a chance to keep rising,

the central bank may step in to buy US dollars

and sell NT dollars,

so that the NT dollar doesn’t rise too quickly.

This strategy has allowed Taiwan to maintain

very impressive export performance.

The Directorate‑General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics even estimates

that Taiwan’s economic growth rate in 2025 may surpass 5%.

That would put us far ahead of other Asian countries.

At first glance, holding down the NT dollar

looks like a very successful policy.

But The Economist reminds us

that this success comes at a cost paid by someone.

Because to suppress the NT dollar,

the central bank has to constantly buy US dollars and sell NT dollars.

The result is that the whole market is flooded with NT dollars.

Where did all this money go?

It didn’t go into domestic‑demand industries,

and it didn’t go into wages either.

Most of it flowed into the housing market.

That is also why housing prices in Taiwan keep going higher and higher.

You may think it is all caused by speculative property investors,

but in reality, part of the reason

is the flood of money created by the exchange‑rate policy.

Once housing prices go up,

another side effect appears.

Companies can rely on a weak NT dollar to stay competitive,

so the pressure to innovate actually becomes weaker.

With no pressure to improve,

there is no incentive to raise productivity either.

This keeps companies from boosting their profits and added value,

and the result is that employee wages stay stuck.

So Taiwan has ended up with a very paradoxical situation.

Our GDP growth outshines the other Asian Tigers,

but wages can’t keep up with prices and housing costs.

As a result, domestic demand just cannot take off.

A study by Cathay Financial Holdings and the NTU research team further points out

that in 2025, Taiwan’s domestic consumption growth is zero.

In other words, our export growth is very strong,

but the food and beverage, retail, and service sectors clearly feel a chill.

This is the Taiwan disease that The Economist talks about:

a chain reaction triggered by exchange‑rate intervention.

But if at this point you think

“Taiwan disease equals exchange rate,”

then actually we’ve only seen

the first, surface layer of the problem.

Where is the deeper Taiwan disease hiding?

I’ll tell you in the next part.

You’ll notice a very special phenomenon in Taiwan.

No matter what problem we encounter,

our first reaction is that the government should step in.

If electricity prices are too high, the government freezes price hikes.

If health insurance is too expensive, the government pushes drug prices down.

If the housing market is too hot, the government cracks down on housing.

If the cost of living is too high, then the government hands out subsidies.

So every intervention works like a painkiller.

But pain relief is not the same as treatment.

Over time, this kind of intervention has created

a “one Taiwan, two worlds” situation.

Let’s look at three concrete examples.

The first example is electricity prices.

In Taiwan, electricity prices have not been raised for many years.

The result is that Taipower has built up 450 billion NT dollars in losses.

You might think losses at a state‑owned enterprise have nothing to do with you,

but in reality, this black hole

has to be filled with taxpayers’ money.

After subsidizing Taipower,

the government has less money left for other uses.

So freezing electricity prices looks like it protects everyone,

but the real beneficiaries are large electricity users and corporations.

And Taipower’s losses are borne collectively by ordinary taxpayers.

The second example is health insurance.

National Health Insurance is a source of pride for Taiwanese people.

But to keep it affordable for everyone,

the government has long kept drug prices low.

This has pushed pharmaceutical companies to the breaking point.

In the past decade, 13 original brand‑name drugs have pulled out of Taiwan,

and in this year alone, 7 more have exited.

These include drugs for high blood pressure, antidepressants, and so on.

These are not luxury goods;

they are medicines that some people must take every single day.

After original drugs withdraw,

patients can only use substitute medications.

Health insurance has also pushed down the pay of many medical professionals.

Under the NHI system,

low pay and high pressure

have driven many healthcare workers to leave in large numbers.

They move into cosmetic medicine or self‑pay clinics.

Why do so many doctors now choose to do cosmetic procedures?

Because cosmetic treatments involve relatively low risk,

but there are many clients and frequent visits,

so the pay is higher.

Under the NHI payment system, however,

it is hard for doctors treating serious and critical illnesses to earn much,

yet they must bear high risk.

The original intention of NHI was great—to let everyone afford medical care.

But what has happened is that original drugs leave Taiwan,

doctors leave medical centers

to treat colds or do cosmetic procedures instead,

and nurses resign in large numbers,

to the point that some doctors warn

that it’s best not to get sick in the next five years.

Keeping drug prices low under NHI

may look like protecting everyone,

but the real victims are

certain patients and medical staff.

The third example is our main character just mentioned: the exchange rate.

By holding down the currency,

our export sector is booming.

But silently, because the supply of NT dollars has surged,

the market is awash with liquidity, which has pushed up housing prices.

Meanwhile wages are stagnant, and people still can’t afford a home.

This makes young people afraid to have children.

Taiwan’s birth rate is now among the lowest in the world.

In the first ten months of this year, just over 90,000 babies were born,

almost 20% fewer than in the same period last year.

“Better to die than be born in Taiwan”—

in other words, the death rate exceeds the birth rate—

has already been the case for 58 consecutive months.

Of course, low wages and a low birth rate have many causes;

they are not triggered by exchange‑rate factors alone.

But if you look closely at the many problems we just discussed,

you’ll notice

that behind them all lies well‑intentioned government intervention.

Yet these good intentions have led to unintended consequences.

The beneficiaries are often a small group,

concentrated among influential players such as

corporations and big energy users,

exporters and life insurers.

But the victims are the dispersed majority,

who have few channels to make their voices heard,

such as ordinary office workers, new parents, patients,

and domestic‑demand businesses.

When policies become overly protective,

and we develop the habit of wanting the government

to step in whenever something happens,

the number of losers created by the system keeps growing.

This is the real Taiwan disease.

Among high housing prices, low wages, and labor shortages, which hits you the hardest,

or makes you feel the most powerless?

If you had to pick just one area where you most want the government to start reforming,

go to the comments section and write down your honest thoughts.

At this point, you might be wondering:

Why can’t we just change the exchange rate, health insurance, or electricity prices?

The real problem is not how to tweak specific policies.

The real problem is that Taiwan’s institutions make these policies

extremely hard to adjust.

Each intervention forces the next intervention,

forming a vicious cycle.

The exchange rate is a classic example.

To suppress the NT dollar,

the central bank buys US dollars and sells NT dollars.

This increases the NT dollars circulating in the market.

The money flows into the housing market,

pushing housing prices higher and higher.

So the government has no choice but to start cracking down on housing,

rolling out limits on loan‑to‑value ratios

and selective credit controls.

But the housing crackdown itself also causes side effects,

so the next round of controls arrives.

This is just what economist Ludwig von Mises described:

to fix the first intervention,

you are forced to add even more interventions.

You’ll find that the problem is not actually solved;

it just gets buried under the next layer of intervention.

And with every new layer, the hole that must be filled in the future gets bigger.

So the real Taiwan disease is not the exchange rate, not electricity prices,

not housing prices, and not health insurance.

It is that Taiwan’s system makes intervention easy

but reform difficult.

It amplifies the voices of the beneficiaries

and weakens the voices of the victims.

And every intervention becomes the justification for the next one.

Of course, does this mean the government should just stop doing anything?

If the government doesn’t intervene,

what exactly should it do?

Given Taiwan’s current economic structure,

letting the NT dollar appreciate freely

would indeed cause many businesses to face an immediate shock.

But is there room to at least review this kind of intervention?

For many issues,

there may not be a clear‑cut answer right away.

But without discussion, nothing ever begins.

Without a beginning, these interventions will just keep going.

If this round of debate over the exchange rate

can get more people thinking about

which interventions should continue,

which ones should be rolled back,

and which ones should be redesigned,

then the real Taiwan disease will finally have a chance to start healing.

Do you agree with Business Weekly’s view of what the real Taiwan disease is?

What do you think are the real causes of low wages and high housing prices?

Or do you feel the government should actually intervene even more?

If you found today’s content interesting,

you can check the links in the description box.

There you’ll find more in‑depth reports.

If you have any thoughts about today’s video,

please feel free to leave us a comment.

Also, we’ve now turned on the “Super Thanks” feature.

We really need everyone’s support.

I’m Hui-Chun from Business Weekly.

Understand business, read Business Weekly.

See you in the next episode. Bye‑bye.

[Chinese]

大家好 我是商周的惠群

懂商業 看商周

今天是特別集

我們想跟大家聊聊

最近討論很熱烈的台灣病

你可能已經看到

《經濟學人》再次點名台灣了

說我們得了一種台灣病

但這一次被點名的不是地緣政治的問題

而是央行長期壓低新台幣的匯率

《經濟學人》的說法很直接

他說為了保護出口產業

新台幣匯率長期被壓低

雖然讓台灣的出口很強

科技業很賺

但也造成了房價飆高 薪資停滯

今天這一集我們的重點不只是匯率而已

而是想跟大家聊聊真正的台灣病

商周認為真正的台灣病不是新台幣

匯率其實只是冰山一角而已

台灣真正的病其實是我們得了一種

什麼都讓政府管的病

政府的每次出手

都好像是在保護大家

可是代價其實被沉默的大多數人承擔

房價 低薪 藥荒 台電虧損

少子化 缺工等等

這些看起來互不相干的議題這背後

其實都指向同一種台灣病

今天看完這支影片你會知道

一 《經濟學人》講的台灣病到底是什麼

為什麼出口越強

台灣人卻越買不起房

答案竟然藏在新台幣

二 匯率只是冰山一角

真正的台灣病到底是什麼

電價凍漲 健保便宜

真的在保護你我嗎

還是你正在付出更大的代價呢

三 為什麼台灣病一直治不好

改革為什麼永遠都卡住

《經濟學人》在講的台灣病到底是什麼

台灣長期是出口導向的經濟

2025 年第二季出口占 GDP 的比重

甚至高達了 75.9%

所以新台幣匯率只要稍微升值

就會出現兩個問題

第一個是出口業覺得壓力很大

因為美元換回台幣之後

帳面上的獲利就會被侵蝕

第二個是台幣升值也會讓出口商的產品

換算成外幣後變得更貴

價格競爭力立刻下降

於是我們的央行長期採用了一種

弱台幣的策略

當外資大量地流入 台股飆升

新台幣有機會節節升高的時候

央行可能會進場買美金

賣新台幣

讓台幣不要升得太快

而這個策略讓台灣維持了

非常亮眼的出口成績

主計處更預估

2025 年台灣的經濟成長率有望突破 5%

遠遠領先了亞洲其它國家

乍看之下台幣被壓住

是一個很成功的政策

但《經濟學人》提醒我們

這個成功是有人付出代價來換的

因為央行為了壓台幣

必須不停地買美元 賣新台幣

結果整個市場充滿了很多的台幣

這些錢跑去哪裡了

不是跑去內需產業

也不是跑到了薪資

絕大部分流向了房市

這也是為什麼台灣的房價越來越高

你可能會以為是炒房投資客造成的

但實際上背後有一部分

是匯率政策造成的資金泛濫

房價上去之後

另外一個副作用就出現了

企業靠弱勢台幣就能維持競爭力

創新的壓力反而變小了

沒有進步的壓力

也沒有提高生產力的誘因

讓企業的獲利跟附加價值無法提升

結果就是員工的薪資停在原地

因此台灣出現了一個非常矛盾的現象

GDP 成長率傲視亞洲四小龍

但薪資卻追不上物價 房價

於是內需一直成長不起來

國泰金控與台大團隊的研究更指出

2025 年台灣內需消費成長是零

換句話說我們的出口成長很強勁

但餐飲 零售服務業卻明顯感覺到寒風

這就是《經濟學人》所說的台灣病

是一個由匯率干預引發的連鎖反應

但是如果你看到這裡覺得

台灣病等於匯率

其實我們只看到了

問題的表面第一層而已

深層的台灣病到底藏在哪裡呢

我下一段告訴你

你會發現台灣有一個很特殊的現象

不管遇到什麼問題

第一個反應就是政府要出面

電價太高 政府會凍漲

健保太貴 政府會壓藥價

房市太熱 政府會打房

生活成本太高 那政府來補貼

所以每一次的干預都像是止痛

但止痛並不等於治療

這種干預逐漸形成了一種

一個台灣兩個世界的局面

我們來看三個最具體的例子

第一個例子是電價

台灣的電價多年不敢調漲

結果是台電累積了 4500 億的虧損

你可能會想國營事業虧損跟我很遙遠

但實際上這個黑洞

是要靠納稅人的錢來填補的

補貼台電之後

政府手上能用的錢就變少了

所以電價凍漲看起來保護了大家

但其實真正的受惠者是大用電戶 企業

而台電的虧損卻是一般納稅人在全體承擔

第二個例子是健保

健保是台灣人的驕傲

但為了讓大家都負擔得起

政府長期壓低藥價

而造成藥廠受不了

過去十年有 13 款原廠藥退出台灣

但今年一年內就有 7 款退出

包括高血壓藥 抗憂鬱藥等等

這些不是奢侈品

而是有人每天都得吃的藥

但原廠的藥退出之後

病患只能吃替代品

其實健保也壓低了很多醫護人員的薪資

因為健保體制下

報酬低 壓力大 讓不少的醫護人員

大量出走

跑去醫美或者是自費診療的領域

為什麼現在很多醫生都要去做醫美呢

就是因為做醫美療程的風險比較低

但是治療的人多 頻率高

報酬也就更高了

但在健保給付的體制下

醫生去治療急重症卻很難賺

還得承擔高風險

健保的初衷很好 讓人人都看得起病

可是卻是原廠藥退出台灣

醫生離開醫學中心

改看感冒做醫美

護理人員大量離職

以至有醫生警告

未來五年最好不要生病

健保壓低藥價

看起來在保護所有人

但真正的受害者是

特定的病患與醫護人員

第三個例子就是剛剛提到的主角 匯率

幣值被壓低

讓我們的出口業大好

但無形當中因為新台幣供應大增

市場資金充沛 助長了房價

但薪資又停滯買不起房

讓年輕人不敢生

現在台灣生育率是全球最低之一

今年前十個月僅出生九萬多名新生兒

比去年同期減少了將近兩成

台灣生不如死

也就是死亡率大於出生率的現象

已經連續第 58 個月出現了

當然低薪 少子化 有許多原因造成

並非單一匯率因素引起

但是剛剛談到的很多問題

你仔細看都會發現

背後都是政府出於好意的干預

但卻造成了無心的結果

受惠者常常是少數

集中有影響力的人像是

企業 能源大戶

出口業者 壽險業

但受害者則是分散的多數

沒有發聲管道

像是一般上班族 新手爸媽 病患

內需企業等等

當政策過度地保護

而也養成了我們遇到事情

就希望政府出手干預的習慣之後

制度所產生的輸家就越多

這才是真正的台灣病

高房價 低薪 缺工哪一個讓你最有感

或者是最無力呢

如果選一個你最希望政府先從哪裡開始改

趕快到留言區寫下你的真心話

講到這裡 你可能會想

匯率 健保 電價到底為什麼不能動

真正的問題不是政策怎麼調整

而是台灣的制度讓這些政策

根本很難被調整

每一次干預都會逼出下一個干預

形成了一個惡性循環

匯率就是典型的例子

為了壓住新台幣

央行買美金 賣台幣

結果市場裡的台幣變多

資金流向房市

把房價越推越高

政府只好開始打房

推出限制貸款成數

選擇性信用管制

但打房本身也會造成副作用

於是下一輪的管制又來了

這就是經濟學家米塞斯說的

為了修正第一個干預

你必須追加更多的干預

你會發現問題不是沒有解決

而是被新的干預蓋掉了

而每蓋一次 未來要補的洞就更大

因此真正的台灣病不是匯率 不是電價

不是房價 不是健保

而是台灣的制度會讓干預變容易

改革變困難

會讓受惠者的聲音更大

受害者的聲音更小

而每一次干預都會變成下一次干預的理由

當然你說難道要讓政府什麼都不管嗎

政府不干預

政府到底要做什麼

確實以現在台灣的經濟體質

放手讓新台幣升值

很多業者也會立刻面臨衝擊

但這種干預是否有機會被檢討

很多問題或許一時之間

都沒有標準的答案

但是不討論就沒有開始

沒有開始 這些干預就會一直持續

如果這一次匯率的討論

能讓更多人開始思考

哪些干預該繼續

哪些該收手

哪些該重新設計

那麼真正的台灣病才終於有機會開始痊癒

你認同商周對於真正的台灣病的觀點嗎

你覺得高薪 低房價的原因到底是什麼

還是你覺得政府其實應該再多管一點

大家如果對今天的內容有興趣

都可以參考資訊欄裡面的連結

有更詳盡的報導

如果你對今天的影片有任何想法

都歡迎留言告訴我們

還有我們現在也開啟了超級感謝的功能

我們很需要大家的支持

我是商周的惠群

懂商業 看商周

我們下集見了 Bye bye

Key Grammar Structures

• 雖然讓台灣的出口很強，科技業很賺，但也造成了房價飆高、薪資停滯。

  ➔ concessive clause with "although... but..."

  ➔ The word "雖然" introduces a concession, and "但" marks the contrast: "雖然" ... "但" ...

• 因為央行為了壓台幣，必須不停地買美元、賣新台幣，結果整個市場充滿了很多的台幣。

  ➔ cause‑effect clause with "because... therefore..."

  ➔ The clause starts with "因為" (because) and is followed by "結果" (as a result), showing cause and effect.

• 如果新台幣稍微升值，出口業就會感受到壓力。

  ➔ conditional clause with "if... then..."

  ➔ The word "如果" sets a condition, and "就" marks the consequent: "如果" ... "就" ...

• 不僅房價上升，薪資也停滯不前。

  ➔ correlative conjunction "not only... but also..."

  ➔ "不僅" introduces the first element, and "而且" adds a second, parallel element.

• 當外資大量流入，台股飆升時，央行可能會進場買美金。

  ➔ temporal clause with "when..."

  ➔ "當...時" sets the time frame for the main clause: "當" ... "時" ...

• 政府每次出手都好像是在保護大家，但代價其實被沉默的大多數人承擔。

  ➔ repetition with "每...都..." and contrast with "但"

  ➔ "每次" (each time) pairs with "都" (always) to stress frequency, followed by the contrastive "但" (but).

• 台灣的電價多年不敢調漲，結果是台電累積了4500億的虧損。

  ➔ result clause introduced by "結果是..."

  ➔ "結果是" directly signals that what follows is the outcome of the previous statement.

• 因為健保壓低藥價，原廠藥退出台灣，病患只能吃替代品。

  ➔ causative chain using "因為...導致..."

  ➔ The first clause begins with "因為" (because), which leads to "導致" (leads to) in the next clause, showing a cause‑effect chain.

• 每一次干預都會逼出下一個干預，形成惡性循環。

  ➔ repetition with "每一次...都..." indicating inevitability

  ➔ "每一次" (every time) pairs with "都會" (will always) to stress that the outcome is unavoidable.