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The Early Muslim expansion changed the fate of the Middle East and the world.

In our first season, we have covered the very early campaigns mostly led by Khalid ibn al-Walid

in Iraq and Syria.

This second documentary will describe the Arab incursions into Anatolia, Egypt, Iran

and North Africa, showing how the Rashidun Caliphate became the dominant power in the

wider region.

These long videos are extremely time-consuming and difficult to make, so consider liking,

commenting, and sharing!

It is probably a good idea to start our video with the description of the early Muslim army.

From Ajnadayn in 634 to Alexandria in 641, Islamic armies of seemingly miniscule size

picked apart the veteran armies of two separate, massive empires in battle after battle.

The question remains: how did these earliest Muslim soldiers fight and how did they forge

the caliphate with such speed?

Akin to most other regions and centers of civilisation within the ancient and medieval

world, Arabia was a violent place in its own unique fashion.

Far from being comparable to the large, hegemonic empires which bordered and often puppeteered

its many tribes to further their own agendas pre-conquest, the barren desert of the Arabian

Peninsula and most of its people are more accurately balanced against the fearsome nomadic

folk of the great Eurasian steppe.

Fighting against rival tribes and defending one’s own kin from attack were a central

part of life, a fact which played a key role in creating the local culture.

Motivated in part by vicious terrain that was untenable to larger military campaigns,

the dominant tactic was the so-called razzia - a raiding expedition designed to plunder,

pillage and take slaves.

Such a wealth of common martial experience meant that most Bedouin Arabs were, especially

compared to the agriculturalists and urban citizens of the near-east, a veteran military

population.

This pre-Islam tribal society provided a solid foundation for the development of a conquest

army, but until the prophet’s lifetime and possibly afterwards as well, there was no

‘army’, as such.

With very few exceptions, every single adult male in Bedouin life was a warrior, compensated

for their endeavours with booty, honour or the defence of their own kin-group from enemies

who were attempting to do the same.

With the advent of Islam, leadership of Muhammad and the subsequent unification of the Arabian

Peninsula under the first Rashidun caliph, its weapon-rich cities and Bedouin-inhabited

hinterland alike came under one rule, and one religion.

This warlike population, who until recently were occupied fighting one-another in small-scale

struggles, could now be directed en masse to attack the settled, exhausted and unready

empires beyond the desert frontier.

Although now turned to a single purpose; to expand the Dar al-Islam, the early Islamic

armies remained in many ways what they had been before - tribal raiders.

As the assault on Byzantine and Sassanid territory began, it quickly became clear that the established

empires were not going to be met on their own terms.

It was to be a mobile war of razzia which the two emperors and their armies, each bent

towards attacking the other, simply could not match.

To this purpose, a primary strategic weapon of war utilised by the conquering Arabs was

the unassuming camel.

Accustomed to travelling across incredibly arid terrain with essentially no water, these

workhouse pack animals were used to lethal effect on campaign.

Camel-mounted armies of Muslim infantry would frequently strike Byzantine or Sassanid territory

from unexpected, undefended angles, bleeding the empires of manpower and money before fading

back into the desert, where their enemies simply could not go.

Imagine playing a game of Civilization and possessing an area of apparently impassable

terrain near your key resource-producing regions, so you naturally do not fortify the area,

because you don’t need to.

After all, if no powerful enemy can get there, they can’t attack it anyway.

However, one of your underdog opponents then starts cheating and bypassing the impassable

to strike at the heart of your most crucial land.

Worse still, you can’t chase them back through that terrain.

If you try, you give them the opportunity to strike elsewhere.

This is what the established empires must have felt when the Muslims started attacking.

Khalid ibn Al Walid - arguably the greatest early Muslim general, exploited this prodigious

mobility to frustrate and exhaust a Sassanid imperial army in what is perhaps the greatest

example of its use.

During an attack in 633, Khalid planted his Arab army in front of Hufair and tempted Persian

general Hormuz, then stationed at Kazima to approach him.

His heavily-armoured force embarked on a tiring march to do so.

When the commander got there however, he discovered that the Muslims had ghosted into the desert

and were beelining back towards Kazima.

Bound to march in the defence of such a strategically vital place, Hormuz forced his unruly, exhausted

troops on a countermarch.

By the time Hormuz arrived back near the city, his army was near mutinous, barely in a fit

state to move, let alone fight, and in a terrible situation.

Meanwhile, Khalid’s well-mounted, leisurely stroll back to Kazima had allowed his forces

to prepare adequately.

In the subsequent Battle of Chains, rejuvenated Muslim forces soundly thrashed Hormuz’ thoroughly

outmaneuvered, physically drained army.

The average Arab warrior of the early Islamic conquest period would’ve been far less standardised

in form than a soldier from the Byzantine or Sassanid Empires.

Infantry and cavalry were both prominent, despite Arabia’s prominent lack of viable

horse-rearing ground.

Moreover, the distinction between foot and mounted troops was often blurred.

Changing with the situation, cavalry might dismount and fight as infantry while what

might be dubbed mobile infantry were frequently carried to battle on horses or camels.

Equipment, relatively similar between both cavalry and infantry, was purchased and provided

by the individual warrior or tribesman, rather than being issued by the Rashidun Caliphate

as a state.

However, potential combatants who were indeed too poor to assemble equipment of their own

might be assisted by wealthy kinsmen, neighbors or other benefactors.

Even for the well-to-do in Muslim society, however, good quality equipment was scarce

in the early days.

There was nothing overly unique about Muslim weaponry during their wars of expansion.

Spear, sword and bow were the primary methods of assault, but it is said that the Arabs

possessed particularly long spears and remarkably short swords when compared to their enemies.

As this short sword was carried in a shoulder-baldric rather than a belt at the waist, it is likely

that this style was copied or inspired by the old Roman gladius, which was kept in a

similar manner.

Metal armour seems to have struck both hot and cold in the Arab mindset from the very

beginning, as is evident in a saying of the second caliph Umar.

He describes mail armour as ‘Keeping our horseman busy, a nuisance for our infantry

and yet always a strong protection’.

Originating from the scalding hot and sun-bleached deserts of Arabia, heavy armour must have

seemed anathema to Arab warriors at first, due to the sheer discomfort it must have brought

on when worn, not to mention its encumbering effect.

We can imagine the more well-off Arab warriors investing in a coat of mail, only to speak

to their comrades about it and be met with traditionalist derision at wearing such a

burdensome thing.

Therefore, it may have been that use of armour was based upon both a warrior’s ability

to obtain it, in addition to the willingness to don it in battle and on the march.

Conversely, it might also have been the case that mail was reserved for frontline troops,

while rear-line infantry and archers went without.

Whatever the case, a notable and repeated occurrence during the Rashiduns’ expansion

was trouble facing enemy archers.

It became so bad that, whilst fighting the Byzantines in the eventual victory at Yarmouk,

Islamic warriors suffered what became known in legend as the day of lost eyes.

It might have been that this, in addition to other such occasions, was brought on by

a reluctance to wear heavy armour and helmets.

Two other crucial ‘units’ which partially made up early Rashidun armies have come to

symbolise the Muslim style of war during this period - the ‘mobile guard’ cavalry strike

force and Mubarizun.

Rather than being a default part of the Islamic army of expansion as an institution, however,

the mobile guard in particular was in fact a circumstantial reorganisation enacted by

the great general Khalid Ibn al-Walid in the middle of his invasion of Syria.

After the commander’s triumph at Ajnadayn in late 634, it was clear that the next stage

of the Muslim invasion would have to pierce deep into Syria.

So, sifting through the 8,000 strong army under his leadership, Khalid extracted the

most veteran, most elite and deadliest fighters to form a 4,000 man-strong band of horsemen

which was known as the ‘Army of Movement’, or more commonly the mobile guard.

In an army whose warriors were already battle-hardened veterans, these paragons were the crème de

la crème.

One of those handpicked 4,000 was the near mythical warrior-captain Qa’qa bin Amr.

Not only did this ferocious lieutenant supposedly play a crucial role in both the Battle of

Chains and the Battle of Yarmouk, but he was also personally chosen by the caliph to lead

Arab reinforcements to the Battle of al-Qadissiyah.

If our sources are to be believed, he also played a key role in winning this domino-toppling

clash as an energetic cavalry commander.

That was the sheer quality of soldiers assembled together in Khalid’s elite unit.

As a coherent and unified force, the mobile guard was frequently used by the legendary

sword of Allah as a lethal mounted reserve which could be used wherever it was seen fit.

The unit could plug a hole in allied lines by riding swiftly to where aid was most needed,

or it could sweep around the flanks of an enemy to roll up their battle line and win

the battle.

Under Khalid’s generalship, it played both of these roles during the battle at Yarmouk.

Despite its fame and flashy style of warfare, the Rashidun mobile guard was an incredibly

short-lived entity, which nevertheless served its purpose.

When Khalid was dismissed from his post by Umar, the regiment as a unified entity was

simply disbanded and its members dispatched to other fronts in Islam’s ongoing wars

of conquest.

Many more of its warriors apparently passed away during the plague of 639/640, and those

few who survived accompanied Amr Ibn al-As to Egypt.

The Mubarizun, translated as ‘duelists’ or ‘champions’ served the purpose one

would expect of a warrior bearing their title.

The bravest men in all the Arab armies, Mubarizun would step forward alone and battle a Byzantine

or Persian champion in the ritualised single combat which was so common in that period.

Arab champions were particularly deadly, gaining victory in most battles.

As victors they would bring pride to their religion and caliphate, morale to the army

and conversely demoralise the enemy force.

Still, despite their successes, Muslim forces frequently found themselves on the sharp end

of heavy casualty figures and manpower replenishment rapidly became an issue that the caliphs needed

to deal with.

Part of this shortfall was made up by non-Arab deserters who took up with the invaders and

quickly became key cogs in the overall machine of expansion out of the Arabian Peninsula.

As early as the Battle of Al-Qadissiyah, 4,000 soldiers from the army of Rostam Farrokhzad

went over to the Muslim side.

So great was this coup that the defecting warriors were able to demand from the Arabs

land of their own choosing, to closely associate themselves with an Arab band of their own

preference and to be paid salaries sometimes even in excess of regular Arab warriors.

These and other such traitors to the Sassanid shah’s cause were known as the Hamra, or

‘red people’.

This phenomenon became so prevalent that, during the Muslim invasion of Khuzestan and

the Siege of Shushtar, a famous unit of elite Persian soldiers known thereafter as the Asawira,

led by one of Yazdegerd’s most senior and trusted commanders, also went over to the

caliph’s side.

Not only did these most capable of soldiers convert to the new and rising religion of

Islam, but they were given in exchange the highest possible level of pay, dwellings in

the new town of Basra and a position of honour within the Bani Tamim tribe.

While a massive amount of Byzantine territory was lost to the Arabs, it paled to the annihilation

which they inflicted on the Sassanid state, almost certainly in large part due to this

lack of faith in their leadership.

Persian civilians and soldiers alike seemed all too eager to defect and join the invaders

at the slightest opportunity, perhaps due to instability within the royal house, weakness

of leadership or oppressive taxes.

Conversely, Arab soldiers were, as soldiers go, relatively well behaved.

Atrocities still, no doubt, occurred in great quantities, as they do in the vast majority

of military conflicts.

However, Islamic rules of military conduct, known as siyar, mandated that some sense of

civilisation remained even at the darkest points of war.

Enemy envoys were to be safeguarded and inviolate, non-combatant civilians were to be treated

as neutral parties and truces were to be accepted wherever possible.

‘Do not kill women or children, or an aged infirm person-’ once proclaimed caliph Abu

Bakr ‘Do not cut down fruit-bearing trees.

Do not destroy an inhabited place.

Do not slaughter sheep or camels except for food.

Do not burn bees and do not scatter them.

Do not steal from the booty and do not be cowardly.’

This kind of attitude, which ideally would result in minimal damage to ‘enemy’ civilian

occupations and populations, is likely to have garnered the invading Arabs incredible

favour.

In the previous season, we covered the first stages of the Muslim conquest of the Middle

East.

It started in 633 with the campaign in Mesopotamia against the Sassanid empire by the general

of the Rashidun Caliphate Khalid ibn al-Walid.

After a string of victories that brought him to the border of the Eastern Roman Empire,

Khalid entered Syria and again won a number of decisive battles culminating at the battle

of Yarmouk, which put most of the region under the control of the Caliphate.

In southern Mesopotamia though, the Sassanid empire attempted a counter-attack which led

to the battle of al-Qadisiyyah.

After the battle that continued for days, the Muslim army commanded by Sa’d Ibn Abi

Waqqas defeated Rostam’s Sassanid force.

Amidst the slaughter and unfolding catastrophe at Qadissiyah, the commander of the Persian

centre-right - Jalinus - assumed leadership of the imperial army’s remnant and set about

saving what forces he could.

Assembling a small, elite strike force, he thrust towards the al-Atiq dam and drove a

unit of Muslim troops away before forming a perimeter and holding it.

As Sassanid stragglers withdrew across the dam wall to the other side, Jalinus bravely

repelled many attacks from the Muslims and managed to see most of the remaining troops

to safety, but it was still a painfully small number.

When the last of them were on the canal’s far side, Jalinus had the dam destroyed and

began hastily pulling his men upstream to Najaf before the victors fully turned on him.

Unwilling, however, to give the foe any breathing room, Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas dispatched Qa’qa

and Shurahbeel to hunt down scattered Persian units, while cavalry commander Zuhra bin al-Hawiyya

was sent after Jalinus with 300 elite Arab horsemen.

Not deterred by the dam crossing’s destruction, Zuhra and his 300 drove their mounts into

the torrent and forded it before chasing Jalinus’ column upstream.

The latter realised he was being chased and halted with his own cavalry at a nearby bridge,

while the infantry carried on withdrawing all the way to Najaf.

After a short time, the horsemen of Zuhra came across Jalinus’ valiant rear-guard

and charged it, breaking the formation swiftly and provoking its leader into yet another

withdrawal.

His heels constantly bit by Zuhra as he did, Jalinus chose to turn and face the enemy in

a final fight, believing that the best way to stop the pursuit was to kill the leader.

So, he halted his forces, turned about face and arrayed for battle, before personally

riding before his troops and challenging Zuhra to single combat.

Galloping forward atop their horses, the two exhausted commanders fought one another to

decide the issue once and for all, and once again it was the Muslim who came out on top

after a hard-fought struggle.

Jalinus was killed and his cavalry took flight, but many were still caught and slain by Zuhra’s

riders.

By sunset, the 300 reached Najaf, where they halted for the night.

With the aim of conquering prosperous Iraq, which the Muslims believed was the ‘heart

of the world’, Sa’d reorganised his 20,000 troops into five marching corps1 with Zuhra

retaining his advance guard position.

Two weeks after Qadissiyah, he was quickly joined at Najaf by the remainder of the army

and given the order to cross the Euphrates.

Incoming Sassanid reinforcements under Nakheerjan arrived in the area soon after, having been

initially bound for Rostam’s now broken force.

Hearing of the defeat, the reinforcement group halted east of the Euphrates and waited for

new orders from Ctesiphon, which came in the form of Firuzan, a general tasked by Emperor

Yazdegerd with preventing or delaying the seemingly unstoppable advance of the Muslims.

When Firuzan appraised the situation, he decided that his army of fresh and recently defeated

forces under his command wouldn’t be enough to throw the Arabs back.

So, he instead prepared defensive actions at a series of defensible locations and cities

on the road to the Persian capital, so that the great city would have time to fortify.

As his first move, Firuzan ordered the governor of Burs, Busbuhra, to hold his branch of the

Euphrates and gave him some troops to help with the task, while the general and his main

army started massing near Babylon.

When Zuhra’s advance guard neared Burs, the city’s governor rode out to meet him.

In a short battle, the holding force of Sassanid troops was routed and Busbuhra severely wounded.

During the flight, he died from his wounds.

Following this defeat, the new local leader made peace with the Caliphate, agreeing to

provide information and logistical assistance.

From these new allies, Zuhra learned that the formidable main Sassanid army opposing

him was indeed across the Euphrates at Babylon, along with several high nobles.

Zuhra then forwarded this crucial information to Sa’d at Najaf, and waited for the four

corps trailing his own to catch up.

When they did, the Muslims advanced on Babylon in strength and, at some point in December

636, met Firuzan along the river bank and crushed his army in a brief but harsh battle.

One of the defeated generals, Hormuzan, fled south with his contingent to his domain in

Ahwaz, while Firuzan and the remainder withdrew north in good order, leaving garrisons at

Sura and Deir Kab along the way2.

Zuhra again set off in hot pursuit and, despite fierce resistance from the defensive Sassanid

armies in his way, managed to defeat them at Sura, Deir Kab, and Kusa on his relentless

drive to Ctesiphon.

By early January of 637, the Muslim leader neared Vologesocerta - just one of the cities

which made up larger Ctesiphon, where he was again rejoined by the bulk of the army.

To the desert-dwelling Arabs, whose largest urban areas were but a fraction of the size,

the Persian capital was unlike anything most of them had ever witnessed in their lives.

More than just a single city, Ctesiphon had in fact grown to encompass about seven grandiose

population centres which had been constructed and assimilated over the centuries, forming

a true metropolis.

Because of its unique nature, the Persian heartland was dubbed Madain, or ‘The Cities’

in Arabic.

On the Tigris’ western bank stood Seleucia, Vologesocerta and Veh-Ardashir, while Ctesiphon

proper and a number of peripheral hubs were to the east.

Perhaps the most majestic sight for those approaching Arabs during 637 would have been

the 40-meter-tall Arch of Khosrow, an architectural marvel unique in the world at the time.

Although Firuzan hadn’t managed to stop the Muslim advance, his delaying action had

worked, and now the entire western portion of Yazdegerd’s imperial capital was fortified

with a deep ditch, with manned positions at regular intervals.

The Sassanid Shah3 and his advisors also massed a number of ballistae and catapults in the

bounds of Veh-Ardashir which, as the closest sub-city to Ctesiphon proper, was the focus

of their defensive efforts.

Zuhra ordered an attack on Madain shortly after his arrival, but Yazdegerd’s artillery

began launching bolts and throwing giant stones out of Veh-Ardashir and into the Muslim ranks,

causing severe losses and forcing Zuhra’s forces to retreat out of range.

Unable to reply in kind, he sent scouting parties to probe and find a way inside, but

everywhere came across the Persians’ defensive trench and were unable to breach it.

Sa’d arrived at this point and assumed command, swiftly deciding that there was little point

wasting his warriors in careless assaults against such strong defences.

So, instead he established a blockade around all of Madain west of the Tigris and settled

his forces down for a long siege.

However, Sa’d wasn’t content to sit and wait for victory, taking all measures he thought

possible to secure a faster surrender of the unbelievers, primarily by scything away the

western bastion’s food supplies.

To do this, he had his subcommanders conduct raids on the neighboring hinterland, seizing

cattle and sheep for the Muslims’ own uses whilst also sapping the enemy’s resources

by preventing supplies from reaching Veh-Ardashir.

In the process of doing so, Arab cavalry seized thousands of farmers as prisoners of war who,

upon the intercession of a regional leader who had submitted, were freed upon agreeing

to pay the Jizya tax.

In addition, security for their lives and possessions were guaranteed, an act which

won the Muslim invaders considerable good will with the locals.

Throughout the months long siege, Sa’d’s warriors had also been continuously harried

by the sophisticated Sassanid engines of war Yazdegerd’s generals had amassed, although

casualties at their hands remained relatively light.

Unfortunately for the Persians, some of their engineers defected during the course of the

siege and provided their masters with at least 20 novel artillery pieces of their own.

When these contraptions subsequently began sending their own missiles howling into Ctesiphon,

the dense concentration of Sassanid soldiers and civilians inside resulted in them causing

terrible destruction.

The fact that the Muslims had even acquired weaponry of this kind, which had until then

been universally in Persian hands, also badly affected morale.

By mid-March 637 western Madain’s situation was becoming intolerable.

Persian civilians starved to death in the hundreds, while more were reduced to eating

stray cats and dogs to survive.

Beset by such conditions, the Sassanid troops not manning the ditch were concentrated into

a single strike force and led in a desperate sortie beyond their defences.

The Muslims arrayed to meet them in pitched battle and a desperate struggle began.

Zuhra’s corps was in the thick of the action and he himself was wounded by an arrow.

Despite his injury, the valiant Bani Tamin chief led a counterattack and personally slew

the Persian strike force commander, after which the defenders withdrew behind their

ditch.

The savage fighting to repulse the Persian attack was followed by a few hours of eerie

calm, during which a Sassanid officer approached the Muslims with an offer: each belligerent

would retain whatever territory they had captured on their respective sides of the Tigris.

However, these conditions were declined with the reply “There can never be peace between

us until we get honey out of the lemons of Kusa.”

When these peace overtures were rejected, the Persian forces in Veh-Ardashir quietly

withdrew from their positions and pulled back across the Tigris.

Western Ctesiphon was now under Muslim control.

Yazdegerd III also sent his family, retainers and treasury ahead to Hulwan, where the emperor

intended to move his court if the great capital fell.

Although behaving as if defeat was already inevitable, from his seat in the White Palace

Yazdegerd appointed Rostam’s brother Khurrazad and Mihran to command the defence of the eastern

city.

These generals promptly redeployed their remaining forces on the eastern bank and waited for

the besiegers’ next move.

That same evening, on the river’s edge of newly occupied Veh-Ardashir, Sa’d stared

across the Tigris at the glorious Arch of Khosrow and pondered his next move, eager

to claim it for Islam.

As Muhammad’s former companion strategised to himself, a Persian approached him and asked

“What are you waiting for?”, followed by the alarming revelation that “Not another

two days will pass before Yazdegerd departs with everything in Ctesiphon!”

Time was now of the essence.

Another sympathetic local, possibly disillusioned by heavy Sassanid taxation or possibly even

a recent convert to Islam, took Sa’d to a known ford in the river, one which Sa’d

deemed unsuitable due to the swift current and deep water.

Rather than make a hasty decision right then, he chose to sleep on the issue and decide

in the morning.

During the night, Sa’d supposedly had a strange dream in which he saw the Tigris’

waters, only they were flowing incredibly quickly and were unrealistically deep.

Still, his own Arab cavalry appeared and plunged into the seemingly impassable torrent, reaching

the other side relatively easily.

The next morning, Sa’d convened a conference of his highest generals and declared that

the cavalry would swim through the river, and asked if there were any volunteers to

lead the dangerous attack.

The first to put himself forward was Asim bin Amr, Qaqa’s tribal comrade and a dashing

military leader, followed by 700 of the most reckless and brave Muslim warriors.

After all necessary preparations had been made by midmorning, Asim plunged into the

water and began his crossing.

Khurrazad responded by ordering his Persians into the river to meet them, but after a hearty

resistance the Sassanid cavalry who responded were pushed back when one of their comrades

from the city came, shouting “Why are you killing yourselves, there is nobody left in

Ctesiphon to defend!”

He was at least partially correct.

Upon receiving word that the Muslims were crossing the Tigris, Emperor Yazdegerd had

departed his capital for Hulwan, taking much of the imperial court with him.

After their resistance faltered, most of the army defending the city followed suit4, save

for a Sassanid regiment fortified in the White Palace.

On the Tigris, Sa’d took the opportunity Asim’s lance-like advance had given him

and began ferrying the rest of his warriors across to the bridgehead, not without danger

of succumbing to the raging waters.

One man fell from his horse and fell into the current, but the all-powerful Qaqa reached

down in the nick of time and heaved him up.

Despite the myriad dangers of the crossing, in relatively short order the entire Islamic

army was on the eastern bank of the Tigris river.

The moment Sa’d himself landed, he ordered Asim and Qaqa to move on the core of Ctesiphon,

in the process of which they encountered token resistance, but this was quickly dealt with.

The Muslims found their final opposition in the White Palace, but chose to deal with it

by sending forward yet another companion of Muhammad - Salman.

A Persian by birth, he had converted to Islam after meeting the prophet in Arabia, and now

his heritage proved a crucial boon.

“I am actually one of you, I feel for you.”

he said upon meeting the defenders, and outlined the usual three choices - Jizya, conversion,

or death.

After a short negotiation, the hopeless palace troops accepted the Islamic tax and surrendered.

Ctesiphon - Jewel of the Sassanid imperial superpower for over four centuries - was now

in Arab hands, a people who had been a mere afterthought only years earlier.

Separate columns of Arab riders under Zuhra and Qaqa galloped forth from the captured

city almost immediately, moving in different directions5 in pursuit of their enemy.

The spoils were plenty - for example, 11 priceless suits of armour and swords which belonged

to Heraclius of the Byzantine Empire, the Turkish Khagan, and other world leaders.

Other treasures now in Sa’d’s hands included gold, jewels, and imperial regalia.

With the Sassanid capital had come the empire’s boundless wealth, and also the first major

mass conversions of Persians to Islam.

Salman the Persian in particular played a role in this religious change, preaching to

his countrymen the values and beliefs of the new faith.

Although Ctesiphon and all the ‘Suwad’ was lost to the House of Sasan, the Persians’

resistance to their conquest by the Muslims would continue in the old heartland beyond

the Zagros.

We last left the Muslims’ Syrian campaign in the aftermath of Abu Ubaidah and Khalid

Ibn al Walid’s triumph over the Romans at Yarmouk.

Exhausted from that long six-day struggle, the Muslims remained camped around Jabiya

for a month, collecting the bounties of war and recuperating their strength.

The scant few of Heraclius’ warriors who survived the massacre fled north to the relative

safety of Northern Syria, leaving Palestine at the mercy of the Islamic forces.

Without an army to check his progress, Abu Ubaidah assembled his generals in October

636 to decide how best to exploit the situation.

Some argued for an attack on the strategic lynchpin of Caesarea - a coastal fortress

whose garrison could be indefinitely reprovisioned by the Roman navy if besieged, but which could

also serve as a potential beachhead for a counterattack if not taken.

If the Muslims got it, the campaign for Palestine would be over.

However, other commanders pointed inland towards a much simpler and symbolically enticing target

- Jerusalem.

Not only could this isolated city be strangled into submission with relative ease, but the

loss of their holiest place would be a crushing blow to Roman Christian morale.

Unable to come to a decision, Abu Ubaidah sent a message to Caliph Umar asking his opinion.

The reply was simple - take Jerusalem.

So, Abu Ubaidah led the Muslim army straight at the holy city.

Realising what was about to happen, Jerusalem’s patriarch Sophronius secretly sent the holiest

Christian relics, including the true cross, off to Constantinople by sea.

The raiding Arab mobile guard under Khalid reached Jerusalem sometime in November, just

before the rest of the army, and this prompted the Roman garrison to pull back inside.

Discovering to their chagrin that its fortifications had been reinforced after Yarmouk in anticipation

of just such a siege, the five commanders - Abu Ubaidah, Khalid, Yazid, Amr and Shurahbil,

nevertheless blocked off all passage in and out of Jerusalem.

This state of affairs continued for four months in a relatively uneventful siege of which

few details survive.

The situation in the city must have become unbearable though, because in March 637 Sophronius

offered to surrender Jerusalem if Umar himself came and personally signed the treaty with

him.

When these terms became known, Shurahbil suggested that Khalid, whose appearance was relatively

similar to that of the caliph, should impersonate their leader and secure a quick surrender.

However, this attempt at deception failed the next morning because Khalid was far too

well known in the Levant by this point.

When it did, Abu Ubaidah instead dispatched a message to Medina explaining the situation.

A few weeks later, having made the long journey from Arabia, Caliph Umar arrived near Jerusalem.

Khalid and Yazid greeted him, both dressed in fine silk clothing, but this annoyed Umar

- a firm enemy of luxury and a proponent of the Spartan way of life.

Seeing his generals in such a state of apparent excess, the caliph picked up some pebbles

and threw them at the two stunned men, shouting “Shame on you, that you greet me in this

fashion.

It is only in the last two years that you have eaten your fill!”.

The caliph’s rage was quickly sated when Khalid and Shurahbil revealed that they were,

in fact, still carrying armour and weapons beneath their fine outer garments.

Drama aside, he quickly got down to business and negotiated with Sophronius, with the result

that Jerusalem was opened to the Muslims by late April.

It is said that the pact between Umar and Sophronius recognised Christians as a ‘protected

people’ with the right to practice their own religion in return for the Jizya, but

this ‘Covenant of Umar’ is probably apocryphal.

Now that the holy city of Christendom was in his hands, the caliph conferred with his

commanders and then went back to Arabia.

The Syrian army then split into thirds, with Amr and Shurahbil moving to reoccupy and secure

Palestine, Yazid besieging Caesarea, while Khalid and Abu Ubaidah moved to begin the

conquest of Northern Syria.

With the situation in the region seemingly hopeless after the Yarmouk disaster, Emperor

Heraclius sailed from Antioch and withdrew back into Anatolia, intent on consolidating

Byzantine military strength and protecting the remainder of his empire.

Once the ship departed, it is said that Heraclius said the words: “Farewell, a long farewell

to Syria, my fair province.

You are an enemy’s now.

Peace be with you, o’ Syria, what a beautiful land you will be for the enemy’s hands.”

Despite this effective abandonment, some of the Roman garrisons were still determined

to resist the Arab advance.

From Jerusalem, a 17,000 strong force under Khalid and Abu Ubaidah marched unopposed to

Damascus, and then even further north to Emesa.

From there, Khalid was dispatched with his elite mobile guard to Chalkis - modern Qinnasrin

- but was intercepted on a plain at nearby Hazir by 7,000 men under the town’s Roman

commander - Menas.

He deployed his limited forces in three divisions - a centre and two wings, placing himself

at the forefront.

Khalid charged with his Arab cavalry and soon enough a fearsome mounted engagement was underway.

After only a short amount of time, however, Menas was slain amidst heavy fighting, and

his troops, who loved their general, went wild with fury.

Despite their numerical inferiority, the Roman troops matched the Muslims pound-for-pound

in the head-on clash, pushing them back a little but committing themselves too much.

To exploit the opportunity, Khalid detached a unit of cavalry from one of his wings and

led it around the Byzantine line, attacking his enemy from the rear and defeating them.

It is said that not a single Roman survived this engagement at Hazir.

Following this victory, in June 637, Khalid moved on Chalkis itself, where the garrison

was stubbornly fortified in the town’s citadel.

Rather than launching an assault, the Muslim general merely demanded those inside and the

defenders surrender, which they did soon after.

Abu Ubaidah rejoined Khalid at this point and the pair moved north to Aleppo, where

they defeated a minor Byzantine force commanded by Joachim in a pitched battle outside the

city.

Much like at Chalkis, the Romans retreated into their fortifications - a hilltop citadel

outside Aleppo itself.

Joachim sallied out a few times in an attempt to break the siege, but failed, and by October

637 the city was in Arab hands.

The greatest Roman city in Syria - Antioch, was now close.

To precipitate an attack on it, Ubaidah sent a strike force to deal with the garrison at

Azaz in the north, so that no Roman units could hit them from the flank as they were

taking Antioch.

This was done swiftly, and when the strike force returned Ubaidah’s advance on Antioch

began.

When the Muslim army was 12 miles from one of the urban jewels of the Byzantine Empire,

they were met at an iron bridge over the Orontes River by a powerful Roman army who had come

from Antioch.

Although the details of this ‘Battle of the Iron Bridge’ are also unknown, it is

clear that Khalid used his mobile guard to superb effect, crushing the Romans in a battle

whose casualties were only exceeded by Ajnadayn and Yarmouk.

In the wake of thousands of fleeing enemy soldiers, the Muslims approached and besieged

Antioch, but taking the illustrious capital of the east was an anticlimax.

Only a few days into Abu Ubaidah’s investment - October 30th, the weakened city surrendered

on terms and its defenders were permitted to withdraw north unmolested.

Having cleaved the Eastern Roman Empire into two disconnected pieces, Abu Ubaidah dispatched

Khalid on a daring cavalry raid across the Taurus Mountains and into the Tarsus region,

while the supreme commander himself thrust south down the Mediterranean coast, capturing

seaports such as Laodicea, Gibala, Antarados and Tripoli making it impossible for emperor

Heraclius to use the superior Roman navy to bring armies into the Levant.

Although fighting in the area was far from over, by late 637 most generals of Syrian

campaign settled down to rule their respective regions as governors1.

At Hulwan, Yazdegerd III was still eager to salvage his crumbling empire after the loss

of Ctesiphon.

To do this, he ordered the main Persian army under Mihran and Khurrazad to halt their retreat

and turn to face the invaders near Jalula.

Armies attempting to push north past the riverside town were forced to march through a narrow

gap between the Tigris’ Diyala tributary to the west side and an area of barely passable

broken ground to the east.

If Mihran’s 20-30,000 could hold this position, the remainder of the northern Suwad and Sassanid

territory east of the Zagros Mountains would be unassailable.

With the aim of converting Jalula into an impenetrable fortress able to resist any enemy

thrust, Mihran immediately started digging in.

A ditch was excavated three miles to the south which connected the broken ground to the river,

blocking the gap.

Behind this trench were a number of other fortifications, artillery and thousands of

Persian archers, while in front were placed an array of wooden anti-cavalry caltrops.

Recruits were mustered, armed and trained from the local area, and provisions were gathered

from around the nearby countryside.

Jalula was to be a crucial battle.

The moment Sassanid defensive works began around Jalula, word reached Sa’d in Ctesiphon

that this was happening.

As the Muslim general was just as keen to seize the fertile northern Suwad as his Persian

enemies were to keep hold of it, and wanting to push the defensive frontier eastwards,

Sa’d sent his nephew Hashim bin Utba with 12,000 troops to reduce the Persian position.

In order to prevent reinforcement or retreat, Sa’d also dispatched 5,000 men to deal with

Persian governor Intaq’s garrison at Mosul.

After several attempts at taking that city by storm, Muslim spies managed to secure the

defection of a Christian Arab contingent in a betrayal which led to the fall of Mosul.

In the main force heading for Jalula during March 637, Hashim brought with him many companions

of Muhammed, as well as the ever-ferocious Qaqa ibn Amr.

Also in the Muslim ranks were several thousand Persian troops along with Sassanid officers

who had joined them after Ctesiphon.

When the Arabs and their Persian units approached the Jalula gap after a day’s march from

the former Sassanid capital, Hashim constructed his camp and deployed along the southern arc

of Mihran’s protective trench, unwilling to launch an outright assault against it.

So, the situation remained in this manner for many months, during which reinforcements,

provisions and money was channeled into the fortified city from Hulwan, where Emperor

Yazdegerd was continuously rallying additional forces.

Aware that his situation was only going to worsen with time, Hashim ordered several attempts

at storming the fortified ditch.

Despite the disconcerting failure of Mihran’s wooden caltrops to stop Arab cavalry, Persian

missile troops managed to overwhelm and repel these attacks.

Afterwards, the Sassanids replaced the wooden obstacles with more effective iron ones.

Demoralised due to their lack of success in breaking the Persian line, the Muslims ceased

offensive actions for a while, and that gave Mihran an opportunity of his own.

Utilising the constant steady stream of reinforcements coming his way, the Persian general began

launching sorties against Hashim’s positions, inflicting losses and gaining confidence as

he did.

Although the Muslim army was easily able to fight up to 80 of these attacks off when they

arrived and pushed Mihran back into his fortifications repeatedly, there was still no way to break

the deadlock.

With little other option, Hashim sent word back to Ctesiphon that he required reinforcements.

Sa’d initially sent 600 infantry and 400 cavalry to bolster the army at Jalula, but

this total was barely enough to replace the losses suffered during eight months of battle

and light siege.

So, soon after, another 500 cavalry reinforcements were dispatched which included many competent

Arabic tribal chiefs who had fought against the Caliphate in the Ridda Wars.

The Persians, having been themselves reinforced by Yazdegerd and emboldened by Muslim inability

to break their defences, now decided to go on the attack before Hashim was further reinforced.

Mihran also realised that simply waiting wasn’t going to win him the battle - the only way

to make the Muslim invaders leave was to inflict a decisive defeat on them.

Deployment for an assault began with haste.

Such Sassanid preparations for a major attack could not be concealed, and it immediately

attracted Hashim’s attention.

This state of affairs was, however, also favourable to the Muslims, who were utterly sick and

tired of sitting helplessly outside Mihran’s fortifications, So, to facilitate a pitched

battle, Hashim withdrew his forces a short distance to the south and allowed his Persian

adversaries to cross their own entrenchments, thereafter arraying for battle opposite.

The actual order of battle at Jalula is obscure to us, but we do know that two former ‘apostate’

chiefs - Amr bin Madi Karib of the Zubaid family and Tuleiha bin Khuleiwad of the Banu

Asad, were given command of the cavalry and infantry respectively.

Now that the Persian rear was anchored by their own ditch, the only direction to move

was forwards, and that is just what happened.

At Mihran’s command, the Battle of Jalula proper began with a full-scale Sassanid attack

along the entire front, with archers and javelineers loosing their projectiles before melee troops

made contact.

The charge struck with devastating impact, but Hashim’s Muslims nevertheless resisted

stalwartly for a time, refusing to give an inch of ground.

This didn’t last long however, as the ferocious assault, fired up by constant shouts swearing

vengeance for Qadissiyah and Ctesiphon, began punching small holes in various places along

the Muslim line.

These successful thrusts endangered the integrity of the entire Muslim front, and it was immediately

clear to Hashim that the danger of total collapse was very real, and perhaps imminent.

To resolve the problem, Sa’d’s nephew rode along his buckling line to speak inspirationally

to those units which were weakening, proclaiming that if they persisted, this was the last

battle they would have to fight.

The present clash between Sassanid and Muslim troops became increasingly brutal as both

sides’ missile units ran out of javelins and arrows, instead taking up melee weapons

and charging into the slog themselves.

Both armies had units battered into non-functionality by the extended fighting, but when this happened

the Persians were able to replace them, while Hashim had no such luxury.

Because of this numerical disadvantage, one Islamic unit gave way and routed to the rear

at about noon, leaving a potentially fatal vacuum in the Muslim line.

However, either because Mihran did not notice the opportunity or due to his soldiers’

exhaustion, an attack on the position was not ordered and Hashim scraped together some

men to fill the position.

Witnessing the flight of this unit, Qaqa rode back and restored order, returning it to the

battle.

Almost unbearable desert heat and the brutal fighting led to the Persians halting their

offensive just after this, and both sides disengaged.

After a short rest, Mihran planned to keep piling on the pressure, but Hashim had other

plans.

As his enemy had before, the Muslim general ordered his warriors to charge across the

entire front, spoiling Mihran’s assault and initiating another gruelling clash which

lasting for over an hour without a decisive moment.

Just before sunset, however, the wind whipped up and a storm rolled in from the south, a

weather phenomenon which affected the Persians more than the hardy desert nomads.

As the wind was now at the Muslims’ back, granting them momentum in the advance, Hashim

signalled Qaqa ibn Amr to embark on a maneuver they had prepared beforehand.

While his general kept Mihran occupied in front, the buccaneering Arab warrior took

a regiment away from the left wing unnoticed and managed to circle around the Persian rear.

Instead of attacking immediately, Qaqa left most of his outflanking force in a sheltered

area to stop them being seen, then took a few outriders and a man with an incredibly

strong voice close to the main crossing point over the Persian trench.

Following the call, multiple things happened at once.

First, the Muslim army, deceived by their own into believing that their general had

reached the trench alone, attacked with renewed vigour and peak morale.

At the same time, worried that large numbers of Muslims were now behind them, individual

Sassanid units, who did not have a strategic overview of the field, panicked, lost cohesion

but did not break.

The coup de grace was administered by Qaqa himself, whose flanking force charged upon

hearing the shout, whirling into Mihran’s flank like a thunderbolt.

At the impact, the Sassanid line was rolled up before being encircled entirely.

Still, however, the Persian forces were stalwart, refusing to collapse utterly despite their

unwinnable situation.

Muslim forces continued attacking the encircled but still resistant forces of Mihran all day,

losing troops as they did.

However, the Sassanid soldiers were only human.

At sunset, as the sky began to darken, everything fell apart and the Persians routed, only to

be cut down as they fled.

A great mass of them, driven into the ditch and their own iron stakes by Hashim’s army,

perished terribly.

Up to half of the Sassanid army perished at Jalula, while the remainder, including the

town garrison, fled in the direction of Hulwan, and the town itself fell in December 637.

Shortly after, Qaqa rode in pursuit of the retreating enemy and defeated them first at

Khaniqeen, before besieging and capturing Hulwan in January 638.

Emperor Yazdegerd retreated beyond the Zagros.

When Qaqa subsequently wrote to the caliph asking permission to operate deeper in Persia,

Umar would have absolutely none of it.

Forbidding the operation, he replied “I wish that between the Suwad and the hills

were a wall which would prevent them from getting to us and prevent us from getting

to them.

The fertile Suwad is sufficient for us, and I prefer the safety of the Muslims to the

spoils of war.”

Expansion to the east was halted, but the Muslims were now looking towards the jewel

in the Roman imperial crown - Egypt.

Despite winning all of Syria and Iraq for Islam in a series of stunning victories, the

caliphate’s military situation remained unstable.

Fierce Persian resistance continued in the mountainous to the northeast, while Emperor

Heraclius was hindering the Muslim advance as much as he could.

To stall for time while he created an impenetrable dead-zone between the Anatolian plain and

enemy-occupied Syria, Heraclius sent envoys to his Christian Arab allies in the Jazeera

area , requesting that they attack the Muslim army in Syria.

They obeyed the emperor’s orders, crossing the Euphrates and arriving outside Emesa in

March 638, where Abu Ubaidah had concentrated his forces to meet them.

However, Umar, in his typically hands-on fashion, reacted to this news by sending orders to

Sa’d, in Persia, for three columns to invade Jazeera from Iraq.

When this group of Muslim warriors launched their attack and began plundering, the Christian

Arabs retreated.

In the aftermath, forces under Sa’d turned and annexed Jazeera completely.

At the same time, multiple mounted raiding parties were sent by Abu Ubaidah into Roman

lands.

Khalid, the commander of one of these contingents, captured Marash in Autumn 638, and hauled

vast quantities of loot back to his base at Qinnasrin.

However, Khalid wasn’t a man accustomed to hoarding wealth, routinely distributing

his personal share of battle spoils to others.

On one occasion after his raid on Heraclius’ lands, an Arab chief and excellent poet - Ash’as

bin Qais - recited a beautiful piece for Khalid, and in return was given 10,000 dirhams.

Unknown to the poet’s benefactor, this act of generosity was in fact to herald the end

of his peerless military career.

Caliph Umar had been concerned about Khalid for years by 638, specifically that his personal

brilliance and constant victories were enticing the Muslims to worship him, rather than god.

So, when Umar received reports of his general’s extravagance, Umar used it as an excuse to

dismiss the Sword of Islam from his post and bring him to Medina.

When the two formidable men came face to face, the caliph spoke the words: “You have done,

and no man has done as you have done.

But it is not people who do; it is Allah who does.”

After this, Khalid left Arabia for Chalkis, where he lived just four more unhappy, unremarkable

years before finally passing away in 642.

As the undefeated victor of hundreds of clashes leaves our story, another bold but historically

unappreciated Arab general enters the limelight.

That was the forty-eight-year-old Amr ibn al-As, who won distinction during the battles

at Ajnadayn, Yarmouk, and many others.

When Abu Ubaidah appointed the conquered regions to his subordinates, Amr received all of Palestine.

Upon moving into the area, he forced the surrender of Gaza and several other Roman garrisons

which had remained unconquered after the Fall of Jerusalem.

In early 639, plague spread rapidly throughout the Levant.

The Arabs, unaccustomed to this kind of terrible disease because of their nomadic lifestyle,

died in the thousands, including generals Yazid, Shurahbil, and Abu Ubaidah himself.

It is worth noting that upon Yazid’s death, his younger brother Muawiya was appointed

as governor in his place.

Amr, who survived, was given command of the army, and this gave him a golden opportunity

to propose an idea to the caliph : Having visited Alexandria multiple times earlier

in his life, Amr was well aware of just how prosperous the Nile region was, and believed

it would be easy to conquer.

The new commander put forward his plan to seize Roman Egypt for Islam, confidently declaring

to the caliph: “It is the richest of lands, and the weakest in defending itself!”

Although Umar, who wished to consolidate Muslim gains after years of incessant warfare and

plague, was initially reluctant, believing Amr was underestimating the task, his eloquence

and persistence eventually led the caliph to relent.

Restricted to just 4,000 troops, mainly cavalry, Amr set forth from Jabiya that same night

in total secrecy, under the condition that he would withdraw if instructions to turn

back reached him before he crossed into Egypt.

However, if Amr’s army was already inside Egypt when these instructions arrived, it

could keep going.

Convinced almost immediately that this expedition was too risky, Umar sent a camel rider off

to Amr carrying a sealed letter, ordering him to pull back.

When it reached the general at Rafah, just a few miles from Egypt, Amr understood that

the letter would doom his expedition before it even began.

So, Amr left the message unopened and moved into Egypt and only then opened the letter,

and since the army was already in Egypt when Umar’s orders were revealed, Amr reasoned

that it could keep going.

The timeless province of power and riches was incredibly vulnerable, weakened by years

of military laxity and alienated from the imperial authorities in Constantinople by

long-standing cultural and religious differences.

The primary factor was that the Copts - Egypt’s native population - adhered to a different

form of Christianity to the empire at large . Emperor Heraclius in particular persecuted

any perceived heretic in a manner that made religious division inevitable.

The Roman authorities in Alexandria were alerted to Amr’s presence, responding by raising

troops and sending some of them to reinforce Pelusium - the ‘key to Egypt’.

Setting forth from Arish in late December 639, the Caliphate’s small army of veterans

soon reached Pelusium, besieging it by land.

However, Roman naval superiority meant that the city garrison could be reinforced and

supplied, and this led to a two-month-long siege which was only brought to a conclusion

when the Muslims repulsed a sortie and stormed the city in mid-February 640.

After taking Pelusium, to the alarm and astonishment of the government in Alexandria, Amr marched

unopposed along the Nile Delta’s eastern fringe until he reached the citadel of Bilbeis.

The defenders resisted under blockade for a month, giving the Romans time to shift their

forces around.

Aware that the marauding 4,000 Arabs were aiming for the Memphis area , Egypt’s prefect

and Patriarch of Alexandria, Cyrus, marched a 20,000 strong army to reinforce the nearby

fortress called Babylon.

Commanded by Augustalis Theodorus and garrisoned by 5,000 soldiers, Babylon was one of the

Nile’s strongest defensive bastions, standing 60 feet high in places and possessing walls

up to six feet thick.

By the time Amr starved the Bilbeis defenders into surrender in the spring of 640, the Romans

were prepared for his inevitable assault.

Bypassing Heliopolis on their left, the Muslims arrived outside Babylon in May.

Due to its sheer size, only some of Theodorus’ army were manning the battlements, while most

were encamped outside of the northern wall of the fortress, protected by a deep arcing

ditch.

Fortifying this secondary protection even further were spikes in front and undug sections

around the perimeter to act as sally points.

Shortly after arriving and witnessing the Roman strength arrayed inside Babylon, Amr

launched his 4,000 against the Roman units directly in front of the trench.

After a hard-fought skirmish, the Muslims were repulsed with relative ease and set about

finally making camp.

Observing that his plan to keep Theodorus on the defensive was paying off, Amr mounted

daily raids against the Roman positions all along the ditch.

Furthermore, in an attempt to conceal just how tiny his forces were, the Muslim commander

split and spread it over a large area.

This state of affairs lasted for two months - the Muslims constantly assailing the Roman

positions and the Romans remaining hunkered down behind the ditch, presumably believing

they would be able to win without fighting.

By July, no opportunity to gain a decisive victory had shown itself to Amr and his men

were slowly tiring.

So, having put the eventuality to the back of his mind, the man who had proclaimed that

taking Egypt would be simple, wrote to the caliph asking for reinforcements.

Rather than chiding his overly optimistic general, Umar mustered and sent him 4,000

reinforcements to conclude the campaign, who reached Amr a few weeks later.

With these new forces, the Muslim attacks on Babylon were renewed with even greater

force, killing large numbers of Roman soldiers but failing to break the bastion’s resistance.

Even more hesitantly than the first time, Amr sent another request for Umar’s aid.

This time, a further 4,000 troops were dispatched under the leadership of Zubayr bin Al-Awwam

who, despite being offered Amr’s command by the irritated caliph, merely stated that

he wished to help the Muslims engaged in Egypt.

These new troops arrived in late September.

After conducting a personal reconnaissance mission around the area, Zubayr pointed something

out to Amr which the general seems to have missed: still present about 10 miles behind

the Muslim army was the Roman-garrisoned city of Heliopolis.

If coordinated correctly, these troops could smash into the Muslims from behind if Theodorus

launched any attack from Babylon.

To remove this potential threat, Amr led a large portion of his 12,000 total soldiers

to Heliopolis, leaving just enough at the fortress to keep the Romans on their toes.

Upon approaching the walls, however, some of the garrison’s cavalry contingent emerged

from the city and beat some of Amr’s horsemen in a brief engagement.

Nevertheless, they were forced to pull back inside the walls as the city was besieged.

Only a short time after investing Heliopolis, Zubayr and a small unit of handpicked warriors

scaled the walls in a dashing maneuver and breached the city.

Seeing this, and realising that the result of the clash was inevitable anyway, Heliopolis’

garrison sued for peace and paid the Jizya, after which Amr and Zubayr returned to Babylon.

In their absence, the Romans had driven away the Muslim detachments closest to the trench

and re-established their positions beyond it.

Theodorus, likely realising that he wasn’t going to have the luxury of simply waiting

the invaders out, began employing the Muslims’ own tactics against them, launching daily

raids through the Roman bridgeheads.

Although the Romans generally lost more men in these scattered engagements, they could

afford to, while Amr could not.

The stalemate went on relatively unchanged until a revered Arab officer - Kharija bin

Huzafa - approached Amr with a risky but potentially decisive plan to win the battle.

That night, Kharija was given a cavalry regiment and ordered to lay his trap, which he did

by riding around to the southern spur of a featureless ridge on the eastern side of the

field.

After quietly taking up a concealed position relatively close to the Romans’ ditch, the

Muslim cavalry waited.

As Huzafa suspected, when morning came the Roman forces crossed the trench in force and

deployed for battle - the Muslims arrayed opposite them.

When both sides were ready, Theodorus launched his attack across the front, pushing Amr,

who ordered his army to retreat from Babylon with suspicious ease.

It was, in reality, a feigned retreat.

When the melee had moved far beyond Babylon’s defensive trench, Kharija’s mounted contingent

galloped out from their hiding place behind the ridge and occupied the crossing areas

which Theodorus would have to use for any retreat.

Amr, seeing that his horsemen were in place, countercharged with immense ferocity, driving

the Romans back towards their own fortifications.

Hearing the given signal, Kharija also launched his assault, crashing straight into Theodorus

rear, hemming the Romans in and then encircling them.

Many defenders were killed, but a few Roman units turned and burst through Huzafa’s

cavalry, managing to resecure the crossing points.

The remnants of the Roman army at Babylon retreated across the trench, pursued closely

by Amr’s forces, who continued their attack up to the very walls of the fortress.

Fighting continued in the space between the ditch and the citadel proper until the gate

was closed from inside.

Those who got in were the lucky ones, as not a single Roman soldier remained alive on the

field of battle . The morale of Cyrus, who was not a military man by profession, and

the Roman soldiery as a whole, was completely shaken by this stark defeat, and to the prefect

it was clear that peace had to be concluded.

To make matters even more dire, Amr somehow got his hands on a few catapults and used

them to launch deadly boulders, softening up the defences.

When this began happening, Cyrus departed Babylon with a small escort and took up residence

on the midriver island of Rauda, from which the fortress was being resupplied.

Then the Coptic prefect dejectedly sent word to the Muslims that he wished to treat with

them.

Envoys were exchanged back and forth between the two sides, and Heraclius’ viceroy attempted

to offer Amr a lavish bribe if the Muslims left Egypt, but the Arab commander responded

by giving 3 options - conversion to Islam, payment of the Jizya, or death.

Cyrus favoured capitulating in some form, but his Egyptian colleagues wouldn’t have

any of it, so the stalemate continued outside the impenetrable fortress.

Since coming to terms with Cyrus was impossible, Amr went into Babylon with a few companions

in order to speak with Theodorus.

However, when he was entering the fortress, a Roman soldier muttered to him scornfully

“You have entered, now see how you get out.”

Correctly believing orders had been given for him to be killed upon exiting the conference,

Amr tricked his way out of the fortress, convincing Theodorus that he was going to bring even

more of his generals unwittingly into the trap.

These attempts at ending the siege failed and the gridlock outside Babylon continued.

But finally, in mid-December, the observant Zubayr noticed that, since most of the fighting

had taken place on Babylon’s northern side, the riverside Gate of Iron and its two guard

towers were relatively undefended.

Just like that, the Muslims had found a key to Theodorus’ citadel.

Swiftly putting his infiltration plan into action with Amr’s blessing, Zubayr assembled

a unit to conduct the operation.

On the moonless, clear night of December 20th 640, most of the Muslim army arrayed quietly

outside the Gate of Iron while Zubayr and his comrades climbed ladders up the wall.

Then, when some of his men were gathered on top, a deafening Islamic battle cry was sounded

and echoed by the entire army, causing shock and panic amongst defenders who had no idea

what was happening.

Amidst the chaos, Zubayr slew the gatehouse sentries and broke the chain which held the

gate closed, allowing Amr and the Muslim army to flood inside.

While some of the more elite Roman formations made a brave last stand, most of their comrades

routed towards the Nile.

Once they reached the riverbank, the soldiers crossed to the safety of Rauda on pre-prepared

boats, which ferried soldiers back and forth throughout the night.

Among those who fled was Theodorus, who managed to escape Amr’s grasp and run back to Alexandria.

The next day, Cyrus sued for and obtained peace for the Copts on Muslim terms, agreeing

to pay the Jizya and submit the entire country to Islamic rule.

The Romans in Egypt could either accept and remain, or reject and depart.

Unsurprisingly, when Heraclius received a letter from Cyrus seeking the imperial stamp

of approval for his peace with Amr, the emperor was furious and categorically refused, responding

with a message full of scorn and insults.

To ensure that an active defence of Egypt continued despite the prefect’s treachery,

Heraclius had other messages ordering firm resistance delivered to all of his Roman generals

in Egypt, who obeyed their sovereign without question.

Cyrus, disavowed by the Romans, put himself and the Copts under Amr’s command, promising

the Muslims administrative and engineering assistance.

Memphis was now secure, and the push towards Alexandria could begin.

After the fall of Babylon to Rashidun forces in December 640, Amr Ibn al-As kept his army

stationed in the area for a while, dispatching word to caliph Umar of his triumph and requesting

permission to continue the conquest towards Alexandria.

This pause also gave his army a much-needed rest.

In Constantinople, the elderly and sickly Emperor Heraclius reacted to the latest Muslim

victory by ferrying several thousand more imperial reinforcements to Egypt over the

Mediterranean.

They had clear orders - protect Alexandria at all costs.

Upon making landfall at the provincial capital, these reinforcements and the existing Alexandrian

garrison, possibly under Theodorus’ command, began working to strengthen the city fortifications

and fanning out to defensible positions en route to the city.

Reports of these preparations made it south to Amr.

At about the same time, a messenger arrived from Arabia with the caliph’s order to advance

and seize Alexandria.

So, leaving a small garrison to hold down Babylon and keep the Memphis region in check,

Amr gave orders for his men to break camp.

The 12,000 strong Muslim army headed northwards in February 641.

Marching along the Nile Delta’s western fringe immediately adjacent to a familiar

desert climate, the Muslims overcame light Roman resistance at Tarnut and Kaum Shareek

before turning northwest, away from the river.

After subsequently capturing Sulteis, Amr then won a bloody victory at Kiryaun, just

12 miles away from Alexandria, and chased the defeated Roman forces to the city’s

eastern approach.

The march to the sea had taken just 22 days.

Alexandria had been built by Alexander the Great and his Ptolemaic successors on a relatively

narrow strip of land, bounded to the north by the Mediterranean Sea and in the south

by Lake Maryut.

Since the main transportation routes ended east of the city, the only truly vulnerable

approach was the northeastern one.

The Muslims made camp outside weapon range and then deployed for battle, slowly advancing

towards the recently reinforced Alexandrian walls.

Unfortunately for Amr, such a careless preliminary move allowed the expert Roman artillerists

to disrupt and scatter his units with volley after volley of massive catapult stones.

This bombardment sent Amr and his warriors back to camp, dodging missiles all the way.

Such attacks continued with intermissions, and in these intermissions the Roman defenders

would instead launch sorties out of the city and attack the Muslim army, aiming to throw

it back and end the siege.

Despite the ferocity and competence of the men carrying them out, these attempts failed

consistently and ended up being pushed back into the city.

At some point during the first months of indecisive action, the defenders sortied out against

a section of the front manned by the Arabian Mahra tribe and a fierce clash began.

It seems to have concluded as an indecisive draw, but the Mahra lost a man whose head

was subsequently cut off and taken away by the Romans, much to the Arabs’ fury.

The next morning, the same thing happened.

A Roman officer, probably made confident by the previous day’s action, launched an attack

on the Mahra, but this time the outcome was very different.

After being killed in the fighting, his head was taken by the Arab warriors and used as

a bargaining chip to get their comrade’s head back.

After a brief negotiation, both sides made an exchange and buried their kinsman with

honours.

At the height of summer, around two months after Amr initially constructed his camp,

the Sahmi tribal commander decided to shift it forward for reasons which we are not aware

of.

However, as his forces were moving, the Roman defenders sensed an opportunity and mounted

a daring cavalry attack, which nevertheless was easily repulsed.

A reckless Muslim cavalry detachment set out in hot pursuit of the fleeing Romans and actually

got inside the city just before the defenders could close the gates behind them.

Heavily outnumbered, they fought a fierce skirmish at the so-called Church of Gold.

in which some of them were killed and the rest were pushed out of Alexandria.

Heraclius, who maintained constant contact with Alexandria, was all too aware that the

Muslims were gaining momentum.

Worried that all of Egypt was about to be lost, he gathered a formidable army from across

what remained of the empire, together with equipment and supplies.

Just before this giant, emperor-led relief armada was about to set sail, Heraclius died

in Constantinople at the age of 66, leaving his eldest sons, Constantine III and Heraklonas,

as joint-heirs.

This initiated a round of imperial politicking which didn’t allow the empire to react at

the worst possible moment.

As senior emperor, Constantine attempted to get ahold of the increasingly dire situation

in Egypt.

His untimely death only a short time later derailed those plans entirely.

If that wasn’t bad enough, some Byzantine generals, including one Valentinus, took up

arms in support of Constantine’s son Constans II, believing that Heraklonas’ mother - Martina,

had poisoned Constantine.

This dynastic struggle would not conclude until late 641, ensuring that no reinforcements

would be sent to Alexandria.

Politicking also infected the soldiers defending the Egyptian capital, causing infighting and

massive morale loss.

When the siege had dragged into its sixth month with no sign of ending, Amr received

a letter from the caliph chastising him for taking so long.

So, after conferring with his generals, Amr selected the experienced Ubada bin As-Samit

to lead an assault.

In late October 641, the entire Muslim army assembled for midday prayer and then deployed

for battle.

Then, led by Ubada, Amr’s forces finally captured Alexandria by storming a gate near

the Church of Gold.

Of Muslim achievements to this point - 20 years since Hijra - the seizure of Alexandria

ranked alongside events such as Yarmouk and Al-Qadissiyah in its importance.

The caliphate acquired an invaluable naval base while diminishing Roman seapower and

conquered a land of immense riches and culture.

Perhaps most importantly for the future, possession of Egypt allowed the Islamic armies to penetrate

even further south and west into Africa.

The wealth, beauty, and luxury of Alexandria ensnared the Arabs and their general in equal

measure, but Amr could not make his headquarters there without the caliph’s permission.

So, he sent an emissary back to Medina asking Umar whether or not he could stay in the metropolis.

Unfortunately for the conqueror of Egypt, one of the Rashidun ruler’s many quirks

was the absolute contempt and distrust in which he held large expanses of water, such

as the Nile.

The single occasion on which Umar allowed one of his commanders - a governor of Damascus

known as Muawiyah, to embark on a naval operation, the entire force had been destroyed.

So, Umar refused Amr’s request, explaining: “I do not wish the Muslims to take up their

abode where water intervenes between them and me, in winter or summer.”

Disappointed, Amr moved south and laid the foundations for his new city, the first capital

of Islamic Egypt - Misr al-Fustat - the City of the Tents, or Fustat for short.

The country’s new governor was occupied for the next few months attending to the administration

of the Caliphate’s newest territory.

As 641 gave way to 642, Amr settled grievances among his warriors and the locals, revitalized

previously abandoned pieces of infrastructure, including canals, and even dispatched food

aid to famine-ridden Medina at Umar’s request . To extinguish any remaining embers of resistance

against Muslim rule, Amr sent out three columns to the areas around Damietta, Heliopolis,

and Fayyum, while a fourth ensured that the remainder of lower Egypt was obedient.

All of them had an easy time, accomplishing their task without bloodshed by mid-642.

With Egypt firmly in his grip, the adventurous Amr Ibn al-As turned his focus towards a Christianised

Nubian kingdom called Makuria to the south.

Makuria, ruled by a king called Qalidurut from his great citadel at Dongola, was a rising

and expansionist power in Subsaharan Africa.

In fact, its monarch had only recently annexed a former regional rival Nobatia.

A literate society with a vibrant culture of their own, the Nubians were renowned as

hardy, ferocious warriors.

In particular, their formidable reputation for horsemanship and archery was known around

the Mediterranean world.

At some point during the scorching African summer of 642, Amr sent his cousin Uqba bin

Nafe and 20,000 horsemen into Nubia, where they quickly began suffering at the hands

of the local inhabitants.

Unable to resist the Muslims in a pitched battle, lethal but unarmoured Makurian archers

- mounted and on foot, launched constant hit and run attacks which gradually sapped Uqba’s

strength before darting back unharmed into the wilderness.

As the Islamic army pushed deeper into Nubia and encountered guerilla-style attacks in

increasing numbers and ferocity, the hawk-eyed Makurian archers would frequently call out

to the Arab invaders: “Where would you like me to put an arrow in you?”

When one of the Muslim warriors skeptically pointed at an area of their body, our sources

state that an arrow would indeed strike there, injuring or killing the man in question.

When Uqba and his diminished forces finally neared the Makurian capital at Dongola, they

found a smaller enemy army of around 10,000 waiting for them, forced into defending their

central city by Uqba’s movements.

Eager to destroy the Nubians’ fighting potential now that he had them all in one place, Amr’s

cousin began arraying his troops for battle.

As the Muslim advance towards Qalidurut’s line began, it was almost instantaneously

hit by an utterly merciless barrage of Makurian arrows that struck the attacking army with

pinpoint accuracy.

Uqba’s assault was stalled in its tracks by the hail of missiles just as soon as it

began and his soldiers, 250 of whom had lost at least one eye in the battle, suffered terribly.

Unable to close with the Nubian archers and swiftly losing men to grievous injury, Uqba

withdrew his warriors from the field.

Forever after, Muslims would call the Nubians ‘the archers of the eye’ because of their

penchant for loosing arrows with deadly accuracy into the eyes of their enemies.

Unwilling to continue such a difficult campaign in a land which promised them little gain

from plunder or future land, the Muslims continued retreating all the way back to Fustat.

Although not exactly a decisive defeat, an army of the Caliphate had been defeated for

one of the first times in history.

After a month or two of recuperation, Amr assembled his armies from their bivouacs and

personally led them west into the desert during September of 642.

After a month of hard marching, the Muslims eventually arrived at a still-Roman city known

as Barca which, having no arrangements for defence, quickly surrendered.

This was the first act of the decades’ long Islamic conquest of a region which is now

called the Maghreb.

Amr had Uqba ride inland from the coast, where he successfully pacified the area of arid

desert between Barca and Zawila without violence.

The poor population quickly proved law-abiding and reliable in their payment of taxes, so

Amr decreed that part of the revenues coming in from the entire Fezzan region would be

spent to alleviate poverty there.

Then in spring 643, the Muslim army advanced on and blockaded the Roman-garrisoned city

of Tripoli.

Amr set up his camp on an elevated section of terrain east of the city and waited, realising

that such a coastal settlement could be navally resupplied for an extended period of time.

Lacking siege weapons, he also lacked the ability to reduce fortifications.

After two months of relative inactivity, eight of Amr’s warriors galloped off west of the

city for a hunting trip.

When these hunters began making their way back around noon, the sheer heat of the day

led them to ride back along the coast.

All of a sudden, they came upon Tripoli’s western boundary, where the city wall met

the sea, and discovered that the section was only thinly protected.

In a display of bravery or foolishness, these eight intrepid opportunists used Tripoli’s

vulnerable flank to infiltrate their way inside the city.

Before the defenders even realised what was happening, the Muslim group reached the city

centre and began slaying enemies.

Such unexpected violence triggered a bout of extreme panic within the city, both among

the civilians and Tripoli’s defending forces.

In fact, a large number of the armed soldiers within the city believed that a large enemy

contingent had somehow gotten inside and, because of this, took refuge aboard a number

of anchored ships in the harbour.

Amr caught wind of the pandemonium taking place inside the city and so quickly set about

exploiting the weakness.

Arraying his warriors with haste, the Arab commander ordered a full-scale assault to

scale Tripoli’s enfeebled walls.

In yet another action of which we have left no detail, the Muslims managed to get inside

and joined their eight-strong vanguard.

Unwilling to fight any further, the Roman defenders took whatever they could carry and

departed aboard their ships, leaving Tripoli to Amr’s army.

While most of the army stayed in the city for a while, the conqueror of Egypt sent a

swift detachment of cavalry about 40 miles to the west, where the population of a town

known as Sabrata were still carefree.

They had heard rumours of fighting for neighboring cities, but it would be a while before the

war reached them, if ever.

The next morning, Sabrata’s Roman guards opened the gates of their city as its population

began leading animals out to graze for the day.

Unfortunately for them, it was at this moment that the Islamic cavalry unit struck completely

by surprise, getting through the gates, killing the majority of defending troops, and sacking

the town.

With that done, they returned to Tripoli.

Having succeeded, Amr longed for more, and eagerly penned another letter to Caliph Umar

containing both the good news of victory and request to continue his conquest.

This was rejected, as the caliph was worried about overextending his forces.

And this time, there was no loophole or clever ploy that Amr could use to bypass Umar’s

decree and continue his relentless campaigning.

Therefore, after allowing his army to recuperate in Tripoli for a time, Amr travelled back

to Fustat and remained there, quietly administering his Egyptian domain and dealing with whispers

of future rebellion.

Although Umar had spared the rest of Byzantine Africa for the time being, that wouldn’t

last long.

However, as the combat in North Africa was winding down, the situation on the Persian

front was becoming heated again.

Sa’d army was eager to pursue Yazdegerd across the mountains, however, Umar’s refusal

halted any further eastward expansion for the time being.

At the Caliph’s command, Sa’d began combing Iraq for a place where he could establish

a permanent military garrison.

Eventually, after receiving guidance from the locals, Sa’d found a promising area

of land in Suristan ‘where the land is both dry, well-watered, and is overgrown with thistles

and constructed a colony that would eventually grow into the city of Kufa.

Far to the southeast, another Arab raiding force of 800 led by Utba bin Ghazwan began

searching for a base of their own and came across an arid area covered in rocks, and

it was there that Utba began work on a settlement which eventually developed into modern Basra.

It seemed as though the frontier between the caliphate and the Sassanid Empire would calcify

at the Zagros mountains, allowing Sa’d and Umar a brief time to consider administrative

questions.

However, the post-Jalula status quo wouldn’t last for long.

Unwilling to accept the permanent loss of their Mesopotamian heartland due to haughty

imperial pride, the Sassanids continued backing military action against the Caliphate led

by Hormuzan, head of one of Persia’s premier families.

During the retreat from Qadissiyah, Hormuzan had split off from the main column with his

personal levy of survivors and marched back to his estates in Khuzestan.

This territory formed a vulnerable bulge, being the only remaining imperial Sassanid

territory west of the Zagros Mountains.

With little chance of resisting a concerted Muslim invasion of his lands, Hormuzan decided

to go on the attack.

From a forward base at the greatest city of his province - Ahwaz - the Persian general

began launching quick raids into the area of Maysan in 638.

As these attacks increased in frequency, Hormuzan established two additional bases even further

west near Manazir.

Utba was unable to deal with the Persian attacks with his mere 800 troops and appealed to Sa’d

for aid.

In response, the commander-in-chief ordered Nu'man bin Muqarrin with a few thousand warriors

to bolster Utba’s strength.

The combined Muslim force launched a lightning campaign that defeated Hormuzan’s army in

its forward bases and pushed the frontier east to the Karun River.

Suitably chastened by the reverses his soldiers had suffered, the Persian general concluded

an unstable peace with his two Muslim counterparts, claiming to submit to the Caliphs’s suzerainty.

The remainder of 638 passed without further warfare on the Persian front except for a

single act elsewhere - the so-called Fiasco of Fars.

One of Sa’d rivals and governor of the uneventful province of Bahrain - Ula bin Al Hadrami - sought

to increase his own status and launched a reckless amphibious assault across the Persian

Gulf.

Landing on the coast of Fars, the Arab force headed towards Persepolis, managing to defeat

a small militia in a costly battle before being surrounded and trapped by the Sassanids.

The naval warfare despising caliph found out what Hadrami had done and was furious, but

nevertheless sent Utba to rescue the beleaguered governor, after which he was dismissed from

the position.

Hormuzan used the respite granted by his truce with the Muslims to levy more soldiers and,

in that time, also received imperial reinforcements from Hulwan.

Now reinforced, he took advantage of the treaty’s unclear boundary terms as an excuse to reinitiate

hostilities in early 639.

The new governor of Basra - Abu Musa - was aware of his caliph’s command to avoid taking

any further Persian territory, so he wrote to Umar explaining the situation and asking

for guidance.

Umar responded with an order to take Ahwaz and stop Hormuzan’s attacks.

This prompted Musa to march his forces to the river Karun and face off against the Persian

Lord across its breadth.

Feeling confident about his chances, Hormuzan invited the Arab army across the river with

the aim of facing and crushing it in a pitched battle.

Musa gladly accepted, crossing by a bridge north of the city, defeating the Sassanid

provincial force in a grueling fight and forcing Hormuzan into flight to Ram Hormuz.

A typically aggressive pursuit force of Arab cavalry forced the overwhelmed Persian commander

to retreat even further east.

From a strong position behind yet another river, Hormuzan parleyed for peace with the

Muslims, offering to recognise their conquest of Ahwaz while retaining a remnant of his

own district.

Still, the Sassanid reinforcements were pouring into northern Khuzestan in such large numbers

that the preparations for another military campaign could no longer be kept secret.

At this point, Sa’d was replaced as governor at Kufa by Ammar bin Yasir, who sent troops

to Musa to subdue the Persian threat without delay.

From Ahwaz, Musa launched his thrust against Hormuzan’s forces at Ram Hormuz, defeated

them in a brisk engagement and subsequently captured most of eastern Khuzestan.

Hormuzan retreated north to the Sassanid concentration point at Shushtar - a highly fortified, walled

city in the Zagros foothills.

Unsure about his ability to take on such a stronghold with his current strength, Musa

had a thousand fresh warriors sent to him from Kufa.

With these additional warriors, Musa advanced north, captured Shushtar and Hormuzan along

with it, followed relatively quickly by the truly ancient city of Susa.

Returning to Basra after this victory, Musa sent a subordinate to capture the final garrison

in Khuzestan; this was Junde Shapur, who succeeded by late 641.

With the seizure of this final city, all of Khuzestan and Sassanid territory west of the

Zagros was now under Muslim rule.

Despite the loss of Iraq, Sassanid Persia east of the rocky barrier was still a cohesive

and powerful empire with loyal territories as far off as India.

After the fall of Khuzestan to Musa’s army, Yazdegerd1 dispatched urgent orders to all

of his remaining provinces to raise troops and send them to Nahavand, a city on a primary

transportation artery west.

Throughout the later part of 641, contingents from cities across Iran and beyond, such as

Isfahan, Rayy, Hamadan, and many others arrived at Nahavand, until, at the turn of 642, an

army of around 60,000 had come together.

At the same time, this fearsome force was Yazdegerd’s final chance to turn the war

in his favour.

If he lost now, he would lose everything.

A Sassanid general named Mardanshah was appointed to lead the army, who quickly warned the men

that Umar “Is coming for you if you do not go for him.

He has already destroyed the seat of your empire and plunged into the land of your emperor.”

A Persian frontier commander in service to the Caliphate noticed this massive military

buildup and, alarmed, sent word to Ammar bin Yasir in Kufa, who immediately forwarded the

information to Umar.

Addressing the people of Medina on the issue, the caliph’s pronouncement that “This

is the day on which the future depends” left no doubt as to the importance of the

upcoming clash.

The ever-active caliph declared his intention to oversee the battle but was talked out of

it by his advisors, who pointed out that this was unnecessary.

A more contentious issue was the assignment of military resources.

Uthman wanted the whole army of the caliphate concentrated, but Muhammad’s son-in-law

- Ali Ibn Abi Talib - disagreed, reminding Uthman that depriving the other frontiers

would just invite the Byzantines, Ethiopians, and others to retake their old provinces.

Instead, he suggested the troops at Kufa, Basra, and along the Persian border form the

core of a field army, supplemented by a fresh levy of raw recruits and veterans from Arabia.

Umar concurred with Ali and gave command of the preemptive strike to the veteran of Qadissiyah

and conqueror of Susa - Nu'man bin Muqarrin.

Upon enthusiastically receiving the caliph’s decree, Nu'man assembled his troops, marched

east from Kufa, and crossed the Tigris, rendezvousing with a number of other frontier units along

the way.

Trekking northeast from Ctesiphon along the Diyala River, the Muslims pivoted at Qasr

Shereen and dove into the Zagros Mountains, eventually reaching a concentration point

at Tazar in December 641.

With 30,000 Muslim warriors assembled, Nu'man sent a scouting detachment into the Nahavand

Valley to establish where exactly the Persians were.

By nightfall it returned having observed little to no sign of Sassanid activity in the rocky,

uneven terrain between Tazar and the Persian base.

Nu'man immediately seized the opportunity and decamped, marching his entire army to

a small town known as Isbeezahan, just ten miles northwest of Nahavand itself, and its

Persian occupants.

When, not long after, Mardanshah learned that the invader was closing in, he responded by

bringing the entirety of his own army out of the city.

In preparation for the final battle, he deployed Sassanid Persia’s great retribution field

force in an L-shaped hook formation, ‘wrapped’ around a high terrain feature known as the

brown ridge.

While his soldiers advantageously faced down the slope, Mardanshah himself took up a position

atop the heights, where the imperial commander had a brilliant view of the entire area.

This adroitly selected defensive position had multiple terrain features amplifying its

strength: in front of the Sassanid front line was a small stream, along the bank of which

Mardanshah placed a minefield of cavalry-crippling caltrops.

Furthermore, his right2 - the short edge of the reverse L formation - was anchored on

a fortified village and the 3,000-foot-high Ardashan ridge, while the longer, southeast-facing

left flank3 was protected by a fork in the stream.

Confronted by this natural fortress and with few other options, Nu'man drew up his warriors

along Mardanshah’s entire front, just across the stream and facing up the slope.

The Muslim general’s brother Nueim led the L’s short section, Hudayfah bin Al-Yaman

commanded the right, and Qaqa bin Amr headed the Caliphate’s cavalry reserve.

Nu'man himself was in the centre.

The Caliphate’s deployment gave Mardanshah a potential opportunity to launch a preemptive

assault at the unprepared Muslim lines.

However, either due to overconfidence in his prepared fortifications or cautious of leaving

them due to the previous defeat at Jalula, the empire’s field commander remained where

he was, allowing Nu'man to finish bringing his forces up.

This inaction likely did not seem like a blunder - the Muslims were far away from their bases

in Iraq and could either smash their heads against the dangerous Persian fortifications

or wait, chew through their supplies and retreat in deadly conditions.

An hour after the Islamic noon prayer, as the sun reached its highest point in the sky,

the entire Muslim army began its attack straight at Mardanshah’s defensive belt.

Upon reaching the Wadi stream, the attackers’ infantry and cavalry alike were met with a

deadly rain of Persian arrows, loosed by archers who had the luxury of shooting downhill.

Worse still, Qaqa’s horsemen galloped headlong into the caltrops, leading to the maiming

and immobilisation of many horses.

Nevertheless, Nu’man’s men pushed on across the entire front, weakened all the way by

arrow fire.

Then, charging uphill, the Muslims crashed into the Sassanid ranks and the two sides

met in ferocious melee combat.

A grinding clash of attrition began with little room for flair or tactical brilliance, only

numerical weight, personal prowess, strength, and discipline.

On some sections of the line, perhaps those under Nueim’s command where the slope was

more gradual, the Muslims managed to temporarily push Mardanshah’s soldiers back, but each

time were counterattacked and shoved to their original positions by the Persians.

In other areas - near Zarrameen where the slope was steepest - the Persians even managed

to haul the Caliphate’s forces back across the Wadi, but they in turn counterattacked

and fought back to where they were.

The battle’s outcome rested on a knife-edge, with dead and dying of both sides littering

the field - either laying still or shouting in terrible agony.

This mass slaying continued until nightfall when the Muslims, with no prospect of breaking

the Persian line that night, pulled away and withdrew to their camp.

The night hours passed without contact, with both sides recovering their fallen comrades

and tending to the wounded.

When dawn broke on the second day, however, Nu'man formed his army up and, somewhat inexplicably,

launched another frontal assault across the stream lasting all day.

After what historian Akram poetically described as a ‘tragic harvest of death’, the Muslims

again retreated, unsuccessful and badly bloodied.

Both armies formed up again at dawn on the third day, but a mixture of the horror, tactical

sanity, and possible mutiny kept the Muslim general from attempting his human wave assault

for a third time.

Instead, he waited for the Persians to emerge from their fortifications and launch an attack

of their own, but Mardanshah was a wily commander aware that time was his champion, and refused

to budge.

After a tense two-day standoff, the Sassanid regimental commanders began raiding the Muslim

line with small contingents.

These limited attacks would inflict damage on personnel and supplies before swiftly pulling

back behind their defences, leaving the Islamic forces frustrated.

While constant assailment and the cold conditions struck blow after blow to Muslim morale and

strength, Mardanshah began absorbing a steady stream of reinforcements and provisions from

nearby Hamadan.

The situation could not continue as it stood, and so Nu'man called a council of war only

a few days after his previous attack.

The eldest companion present4 advised that the Muslims ought not to attack at all, and

to merely destroy those raiding parties which came to attack them.

As all the officers were eager to get stuck in properly, this proposal was met with disapproval.

Another more gung-ho leader suggested that the frontal attacks actually be resumed regardless

of consequences.

This too was quickly shot down.

Then spoke Tuleiha bin Khuleiwad - a former enemy of Islam and one of the architects of

Jalula - who put forward a clever stratagem.

The Muslims, he said, should “Put the cavalry in a position to outflank them, and show a

weak front, making as if to withdraw.

Let the Persians hope for victory and advance against us.

Then we turn and fight them.”

This plan was approved by most of those present, and put into motion.

With the purpose of making the illusion of weakness more convincing, at Tuleiha’s proposal

the Muslims also began circulating false rumours that Caliph Umar was dead.

Over the next few days, word of Umar’s ‘death’ proliferated around the overjoyed Persian

army like a kind of virulent mental plague, provoking hopes of an offensive against their

now surely demoralised enemy.

The Friday after Nu’man’s last attack, Sassanid sentries began observing the abandonment

of Muslim positions across the stream: tents being pulled down in the Muslim camp, baggage

being loaded, and small contingents of men marching west.

Everything Mardanshah could see appeared to suggest that the invading army was vulnerable

and about to retreat.

So, the general opened a series of gaps in the caltrop belt on his right flank according

to a pre-prepared plan and began having his soldiers cross to the outside5.

Lead elements halted just beyond the caltrop field, waiting for the rear ranks, and began

forming up there.

According to our sources, Mardanshah might have restored the caltrop field so his troops

could not run.

The ‘retreating’ Muslim infantry span around upon seeing that they were about to

be struck from behind and hastily deployed for battle, somewhat further back than before.

Of course, this was all a part of Tuleiha’s plan - the Persian general had swallowed the

bait hook, line, and sinker.

Unbeknownst to the Sassanid army, Qaqa and his cavalrymen were concealed in a gap behind

the Ardashan ridge, ready to attack.

Two hours before noon, Mardanshah ordered his army to advance slowly towards the stationary

enemy line.

When the Persians entered missile range, they began loosing arrow volleys with the aim of

softening the Muslims up at a greater range than Arab bows could operate at.

Forced to defend themselves with only their shields, many of the Caliphate’s warriors

were chomping at the bit to close with the Sassanids and fight them in melee, but Nu’man,

with a wider view of the strategic situation, ordered them to remain steady.

After a while weakening the Muslims with missile fire, Mardanshah launched a full-on charge.

This was the key moment of the battle, as this attack finally un-anchored the imperial

right flank from the Ardashan ridge and its nearby fortified village.

Remaining on the defensive, Nu’man restrained his forces from effectively pushing back,

withdrawing slowly in a similar manner to Hannibal’s centre at Cannae.

Then, after some time of suffering this, Nu’man ordered a counterattack just after midday

and, at the same time, Qaqa’s cavalry swept out from behind the ridge and drove a wedge

between the Persians and their obstacles.

However, Mardanshah detached a unit of reserves that met and held the Muslim cavalry before

the encirclement was completed.

On the front line, Persian forces were gradually pushed back under the weight of Nu’man’s

counterattack.

But then, the Muslim general was struck by an arrow, fell from his horse, and was spirited

away from the fight, with Nueim impersonating him to maintain morale.

Although Sassanid resistance was absolutely unwavering, by late afternoon the Muslim forces,

half encircling their foe, were clearly in the superior position.

Suddenly, as the sky began to darken, the majority of Mardanshah’s army collapsed

and routed, able to do so because the forces opposing Qaqa were still resisting.

Amidst this chaos, Tuleiha was also slain.

A relatively large number of Persian troops managed to escape the battlefield, but many,

including Mardanshah, were killed by their Muslim pursuers, fell victim to the re-strengthened

caltrop belt, or were taken prisoner.

Hudayfah took command of the Caliphate’s army after Nu’man’s death and advanced

the following morning, defeating the Sassanid remnant at Darazeed.

Part of the defeated army retreated into Nahavand itself after the second defeat, where the

new imperial commander, Dinar, surrendered the city unconditionally.

Nahavand was the final great battle between Islam and Persia, making the point at which

there was no longer any doubt - the Sassanid Empire would fall.

For this, Nahavand is known to Muslims as the ‘victory of victories’.

It would take another decade to subdue all of the far-flung Persian territories in Central

Asia and Eastern Iran, but by late 644 as author Peter Crawford states, Yazdegerd III

was effectively “a king without a kingdom.”

On the Egyptian front, after Amr returned from his expedition against the so-called

Pentapolis in late 643, he travelled back to Medina in order to meet with Umar, with

whom he already had a somewhat tense relationship.

Mistrusted by the caliph, Amr received a frosty reception from the very start.

The tension between the two men wasn’t helped by the fact that Umar, who always kept a close

eye on his governors via an internal spy network, suspected Amr of unjustly appropriating Egypt’s

wealth.

So, when the latter returned to his province, the caliph dispatched a trusted inspector

- Muhammad bin Maslama - to appraise Amr’s assets.

The latter produced an account of his assets and he was found guilty of taking too much.

The excess was confiscated and taken back to Medina.

That wasn’t the end of the caliph’s incessant prodding.

A short while thereafter, unsatisfied at the lacklustre revenues flowing into the treasury

from Egypt, Umar had a heated debate with Amr by letter.

After that ended in a deadlock, a Copt was sent to Medina to inform the caliph of his

province’s financial situation.

He bluntly informed Umar that previous rulers of Egypt had seen to the land’s prosperity

before taking anything from it, while Muslim governors only extracted.

In response, Umar carved Egypt into two separate administrative districts during late 644,

giving Amr Lower Egypt to govern from Fustat, while Upper Egypt would be ruled from Fayyum

by Abdullah ibn Sa’d ibn Abi Sarh, the foster brother of Uthman.

Predictably, Amr was, once again, infuriated at this deliberate diminishing of his authority.

Back in Medina a deadly plot had formed, centring around Hormuzan, who had converted to Islam

and used his vast experience in Sassanid administration and governance to become one of Umar’s key

advisors.

Despite this, the Persian noble never forgot the injury done to his home.

It seems that Hormuzan made contact with Firuz, a Sassanid soldier who was enslaved after

Qadisiyyah or Nahavand and brought to the Caliphate’s capital, and in November of

644 Firuz knifed Umar.

Before passing away three days after, the second caliph appointed a shūrā - or “counsel”

of six men1 - to appoint his successor from among their ranks.

After deep debate, they decided that Uthman would become the third Rashidun caliph.

It is worth noting that while Sunni Islam views Uthman as one of the rightly guided

caliphs, Shia Muslims believe this election should not have occurred at all and Ali was

to be the next in line.

Shortly after, Amr Ibn al-As visited Uthman in order to lobby for his Upper Egyptian colleague’s

removal.

The new caliph refused outright, prompting him to declare that he wouldn’t return to

Egypt until Abdullah ibn Sa’d was removed.

In response to this threat, Uthman appointed his foster brother governor of all Egypt2,

further deepening the dispute between the two men.

The Romans in Egypt were not happy with Amr’s policies, but Abdullah’s attempts to increase

the incomes from the province were even less popular.

Alexandria in particular bore the brunt of this new lust for revenue, leading its notoriously

riotous population to undertake drastic measures.

A group of prominent Romans dispatched messages to the new emperor Constans II.

These letters outlined the outrages of Muslim rule and its jizya tax, but also pointed out

that Abdullah had let the Nile realm’s defence slip into a pitiful state and the city was

only garrisoned by a paltry thousand men, and could be easily taken.

Perceiving an opportunity to regain control of Egypt and remedy the wound which its loss

had dealt to his empire and his pride, Constans began secretly amassing a great strikeforce

of 300 ships and many thousands of soldiers, command of which he bestowed on a eunuch known

as Manuel.

Constans’ fleet was ready after almost a year.

Because the reduced Byzantine Empire was still the dominant naval power in the Mediterranean

- the Caliphate having not yet developed any seaborne capacity - there was nothing to stop

this fleet from unexpectedly sailing straight into the harbour at Alexandria in early 646.

As the Roman sympathisers predicted, the thousand strong Muslim garrison was no adequate defence

against this shock assault from the sea.

When Roman forces landed almost unopposed, Alexandria’s population simultaneously rose

up against the occupying Arabs.

Most of the city’s garrison was slain in the brief clash that followed.

However, while the invasion army began ravaging the vicinity around Alexandria, some of the

Muslims that escaped travelled to Fustat and informed the governor what was happening.

Abdullah ibn Sa’d didn’t even have a chance to react.

Lacking confidence in their new viceroy’s martial ability, the Muslims of Egypt sent

a delegation to Caliph Uthman, urging him to send Amr back so that he could put an end

to the crisis.

Understanding that Amr was both a man of formidable military talent and feared by the Romans,

Uthman bit his tongue and asked Amr to take his post back.

Wasting no time, the man who had conquered the Romans once before travelled to Fustat

as quickly as possible with the aim of emulating his previous achievement.

Upon his arrival, the morale of Islam’s warriors was boosted significantly and they

prepared for war eagerly, while Amr started planning.

Informed by spies and agents that the Romans were advancing leisurely from Alexandria to

Fustat, many of Amr’s brash officers pressed for their commander to attack and confine

the enemy to the treacherous Mediterranean metropolis before all Egypt revolted against

the Muslim regime.

Amr did not agree with this appraisal, as he believed that this advance would stretch

Roman supply and communication lines to the limit.

Manuel and his army marched under the close observation of Amr’s informants, who constantly

reported the Romans’ position and strength.

The land forces made their way up the eastern bank of the Nile accompanied by a large flotilla

of supporting warships sailing parallel to them on the river itself.

Byzantine indiscipline began causing problems almost immediately.

Roman soldiers moved from town to town and the population was not happy with their behaviour.

When Manuel neared the halfway point between Alexandria and Fustat, Amr began a countermarch

with 15,000 warriors of his own, moving on a direct collision course with the Romans.

Both armies finally came into contact with one another near a large town known as Nikiou,

or Naqyus.

After resting for the night in their respective camps, the Romans and Muslims deployed on

the cultivated, featureless, and flat terrain just south of Nikiou.

Amr’s left - a cavalry regiment under the command of Shareek bin Sumayy, rested on the

Nile River, as did the Roman right.

In addition to their organisation in neat formations, a large number of Roman archers

also embarked on the riverine ships.

Once his preparations for battle were complete, Manuel ordered the Byzantine ground forces

into effective bow range before coming to a halt and unleashing a destructive barrage

of arrows against the Muslim position.

On the river, Manuel had prepared a clever stratagem.

His ships continued sailing until they passed by Amr’s flank, at which point their on-board

archers struck the Muslims in the flank as well.

Amr’s men had already been struggling to deal with the frontal volley, and so suffered

terribly from the multidirectional bombardment.

Sumayy’s regiment in particular was almost totally decimated, having been positioned

closest to the river, but even Amr had a horse shot out from under him.

Despite this punishment, however, the Muslims were unwilling to surrender the battlefield,

and so endured the storm with considerable tenacity.

Once Manuel believed that his enemy was sufficiently weakened, he called back the flanking vessels

and had their on-board troops fall into ranks behind the main army, and then began yet another

arrow attack against the Muslim line.

The moment after the Byzantine eunuch general ordered a halt to his preliminary barrage,

he directed his infantry to advance into spear and sword range.

Although early Muslim armies were generally portrayed as being most comfortable in this

kind of close quarters engagement, the Roman soldiers nevertheless impacted Amr’s battered

host with considerable ferocity, cracking their already faltering line.

Sumayy’s regiment, which had endured the brunt of Manuel’s seaborne missile attack,

actually did break and run.

Amr hastily pulled the remainder of his men away from the Romans’ attack and halted

only a short distance away, in order to regroup as best he could.

However Manuel, believing that the Muslims were already beaten, did not advance and finish

his enemy off, instead simply waiting where they were.

After a brief, eerie pause in the fighting, a magnificently dressed Roman champion, clad

in gold-studded armour, rode out into the open space between the two armies and challenged

the Muslims to single combat.

This would give the latter time to take a breath, reform and reorganise.

So, one of Amr’s favoured mubarizun - an Arab known as Haumal - accepted the Roman

offer and strode out to meet the enemy fighter.

With the remainder of both armies bearing witness, their respective champions initially

clashed with spears, and neither combatant was able to score a decisive blow.

Dropping their polearms after a certain amount of time had gone by, the champions clashed

with sword and shield, but again neither warrior could get an edge over the other.

This continued until the larger Roman duelist managed to disarm and severely wound Haumal

with a series of fierce thrusts.

As the hulking Roman was about to finish Haumal off, the Arab champion unsheathed his short

dagger and plunged it into his unsuspecting counterpart’s throat with prodigious speed.

Although Haumal managed to win the duel by the skin of his teeth, he died of his wounds

a few days later, much to Amr’s sorrow.

This traditional single combat had given the Muslim general time to get his army back in

order, and by the time Haumal had won, Amr was ready - Sumayy’s routed regiment even

returned to the battlefield and formed up.

When the whole Muslim army was ready, they charged and engaged in a grinding melee with

Manuel’s forces, combat which they were far better suited to.

After a few hours of Roman resistance, the eunuch’s soldiers broke and ran, pursued

and hunted all the way to Alexandria.

Amr brought up a number of catapults and launched boulders at the recalcitrant city, whose own

artillerists fired back.

The defences nevertheless held firm under such bombardment, until one of the gatekeepers

- Ibn Bassana - offered to let Amr’s troops inside if he, his family, and property were

retained, terms which the Muslim commander found agreeable.

Therefore, at some point in the middle of 646, Alexandria’s gates were opened and

the Islamic army poured inside.

Any Roman unit opposing the incursion was swiftly dealt with, and even those coming

up to reinforce the breach were pushed away.

As the rebellious city began falling victim to a sacking, the surviving imperial soldiers

withdrew to their ships and sailed away.

Before the vengeful Arabs could truly wreak havoc on the ancient Mediterranean metropolis

and its vanquished inhabitants, an unknown Muslim approached Amr and beseeched him to

stop the violence.

Although the conqueror of Egypt was by no means a merciful man by nature, his kinsman’s

words had such an impact that Amr immediately ordered the cessation of hostilities.

At the very spot where this was proclaimed, a mosque was constructed known as the ‘Mosque

of Mercy’.

Still, large numbers of Romans including Manuel died in the battle and the revolt was quelled.

In the aftermath of the Second Siege of Alexandria, Amr ripped down the walls and made the city,

in his words “Like the house of an adultress, accessible from all sides.”

The neglect of Egypt’s defence was also remedied with the new division of its Muslim

garrison into four parts - two in Fustat, and one each in Alexandria and on the northern

coast to be moved around where necessary.

It would also be rotated and the troops replaced every six months.

Not only had Amr ibn Al-As both conquered and reconquered Egypt in difficult circumstances,

he had built the foundations of a rule that would secure Muslim hegemony over the fruitful

country.

For this, Amr well expected to be rewarded by Uthman, but he was to be disappointed.

Uthman wanted his tax fiend of a brother to occupy the plum position, but was aware that

Amr probably deserved some reward for his deeds.

So, summoning the conqueror to his place of residence, Uthman enquired if he would like

to remain in military command of Egypt while Abdullah ibn Sa’d managed civilian administration.

Amr responded with the witty barb: “In that case I would be like the man holding the horns

of the cow while another milks it.”

For the remainder of Uthman’s caliphate, Amr would bear a potent grudge and even oppose

him publicly.

This mutual resentment was to have serious consequences for Islamic history in the near

future.

By the end of 646AD, the entire near-east had been transformed into a completely different

geopolitical entity than it was just two decades before, and had been for many centuries prior.

On its eastern wing, a four-century-old dynasty - the Sassanids - were now all but dust, its

last true Shah1 pursued across Iran by eastward driving Muslim armies and its ancient territory

devoured.

In the north, Rashidun forces reached the Caucasus Mountain barrier, enclosing the once

insurmountable Byzantine Empire within its Anatolian heartland in the process.

Now that all major battles against Rome and Persia were at an end, Islam’s armies began

seeking another direction in which to conquer.

Once Constans II’s counterattack against Egypt was decisively repelled, Caliph Uthman’s

foster brother Abdullah ibn Sa’d began launching raids into the Roman-Berber lands west of

his new province.

These small expeditions quickly proved a stunning success, returning with vast quantities of

slaves, cattle, and other riches.

Judging that Roman Africa would yield an easy and generous bounty if squeezed, the Egyptian

governor wrote to Uthman, asking for permission to launch a major campaign to the west.

Uthman agreed with Abdullah’s assessment and decreed the formation of a 10,000 strong

force in Arabia composed of warriors from various tribes.

It was a relatively young army, and in its ranks marched one son of Amr, two sons of

Umar and two sons of Umayyad chief Al-Hakam - one of whom was the future Marwan I.

The freshly mustered Arab force was ready for war in early 647 and marched for Egypt2,

joining Abdullah ibn Sa’d at Fustat a few weeks later.

There, the 10,000 newly arrived Arabic fighters were merged with a further 10,000 from the

governor’s Egyptian army, resulting in a total strength of 20,000.

With this mostly camel and horse-mounted invasion force at his back, Abdullah marched west.

This part of the Mediterranean seaboard bore witness to some of the ancient world’s most

dramatic events during the course of several centuries.

Emperor Heraclius’ father had previously served as ruler of this sizeable ‘Exarchate

of Africa’ before his son’s ascension to the Byzantine throne in 610, upon which

the elder governor died.

Close to the emperor’s death in 641, Heraclius himself appointed as Exarch a patrician known

as Gregory, However, dynastic chaos following the death of Heraclius, and Constans II’s

inability to repel Muslim attacks, particularly in nearby Egypt, were all too much for Gregory.

In 647, as Uthman’s army was in the process of readying to attack him, the Exarch declared

independence from Constantinople amid a surge of popular support from Romanised Africans

and native Berbers alike.

Abdullah ibn Sa’d meanwhile, crossed the Nile from Fustat and took his army up the

west bank until he neared Alexandria, at which point he drove northwest and cut across the

desert as a shortcut.

After a few more days, the viceroy’s 20,000 hit the Mediterranean coastal road and marched

along its course until, finally, after a six-week journey, Abdullah reached Barca - the city

which his predecessor Amr seized years before.

The Muslims then marched a further seven hundred miles along the Mediterranean coast around

the Bay of Sirte, enduring the scorching privations of a North African summer.

The Arabs were used to such arid conditions and thrived in them, an advantage which helped

them conquer the Near-East.

When the Rashidun army finally reached Tripoli, closer to the heart of Gregory’s realm,

its warriors found the heavily fortified city barred against them, contrary to the friendly

reception they’d received in Cyrenaica.

As Amr did half a decade earlier, Abdullah blockaded Tripoli on its landward flank and

placed it under siege.

In order to slow or prevent any resupply or reinforcement by ship, Abdullah stationed

artillery at both points where the city wall met the water, They were ordered to strike

any enemy vessel which attempted to enter the harbour and effectively rendered the seaport

unusable.

Gregory, who was readying the main Exarchate army at his inland capital of Sufetula, had

a naval reinforcement armada dispatched from Carthage to Tripoli.

However, rather than disembarking at the port on arrival as they would have liked, the transport

ships were forced to disgorge their human cargo on segments of the beach which were

outside of Abdullah’s artillery range and outside the wall’s protection.

Although this prevented Rashidun catapults and ballistae from carving bloody holes into

their ranks, it made the tired and disorganised soldiers easy prey for Muslim infantry, which

charged at them from two different angles.

Exhausted from the long sea voyage and without any time to deploy adequately, Gregory’s

reinforcements were scythed down to a man on the beaches of Libya.

Remaining vigilant against any further attempts to prop Tripoli up, Rashidun forces nevertheless

were unable to breach the well-provisioned, nigh impregnable fortress.

As his army languished outside the walls, Abdullah ordered riders to scout in the direction

of Sufetula to observe any military activity going on there.

A few weeks later two things were clear to the Muslim governor.

First: Tripoli was still a long way aways from opening its gates to him and remaining

static outside its walls seemed pointless.

Second: reports from his scouts made it apparent to Abdullah that the newly independent Roman

Exarch was readying for a fight.

Possibly convinced Tripoli was just a delaying action which only served to grind down his

own army’s strength and will to push on, the Muslim governor lifted his siege and spirited

away to the west.

The Rashidun army and its thrifty commander plundered their way through the wealthiest

region of Roman Africa, unmoored from any supply train and therefore unconcerned about

the Tripoli garrison behind them.

At Sufetula, Gregory was made aware of the Muslims’ location the moment they passed

through Gabes and reacted to the news immediately, with the intent of engaging his enemy well

away from his interim inland capital.

To do this, the Exarch ponderously shifted his heavily-equipped, primarily infantry-based

army, which probably matched that of the Muslims in size, to a blocking position at Faiz - 30

kilometres from Sufetula - and set up a camp there.

Part of the Exarchate’s army was placed slightly forward of the camp as a covering

force.

However, only a short time after Gregory’s force went into camp, the Rashidun light cavalry

advance guard fell on its Roman counterpart, sending it reeling back to the main camp in

flight.

Unnerved by such strength of the Muslim mounted units, Gregory ordered his army to withdraw

all the way to Sufetula, believing his position at Faiz was too vulnerable.

About four miles east of his capital the Exarch turned and readied for battle.

Such close proximity to its base granted the Roman army logistical supremacy, prevented

wide flanking maneuvers from the mobile opposing army, and permitted them a safe retreat inside

if they needed it.

The Muslims arrived soon after and made their own camp a short way from Gregory’s front

line.

One rejected emissary later, both sides deployed for battle on the arid plain about four miles

from Sufetula.

The Roman army’s posture was defensive, its line anchored to the north and south by

two high ridges.

Abdullah, realising the observation potential of these terrain features, successfully sent

forces to occupy them.

Unlike his more iron-willed predecessor, Abdullah ibn Sa’d was considered personally weak

by the warriors under his command, an accountant and bureaucrat rather than general or soldier.

Lacking Amr’s bravery, Abdullah retreated to a safe position behind the line where he

was not likely to suffer any personal threat once the army was deployed to his liking.

Fortunately, Gregory was a kindred spirit in that he wasn’t a bold frontline commander

either, choosing to oversee the clash from a throne inside the walls of Sufetula.

Subordinates and lower-level officers fought the battle for him on a tactical level.

At the dawn the next day, fighting commenced.

Details about the first days of Sufetula are unclear and sparse in our sources, but it

is evident that the combat was incredibly fierce, uninterrupted, and bloody.

Although the actual battlefield was a flat plain, the ridges on either flank prevented

any outflanking maneuvers or fancy tactical flair.

Moreover, the uninvolved nature of both army’s skittish commanders further paralysed the

situation.

After a few days of such indecisive fighting, Gregory decided to attempt an assassination

of the enemy leader in order to sever the head from the Muslim serpent, but obviously

wasn’t going to do the deed himself.

Instead, he offered to wed his legendarily beautiful, intelligent, and valiant daughter

to the Roman warrior who killed Abdullah.

Morale in the Exarch’s army skyrocketed at this news, with each warrior - whether

they were Roman, Vandalic, Greek or Berber, steeling themselves with the aim of gaining

the princess’ hand.

Word of this also spread throughout the Muslim army and in particular to Abdullah himself.

Not at all comfortable with being a marked man, his confidence suffered an even further

decline.

To counter Gregory’s offer, the Muslim commander announced to his army that he would grant

the Exarch’s daughter to any warrior who personally killed her father, before withdrawing

to his tent.

Still however, the next few days continued as a deadly stalemate of bitter violence,

brought to a crescendo by the offer and counteroffer between generals.

This continued without end until one of Abdullah’s officers - Zubayr - was approached by a Berber

defector from Gregory’s army.

He told the Muslim captain that because fighting had until that point been quite far from the

walls, the Exarch’s position, near Sufetula’s northern gate, was actually very thinly defended.

Alerted to this crucial information and the best route which he should take in order to

exploit the opportunity, Zubayr put forward his plan to the demoralised Muslim commander,

and was granted leadership over the army’s mobile reserve - about 2,000 strong.

The invaders’ spirits were buoyed due to the dynamism and boldness of this dashing

young officer, who spent the remainder of the day setting his scheme into motion.

Swarmed by warriors who desired to embark on the risky venture with him, the younger

Zubayr eventually selected thirty of the fiercest, most capable, and valiant combatants his army

could offer as an attack squad.

When asked what they were to do, Zubayr replied - “I am attacking, defend me against those

who assail me from the rear and I shall defend you from the front!”

During the near soundless hours of night, after issuing all necessary orders, Zubayr

positioned himself, his 30 stalwarts, and the mobile reserve horsemen behind Sufetula’s

northern ridge.

Then when morning came, both armies closed with one another and fought as though nothing

had changed.

At noon, with an especially hot day weighing down on them heavily, both armies broke contact

and withdrew - the Romans quickly, the Muslims suspiciously sluggishly.

Distracted by the din of war, Gregory, his attendants, and guards did not notice as Zubayr

and his band of daredevils galloped into the city through what became known as the ‘gate

of treachery’.

Realising what was happening, the Exarch’s guard formed a hasty line, but the 30 Muslim

warriors broke it and allowed Zubayr a clean run at the African ruler.

In the confusion, Gregory initially believed this lone mounted figure to be an envoy, and

so did not react.

Gregory was killed and his head sliced from his body.

Word of their leader’s death quickly reached the retreating Roman infantry, causing terrible

confusion and disheartening the soldiers.

Then, at the perfect moment, Zubayr’s large mounted reserve crested the North Ridge, rode

at a gallop and charged into the disorganised Exarchate army’s left wing with saber and

lance before wheeling around the battlefield.

Simultaneously, the bulk of the Muslim infantry turned about and advanced, locking their tenacious

enemy into an unwinnable fight.

Pressured from the front by Arab infantry and outmanuevered by swift Muslim horsemen

all around, the Roman army collapsed and its soldiers scattered in all directions in their

attempts to flee.

Zubayr’s cavalry reaped an especially bloody toll and, within a short time, the battered

corpses of Romans, Berber, Vandals, and Greeks littered the plain outside Sufetula.

Despite the slaughter, several thousand of Gregory’s soldiers managed to retreat intact

towards the capital, believing its walls would grant them safety.

It wasn’t their lucky day.

Zubayr, having handily dealt with the Exarch, sent small squadrons to hold each of Sufetula’s

gates, preventing entry or exit.

When the retreating columns of exhausted Roman soldiers reached the city therefore, they

were viciously attacked by Muslim cavalry coming the other way and cut to pieces.

The Rashidun triumph at Sufetula is frequently touted as the point at which Roman Africa

was forever lost to the Empire, and while it was a back-breaking moment for the province,

this is far from true.

Once the vast quantity of captured silver, gold and cattle was accumulated and distributed,

Abdullah ibn Sa’d moved on the Exarchate’s real capital - Carthage.

Upon putting the millennia old city to siege, the Muslim commander and local leaders within

the city came to an impasse.

There was no chance that the besiegers would be able to take Carthage with their overextended

supply lines and barely functional siege train, but at the same time, there was no way for

the inhabitants of Carthage to make them go away.

However, with exaggerated reports of Gregory’s fate fresh in their minds, they asked for

terms after only a few days.

Always with income on his brain, Abdullah ibn Sa’d accepted a vast quantity of Roman

gold as payment to leave Africa alone keeping only what they had so far conquered.

After a subsequent eastward journey of about three months, the Muslim army arrived back

in Fustat by late 647, bringing with it a vast hoard of wealth which further swelled

the treasury in Medina.

Regardless of the gathered loot, Abdullah had effectively won a victory and then given

up the ghost before the conquest was concluded.

At about this time - late 648 - the governor of Syria Muawiya launched a naval expedition

of unknown scale on Cyprus in order to neutralise any potential threat that it posed as a staging

point for future Byzantine attacks.

Muawiya landed on the Mediterranean island and seized it without opposition, exacting

a tribute of 7,000 dinars annually.

With the North African front winding down, most expansionist movement within the Rashidun

Caliphate came to a halt.

Three years passed in relative quiet until Abdullah ibn Sa’d led another attempt to

conquer Nubia in 652, failing once again due to the country’s ‘Archers of the Eye’

.

Because the situation on land between Eastern Rome and the Caliphate had calcified at the

Taurus Mountains, both sides began looking to the sea for an advantage.

If Constantinople maintained its naval supremacy, it would have the ability to land a force

in Syria, Egypt, or Africa at will.

However, if the Caliphate usurped this control, they could make the Mediterranean a Muslim

lake and even threaten the great imperial city.

To that end, both the Egyptian governor and Roman emperor refocused their efforts on constructing

vast fleets of ships with which to dominate the sea.

In 654AD, the Arab and Roman fleets met off the Lycian coast at what became known as the

Battle of the Masts.

Abdullah ibn Sa’d revealed himself to be a veritable sea wolf compared to his feeble

reputation on land, crushing Constans II’s navy in the first true Muslim naval triumph

and clearing the way for an attack on Constantinople.

From the status of a subjugated, scorned, and irrelevant people of the desert, the Arabs

burst forth from their ancient homeland in a manner akin to an irresistible sandstorm,

blowing away everything in their path in the course of just two decades.

The third season of the Early Muslim Expansion will come in late 2021, and we will cover

the famous battles like Talas, Tours, Guadelete, Constantinople, and much more, so make sure

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Key Vocabulary

Vocabulary	Meanings
army /ˈɑːrmi/ A2	noun - a large organized group of armed forces
battle /ˈbætl/ B1	noun - a fighting between armies in a war
conquer /ˈkɒŋkər/ B2	verb - to take control of a place or people by force
empire /ˈɛmpaɪər/ B1	noun - a group of countries or regions ruled by a single monarch or government
caliph /ˈkeɪlɪf/ C1	noun - a religious and political leader in Islam
general /ˈdʒɛnərəl/ A2	noun - a high-ranking officer in the armed forces
Muslim /ˈmʊzlɪm/ B1	adjective - relating to the religion of Islam or its followers noun - a follower of Islam
Roman /ˈroʊmən/ B1	adjective - relating to ancient Rome or its empire noun - a citizen of ancient Rome
Persian /ˈpɜːrʒən/ B2	adjective - relating to ancient Persia or Iran noun - a native of ancient Persia
defeat /dɪˈfiːt/ B1	verb - to win a victory over someone in a battle or contest noun - a loss in a battle or contest
victory /ˈvɪktəri/ B1	noun - the achievement of winning a battle or contest
siege /siːdʒ/ B2	noun - the surrounding and blockading of a place to force surrender
expansion /ɪkˈspænʃən/ B2	noun - the process of increasing in size or extent
city /ˈsɪti/ A1	noun - a large town
fight /faɪt/ A2	verb - to take part in a violent struggle involving weapons noun - an act or instance of fighting
led /lɛd/ A1	verb - guided or took charge of
attack /əˈtæk/ A2	verb - to take aggressive military action against noun - an aggressive military action
charge /tʃɑːrdʒ/ B1	verb - to rush forward in an attack noun - a sudden rush forward
fierce /fɪrs/ B1	adjective - having or displaying an intense or ferocious aggressiveness
veteran /ˈvɛtərən/ B2	noun - a person who has had long experience in a particular field, especially in the military adjective - having had long experience