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In the previous episode, we talked about the beginning of the Great Roman Civil War.

This first phase was underlined by the conflict between Caesar and Pompey – 2 former allies

who became mortal enemies.

The winner was decided during the last battle – Pharsalus.

Pompey was defeated, but that wasn’t the end of the war, as Caesar had to contend with

the remainder of the Optimate party and external enemies.

Welcome to the second episode on Caesar’s civil war.

Throughout Caesar’s campaigns in Greece, he had continued to levy Legions elsewhere,

adding the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd to his ranks.

Following the Battle of Pharsalus, he also inducted some of Pompey’s surrendered men

into his army, making the 34th, 35th, 36th and 37th Legions.

Caesar, by this stage of the war, now had the numerical advantage, but the Optimate

faction still harboured some of the most influential politicians of the day; the war was far from

over.

Caesar’s first priority after the Battle of Pharsalus was Pompey himself.

He immediately left in pursuit, leaving Antony to oversee the political situation in Rome.

It was the time of year where the elections for next year’s consul would usually be

decided, and Caesar’s term as consul of the year 48BC would be coming to an end.

Caesar would entrust Antony with ensuring that his political power continued.

Having picked up on Pompey’s trail through informants in Asia Minor, Caesar pursued Pompey

to Egypt with a fleet of 10 Rhodian ships, as well as a few more from Asia Minor.

Onboard were two Legions, the 6th and 27th, totalling just around 3,200 infantry, as many

soldiers had been lost to war and illness over the years, and 800 cavalry.

Caesar only learned of his ex-triumvirs’ death upon his arrival in Alexandria at the

start of October 48BC, just a few days after Pompey’s death.

According to Plutarch and Cassius Dio when Caesar was first presented with Pompey’s

head, he turned away disgusted.

He was next presented the seal-ring of Pompey, at which point Caesar broke down in tears.

Both historians interpret this grief differently.

Plutarch claims that it was genuine; after all, though enemies in later life, Caesar

and Pompey had been political allies for around 8 years, had effectively ruled Rome together,

and had even been related by marriage.

Dio, on the other hand, claims that this grief was only for show and that Caesar had always

hated Pompey from the start.

It is impossible to say which is true.

However, it is likely that Caesar was incredibly frustrated at Pompey’s death.

Caesar had a genius for public relations; capturing Pompey, forcing him to renounce

the senate, and then pardoning him, as was Caesar’s habit, would have been the ultimate

coup de grace.

Instead, Pompey’s assassination made him a martyr for the Optimate cause, something

Caesar would have surely wished to avoid.

In Rome however, Antony was able to capitalise on the news of Pompey’s death.

Many in Rome had refused to believe that Pompey had been defeated, but upon being presented

with Pompey’s ring, which Caesar had sent to Rome, they finally accepted that the old

general had lost and was dead.

Rome now acclaimed Caesar as the victor, bestowing countless honours on him.

Seizing upon the situation, Antony labeled the Pompeiians in Africa as conspirators,

declared a national emergency, and that a Dictator was needed.

The man chosen to be a Dictator was, of course, Caesar.

Rather than the regular 6 months, his term as Dictator was also set at one year, running

through until October 47BC.

In return for his continued loyalty and effectiveness, Antony was named by Caesar as Master of Horse,

effectively his second-in-command, and was entrusted with the governance of Italy and

Rome in Caesar’s absence.

Many Optimate politicians, such as Gaius Cassius now returned to Rome and appealed for forgiveness

from Caesar - all were spared and welcomed into the new regime.

Cicero also returned to Rome and was forgiven.

He returned to the Senate where he hoped to use his influence to do what he could to preserve

the Republic.

With Caesar in Egypt now being Dictator, he decided to turn his attention to Roman interests

in the area, namely the rulership of the kingdom, and its debt to Rome.

As we have seen, Egypt was ruled by the boy pharaoh Ptolemy XIII.

The pharaoh’s father, Ptolemy XII, had made an alliance with Rome during Caesar’s tenure

as consul in 60BC.

Before his death, Ptolemy XII named his eldest son, Ptolemy XIII, and his eldest daughter,

Cleopatra VII, as co-rulers, with Rome as the guarantor of the will.

Tensions between the two sibling rulers quickly escalated, however, both raising armies against

each other.

Furthermore, both had inherited the debts of their father.

Ptolemy XII had borrowed huge sums of money from Rome throughout his life, and by his

death, there was still an unpaid debt of 17.5 million drachmae to the Republic, which constituted

approximately half of Egypt’s yearly revenue.

Caesar was badly in need of money to pay his growing armies and also saw an opportunity

to solidify Roman influence in the area.

As consul when the alliance with Egypt was first made, and the current Dictator Caesar

thought it his obligation to see that pro-Roman rule in Egypt was maintained, and that the

debt was paid.

Caesar first attempted to take a diplomatic approach, suggesting that Ptolemy and Cleopatra

both disband their armies and that he acts as an arbitrator to see their father’s will

fulfilled.

He also requested the debt be paid but was willing to reduce it to 10 million drachmae.

Ptolemy, though pharaoh by title, was still young and, as such, was being advised by a

council who effectively ruled Egypt through their regency.

Pothinus, a eunuch, was one of the most influential of these advisors.

It had been on his advice that Pompey had been assassinated as a ploy to curry favour

with Caesar.

Now, he opposed Caesar’s suggestions.

He saw Caesar’s arrival as a threat to the royal authority, and initially refused to

pay the debt.

He even went so far as to bring Ptolemies’ Royal Army into Alexandria under the command

of Achillas, one of Pompey’s killers.

This was clear defiance of Caesar’s demands that Ptolemies army be disbanded and, in response,

Caesar sent messengers to Cleopatra, perhaps thinking she would be able to better fulfill

his demands without requiring a regent.

Cleopatra decided to meet Caesar in secret within Alexandria.

Plutarch gives an extraordinary account of this meeting, in which Cleopatra, with the

help of her right-hand man Appolodorus, smuggled herself into the city in a bed sack, laundry

bag, or carpet.

Cassius Dio gives the much more reasonable account, that the two simply met in secret

with no reference to her being smuggled in.

Both sources, however, agree that Cleopatra was quickly able to seduce Caesar.

Cleopatra is described as being beautiful, charming, and above all, clever.

She was a brilliant orator, and could speak as many as eight languages, and was the first

Ptolemaic ruler to learn Egyptian.

Caesar immediately tried to reconcile the two monarchs, proclaiming them co-monarchs

and offering the island of Cyprus recently annexed from the Egyptians by Rome to the

other two siblings, Arsinoe and Ptolemy XIV, thus removing other potential claimants to

the Egyptian throne.

Pothinus, however, was not happy with this arrangement.

He was worried that, due to Cleopatra’s now very close relationship with Caesar, she

would be the more powerful of the two siblings, and that Pothinus would, as a result, lose

his influence.

He began stirring up unrest in the city, even having gold from the temples and royal treasury

melted down in a deliberate attempt to show Caesar as being extortionate.

With the situation worsening, Caesar sent emissaries to Achillas and the Egyptian army,

attempting to explain that he wanted only to be an arbitrator of the will, as was his

legal right.

These emissaries were killed on Achillas orders.

The message was clear; a fight was imminent.

Caesar was aware that he did not have enough men to fight in the open, only having the

4,000 he had brought from Greece.

Instead, he ordered his men to seize the royal quarters where he had been housed.

Within these quarters were Cleopatra, Pothinus, Arsinoe, and the boy pharaoh Ptolemy himself.

Having taken control of the pharaoh, Caesar awaited Achillas next move.

Achillas’ army numbered around 20,000 plus a further 2,000 cavalry, all experienced veterans.

Their numbers were swelled still further by the rioting Alexandrian citizens, and even

slaves, who aligned with the army and took up arms, making a kind of militia.

Things were descending into chaos and Caesar was forced to begin further fortifying his

position and send messengers to allies and his forces in Asia Minor requesting reinforcements.

What had started as a simple political mission had now devolved into a siege.

Achillas army occupied the majority of the city to the west, including the Euonstos Harbour,

while Caesar only held the royal quarters and the royal harbour.

Achillas regularly attacked Caesar’s position, probing for weaknesses, but the narrow streets

helped to mitigate the difference in numbers, Caesar’s men consistently repulsing these

attacks.

Achillas next turned his attention to the Great Harbour where both the Egyptian fleet

and Caesar’s fleet lay at anchor.

If Achillas could seize this harbour and the ships, he would be able to cut off any chance

of Caesar being resupplied or receiving reinforcements.

Sending a diversionary force to attack Caesar’s defences, Achillas simultaneously sent a larger

force to seize the harbour.

Caesar was well aware of the strategic value of the harbour and so, leaving as small a

force as was necessary to hold the defences, led his men to the harbour.

The fighting around the harbour was particularly brutal and Caesar quickly realised he did

not have the men to win this fight and defend the harbour.

Instead, Caesar effectively fought a delaying action, holding off the Egyptian force long

enough for his men to set fire to the Egyptian fleet and pull their own fleet back to the

Royal Harbour.

The fire was ferocious and spread quickly, partially burning the Great Library of Alexandria.

The damage was relatively minor, fortunately, and the library would continue for a number

of centuries afterwards.

Seizing the opportunity of having naval supremacy, Caesar sailed a portion of his men to the

island of Pharos, which controlled access to all Alexandria’s harbours, establishing

a small garrison there, likely around the promenade on which the lighthouse itself was

situated.

Caesar and the rest of his forces then retreated back to the royal quarters.

While Caesar persisted in improving his defences, Pothinus continued his resistance from the

inside.

Secretly, he sent messages to Achillas encouraging him to continue his attacks and plotted to

assassinate Caesar.

Caesar’s men, however, were able to catch some of Pothinus’ messengers who were forced

to reveal the plot.

Caesar immediately had Pothinus killed.

Arsinoe, Ptolemy’s sister, had greater success, escaping Caesar’s defences and joining Achillas.

Following this, an uneasy status-quo developed.

Caesar continued to fortify his position against any assaults, even making makeshift battering

rams to break down the walls of houses to keep a continuous line of defence.

The Alexandrians also constructed their own barricades to keep Caesar penned in, some

as high as 12 meters.

Achillas frequently sent some of the militia forces to assault various points of Caesar’s

defences to look for weaknesses, keeping his veterans in reserve, but with little success.

Perhaps frustrated by this lack of success, a rift began to form between Arsinoe and Achillas,

and eventually, Arsinoe had Achillas killed and replaced by her own man, Ganymedes.

Ganymedes was a cunning general and immediately took steps to try and break the stalemate.

Alexandria was supplied by subterranean watercourses that ran throughout the city.

Ganymedes, therefore, ordered that those sections that flowed into the parts of the city controlled

by Caesar be blocked, and then had these sections polluted with sea water, rendering them undrinkable.

Such a tactic would have been difficult to pull off, but the Alexandrians were renowned

engineers and were quickly able to complete the project, thus making Caesar’s position

even more precarious.

Some of Caesar’s men started to panic, some saying they should have retreated much earlier.

Fortunately for them, Caesar quickly took control of the situation.

He made it clear that if they were to attempt to retreat, the Alexandrians would catch them

before they could successfully evacuate everyone.

He instead ordered wells to be dug day and night, and freshwater was soon found, avoiding

disaster.

Though the situation had been quickly rectified, it was clear that Ganymedes was a dangerous

enemy, not to be taken lightly.

As time passed Caesar’s situation in Alexandria improved.

His lieutenant in Asia Minor, Domitius Calvinus, had received Caesar’s request for reinforcements

and had responded by dispatching two Legions, the 37th by sea, and the 35th by land.

The 35th was still far from reaching Egypt, but the 37th had now arrived.

Strong winds had prevented them pulling into Alexandria’s harbour, instead making land

further down the coast and sending a small boat to inform Caesar of their arrival.

Caesar badly needed these men and so, leaving all his infantry to hold their positions in

Alexandria, he left with his fleet and their respective crews to meet the 37th.

En route, he dispatched small parties to collect what water they could, but these were attacked

by Egyptian cavalry patrols and captured.

The Egyptians, thus finding out Caesar’s position, manned a number of small vessels

with their infantry, hoping to catch Caesar separated from his Legions.

Caesar was not eager for battle; he needed all his ships for the 37th and with no infantry

or marines on his ships, the Egyptians would have the advantage in boarding.

He tried to slip away.

A Rhodian ship, however, drifted too far from the formation and was caught by the Egyptians,

forcing Caesar to turn to rescue them.

Caesar, in his account, is rather damning of these Rhodians for being caught, but also

notes that they fought bravely with remarkable seamanship.

They were able to buy enough time for the rest of Caesar’s fleet to close in.

With no heavy infantry to carry out the customary Roman tactic of boarding an enemy, Caesar

trusted his crew’s seamanship to ram and cripple as many ships as possible while avoiding

boarding.

The plan worked, and the superior ships of Caesar’s fleets were able to sink one ship

and capture another.

With night closing in, the Egyptians gave up the battle and retreated.

Caesar was able to continue to the 37th, adding a much needed 5,000 men to his numbers, towing

their transports into harbour and arriving back in Alexandria the following morning.

The Alexandrians were disheartened by this reversal, but Ganymedes was resilient and

decided that he needed to rob Caesar of his naval capacity.

More than a hundred ships had been burnt by Caesar in the harbour, but not all were beyond

repair.

He ordered the Alexandrians to make repairs on as many ships as possible.

The citizens and soldiers of Alexandria committed wholly to the task, even going so far as to

pull wood from the buildings of Alexandria to suit their needs.

After just a few days, Ganymedes had a fleet of 27 warships and a number of small ships

ready for duty and prepared for battle.

Caesar was well aware of the importance of naval supremacy, and also began drawing up

his fleet, approximately 19 warships and 15 smaller vessels, manning them with infantry

from the Legions.

With Caesar setting off from the Royal Harbour, and Ganymedes from the Eunostos the two fleets

met just off the coast of the Pharos island.

Caesar and Ganymedes both drew their fleets into two lines.

Between the two fleets were shoals, with a narrow channel being the only path through.

Both sides held their position, neither wanting to be caught being the first to pass through

this channel.

Eventually, the Rhodian commander, Euphranor, a skilled and well-known admiral, offered

to break the stalemate.

He insisted that he and his men would be able to push through and hold for long enough for

Caesar’s remaining ships to pass through the channel.

Caesar allowed this, sending Euphranor with 4 Rhodian ships through the channel.

They quickly passed through, and formed a line to receive the Egyptian ships rapidly

closing in, delaying long enough for the rest of Caesar’s ship to make it through the

channel.

Caesar was extremely admiring of the Rhodian's skill and bravery, saying that not one ship

was boarded or had its oars broken, each time meeting their enemy head-on.

With Caesar’s fleet now through the channel, he was fully committed.

The channel would block any chance of an organised retreat, Caesar would need a win.

Caesar had made this clear to his men prior to the battle, stressing that the fate of

the Egyptian campaign rested on their soldiers.

Though the Alexandrians were renowned sailors, the Romans did have a crucial advantage.

The coast and shoals meant there was little room to manoeuvre, not only negating Ganymedes

numerical advantage, but also preventing his men from capitalising on their superior seamanship.

Instead, the ships were forced into close quarters combat with numerous boarding parties.

This was the style of naval warfare the Romans excelled at, effectively making a naval battle

a land battle, where the superior skill and training of the Legions could truly come into

its own.

By the end of the battle, 2 Egyptian ships had been captured, 3 sunk and the remnants

being forced to retreat back to harbour.

Seeking to capitalise on his naval supremacy, Caesar immediately turned his attention to

the Pharos island.

The island was crucial for controlling access to the harbours and was linked to the mainland

by a bridge which connected two moles, one extending from the island, one from the mainland.

As has already been mentioned, Caesar had already stationed a small garrison on the

promenade on the east of the island, and he now saw a chance to completely control the

Pharos island.

Leaving just a few cohorts to hold the now completed defences in the city, Caesar ordered

10 cohorts - approximately 5,000 men, some light infantry and his best Gallic cavalry

to their transports to prepare for an amphibious assault.

He then ordered them to attack, at the same time attacking the island’s garrison with

his warships from the west.

The fighting on the island was some of the bloodiest so far.

The narrow streets and rooftops were ideal for the defenders, while Caesar’s men disembarking

from the ships were forced to wade through shallow waters and across a beach under constant

missile fire.

Caesar’s tactic of attacking from two sides had been effective in splitting the island's

defenders however, and finally the Romans were able to force the Alexandrians to retreat

across the mole back to Alexandria.

The retreat was not organised, many choosing to jump from the bridge and mole and swim

to Alexandria, rather than be caught in the bottleneck.

Caesar gives the Alexandrian losses as being 6,000 captured and killed.

Following this victory, Caesar fortified defences around the bridge controlling access to the

Pharos, the Alexandrians garrisoning the bridge linking the mainland city to the mole.

This bridge had a large arch, through which the Alexandrians could potentially send ships.

In order to stop the Egyptians being able to harass his own ships, Caesar would need

to control this bridge.

The day after taking the island, he first sent ships with artillery and archers to attack

the Alexandrian garrison holding the bridge, forcing them to retreat, and then landed himself

and 3 cohorts, about 1, 500 men, on the mole.

These men were then ordered to build a rampart to defend the bridge from the Alexandrian

side, while men from the Pharos brought up stones from destroyed buildings to block the

arch of the bridge.

All seemed to be going well, when the Alexandrians suddenly made a huge push from the city to

retake the bridge, simultaneously bringing up light ships to try and land some of their

own men on the mole.

With Caesar on the mole, some of his ships tried to take the initiative themselves, landing

marines, slingers and archers on the mole.

Initially, these missiles were effective at fending off the Alexandrian light ships, but

eventually the ships bypassed their position, landing behind them on the mole.

These lightly armed troops were quickly outfought by the Alexandrians and panic ensued as they

attempted to retreat back to their ships.

Caesar and the three cohorts were now caught in a pincer.

Seeing their allied light infantry in disarray, the cohorts also began to break.

Some fought a desperate last stand and were cut down, many more desperately tried to retreat

to their transports.

Amongst these was Caesar.

Due to the sheer number and panic, however, many of these transports began to capsize.

Thinking fast, Caesar was forced to strip his armour and dive off the boat, swimming

to his nearby ships to save his life.

The battle had been a disaster for Caesar.

Though the Pharos island was in Caesar’s hands, the bridge was not and so the Alexandrians

could still use the arch to harass his own ships.

Moreover, according to Caesar himself, he lost 400 legionaries and another 400 sailors

and marines.

Seeking to capitalize on their good fortune the Alexandrians sent emissaries to Caesar,

requesting Ptolemy be returned to them, in exchange for an end in the hostilities.

Caesar relented, and handed the pharaoh over, with the understanding that Ptolemy would

then negotiate peace terms.

The young king betrayed Caesar, however, and took control of the army, continuing the assaults

on Caesar’s defences.

The decision to hand over Ptolemy was clearly a mistake.

In his own account, Caesar relays how his own officers and centurions strongly criticised

him for his lack of judgement and trust in the king.

Caesar attempts to justify his decision, claiming “it was part of a far-sighted strategy’

which his men did not understand, and that Ptolemy had cried and begged Caesar to let

him stay.

This seems a clear point where Caesar was using his narrative to try and revise the

events and put a positive spin on things.

It is far more likely, given Caesar’s situation, that he was grasping at straws by letting

Ptolemy go and, judging by how much Caesar attempts to mask this, he was well aware that

he had made a mistake.

Nevertheless, roughly a month later, around the end of February/start of March, Caesar’s

fortunes began to turn.

His allies in Asia Minor had been rallying a force together and marching through Syria

and the Levant to Egypt, while supplies were being sent by ship to Caesar.

Word of this had already reached the Alexandrians, however, who sent a fleet to intercept the

supplies.

As soon as Caesar heard of this, he sent his own ships, commanded by Tiberius Nero and

Euphranor to defend his allies' supply ships.

Though the Romans were able to win the battle, Euphranor’s ship was surrounded and the

Rhodian was killed.

The army was also having success.

The force was around 13,000 strong and commanded by Mithridates of Pergamum, an experienced,

talented general and close friend of Caesar.

He had now made it to the Nile Delta, having already stormed and seized the strategically

important town of Pelusium.

An Egyptian force was hastily gathered and sent to attack Mithridates at the river, hoping

to either destroy his army or at the very least, prevent him from reaching Alexandria

and supporting Caesar.

Mithridates had been well trained in the Roman style of warfare however and successfully

fortified his position, holding the Egyptians in check and inflicting heavy casualties as

he did so.

Messengers were sent to both Caesar and Ptolemy of these events, both learning of them around

the same time.

Ptolemy knew Mithridates had to be crushed, or else risk Mithridates attacking his force

in Alexandria from the rear while they were busy besieging Caesar.

Similarly, Caesar was well aware that any hope of victory now rested in the Mithridates

army.

Both decided to move to the Nile, Ptolemy leaving just the militia in Alexandria, and

sailing his army down the river, Caesar leaving a light garrison in Alexandria before taking

the sea route.

Ptolemy had the quicker route and was able to reach the Nile Delta before Caesar, merging

with the force already there and taking a strong defensive position on high ground with

their rear protected by the Nile, one flank by rocky high ground, and the other flank

by marsh land.

Caesar arrived shortly afterwards, before Ptolemy could launch on Mithridates position,

meeting Mithridates approximately 7 miles away from Ptolemies camp.

In order to reach the king, they would need to ford a small river.

Ptolemy sent a force of cavalry and light infantry to this river, hoping to harass Caesar

and his allies as they crossed.

However, Caesar’s Germanic and Gallic cavalry, by now well experienced in river crossings,

had been sent ahead of Caesar's main army, crossing the river undetected.

Meanwhile, Caesar had his Legions cut down trees, placing them across the river as makeshift

bridges and ordered them to charge across.

The Legions poured across, falling upon the Egyptian light infantry and cavalry.

As they did, Caesar’s Gallic and Germanic cavalry appeared, charging into the Egyptian

flank, routing them almost immediately.

Only a few managed to make it to Ptolemies camp, the rest being cut down by Caesar’s

cavalry.

As was his custom, Caesar encamped close to the enemy stationing his men at the bottom

of the hill, eager to tempt his enemy into battle.

With Ptolemy in command of the army, a victory here would put an end to all Egyptian resistance.

Caesar had with him the 37th Legion, the remnants of the 6th and 27th, plus the reinforcements

brought by Mithridates; roughly 20,000 infantry and another 1,000 cavalry.

Ptolemies force was slightly larger, perhaps 27,000, including the 20,000 veterans who

had been at Alexandria, and 2,000 cavalry.

With Ptolemies force being larger and holding the better position, Caesar attempted to draw

the young king out of position by attacking a nearby hamlet that had been lightly garrisoned

by Ptolemies men.

He committed his whole force to this attack routing the garrison, but Ptolemy did not

take the bait.

Caesar ordered his men to pursue the fleeing Egyptians up the hill to Ptolemies position,

hoping that the panicked garrison might trigger a mass rout.

Ptolemies men held their positions however, and Caesar’s men now found themselves in

a tough uphill battle against an entrenched enemy.

Some of his men tried to circle around the Egyptian position, attempting to attack Ptolemy

from the rear, but these men were soon peppered by missiles not just from the high ground,

but also from Ptolemies ships on the river.

Effectively cut off from the rest of Caesar’s force, these men took brutal casualties, having

little choice but to try and hide behind their shields.

So far, Caesar was making little headway and his men were starting to lose ground.

As they were being pushed back though, the Alexandrians were pushing forward, out of

their camp and slowly moving further off the high ground.

Noticing this crucial error, Caesar sent a detachment of cohorts to skirt around the

battle lines to seize Ptolemies camp.

They quickly stormed the defences, overrunning the few Egyptians there, before rushing down

the hill to attack Ptolemies main force in the rear.

This move proved decisive, triggering mass panic along Ptolemies line which quickly broke.

They retreated in chaos to the river, piling onto their ships, many of which capsized in

the confusion.

Many Egyptians, weighed down by their armour, drowned in the river, among them the young

king Ptolemy himself.

Wasting no time after this victory, Caesar immediately rode to Alexandria with his cavalry,

proclaiming his success and Ptolemies death.

With the king dead, the militia there immediately surrendered.

Caesar had won.

We do not know how many casualties there were on either side.

Caesar’s men who had tried to attack the camp from the Nile side are said to have taken

heavy casualties, and Caesar’s force had been forced to fight a difficult battle.

Given these circumstances, an approximation of around 1,000-2,000 losses for Caesar seems

probable, and perhaps as many as 10,000 for the Egyptians.

Following the campaign Caesar embarked on a 3-month long pleasure cruise with Cleopatra

down the Nile where he, in Appian’s words, “generally enjoyed himself with her.”

Soon afterwards, Cleopatra gave birth to a boy, Ptolemy XV, who would later be nicknamed

Caesarion.

Though Caesar never officially acknowledged Caesarion as being his son, his birth, in

June 47BC, would align with Cleopatra’s first meeting with Caesar at the end of 48BC.

Cleopatra insisted that Caesar was the father, and it is also worth remembering that Cleopatra

had spent most of that time besieged in Alexandria and so did not have access to a large number

of suitors.

Cleopatra agreed to pay the 10 million drachmae debt requested by Caesar and was named co-ruler

with her brother Ptolemy XIV in sibling marriage, naming both friends of Rome.

In total, Caesar’s escapade in Egypt had taken a full 9 months.

Plutarch calls it “not necessary…inglorious and full of peril”.

It is hard to disagree with this assessment.

Though Caesar had successfully had the Egyptian debt paid and a pro-Roman rule installed,

he had wasted a lot of time and his attention had been badly needed elsewhere.

In the 9 months Caesar was in Egypt, Antony, though talented on the battlefield, had proved

to be a poor governor.

His refusal to cancel outstanding debts was unpopular not only with senators, but also

with plebs and veterans, the core of Caesar’s supporters.

The unrest this caused was so great, that Antony had resorted to bringing soldiers into

the city of Rome itself in a desperate attempt to contain the situation.

Caesar’s lieutenant Quintus Cassius Longinus, who had been left to govern Hispania Ulterior,

had been equally disastrous.

His tyrannical governance of the province had even led to a short-lived pro-Optimate

rebellion.

Furthermore, some of his men had rebelled and proclaimed Marcellus as the new praetor

instead.

The province of Illyricum had also been stirred to revolt by Marcus Octavius, who was constantly

assaulting towns in the area.

In Asia Minor, Pharnaces II of Pontus, another son of Mithridates VI, had taken advantage

of the chaos caused by the Civil War, attacking a number of Roman allies.

Meanwhile, throughout the past 9 months, Cato, Scipio, the sons of Pompey and Labienus had

been consolidating their strength in North Africa, amassing a vast army.

Caesar had entered Alexandria as Dictator and effectively master of the Roman world,

save for a rebellious faction in North Africa.

He was now leaving with dissent, war, and rebellion in North Africa, Spain, Italy, Illyricum,

and Asia Minor.

Leaving three Legions in Egypt, Caesar took the remains of the veteran Sixth and marched

for Asia Minor through Syria.

At the end of 48BC, while Caesar was besieged in Alexandria, the fruits of his victory at

Pharsalus seemed to be crumbling.

Rome, governed by Antony, was in chaos, the Pompeian faction in North Africa was rebuilding

a large army and there had been rebellions and pro-Pompeian insurrections in Spain and

Illyria.

Caesar had continuously been recruiting to try and contain the situation, reinstituting

Legions 1, 2, 3 and 4, some of which were made primarily of ex-Pompeian soldiers, but

the problems persisted.

One of the most pressing of these problems was in Asia Minor.

Son of the infamous enemy of Rome Mithridates VI, the king of Bosphorus Pharnaces II was

eager to return Pontus under his control and he had seized upon the opportunity presented

by the Civil War and attacked a number of Rome’s allies in the area.

Caesar’s victory could not be so quickly tarnished by a foreign king, Pharnaces had

to be dealt with.

With Caesar trapped in Alexandria, the responsibility fell to his long-time ally, Gnaeus Domitius

Calvinus.

Domitius had distinguished himself in Caesar’s Greek campaign, keeping Scipio’s army pinned

and commanding Caesar’s centre at Pharsalus.

In recognition of this service, he had been appointed governor of the Roman province of

Asia.

Soon after his appointment, Pharnaces had gone on the warpath, invading Lesser Armenia

and Cappadocia, lands that belonged to the allied Roman kings Deiotarus and Ariobarzanes

respectively.

Both had previously supported Pompey in the war against Mithridates and the Civil War,

but had been allowed to maintain their positions, so long as they paid tribute to Caesar and

the Republic.

In late 48BC Deiotarus came to Domitius, requesting Rome’s assistance, arguing that he would

not be able to pay this tribute if Pharnaces was victorious.

Domitius immediately sent a delegation to the king of Bosphorus, demanding that he stop

his attack and withdraw.

To reinforce this demand, Domitius also began raising an army.

He had originally been assigned 3 Legions by Caesar, the 35th, 36th and 37, formed from

some of Pompey’s men after Pharsalus, but 2 of these Legions had already been dispatched

to reinforce Caesar, leaving just the 36th in Asia.

To increase his numbers, Domitius hastily levied a Legion from Pontus.

Deiotarus, who had adopted the Roman military style training his men in the Legionary tradition,

supplied 2 more Legions of his own plus 100 cavalry, with Ariobarzanes contributing a

further 10,000 infantry and 100 cavalry.

In total, Domitius' army numbered around 30,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry.

All now marched to Pontus to put pressure on Pharnaces.

Pharnaces soon replied to Domitius’ message, stating that he had withdrawn from Cappadocia

but had taken Lesser Armenia for himself, claiming it as his right through his father’s

conquests, offering to wait until Caesar arrived to mediate the matter.

In reality, Pharnaces had only abandoned Cappadocia because it was too distant from his homeland

to be practically defended, while Lesser Armenia was next to his own kingdom.

Pharnaces had heard that Domitius had sent 2 of his 3 Legions to Caesar and was confident

that the Roman general would not have the quality or quantity of army needed to stop

him.

Pharnaces’ confidence was well founded; his army was well trained and experienced,

many being veterans of over 20 battles.

Furthermore, though the exact size of his army is unknown, modern estimates put it at

around 20,000 and he certainly had a huge cavalry advantage over Domitius.

Domitius saw this offer for what it really was, a façade.

He mustered his army and marched to Lesser Armenia, keeping to high ground to prevent

any potential ambushes.

As he marched, Pharnaces sent a number of delegations, hoping to bribe Domitius with

offers of money and treasure.

Domitius was resilient, however, replying to Pharnaces that by attacking Rome’s allies,

he had insulted the Republic and would now pay the consequences.

Domitius pushed his army hard, ordering a number of long marches, soon arriving in Lesser

Armenia.

He encamped seven miles from the city of Nicopolis, where Pharnaces had gathered his army.

The city was located on a plain, but encircled on two sides by mountains.

In order to reach the city, Domitius would have to march through a pass in these mountains,

presenting Pharnaces with an ideal situation to ambush his enemy.

Choosing his best infantry and almost all his cavalry, he had them lie in wait in the

pass.

To better conceal his plan, Pharnaces also ordered cattle and peasants into the defile

to maintain a look of normalcy.

He also kept up his façade of finding a diplomatic solution, sending constant peace envoys to

Domitius.

Unfortunately for Pharnaces, these envoys somewhat backfired, with Domitius staying

in camp for a number of days attempting to genuinely negotiate with Pharnaces’ ambassadors.

As the days passed, Pharnaces grew increasingly worried that his ambush would be discovered.

Not wanting to risk his men, Pharnaces ordered them to withdraw from their positions.

He would have to wait to fight a battle in the open.

He did not have to wait long.

Domitius saw that peace would be impossible and marched his force closer to Nicopolis

and began to fortify a second camp.

As they began to encamp, Pharnaces’ army poured out of the city and drew up for battle.

Pharnaces knew that his cavalry was his greatest advantage and that they would be wasted in

the city, but the plains in front of the city would be ideal terrain for them.

Hastily, Domitius completed his camp, drawing his army inside.

It is probable that Domitius had originally planned to besiege Pharnaces inside Nicopolis

and so negate his cavalry advantage; now it seemed that the tables would be turned and

Domitius would be the one besieged in the fort.

The following night, Pharnaces intercepted messengers from Caesar telling Domitius of

his situation in Alexandria and requesting immediate reinforcements.

Seeing a golden opportunity, Pharnaces let these messengers go, sending them to Domitius.

Domitius was now caught in a dilemma; on the one hand he could keep his force inside the

fort, which would better preserve his army but would mean he would not be able to reinforce

Caesar possibly jeopardizing the whole Alexandrian campaign; on the other, he could leave the

fort to try and force a quick battle against Pharnaces before rushing to Caesar, but would

first have to fight in open terrain where Pharnaces’ cavalry would have an advantage.

Pharnaces had put Domitius in a dangerous position.

Seeking to capitalise on it, Pharnaces ordered two long trenches to be dug from the walls

of Nicopolis to the front of his lines, each 4 feet deep.

He placed his infantry between the two trenches in one unbroken line, with a further three

lines of infantry each behind the centre and flanks.

His cavalry was put on the extreme flank outside of the trenches.

Pharnaces had effectively constructed a funnel that would force a frontal attack and protect

the flanks of his infantry, while still allowing his cavalry room to manoeuvre.

It was a brilliant tactic and would be very difficult for Domitius’ army to crack.

Nevertheless, faced with the option of saving Caesar or preserving his army, Domitius chose

Caesar and decamped for battle.

He drew his force up in the triple axis, the 36th on the right, the rookie Pontic Legion

on the left, Deiotarus’ Legions in the centre, and Ariobazarnes’ men making up the back

lines.

Domitius gave the order and his army charged.

The 36th, partly made of Pompeian veterans, fought brilliantly against the cavalry opposite

them, forcing a way through to the walls of Nicopolis and even beginning to cross the

trench, attacking Pharnaces’ centre.

However, these were the only men in Domitius’ army having any success.

It is not entirely clear what happened to the Pontic Legion, but it seems they tried

to force a way through the cavalry on their wing, as the 36th had done, but had not been

successful and were pushed into the trench, being attacked from two sides by cavalry and

infantry.

The centre was even less successful; Deiotarus’ Legions and Ariozabarnes’ men had put up

little resistance, breaking soon after engaging Pharnaces’ infantry.

With the Roman left and centre now broken, Pharnaces’ army now started to surround

the 36th legion.

Its experience proved invaluable, however.

Forming a fighting circle called orbis, with the high ranking officers including Domitius

in the centre, the 36th cut their way out of the encirclement, fighting their way to

nearby rocky hills.

With his victory secure and given the difficult terrain, Pharnaces did not press them.

The 36th had lost just 250 men, but Domitius’ allies had suffered many more, Deiotarus’

men alone losing around 5,000.

The Pontic Legion had also taken heavy casualties; Caesar says that a number of Roman nobles

were killed in the battle, and it is likely that they were officers of the Pontic Legion.

Gathering the remnants of his army, Domitius retreated back to his province of Asia.

Pharnaces immediately capitalised on his victory, seizing his father’s old kingdom of Pontus

which Pompey had claimed for Rome.

He stormed a number of Roman-held towns in early 47BC, putting many Roman citizens to

death, castrating Roman boys, and plundering the treasuries.

He would not be able to enjoy his victory for long, however.

Roman Asia was probably saved by a revolt early in the Summer led by Pharnaces son-in-law

Asander, which drew Pharnaces north postponing the invasion.

Caesar by now had won the battle of the Nile, received word of Domitius' defeat and was

en route to personally handle the situation.

Caesar arrived in Syria, spending a few days sorting out administrative problems in the

province, before leaving his kinsman Sextus Caesar in control and sailing to Cilicia.

Here, he again spent a few days settling local problems, before pushing on into Galatia where

he met Deiotarus.

The latter was somewhat nervous of Caesar as he had previously sided with Pompey.

The king sought forgiveness, explaining that due to his position in the East, he had little

choice but to support Pompey.

With customary clemency, Caesar forgave Deiotarus, though he did chide him for his decision.

Caesar mustered the remnants of Domitius’ army in Pontus at the end of July 47BC and

prepared to march.

The 6th Legion, that he had brought with him from Alexandria had taken many casualties

over the years, and more still had been taken seasick after sailing from Syria to Cilicia,

reducing their numbers to less than 1,000.

The rest of the army was formed by the one remaining Legion of Deiotarus, the remnants

of the Pontic Legion and 36th.

In total, Caesar’s army may have numbered somewhere around 15,000, with the 6th and

some of the 36th the only ones who could be considered veterans.

With Pharnaces’ army being larger and more experienced, this would seem likely to be

a long and difficult campaign for Caesar.

Caesar’s arrival forced the Bosphoran king to stop his movement to the north.

Pharnaces was well aware that Caesar was badly needed elsewhere, namely in Rome itself.

Aiming to exploit this, Pharnaces attempted to stall Caesar, as he had done with Domitius,

hoping that Caesar would be forced to return to Rome soon to deal with the turmoil there.

Numerous peace delegations were sent to Caesar, highlighting the fact that Pharnaces had not

provided auxiliaries to Pompey and that Pharnaces wanted a peaceful resolution.

In response, Caesar said that he would be willing to forgive Pharnaces, but in exchange

demanded his full surrender and the return of all taken lands and money.

Still wanting to buy as much time as possible, Pharnaces initially agreed to these demands,

but deliberately delayed, pushing back the date he planned to withdraw his troops.

Caesar quickly saw through this charade.

Never one for wasting time, he decided to follow his tried and tested method; to find

and engage his enemy as quickly as possible.

Pharnaces had made camp near the town of Zela, on the site of a famous victory won by his

father against the Romans.

His camp was in a strong defensive position on high ground, with a track linking his camp

to the town to maintain his supply line, and a valley protecting his flank.

Caesar initially camped 5 miles from this location, but upon his scouts reporting Pharnaces’

position, he determined to seize the high ground opposite Pharnaces on the other side

of the valley.

Supplies needed to build ramparts were collected in the first camp, and then orders given for

the Legions to march quickly, without baggage, seizing the new location before Pharnaces

had a chance to react.

The supplies were then brought up from the first camp, and the Legions began work on

constructing ramparts along the high ground.

Suddenly, Pharnaces drew his army out of camp.

Given the terrain between the two camps, Caesar, in his account, is somewhat baffled by this.

Nevertheless, he drew up one line of infantry in front of the workers to protect them, confident

that Pharnaces would not risk an attack.

However, Pharnaces suddenly began marching his men down his side of the valley in battle

formation.

Again, Caesar in his account is amazed at this strategy.

He suggests that Pharnaces may have been influenced by advantageous omens, or that he may have

been overly confident given his recent victory over Domitius and the size and experience

of his army.

When Pharnaces’ men began the climb up the valley to Caesar’s position, Caesar apparently

could not help but laugh at the absurdity of the tactic.

Nonetheless, Pharnaces’ plan had somewhat worked.

Caesar was so astounded, that he had not yet recalled the majority of his army from their

construction of the defences.

Pharnaces men fell upon the thin defensive line Caesar had placed in front, while Caesar

hastily ordered the rest of his army to join the defensive line.

As his men rushed forwards, some of Pharnaces scythed chariots broke through the thin line,

initially wreaking havoc among Caesar’s men scrambling to get into positions.

As more of Caesar’s men moved forward however, these chariots found themselves under intense

missile fire and were forced to retreat, Caesar’s men finally forming a complete battle line

with the sixth on the right, the 36th on the left and the Pontic and Deiotarian Legion

in the centre.

Despite the Legions having the huge terrain advantage, the fighting against Pharnaces’

veterans was bitter, with brutal hand-to-hand fighting across the line.

Eventually, the 6th, with the height advantage, began forcing their opponents back.

Pharnaces line began to buckle, and soon the centre and left were also being forced down

the slope.

As Pharnaces men attempted to retreat, many lost their footing only to be crushed by their

comrades with the Legions bearing down upon them.

Soon Pharnaces’ entire army broke, throwing aside their weapons to try and more easily

climb back up the valley to their camp.

Caesar ordered his men to pursue, pushing up the hill and storming the camp, killing

the few men Pharnaces had left to guard it.

Almost all of Pharnaces’ army had been killed or captured though the King himself had managed

to escape.

Caesar had only taken light casualties.

The campaign initially seemed that it could take months and numerous battles to complete.

Indeed, the Mithridatic Wars that Rome had waged against Pharnaces’ father had spanned

25 years, and Pompey had spent 3 years campaigning in Asia Minor and securing the region for

Rome.

Caesar’s campaign had lasted just 5 days since he arrived in Pontus with the entire

enemy force defeated in a day.

Though the victory was more a result of Pharnaces’ rather baffling strategy than any brilliant

generalship from Caesar, Caesar was never one to miss out on a propaganda opportunity.

A simple message was spread through Rome proclaiming Caesar’s success: veni, vidi, vici.

I came, I saw, I conquered.

After the battle, Pharnaces attempted to retreat to the north, but was chased by Domitius.

With few options left, he had to abandon Sinope.

Pharnaces then sailed to Bosphorus to raise another army and even had some success before

he was defeated and killed by Asander.

In response to the events in Bosphorus, Caesar appointed Mithridates of Pergamum, who was

invaluable during the campaign in Egypt, the king of Bosphorus.

In the time Caesar had spent in Egypt and Asia Minor, the situation in Spain and Illyria

had also improved.

Lepidus, the future triumvir and current governor of Hispania Citerior, had intervened in Hispania

Ulterior, stabilising the region.

Trebonius had been assigned to replace Longinus who was dismissed and died in a storm while

leaving the province.

Meanwhile, another of Caesar’s lieutenants, Vatinius, had gathered a fleet and the veterans

left in Brundisium who had been too sick to join Caesar in Greece to confront Octavius.

The veterans had proved their worth, winning a quick naval victory over Octavius, securing

Illyricum and forcing Octavius to retreat to North Africa.

With these areas secured, Caesar could now begin to turn his attention to the last remaining

threat, the Pompeian faction in North Africa.

But firstly, he was needed in Rome.

Antony’s governance had been disastrous, and Caesar could not afford to embark on another

campaign with Rome in turmoil.

Caesar left the 36th and Pontic Legion in Asia Minor, ordering the 6th back to Italy,

following them shortly afterwards.

It is now late in 47BC, almost a year and half since the Battle of Pharsalus.

Caesar had fought Pharsalus intending it to be a final killing blow to the Pompeian cause,

and while it had been successful in severely handicapping the Pompeians, it had failed

to destroy them completely.

While Caesar had spent the last 18 months campaigning in the East, the Pompeian faction

had been rebuilding in North Africa.

Leadership had initially been offered to Cicero, but he had refused, preferring to use his

political talents to try and influence the Senate in Rome.

Instead, leadership was split between Cato and Scipio.

Cato was something of a natural successor; he had consistently been one of Caesar’s

most ardent opponents and wielded great influence and prestige in the party, but he had next

to no military experience.

To balance this, Metellus Scipio was appointed as the overall military commander.

Scipio had a long political career, had served as consul alongside Pompey in 52BC, had commanded

an army in Greece against Domitius Calvinus and had commanded the centre at Pharsalus.

Despite these honours, Scipio had not really proved himself as a talented general.

A number of his subordinates, most notably Labienus, were undoubtedly better commanders.

Nevertheless, Scipio was given command due to his rank, prestige and, perhaps most of

all, his name.

Thanks to Scipio Africanus and Scipio Aemilianus, it was rumoured that no Scipio could be defeated

in Africa.

A new Senate had been created in Utica, and a total of 14 Legions mustered, 2 belonging

to the governor of Africa Publius Attius Varus, 8 newly formed consisting of local conscripts

as well as veterans who escaped from Iberia and Greece after the defeats at Illerda and

Pharsalus, and 4 of Juba’s Numidian Legions who were armed and trained in the Roman fashion,

plus a huge amount of Numidian light infantry and cavalry, and 120 elephants.

Pompey’s son, Gnaeus, had been sent to Spain to try and capitalise on the pro-Pompeian

mutiny that had occurred during Longinus’ tenure as governor, and there was rumour that

the Pompeian faction was planning an invasion of Italy itself.

Caesar was aware of the threat and had initially planned an invasion from both the West and

East; Longinus would land his Spanish Legions and attack from the West, while Caesar would

invade from Italy.

Longinus’s abysmal administration of his province had scuppered this plan, however.

Caesar would need to invade himself and without the reinforcements from Spain.

Caesar’s African War was about to begin.

As Caesar returned to Italy from Asia Minor, he visited various client kings and rulers

from in and around Greece, collecting money.

Caesar had been recruiting massively throughout the Civil War, spending almost all his personal

money in the process, and the financial situation was dire.

Even with the money collected from these rulers, he still needed more.

Upon his arrival in Italy, he borrowed huge sums from individuals and cities alike.

Caesar likely had no intention of repaying these huge debts, but in his opinion, the

money was being spent on the public good and so was no different from an official tax or

levy.

The money was given, but it cost Caesar popularity.

Caesar was well aware of this fact, however, and worked hard to keep the people on side.

Clearly, Caesar was well aware that to win any war, it is vital that the population at

large is kept on side.

There was one other major issue that Caesar needed to resolve before he could begin the

invasion of Africa.

Four of his veteran Legions left in Campania and picked to be part of the African campaign

had mutinied a couple of months before Caesar’s arrival in Italy.

These Legions had been campaigning continuously for 13 years and had been promised payment

and discharge following the Battle of Pharsalus.

Caesar’s campaigns in Egypt and the East had delayed this, and with their general gone

for almost a year, Antony had lost control, the Legions going so far as looting wealthy

estates around Rome and even killing two Senators who had tried to negotiate with them.

As a result of his failures as governor, Caesar stripped Antony of his offices, instead assigning

Lepidus as his Master of Horse and governor of Italy by Lepidus.

Four veteran Legions presented a very serious threat if they could not be placated; Caesar

recognised this danger and even garrisoned Rome.

He was advised not to risk negotiating in person, but Caesar knew that these men were

some of his best soldiers and would be much needed in the campaigns to come.

He met them alone at the Campus Martius.

In reality, the legions were attempting to bluff Caesar, hoping that Caesar would not

allow them to be discharged and they could then push for more pay.

Caesar called their bluff and disbanded them on the spot.

Calling them citizens, rather than soldiers, he promised they would all be paid in full

and with interest after his conquest of Africa and subsequent triumph with other Legions.

Caesar continued, allotting the men land from public holdings, as well as from his own.

Caesar concluded by saying “I really have no further need of you.

Yet even so I will pay you the rewards, that no one may say that after using you in danger

I later showed myself ungrateful, even though you were unwilling to join my campaign while

perfectly strong in body and able to carry through all the wars that remain".

The legionaries were stunned.

They considered themselves indispensable to Caesar and were shamed by how readily Caesar

would use other Legions to finish the war they had helped start, as well as by how generously

and quickly he would reward them.

For these men, Caesar was everything.

They had become wealthy and famous under his leadership; now they had attempted to blackmail

him, had their bluff called and were being put out to pasture.

The Legions then asked whether they could volunteer to join Caesar in Africa, but Caesar

simply turned his back and began to walk away.

Desperately, the men begged him to stay and re-enlist them.

Caesar feigned indifference, before agreeing to reinstate all but the 10th Legion.

This Legion was his favourite, and he made it clear that he was insulted that they in

particular had joined the mutiny.

Stung by his words, the 10th requested that Caesar decimate the Legion, killing 1 in every

10 men, as punishment so that they might be taken back into his favour.

Again, Caesar feigned indifference, before relenting and accepting the Legion back without

punishment.

Caesar did keep a list of the leading figures of the mutiny, and assigned them to other

Legions in particularly dangerous provinces, but overall it had been a brilliant success;

all 4 Legions were brought back into the fold without a sesterce being spent, or a drop

of blood shed.

It was a prime example of the importance of the persona and personality of Caesar; no

other man at the time could have spoken to the Legions and reached such a conclusion.

With the Legions once again under control, Caesar could finally begin his invasion and

he ordered 10 Legions to gather in Lilybaeum, Sicily, around late December.

Word had reached Caesar of the rumour that no Scipio could be defeated in Africa, and

to counter these he quickly found a minor member of the Scipio family to include in

his officers’ staff; he too now had a Scipio in his army.

The veteran Legions in Campania were still being organised for the campaign, but 6 Legions

were ready in Lilybaeum; 5 were relatively recently raised and untested one was Caesar’s

veteran 5th Legion and some cohorts of the 10th which had been stationed in Brundisium.

Caesar was eager to sail as soon as possible, but the mutiny had delayed his plans and he

was now faced with bad weather.

Never one for waiting he embarked his men and ordered them to Africa at the first sign

of a lull in the storms.

Caesar spent two days in Sicily giving instructions for the rest of his army when they arrived

on the island, before setting sail himself on the 25th December.

He reached the African coast on the 28th December, landing near Hadrumetum.

In his eagerness to attack quickly, Caesar had risked the storms, and though most his

warships had managed to cross safely, many of his transports had been scattered, leaving

him with just 3,000 infantry and 150 cavalry.

Hadrumetum itself was under Optimate control, garrisoned by 10,000 Romans and Numidians

under the command of Gaius Considius Longus and Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso.

Caesar encamped just outside of the city on the coast.

His men’s morale was low due to the uncoordinated crossing, and they were blaming Caesar because,

in his haste, he had not issued clear, written and sealed orders to his lieutenants as he

usually did.

They were right: Caesar’s obsession with being quick had, this time, backfired.

Caesar was in a dangerous position.

If the Optimates sallied out of Hadrumetum or if enemy reinforcements arrived, his small

force could be caught against the coast.

Initially, Caesar attempted to negotiate with Considius, but the messenger was killed and

the message sent, unread, to Scipio.

He had now spent a day and a night around Hadrumetum and no more of his army had arrived.

Caesar made some minor probing attacks on the city, but quickly decided he had neither

the numbers nor amount of veterans needed to storm the city.

To make matters worse, his scouts also reported that a large force of Numidian cavalry was

closing in.

With little choice left, Caesar broke camp and marched away from the city.

As soon as he did though, the Hadrumetum garrison sallied out, soon being joined by Juba’s

cavalry which had just arrived.

They seized the deserted camp, and the Numidian cavalry began harassing Caesar’s men, forcing

Caesar to halt and form a defensive line.

Clearly, this had been the Optimate plan from the start; rather than attack Caesar in a

fortified camp, where he was known to be particularly dangerous, they had waited for a chance to

catch him in the open.

Initially, it looked as though Caesar would be surrounded and caught just as Curio had

been years earlier.

Unlike Curio, however, Caesar refused to allow his enemy to hold the initiative, ordering

his small numbers of cavalry to charge the Numidians.

Caesar was well aware that they did not have the numbers to win such a fight, but he was

also aware that the Numidians would retreat and skirmish, rather than engage in hand to

hand fighting.

It was vital that Caesar keep his men moving, rather than stop and risk becoming surrounded,

and with his cavalry having repulsed the Numidians for the time being, Caesar seized the opportunity

ordering his Legions to continue their march with the few veteran cohorts and cavalry at

the rear.

His veterans could be counted on to stand their ground against the incoming missile

fire, while the cavalry would charge and scatter the Numidians.

Though progress was slow, Caesar was able to continue this fighting withdrawal until

he reached the safety of the town of Ruspina on the 29th December.

Disaster had been averted, but Caesar was still in a precarious position.

He next moved to the town of Leptis on 1st January, where he was joined by some of his

scattered transports.

As well as his men being scattered, so too had his supplies.

He attempted to forage off the land, but patrolling Numidian cavalry would ambush his men, making

the task almost impossible.

He sent requests to Sardinia, Sicily and other provinces for more grain and focused on consolidating

his position.

He left 6 cohorts in Leptis, 1 Legion in Ruspina, and took 7 cohorts of veterans from the 5th

and 10th to the harbour, boarding his warships.

He did not inform any of his men of what his plan was, but his veterans were confident

that Caesar would have a winning strategy.

In fact, Caesar’s plan was to set sail with the veterans to find the rest of his scattered

fleet.

Caesar had not told his men this, because he was nervous that the garrisons in Ruspina

or Leptis might be captured and reveal his plans.

Clearly, Caesar was rattled and being cautious.

Fortunately, the next day, a large number of the lost transports arrived, bringing much

needed numbers.

With this larger force, he could now attempt to forage in security.

He made camp at Ruspina, and then, on the 4th January, set out with around 15,000 men,

approximately half his total force, to forage for supplies.

After marching 3 miles from Ruspina, his scouts brought news that the enemy was close and

closing in fast.

Quickly, Caesar ordered his small contingent of cavalry and archers to join him from Ruspina

while he rode ahead with his bodyguard to confirm the information.

In the distance he saw a huge dust cloud approaching and ordered his men to prepare for battle.

In total, he would have 15,000 legionaries, 400 cavalry and 150 archers.

The Optimate force facing him was significant; 12,000 of mostly light infantry, 8,000 Numidian

cavalry, and 1,600 heavy cavalry, made from Gallic and Germanic mercenaries, with a smaller

force of a further 1,600 Numidian cavalry close by to reinforce.

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the Optimate army, however, was its commanders.

The main force was commanded by Caesar’s once right-hand man, Labienus himself, the

reinforcements by Petreius.

Labienus was undoubtedly the best general on the Optimate side and his years of campaigning

with Caesar had made him familiar with his tactics.

Petreius was also talented and experienced, having 30 years of military experience, including

having fought Caesar at Ilerda and Pharsalus.

This would be a difficult fight.

Looking to make the most of his large number of cavalry, Labienus deployed his men in a

long tightly packed line, with infantry interspersed among cavalry in order to hide his numbers.

On both flanks, he stationed his heavier cavalry.

Caesar, aware that he could easily be outflanked, stretched his line to have as broad a front,

putting what missiles he had in front and the small amount of cavalry on the wings.

He kept his men in position, not wanting to make the initial move.

With his smaller numbers, and the enemy’s cavalry advantage, he thought it best to be

defensive.

Labienus, on the other hand, used his cavalry to quickly seize the nearby highland, at the

same time forcing Caesar’s cavalry to stretch thin to try and counter any flanking attacks.

Labienus was well aware of Caesar’s style of battle, which relied upon having room to

manoeuvre and using terrain advantages and had now denied these to him.

With these initial moves completed, Labienus began the battle.

He ordered his men to charge the length of Caesar’s line, Caesar’s legions counter

charging at the last minute.

As they did though, the Numidian cavalry fell back, while the infantry hidden among them

pinned Caesar’s infantry.

The Numidians then skirmished back and forth, pelting Caesar’s line with javelins.

His men attempted to charge the cavalry to chase them off, but Caesar gave strict orders

for his men to hold the line.

Meanwhile, on the flanks, Caesar’s cavalry, badly outnumbered, had been routed after a

brief but brave struggle.

Labienus now had Caesar’s force entirely surrounded.

At this point, Labienus removed his helmet and rode around the surrounded Caesareans,

encouraging his men and mocking Caesar’s, attempting to demoralise them.

He mocked them as being raw recruits, and for being foolhardy for following Caesar and

being caught in their current predicament.

A veteran of the 10th Legion from one of the cohorts who had crossed with Caesar, recognised

Labienus.

Removing his helmet, he threw his javelin, shouting out that Labienus would know he was

being attacked by a soldier of the Tenth.

Labienus’ horse was killed, and Labienus was taken from the battlefield after it fell

on him.

Nevertheless, Caesar’s men were still struggling, attacked from all sides and they could do

little except protect themselves from the hail of missiles from the Numidian troops.

It was a dire situation and panic was spreading, and an aquilifer even attempted to flee, forcing

Caesar to grab him, turn him to face the enemy and push him forward to the front.

The day was coming to an end, and Caesar knew that he needed to reach his defences around

Ruspina before nightfall or else lose his army.

He ordered every other cohort to turn around, his line now fighting on two fronts, and gave

the order for them to throw a hail of pila and charge in both directions.

It is a testament to the training of the Roman Legions that such a manoeuvre could be organised

and executed in the midst of battle.

Taken by surprise by this sudden attack, the Numidian light infantry and cavalry pulled

back to skirmish and avoid hand-to-hand fighting.

Caesar seized the opportunity and began withdrawing his force from the battlefield as quickly

as possible.

As he did, Petreius arrived with his reinforcements.

With these fresh troops, the Optimate force pursued Caesar’s men looking to re-engage.

This time, Caesar took the initiative, ordering his men turn and charge their pursuers.

Petreius was wounded in the skirmish, while the Numidians once again fell back not wanting

to be pinned in melee.

This time, Caesar continued to push them back over the high ground.

Caesar paused his men here, waiting to see if the enemy would attack now that he had

the terrain advantage.

The Optimates were exhausted, had both commanders injured and had inflicted as much damage as

they could in a day.

They each withdrew to their camp, Caesar’s men also withdrawing to Ruspina.

The casualties for both armies are not known, but given the encirclement of the Caesarion

troops, it is likely that they suffered more than the Optimates.

Caesar had very nearly lost the entire campaign.

If Labienus had not been wounded, he may have been able to better control the Optimate army

and kept the pressure on Caesar, leaving no chance for him to escape.

But Caesar was saved by his own strategic talent, his men’s training, and luck with

the wounding of both enemy commanders.

Nevertheless, Caesar had managed to avoid having his whole army destroyed as had happened

to Curio.

He would be able to consolidate, and seek a more favourable engagement later.

Caesar’s first priority was improving the defences of Ruspina, and creating entrenchments

from the town to his camp and to the sea.

In doing so Caesar ensured his communication lines would be kept safe, while also providing

a safe landing ground for any reinforcements and supplies.

Caesar had been surprised by Labienus’ tactic of mixing light troops with cavalry and decided

to mimic it, pulling light marines and Archers of his ships in order to do so.

Meanwhile, Scipio was en route to unite his force with Labienus and Petreius, bringing

with him almost all of the Optimate leaders, and the entirety of their army bringing its

total to more than 60 thousand.

Such an army would already have been larger than the one Pompey had, and to make matters

worse for Caesar, there was also a possibility that the king of Numidia Juba, would join

Scipio with his own force, including its famed elephants.

With fortifications improved, Caesar turned his attention to the supplies.

The Optimates had previously stripped the area of corn and most of the local workforce

was pressed into their army, making the harvest of that year particularly poor.

Caesar was forced to purchase supplies from wealthy individuals living in the area and

rationed them out to his army.

A number of his scattered transports were hunted down by the Optimate navy, and were

captured or burned.

Caesar ordered the remainder of his vessels to patrol the harbour of Ruspina, to keep

the area clear for the anticipated arrival of troops and supplies from Sicily.

Just when things were starting to look disastrous, Caesar had a stroke of luck.

The Optimate army under Scipio had paused briefly at Utica where Cato, the figurehead

and political leader of the faction was based.

Whilst the army was there Cato began chastising Pompey’s sons for failing to achieve as

much as their father had by their age.

Shamed and hoping to prove himself, Gnaeus took 2000 slaves and freedmen and attacked

the nearby kingdom of West Mauretania, ruled by King Bogud.

The Mauritanians lured Gnaeus close to the town of Ascurum, before sallying out and quickly

defeating the small force.

Humiliated, Gnaeus withdrew to the Balearic Islands, but his actions had far reaching

consequences.

Having left a sizable garrison at Utica, Scipio now marched to Labienus and Petreius uniting

the two armies and establishing camp 5 kilometers from Caesar's position.

They immediately begin using their large cavalry forces to keep Caesar within his fortifications,

making his supply situation even worse.

Juba began marching to his allies hoping to assist in a quick and definitive win over

Caesar but Gnaeus’ actions now showed their consequence.

The King of East Mauritania Bocchus heard of Juba’s departure and invaded Numidia

to avenge the Optimate attack on his brother Bogud.

Commanding the Mauritanian armies was Publius Sittius, who had been operating in Africa

as a mercenary since the Cataline Conspiracy.

He successfully captured the Numidian city of Cirta, and then proceeded to pillage and

sack the surrounding area.

By this point Juba had almost reached Scipio, but upon hearing the news pulled back to defend

Numidia.

Meanwhile, some of the local citizens had begun sending messages to Caesar complaining

of the harsh rule of the Optimates.

Some towns even requested garrisons, pledging to feed and house them in return, an offer

Caesar gladly accepted sending 3 cohorts, in order to improve his supply situation.

Initially Caesar planned to wait for better weather to ensure his troops would make the

crossing from Sicily safely, but now he ordered that they be sent no matter the conditions,

showing how desperate he was.

Scipio was not idle while all this was going on.

Labienus, in command of the majority of the Optimate cavalry, kept up a relentless harassment

campaign, fighting a number of skirmishes with Caesar’s cavalry that ventured out

to patrol.

Labienus kept searching for ways of keeping Caesar’s forces occupied, including attacking

the towns of Leptis and Acylla, but he was repelled by Caesar’s cohorts now garrisoned

there.

Nevertheless, these attacks were effective at keeping the pressure on Caesar.

Similarly, Scipio would march his army out of camp every day and draw them into battle

formation, including the elephants, hoping to intimidate the recruits in Caesar’s army.

Caesar made a show of indifference, keeping his men at work on their fortifications, but

he never drew up his own army for battle.

He knew that for any chance of victory, he would need more men, particularly more veterans.

His best play was to keep his men behind their fortifications of trenches and palisades and

bide his time.

His patience paid off.

Sallust had arrived in Cercina, the site of a large Optimate grain supply which was poorly

defended.

He easily chased off the garrison and immediately sent the supplies to Caesar.

Simultaneously, two experienced legions - 13th and 14th were finally dispatched from Lilybaeum.

Good luck with the weather and Caesar’s patrolling fleet allowed the legions and supplies

to arrive at Ruspina with relative ease.

Soon after, Scipio sent two Gaetulian spies into Caesar’s camp to assess the new situation.

However, the Gaetuli who had greatly benefited from the actions of Caesar’s uncle in law

Gaius Marius, during and after the Jugurthine War, immediately defected to Caesar.

They informed him of Scipio’s numbers and the morale of his men and, in particular,

that the Optimate 4th and 6th Legions were wavering and eager to join Caesar.

Though Scipio and Labienus had done well to keep up the pressure, they had delayed too

long and lost the initiative: Caesar now had the men and supplies he needed to go on the

offensive and wanted to force a battle with Scipio before the Numidian army would return.

On the 25th January, he sent the transports back to Sicily to get the rest of his army,

and then marched his full force out of camp.

His first objective was to take and fortify the semi-circle ridge of hills that surrounded

the town.

Looking to use similar tactics to those at Dyrrachium, Caesar quickly seized as many

of these hills as he could, ordering fortifications to be built to create a line of palisades

across the tops of the hills.

Hoping to force Caesar back to his original position, Scipio marched his full army out

of camp with Labienus in command of the vast cavalry force, drawing up for battle.

Caesar initially thought this was a bluff, but when the enemy approached in formation

he drew his Legions up on the hills for battle, sending a small detachment of Spanish auxiliaries

to seize the one hill still held by Scipio.

The Numidians holding the position there were quickly chased away, and Labienus led the

majority of his right wing of cavalry to cover their retreat.

Caesar noticed that Labienus had moved too far from the main Optimate battle line, and

sent his own left wing of cavalry to charge through the hole, before turning back to attack

Labienus from the rear.

A large estate prevented Labienus from seeing this movement until the enemy cavalry was

already behind him.

With the cavalry pushing from his rear, and the Spanish auxiliaries attacking from the

front, Labienus was caught in a pincer and ordered a withdrawal.

He and the fast Numidian horsemen were able to extract themselves, but his Gallic and

Germanic cavalry was slower.

It was surrounded and, despite brave resistance, cut down to a man.

Seeing that his right flank was in shambles, Scipio quickly ordered a retreat and pulled

back to his camp.

Feeling robbed, Caesar did the same.

However, soon he tried to force a battle again, this time marching his army towards the town

of Uzitta, a major water source for Scipio, which was located just outside the Optimate

camp.

Scipio marched his army out of camp, positioning them on either side of the town in a strong

defensive position.

Eagerly, Caesar again drew his men up for battle, but was reluctant to attack Scipio

in such a strong location.

For the remainder of the day the armies stood opposite each other, until Caesar ordered

a retreat.

Frustrated once more, Caesar returned to his camp and continued to further fortify his

position on the ridge.

Scipio had been delaying for a good reason.

Immediately after the cavalry skirmish where the Gallic and Germanic cavalry had been lost,

he had sent word to Juba demanding his help.

Juba, who owed his kingdom to Pompey, obliged.

He left his general Saburra, the victor of Bagradas, to fight Sittius, and marched to

Scipio with 3 Numidian Legions trained in the Roman style, 800 heavy cavalry, more light

infantry and cavalry and 30 more elephants.

The Optimates now had 8 Roman and 3 Numidian legions, approximately 55,000 men, almost

16,000 cavalry, 60 elephants, and perhaps as many as 20,000 light infantry; a total

of around 90,000 men, truly a colossal force.

It was now Scipio's turn to go on the offensive.

His fleet had been hunting down any of Caesar ships that had been blown astray in the crossing

from Sicily, and the prisoners were brought to him.

He now displayed a number of captured veterans of the 14th outside his camp, and had them

tortured to death there and their bodies left outside.

He also once again began drawing his army out of camp every day to further intimidate

Caesar and his men.

These actions had the opposite effect, however.

The execution of his men enraged Caesar and he was also encouraged by Juba’s numbers

– they weren’t as significant as he feared, which meant that Sittius was distracting much

of the Numidian force, and confirmed that Scipio had no more aces left up his sleeve.

Following this, a deadlock emerged.

Both sides regularly drew up for battle but no serious engagement was fought, neither

wanting to be the one to attack a fortified opponent.

A number of cavalry skirmishes were fought, with neither side able to gain a significant

advantage over the other.

Two more veteran legions, the 10th and 9th, arrived and Caesar attempted to use them to

break the stalemate, constructing two long entrenchments from his camp to Utizza, despite

the constant harassment from Labienus’ cavalry.

A new camp was made at the end of these entrenchments, where siege weapons such as scorpions and

catapults were constructed and began bombarding Utizza.

Caesar’s constant pressure and the close proximity of his new camp to that of Scipio’s

encouraged some of the Optimate troops, mainly Gaetulians, but also a number of men from

the 4th and 6th Legions to change sides.

Scipio couldn’t allow this to go on and, once again, ordered his army to get into battle

formation.

Caesar did the same, but broken ground in front of Scipio’s army dissuaded him from

attacking, despite the two armies now being less than 200 metres apart.

After squaring off for half a day, Caesar withdrew back into camp.

That is when Labienus launched an attack on Caesar’s retreating cavalry and light infantry.

The Legions were close enough to prevent a complete disaster, but the attack gave Caesar

food for thought: it was only a matter of time before Labienus was able to strike a

deadly blow with his superior cavalry numbers.

Soon word was sent that the last two Legions Caesar pegged for this campaign - the 7th

and 8th, were en route from Sicily.

He also heard from some deserters that Varus, who had been stationed at Utica with the Optimate

fleet, planned to attack them on the crossing.

Immediately, Caesar rode to Leptis himself, took command of his fleet and surprised Varus.

The optimate fleet was chased away and the Caesarean Legions were guided to land safely.

Caesar now felt comfortable enough to send 2 Legions out of his fortifications to find

supplies in the nearby estates.

At this point, Optimate deserters informed Caesar of an ambush planned by Labienus and

Caesar managed to surprise his old ally, killing 500 light infantrymen and routing the Numidian

cavalry.

Unfortunately for Caesar, his Legions were unsuccessful in their foraging, making it

clear that he needed to move his entire army to find food.

Caesar left a garrison in Ruspina, burnt his camp, and marched out with his full force.

He foraged the area around Aggar and Zeta, constantly shadowed by Scipio’s army.

After foraging around Zeta, Caesar began retreating to his camp roughly 23 kilometers away, but

was once again attacked by Labienus and his Numidian cavalry and light infantry.

This time, Labienus kept up the attack, retreating when Caesar’s men turned to confront him,

and then continuing the harassment as soon as they began marching again.

Caesar’s cavalry took the brunt of these attacks, and he was eventually forced to pull

them from the rear and use his Legions to fend off the Numidians.

His heavy infantry took less damage than his cavalry, but his army was now moving incredibly

slowly, only managing to cover 300 meters in 4 hours.

Night finally set in and Labienus withdrew his troops, but he had been successful in

doing significant damage to Caesar’s already much smaller cavalry force.

Impressed by how effective Numidian light cavalry and light infantry had been against

him, Caesar began drilling his men in tactics to combat them, such as how far to retreat

from them and when they should turn and throw javelins.

He was soon met by the last Sicilian reinforcements, bringing his force to Legions, 5 newly raised

and 7 veteran, roughly 3,000-5,000 cavalry and an unknown number of light infantry.

Caesar veteran Legions had taken casualties, some might even be only at half strength,

and so establishing the size of Caesar’s army is difficult, but a number of around

60,000-70,000 seems reasonable.

Though outnumbered overall, Caesar had more veterans than Scipio, as the optimate army

was largely made of fresh recruits and conscripts.

Caesar also brought elephants from Italy.

Although useless in battle and intended for the Roman games they allowed Caesar to train

his troops: his men were taught where the elephants were vulnerable even in armour and

his cavalry practiced throwing dummy javelins at them, familiarising the horses with the

elephant smell and sound.

It is a testament to Caesar’s generalship, that even on a campaign, he still took the

time to train his troops to address new threats.

The stalemate continued: Caesar was moving from town to town looking for supplies with

Scipio shadowing him.

Labienus attempted to keep up his skirmishing campaign while Caesar marched, but Caesar’s

training had paid off.

300 men from each Legion were assigned to not carry any baggage and instead act as a

quick response rear guard, fending off all of Labienus harassing attacks.

Finally, Caesar had enough.

Time and time again he had formed up his army for battle, only for Scipio to decline.

The towns in the area that he raided were not important enough to force a reaction,

and Labienus’ attacks remained a constant source of frustration.

Caesar needed to be able to force Scipio into a situation where he had no choice but to

fight, so on April 4, Caesar abandoned his camp at night and moved to Thapsus.

Thapsus was a major city in the area, holding a large port, supplies and arms and armour;

it was a target that Scipio would not be able to ignore a threat to.

Caesar, having marched through the night, soon arrived at the city, immediately besieging

it, and fortifying his own position against a possible Optimate attack.

Outside of the city of Thapsus was the Marsh of Moknine, which effectively forced any approaching

army to take one of two narrow passes; hugging either the northern or eastern coast.

Caesar had chosen his target well.

He established two forts, one in the Eastern passage which was garrisoned by 3 cohorts,

which effectively blocked that pass, and one surrounding the city of Thapsus.

His strategy was to force Scipio to take the northern passage, meaning Scipio would be

forced to attack him from only one direction.

Scipio soon arrived on the scene.

He initially intended to take the eastern passage, but seeing Caesar’s fort abandoned

this idea.

Leaving a small force under Afranius opposite Caesar’s fort, he ordered Juba, Labienus

and the Numidian cavalry to encamp in a separate camp nearby.

He then commanded a forced march around the west of the Marsh to the northern pass with

the rest.

It seems that Scipio’s strategy was to try and catch Caesar in a pincer, hoping to eventually

make a simultaneous push on his position through both passages.

Quickly, Scipio ordered part of his men to begin construction of a second camp, while

the rest of his army drew up for battle in front of them, with the elephants on either

flank in front of his cavalry.

Caesar could not believe his luck.

Scipio had taken the bait and was now offering battle under terrible conditions; his men

were already fatigued by the long march, part of his army was building a camp, and a significant

portion of his army, including most of the Numidian cavalry, was too far away.

Leaving two of the rookie Legions encamped around Thapsus, Caesar eagerly formed up the

rest for battle.

He deployed his army in the classic 3 lines.

The 10th and 7th Legions were stationed on the right, the 8th and 9th on the left.

The centre was likely held by two of the other veteran Legions, the 13th and 14th, with a

recruit legion on either side of them; mixing recruit and veteran Legions this was a favoured

strategy of Caesar’s.

His last Legion, the 5th, was split into two and stationed behind each flank, acting as

a fourth line.

Their role was specifically to handle the elephants; in case of a charge from them,

the front lines would part and it would be up to the 5th to kill them.

Archers, slingers, and light infantry mixed with cavalry held his extreme flanks.

Caesar and his men noticed a lot of movement and jostling in Scipio’s line as men moved

to and from the camp.

His veterans, many of whom were already supposed to be retired and who had spent the last couple

of months frustrated by the lack of a decisive battle, urged Caesar to attack.

Caesar was hesitant, perhaps thinking that it must surely be a trap.

It is also worth noting at this point that Plutarch claims that Caesar had an epileptic

fit before the battle, which perhaps was the reason for the delay.

His veterans, however, had had enough.

A trumpeter of the 10th or 7th, without Caesar’s orders, sounded the charge, and Caesar’s

right flank surged forward.

Realising that there would be no way of restraining his men, Caesar decided that he must fully

commit and rode ahead to the 10th and 7th to take personal command of them.

He ordered the slingers and archers on the right to target Scipio’s elephants opposite

them, panicking the beasts and sending them rampaging into their own lines.

At the same time, the elephants on Scipio’s right charged Caesar’s left, but his Legions

quickly parted as they were trained to, the cohorts of the 5th Legion taking the brunt

of their charge.

They fought bravely, using spears to jab at the vulnerable and sensitive points on the

elephants, blasting trumpets loudly to further frighten them.

The elephants were soon panicked, and turned to run back to Scipio’s army.

Scipio’s line was now being charged by his own elephants, with Caesar’s Legions following

close behind.

Panic had set in almost immediately.

The left, fighting Caesar’s 10th and 7th, was the first to break, the entire line following

shortly after.

Some tried to fight, but most were stampeding towards the camp that was still being built.

Caesar now had all the momentum, and his men easily cut down the fleeing and disorganised

Optimate forces, as well as those who were constructing the camp.

The garrison at Thapsus attempted to sally out to distract Caesar’s army, but the two

Legions left in the camp easily repelled it.

These Legions then marched down the eastern corridor to the camps of Afranius and Juba.

In a full-scale rout, Scipio’s men fled around the western edge of the marsh, desperately

trying to reach these camps, with Caesar’s men in hot pursuit.

It was a disaster for the Optimates.

When Scipio’s men reached the forts, they found Afranius’ camp already overrun, and

Juba’s being assaulted by Caesar’s two other Legions.

The Numidian king, seeing Caesar’s main force now approaching, gave up the fight and

retreated with Labienus, Petreius and what cavalry he had left.

Caesar’s force stormed his camp, easily taking it.

With no other options left, the remainder of the optimate army surrendered.

Caesar’s men massacred many; Dio blames this on Caesar, however, most sources say

Caesar ordered the men be spared, but that his battle frenzied soldiers disobeyed.

It seems likely that Caesar did not order the massacre; a master propagandist Caesar

knew the power of mercy and was renowned, even in his time, for sparing the vast majority

of his Roman enemies.

The battle was over.

Some sources suggest the Optimates lost 10,000, others suggest as many as 50,000, while Caesar’s

losses were as little as 50 or as many as 1,000.

It was a decisive victory for Caesar.

Following the battle, the Optimate leadership was scattered.

Labienus, Varus and Pompey’s son Sextus had managed to escape and would eventually

make it to Spain, where they would continue to resist Caesar.

Afranius along with Faustus Cornelius Sulla, collected the survivors and began pillaging

Mauritania, planning to gather enough supplies to then also cross to Spain.

However, they were caught by Sittius and then killed.

Petreius and Juba fled to Numidia, confident they would find support there.

Sittius had been successful in defeating and killing Juba’s general Saburra however,

and the Numidians now turned on their king, barring their gates to him.

With no options left, the two men decided to commit suicide.

They had a final dinner and settled on duelling each other, so that at least one of them may

die honourably in battle.

Juba won the duel, killing Petreius, and then had one of his slaves kill him.

As for Scipio, he too hoped to retreat to Spain.

Gathering a few supporters and a small fleet, he set sail, but was caught in a storm and

forced to make port at Hippo.

Caesar’s fleet, commanded by Sittius found him and a minor naval battle was fought.

When defeat here was inevitable, Scipio killed himself; the last Scipio of any real historical

note.

The only Optimate leader left in Africa was Cato in Utica.

As Caesar’s army closed in, he made his final preparations.

He held a feast with his friends and then retired to his bedroom, leaving his children

in the care of Lucius Caesar, a distant cousin of Caesar’s, though a supporter of Pompey,

telling his son “I who have been brought up in freedom, with the right of free speech,

cannot in my old age change and learn slavery instead”.

He then read Plato’s Phaedra, and after finishing it, stabbed himself in the stomach.

In death, Cato did rob Caesar of what would have been one of his greatest triumphs, that

of being able to claim that he spared the life of his greatest enemy.

Caesar was extremely frustrated by Cato’s suicide apparently saying, “Cato, I begrudge

thee thy death, for thou didst begrudge me the preservation of thy life”.

Caesar spent some time in Africa, fining those who had funded the Optimate war effort, before

finally returning to Rome, victorious.

He retired many of his oldest veterans in a generous fashion, and held 4 triumphs, one

for Gaul, Egypt, Asia and Africa.

Having defeated Cato, his position was now supreme.

He was assigned incredible powers by the senate, including Censorial powers for 3 years, and

dictatorial powers for 10, a wholly unprecedented level of power.

For all intents and purposes, Caesar was now the sole ruler of the Roman Republic.

However, though he had now twice won the Civil War, once at Pharsalus and once at Thapsus,

the war was not over.

The sons of Pompey, Varus and Labienus still resisted him in Spain.

The political heart of the Optimate faction, Cato, was dead.

Cicero, his natural heir as political head of the faction, had resigned himself to being

a part of the new order, rather than fighting against it, hoping that he would be able to

persuade Caesar to restore the Republic.

Many other Optimate Senators had similarly resigned themselves to working with Caesar,

in part because many of them had been captured and then spared by him.

The extent to which Caesar had won politically can be seen in the powers bestowed on him

in the immediate aftermath of Thapsus.

He was made Dictator for the third time, for a wholly unprecedented 10 years, made Prefect

of Morals and the Forum of Caesar was completed and dedicated to him in recognition of his

achievements.

Caesar was, for all practical purposes, the master of Rome.

However, some of the Optimates still resisted.

Gnaeus and Sextus Pompey had fled from Africa and arrived in Baetica.

With them went survivors of Thapsus, including two of Caesar’s most active and determined

opponents Titus Labienus and Attius Varus.

Baetica had been chosen deliberately, as Pompey Magnus had been governor of the province in

the 50s BC and people in the area still respected him, including legionaries who fought against

Caesar during the Spanish campaign of 49 BC.

His sons found plenty of support and managed to amass one Legion from survivors of Thapsus.

Shortly after their arrival, 2 Legions under Trebonius’ command had sided with the brothers

and they had managed to levy one more from sympathetic Roman citizens in the area, many

of whom had previously served under Pompey’s command.

Additionally, the brothers made alliances with some Lusitanian tribes, and had drawn

a number of deserters and others to their banners.

Caesar claimed that they had 70,000, but he was probably counting garrisons and other

supporters in that number.

These events had happened in the summer of 46BC.

Caesar was, at the time, occupied in Rome with assigning magistrates, retiring many

of his longest-serving veterans, holding games and triumphs, and beginning the reordering

of the calendar.

As a result, he had assigned Quintus Pedius and Quintus Fabius Maximus, along with 4 Legions

already in the Hispanic provinces to handle the situation.

As the months went on however, Caesar heard of the growing success of the Optimates and

realised that he would, once again, have to handle the matter personally.

He gathered 4 more Legions, his favourite 10th, the veteran 5th and 6th, and the relatively

new 3rd, and marched to Baetica, arriving in the area by the end of the year.

By that point Sextus Pompey had already taken the main city in the area Corduba, and was

holding it with a strong garrison, while Gnaeus was in command of the army alongside Labienus.

Together, they had laid siege to Ulia, one of the few cities in the area that had not

pledged allegiance to them.

Caesar got to work immediately.

Lucius Vibius Paciaecus, one of Caesar’s officers who was known to the Ulians and knew

the area well, was sent with 6 cohorts and cavalry to the city, while Caesar began to

march on Corduba, hoping to draw Gnaeus from Ulia, which was his favoured tactic.

Paciaecus approached Ulia during the night, and a huge storm swept in.

Seizing his opportunity, Paciaecus calmly marched his men through Gnaeus’ lines.

The sentries, unable to clearly distinguish any of the legionary symbols of Caesar’s

men in the dark and through the torrential downpour, simply let them past, allowing Caesar’s

lieutenant to slip into the town and preparing his men to defend it.

Meanwhile, as Caesar was approaching Corduba he sent a detachment of cavalry and mounted

legionaries as a scouting party ahead of his main force.

They soon ran into a cavalry unit sent out by Sextus.

The two forces clashed, Caesar’s legionaries quickly dismounting to fight on foot.

Not prepared for fighting heavy infantry, the Pompeians took heavy casualties before

breaking and fleeing back to Corduba with the news that Caesar was near.

Urgently, Sextus sent messages to his brother requesting reinforcements.

Gnaeus quickly agreed, abandoning the siege of Ulia and marching to Sextus’ aid.

Caesar approached Corduba from the south.

It seems that Sextus had either blocked or destroyed the bridge from Corduba that crossed

the Baetis, forcing Caesar to create a makeshift one by lowering baskets piled with stones

and then laying planks across them.

Afterwards, he made camp outside Corduba.

Gnaeus soon arrived, encamping opposite, and Caesar immediately began erecting a line of

palisades from his camp to the bridge, cutting Gnaeus off from the city.

Similarly, Gnaeus began creating defences from his camp to the bridge, hoping to cut

off Caesar’s escape.

Fierce skirmishes were fought on the bridge itself, each side trying to force the other

to concede control of it.

The narrowness of the bridge made the fighting particularly brutal and many were either thrown

into the river during the fighting, or were killed and their bodies left piled on the

bridge.

Caesar was hoping for a quick and decisive battle, and this was clearly not going to

be that.

Accordingly, one night he lit a large number of campfires to give the impression his camp

was still garrisoned, and then slipped out of the fort.

He carried out a risky, river crossing during the night, slipping away from the brothers

and making for the town of Ategua, which had the strongest Pompeian garrison in the area.

The next morning, Gnaeus realised what had happened and Labienus pursued with his cavalry,

capturing a number of Caesar’s supply wagons, but withdrawing before they could be caught

and pinned.

Caesar, reaching Ategua, began besieging the city, encamping nearby.

The terrain around the city was extremely hilly.

Many of these had watchtowers already built on them and, as he had done at Ruspina, Caesar

quickly assigned pickets to them.

When Gnaeus and Labienus approached, they did so under heavy fog and using it, they

were able to surround and slaughter a number of Caesar’s pickets, with only some horsemen

escaping to give Caesar news of their approach.

Nevertheless, when the fog lifted it became clear that Caesar’s men had already claimed

most of the strategically important high ground in the area.

With little choice, Gnaeus was forced to make camp on high ground between Ategua and Ucubi.

Though he could still see Ategua, he was not close enough to attack Caesar.

The Optimates soon noticed that one of the hills to the south of the town, known as the

Camp of Postumius, was in an ideal location.

A river cutting between it and Caesar’s camp would make it difficult for Caesar to

reinforce.

Furthermore, it was close enough to Caesar to apply pressure and overlooked his supply

and communication lines.

Caesar and Labienus had used this same tactic a number of times in the Gallic Wars, most

notably at Gergovia. and Labienus sent a detachment in the night to seize it.

The Caesareans, however, were alert, and immediately raised the alarm upon the attack, resisting

fiercely.

Caesar sent the 5th, 6th and 10th legions to reinforce them.

With their countless experiences of river crossings, the Legions were able to quickly

ford the river and come to their allies, forcing the Pompeian detachment to retreat to their

camp.

The following day, a reinforcing detachment of cavalry and allied kings arrived to join

Caesar, King of West Mauritania Bogud among them.

Gnaeus and Labienus now decided to abandon their position, marching further West to the

banks of the River Salsum.

Though they would be even less able to pressure Caesar from here, winter was beginning to

set in and this new position would make it easier to be supplied from Corduba.

Caesar, on the other hand, would be forced to winter around Ategua.

A stalemate emerged as Gnaeus and Labienus fortified their camp along the Salsum, while

Caesar simultaneously harassed supplies being sent to them from Corduba, and carried out

several unsuccessful attacks on Ategua.

This situation greatly benefited the Pompeians.

With the locals on their side, it was in their best interest to stall Caesar as long as possible

and hope to drain his supplies throughout the winter.

Caesar, usually known for his clemency, was notably unmerciful during this period, as

several prisoners were executed and captured couriers from Corduba had their hands cut

off.

Gnaeus and Labienus kept Caesar under pressure, attacking his pickets surrounding and killing

many, forcing Caesar to send more men to dissuade any other attacks.

They also continuously attacked Caesar’s cavalry that ventured out to scout and forage.

Once again, Caesar had his back against the wall.

In early 45 BC, the pro-Caesarean faction in Ategua sent envoys to Caesar, offering

to surrender if he agreed to remove the Pompeian garrison, and not garrison the city himself.

Caesar refused, and the envoys returned to Ategua.

The Pompeian garrison soon found out about this and rounded up the men responsible and

murdering them.

This would prove to be a disastrous decision for the Pompeians.

Neither Gnaeus or Labienus had ordered this massacre; they were outraged, as this could

have cost them the support of the people.

Looking to salvage what they could from the situation, they snuck a messenger into Ategua

telling the garrison to sally out that night and force a way through Caesar’s lines to

their camp.

The plan went into effect that night, the garrison rushing out and trying to fight through

Caesar’s lines.

Caesar’s men, however, easily beat them back.

Gnaeus and Labienus kept their men in battle formation across the River Salsum.

In reality, it seems that neither particularly wanted to help the garrison, as following

the massacre, Gnaeus and Labienus were not willing to risk their men’s lives in order

to save the garrison.

The Optimates retreated the following night, abandoning Ategua.

Soon after, envoys from both the garrison and townsfolk came to Caesar offering their

surrender.

Caesar accepted, taking the city on the 19th February.

Following this action, both sides began focusing on gaining popular support for their cause.

Caesar sent messengers to other towns in the area, like Ursao and Ucubi, telling them of

the massacre of the Ateguans.

Support for the Pompeians began to waiver, some deserting to Caesar and the Pompeians

were forced to take more drastic actions, executing the political leaders of the pro-Caesarean

faction in these cities.

It was now Caesar’s turn to apply pressure.

He first moved his camp near Gnaeus’ on the River Salsum, beginning to fortify the

area.

Gnaeus attacked quickly, however, throwing the men working on Caesar’s defences into

disarray.

Two centurions of the 5th bravely pushed forward, both dying in brutal fighting, but their sacrifice

inspired their cohorts to follow and stabilised the line.

Nevertheless, Caesar had gotten the worst of the fighting, and he relocated to Soricaria,

establishing a fort there that cut Gnaeus and Labienus off from Aspavia, an important

town for supplies.

Gnaeus gave chase, keeping his men on the high ground, but some clever maneuvering and

prediction from Caesar led Gnaeus’ men to being caught out of position and taking heavy

casualties.

Both sides had now had some minor successes, but neither was close to the decisive victory.

Gnaeus delaying campaign had been effective at first, but the loss of Ategua and the skirmish

at Soricaria had cost him a lot of support.

Caesar, meanwhile, needed to bring the Civil War to a conclusive end: the resistance of

the sons of the Pompey, Labienus and Varus was undermining his position politically.

Both needed a quick victory.

The older generals, including Labienus, urged Gnaeus to avoid battle and continue his delaying

campaign, but the latter’s mind was made up.

He broke camp at Soricaria and making for the town of Munda.

Caesar followed.

On the 17th March, both drew up for battle.

Gnaeus and Labienus had chosen a strong position.

The town of Munda was on high ground, and they drew up their army in front of the town

on the hill.

At the base of the hill was a plain, approximately 5 miles wide, with a stream cutting across

the middle of it.

Though Caesar says they had 13 Legions, this is questioned by other sources some putting

the number lower than 40,000.

It is possible that the sources are somewhat muddled, and that Gnaeus’ full force was

around 70,000 including auxiliaries and allies, of which around 30-40,000 were legionaries.

Caesar was encamped opposite the Pompeians on the other side of the plain with his army.

With him were 8 Legions, 3 of whom had fought with him since the Gallic Wars, the 5th, 6th

and 10th and 8,000 horsemen, including some excellent light cavalry brought by Bogud.

Caesar gives his own numbers as 40,000, but in reality, his army numbered around 50-60,000

men.

Caesar made the first move, marching his army out of camp and onto the plain, confident

that the Pompeians would come down from the hill and fight on the plain so their cavalry

on the flanks would have room to move.

The Pompeians held their position.

Caesar advanced further, to the banks of the stream.

Again, the Pompeians did not move.

Caesar crossed the stream, and still the Pompeians did not move.

Gnaeus and Labienus knew the strength of their position and would force Caesar to fight on

their terms.

Having finally brought his enemy to the field and not wanting to risk missing the chance

for a final victory, Caesar moved to the base of the hill, drawing up his force with the

10th in the position of honour on the right, the 6th in the centre and the 3rd and 5th

on the left, the rookie Legions interspersed between the veterans and behind, and his cavalry

on the flanks.

With little room for any elaborate maneuvers, Caesar ordered his infantry to attack the

Pompeians head-on.

The fighting was brutal, Caesar’s men having the benefit of experience, Gnaeus and Labienus’

men having the terrain advantage and being driven by the strongest motivator; desperate

survival.

Neither side was making progress.

The generals and staff officers of both armies had started the battle on horseback, Caesar

riding through his lines, urging his men on.

As the brutal fighting continued Caesar grabbed a shield from one of his soldiers, saying

to the other officers “This will be the end of my life, and your military service”

and pushed his way through to the front lines, almost immediately taking a hail of javelins

on his shield.

His other officers and legates, also quickly dismounted and joined him, fighting alongside

him.

Gnaeus, Labienus and Varus had also dismounted and were fighting amongst their men in the

carnage; it was some of the most brutal fighting seen in the Civil War.

Despite being reduced in numbers due to years of campaigning, the 10th Legion, one of Caesar’s

favourite and most experienced Legions, finally managed to turn the tide of battle, pushing

the Pompeian left hard.

Gnaeus was forced to move a Legion from his right to reinforce that wing, and as soon

as he did, Caesar’s cavalry fell upon the now weakened right flank.

The Pompeians started giving ground, being pushed back to the walls of Munda where they

finally broke into a general rout, some making it into the town of Munda, others scattering

in all directions.

30,000 Pompeians lay dead on the battlefield, Caesar having lost 1,000.

Among the Pompeian dead were Varus, and Caesar’s one-time friend, ally, and right-hand man,

Labienus.

Their heads were brought to Caesar after the battle, and Caesar ordered their bodies be

found, and then had them buried with honours where they had died.

According to Appian, Caesar would later say that he had “often fought for victory, but

that on this occasion he fought for his life”.

Despite this decisive victory, the campaign was still not over.

Gnaeus had escaped the battle and fled to Carteia with what survivors he could gather,

many more were either preparing to defend the town of Munda or retreating to Corduba.

Caesar’s men blockaded the men in Munda in a gruesome fashion.

The bodies of the dead Pompeians were used to create a palisade and the spears with heads

of the dead put along with it.

Meanwhile, messengers reached Sextus in Corduba of his brother’s defeat, and, after gathering

a bodyguard, he slipped out of the city at night.

Leaving a detachment under Fabius Maximus to keep the survivors in Munda surrounded,

Caesar soon arrived at Corduba.

It had since been reinforced by some who had escaped Munda, but with the help of the pro-Caesarean

faction in the city, Caesar quickly stormed and took the city, 22,000 Pompeian soldiers

and sympathizers dying in the fighting.

In Carteia, the pro-Caesarean faction there detained Gnaeus and sent envoys to Caesar,

hoping to atone for previously having sided with the Pompeians.

However, the pro-Pompeians rescued Gnaeus, killing the leaders of the Caesarean faction

and fighting to take the gates of the city.

Gnaeus was injured in the fighting, but was able to escape the town with 20 ships before

Caesar could arrive.

Didius, in command of the Caesarean fleet, heard of this and sent ships to give chase,

stationing men along the coast to watch for Gnaeus making any landing.

Having left in such a hurry, Gnaeus did not have time to stock up on water or food and

was forced to make land to try and resupply.

Didius’ men quickly found him, and captured most of his ships burning the rest.

Gnaeus once again managed to escape with what few men he could.

He and his companions were continually hounded as they fled, Gnaeus being wounded in the

shoulder and leg during one of these skirmishes.

Having been on the run for weeks and now having to be carried on a litter, Gnaeus arrived

at Lauro, with probably less than 1,000 men.

A Lusitanian betrayed him, telling his position to the Caesareans.

A force under the command of Lucius Caesennius Lento soon arrived.

Badly outnumbered, the Pompeians nonetheless made what defences they could on the high

ground and prepared to make a last stand.

Despite Lento’s larger numbers, he was initially repulsed, the Pompeians resisting desperately.

Eventually, the weight of numbers proved too much, however, and the Pompeians were overrun,

Lento’s men cutting them down.

Gnaeus, who had been carried by some of his men from the battlefield, was finally found.

Despite his wounds, he bravely tried to fight back before being cut down.

Like his father, he too was beheaded, his head being displayed at Hispalis, before Caesar

ordered him be buried with honours.

During this time, the men at Munda had continuously made sallies against Fabius Maximus and his

men but were consistently repulsed.

Soon after Gnaeus’ death, Fabius stormed the town, killing or capturing all 14,000

men there.

All that remained of the Pompeian faction was Pompey’s son Sextus, who had escaped

but was now little more than a pirate.

Meanwhile, Caesar had been travelling throughout the province, reminding the citizens what

good he had done for the province while quaestor and praetor there.

While he was engaged in these actions, he was joined by one of his nephews, the grandson

of his sister Julia.

This young man was Gaius Octavius.

It was around April of 45BC, the Great Roman Civil War was over, and Caesar was on his

way back to Rome.

It was around April of 45BC, and the Great Roman Civil War was over.

At last, Caesar could turn away from war and focus on the politics of the Republic.

A true representative of the Populares, Caesar, believed that the power of the Republic was

its common people, rather than the aristocracy as the Optimates believed.

The extent to which he really believed in these ideals has been debated for centuries

and he has been variously viewed as a military tyrant, a despotic demagogue, a benevolent

dictator, a would-be saviour of the Republic, and a populist champion of the people.

In this episode, we shall look at the reforms enacted by Caesar throughout his career and

allow you to decide which view you agree with.

By the time of Caesar’s first consulship in 59BC, Pompey has long struggled to push

legislation that would give land to his veterans.

Caesar proposed a bill that would achieve this, while also including measures that would

also distribute land to the urban poor of Rome.

The Gracchi brothers, almost 70 years earlier, had tried to carry out a similar proposal,

distributing “public land” to the poor, eventually resulting in their deaths at the

hand of the Senate.

Caesar, however, had learned from their example.

His proposal to the Senate would provide land for 20,000 of Rome’s poor, without any financial

cost to the Senate or the wealthy landowners.

The riches Pompey had taken from the East would be used to fund the reform, and land

would be bought from the owners at the price it had been assessed at in the tax lists,

ensuring fairness.

A board of 20 would oversee the redistribution, with Caesar exempting himself from the board

to ensure it would not be biased.

When the bill was put to the Senate, it was apparently so watertight that none could criticise

it.

Nevertheless, they did not pass it with stiff opposition coming from influential men such

as Cato, Cicero, and Caesar’s consular colleague, Bibulus.

Caesar read the bill to the people, where it received huge public approval.

Still, the Senate refused to pass the bill, obfuscating and delaying constantly.

Eventually, Caesar requested the help of Pompey and Crassus, both of who publicly supported

the bill.

With their support assured, Caesar decided to bypass the Senate officially proposing

the bill to the comitia, an assembly of citizens.

Bibulus tried to use all the political tricks in the book to stop the assembly but was assaulted

by the people and forced to retreat to his house.

The bill, finally, was passed and all Senators were bound by oaths to uphold it.

Shortly after the passing of this bill, according to both Appian and Cassius Dio, a man called

Lucius Vettius attempted to assassinate both Caesar and Pompey.

He was caught and when interrogated said he had been put up to it by either Bibulus, Cicero,

and Cato, or Cicero and Lucullus (depending on the source) all of whom were adamant Optimates.

Vettius was then killed in the night while in prison before any more could be learned

from him.

Roman historians were extremely critical of Caesar for this bill.

Dio claims that Caesar only proposed it as a favour to Pompey and Crassus, to help win

the public support and so lay the groundwork for the First Triumvirate, while Plutarch

says the law was “becoming, not for a consul, but for a most radical tribune of the plebs”.

They both see the bill as being designed purely to win popular approval.

Caesar certainly did want to assure his supporters that he was a man of action and in control,

and so the ancient historians are right in part.

The bill did indeed win Caesar and his co-Triumvirates a lot of popular support, thus helping Caesar

settle political debts with Pompey and Crassus.

It is also important to note that Caesar did abuse the Republican system in order to get

the bill passed, overruling both the Senate and a fellow consul.

However, it is also true that this kind of land reform was badly needed in Rome and did

benefit thousands of its poorer citizens.

Furthermore, Caesar already had a history of supporting land reform, having supported

a similar but failed bill, in 63BC.

Caesar was also playing a seriously risky game by proposing the legislation.

Similar laws had resulted in the deaths of the Gracchi and would result in an attempt

on his own life, and one is forced to wonder if there was not a less risky way of winning

public support if that was the only motivation.

It is also worth noting that the Roman voting system heavily favoured the rich, the poor

having a comparatively small amount of influence in voting.

As a result, it is debatable just how much power Caesar would really have achieved by

passing a bill that would benefit the poorest.

it is also worth remembering that Dio and Plutarch were both parts of the aristocracy

of the Empire, a highly conservative body, and so criticism of radical populist reforms

would be expected from them.

Unfortunately, we do not have any written histories from people in the class that would

benefit from Caesar’s reforms, but it is hard to imagine that they would agree with

the two historians.

After the Battle of Thapsus, Caesar was named Dictator for 10 years, as well as being given

tribunal and censorial powers, effectively giving him ultimate power over the Republic

and he immediately began the tasks of reassuring the people that the crisis was over and stabilising

the government.

Huge games were held, including elephants and mock naval battles, at colossus expense.

He received considerable criticism for this from some of the public, who thought they

were in poor taste, but they were largely successful in calming and winning over the

populace.

Through his censorial powers, which allowed him to pass laws regarding morality, he regulated

the expenditure of the richest of Rome’s citizens, and gave incentives for people to

have more children and larger families to try and boost Rome’s diminished population.

Augustus would later pass similar legislation, and Caesar’s passing of these laws can be

viewed as a precursor to the autocratic regime of Emperors.

On the other hand, Republican virtues had always valued the rejection of luxury goods

and having large families, and so Caesar can equally be seen as doing nothing more than

trying to reinstate core Republic traditions.

Shortly after this, Caesar would fight the remnants of the Pompeian faction in Spain,

before returning to Rome around April 45BC, finally having won the Civil War.

Upon his arrival back in Italy, he immediately retired his favourite 10th Legion, and the

13th.

Most of Caesar’s other veteran Legions had already been retired, but the significance

of demobilizing these two was vast.

The 10th was renowned as Caesar’s favourite and had fought in almost every major battle

of the Civil War.

The 13th was no less prestigious and had been the Legion that had first crossed the Rubicon

with Caesar.

His message was clear; the war was over, and Caesar wanted peace.

This was reinforced by his rejection of the offer of having a bodyguard saying “it is

better to die once, than to be always expecting death”.

When he returned to Rome, he assured the Senate that he would hold no grudges, and that he

would not carry out the proscriptions that had defined the Dictatorship of Sulla saying:

“The man who recklessly abuses his power on absolutely all occasions finds for himself

neither genuine goodwill nor certain safety, but, though accorded false flattery in public,

is secretly plotted against.

I shall be…not your master…but your champion, not your tyrant but your leader”.

Some Senators and politicians who had been exiled during the Civil War were recalled

by Caesar, even some who had been exiled from crimes such as bribery.

All those who had taken up arms against him were publicly forgiven and granted immunity,

with scrolls that were found in the Pompeian camps after Pharsalus and Thapsus being burnt,

along with any copies, to ensure that no later charges could be brought against him.

Men who had been in positions of power in the Pompeian faction were welcomed back into

the Senate, and some, such as Cassius and Brutus, were given highly important magisterial

positions.

For those that had died in the war with family, money was given to their wives to ensure that

they and their children would be able to sustain themselves.

He even went so far as to have statues of Pompey that had been torn down during the

Civil War restored.

Regarding these actions, historians have largely been in agreement; one of Caesar’s most

admirable traits was his mercy and clemency.

Dio, often one of his harsher critics, says that in doing so he put the reputation of

Sulla to shame and built for himself a reputation for bravery and goodness.

Both he and Plutarch also agree that, whether Caesar was right or wrong in his actions,

he did bring much-needed peace and stability to the Republic, even for just a short while.

Nevertheless, some have been more questioning of these actions, Cicero in his Second Philippic

highlighting how Caesar’s clemency effectively kept his enemies indebted to him.

Caesar should also perhaps be criticised for recalling those convicted of bribery.

An argument could be made that Caesar was looking to start from a clean slate, but his

recalling of these men showed a disregard for the legal jurisdiction of the state, as

well as fuelling rumours of him being bribed in turn in order to recall them.

Though Caesar is occasionally categorised as a military dictator, the disbanding of

his Legions and refusal of a bodyguard make the issue arguable.

One of the hallmarks of a military dictatorship is having an armed bodyguard that can then

be used as intimidation.

Caesar did not have this and he also did not use his army as a threat to his rule, another

hallmark of a military dictatorship.

To say that Caesar achieved power through military force is certainly accurate, to say

that he maintained power through military force, however, is debatable.

While Dictator, he also made significant other reforms that largely benefited the masses.

The dole had previously been distributed to 320,000, many of whom did not actually need

it, putting a strain on the supply.

Caesar reduced this number to 150,000 of Rome’s poorest citizens.

He also began the repopulating of Carthage and Corinth, sending 80,000 citizens there

with plots of land assigned to them.

Medics and teachers of arts were given automatic citizenship to entice more of them to come

to Rome.

Debt had been a huge issue in Rome for a while now, particularly throughout the Civil War.

To address this, Caesar ordered that all debts must be repaid, but only at a rate proportional

to the indebted persons’ wealth to try and curb any usury.

Were these the actions of a demagogue or a man who honestly believed in giving more rights

and freedoms to the people?

No one can truly say for sure, and the interpretation of later historians often reveals more about

their own politics than Caesar’s; certainly, arguments for both sides can be made.

Having served as quaestor, praetor, and propraetor in Hispania, Caesar was well aware of the

level of corruption in the governance of the provinces and knew from personal experience

how powerful Governors could be.

As such, while Consul, he also introduced a bill addressing these issues.

The bill prohibited governors from accepting bribes in regards to administering justice,

fixed the amount of staff they could have so as to better control their expenses, and

protected their subjects from having extortionate tributes demanded of them.

Furthermore, it required that each governor produce 3 copies of their financial accounting

making it harder for the power of a pro-magistrate to be abused, and easier for it to be found

out and evidenced if it was.

As Dictator, he would add a law explicitly limiting pro-praetors to one year in office,

and pro-consuls to two.

Caesar also took steps to integrate the provinces more into the Republic, extending citizen

rights to those living in Cisalpine Gaul, and began the process of fully integrating

the province.

Caesar’s motivation for passing these reforms may have been purely a desire to limit corruption

of the office.

At the same time, it can equally be said that Caesar was trying to stop anyone from following

in his footsteps and rivaling his own position of power.

This is certainly true to some extent, as is noted by Dio.

Caesar was right to be cautious though.

For the past few decades, arguably the biggest threat that the Republic had faced had come

from its own governors being vested with too much power, eventually growing so powerful

that they could not be controlled.

Such had been the case with Sulla, Pompey, and himself; reforms that checked this power

were long overdue.

The extension of citizen rights to Cisalpine Gaul and beginning to integrate the province

may only have been intended by Caesar to further increase his base of support or may have been

more altruistic.

It is certainly true, however, that these reforms were, once again, also long overdue.

Despite its huge gains since the Punic Wars, the Roman Republic had still not yet adapted

to its new size, still largely functioning as the local agrarian-based power it had been

300 years ago, rather than the Mediterranean-wide super-power it now was.

This dissolving of the line between “Romans” and “provincials” would be continued by

Augustus and was crucial in providing stability to the Empire.

The Senate had been massively depleted, many of its members dying throughout the Civil

War.

Caesar addressed this by enrolling many new members, increasing the number from around

400 to 900, including ex-soldiers, sons of freedmen, and some men from provinces.

In a similar vein, Caesar also increased the number of magistrate offices, specifically

those in the provinces.

The number of Praetors was increased, eventually increasing from 8 originally to 16, and increasing

the number of quaestors from 20 to 40.

These two magistrates were some of the most important for provincial governance, praetors

often being given full control of a province, while quaestors acted as their assistants.

The last major reform to magistrates had occurred under Sulla, almost 40 years earlier.

Since then, huge expansions had been made, particularly by Caesar and Pompey, but no

constitutional changes had been made to accommodate this growing Empire.

Caesar’s reforms addressed this, increasing the pool of candidates for provincial governors,

as well as further distributing power across a wider base.

The number of aediles was also increased, adding two to specifically oversee the Roman

grain dole.

Though nominally these magistrates were voted for by the public, it was Caesar who nominated

them.

This was arguably the clearest example of tyranny that Caesar manifested while Dictator,

though it could also be argued that he may only have planned to nominate magistrates

in the short term, in order to stabilise politics after the Civil War, and would have eventually

abandoned the practice.

More contemporary historians of Caesar are critical of a number of these reforms.

Dio says that many of the men included in the Senate were “unworthy” of their position.

He also argues that Caesar’s increasing the size of the Senate and number of magistrates

was primarily because it allowed him a longer list of political positions which he could

hand out to his allies, cronies, and others to whom he owed political favours, filling

positions of power with his partisans.

He also suggests that the increased number of governors was to stop any man from gaining

too much power and challenging his position.

It is perhaps worth noting here that Dio was not against the idea of a Dictator per se.

In his words “Monarchy…has an unpleasant sound…but is a most practical form of government”.

However, he did believe that the democratic elements of the Republic were a weakness and

that the power of the masses was a dangerous thing that should be avoided.

Therefore, while some of Dio’s observations may be accurate in part, they are also clouded

by Dio’s inherent cynicism of democratic government.

Nonetheless, in some aspects, it could be argued that on this point Caesar was ahead

of his time.

During the Empire, men from all over the Empire would be inducted into the Senate, no matter

what province they had come from.

It was restricted by money, but not by geography.

Caesar seems to have laid the groundwork for this being the case, being the first to introduce

any provincials into the Senate.

While it is certainly true that Caesar did put many of his allies into the Senate and

magistrate positions, it also has to be recognised that Caesar also inducted many Optimates into

the same positions, even those who had been his enemy.

Cicero’s earlier criticism, that Caesar did this to keep his enemies on side, does

hold some weight, but the argument can also be made that his reasoning is circular, in

that Caesar would have been equally criticised for only having allies inducted into positions

of power.

Caesar had a number of other huge projects planned.

The sources differ slightly on exactly in what order Caesar planned these campaigns,

but all agree that he planned invasions of Parthia and Dacia and had begun the process

of assembling the supplies and men for this.

Plutarch claims that he also planned to effectively circle Europe after campaigning in Parthia,

fighting through the Caucasus, Scythia, Germany, and then back to Italy through Gaul.

He also had huge construction projects planned, including digging a canal through the Isthmus

of Corinth, draining the marshes of Pomentium and Setia, which would provide farmland for

thousands, as well as expand the harbour at Ostia and constructing moles to make the approach

into the port safer.

Caesar’s reforms had already led some to see him as a tyrant, and this was compounded

by rumours that Caesar planned to overthrow the Republic and become something the Romans

hated most: a King of Rome.

These rumours were not unfounded.

As dictator, Caesar was proclaimed “Father of the Country”, sacrifices and games were

given in his honour, and his statue was included alongside those of the gods in the procession

before the games.

He was also given a special chair in the Senate made of ivory and gold; in effect a throne.

Furthermore, Cleopatra had recently arrived in Rome igniting rumours that Caesar wanted

to install a Hellenistic style monarchy with himself as king, and Cleopatra as queen.

Caesar took to wearing triumphal garb, a laurel crown of victory and red boots, and on one

occasion, didn’t stand to greet the Senators.

The Roman kings of the past had worn red shoes and they combined with the crown, “throne”,

and perceived disrespect to the Senate made the rumours look true.

A small minority liked the idea - they adorned a statue of Caesar with a crown and even once

hailed him as a king.

A plebeian tribune Marullus had them imprisoned for that and, in response, Caesar accused

Marullus of having orchestrated the events in order to damage his political position

and had the tribune imprisoned.

Marullus’ office was sacrosanct, so this was seen as proof of Caesar’s tyrannical

ways and disregard for the Republic.

For some, it was also proof that Caesar did in fact want the title of King, and that he

punished Marullus because the Tribune had been imprisoning Caesar’s supporters.

According to Appian, on one occasion, Caesar was watching a ceremony for the Lupercal games

which included Antony, as Consul for that year, and the other priests running naked

and anointing people.

At one point, Antony approached Caesar with a crown.

Some in the crowd groaned at this, others applauded, but Caesar refused the crown, pleasing

the majority of people.

Again, Antony tried to crown Caesar, and again he refused, drawing huge applause from the

crowd.

This has often been interpreted as a staged affair to see how the people would react,

with Caesar hoping that he would be welcomed as King.

Combined with Caesar’s other actions, some were convinced that Caesar would use his powers

as Dictator to become a monarch.

In the ancient sources, it is these reasons that are given for why the Conspirators decided

to plot against Caesar and later dub themselves Liberators.

However, there is also evidence to counter these claims.

Caesar forbade any from calling him king, saying that he was “not King, but Caesar”,

and Dio points out that he did not ask for any honours.

Some of them were enacted by his past enemies, like Cicero, eager to curry his favour, while

many of his allies likely thought that he really did deserve the honours bestowed on

him.

It was in Caesar’s interest to therefore try to appease both sides accepting some honours,

while denying the more egregious ones.

Caesar’s punishment of Marullus, was arguably overzealous, but it may have been done to

try and maintain neutrality with the party that apparently did want him as King.

According to Dio, Caesar’s wearing of a triumphal crown was to try and hide his baldness.

Similarly, Plutarch claims that Caesar not standing to meet the Senate was due to Caesar’s

illness which often made him dizzy and faint if he stood up quickly after being sat for

too long.

Lastly, there is the anecdote of Antony crowning Caesar.

When one considers the image of a naked, oiled Antony offering the crown to Caesar, it is

harder to see it as a cunning political ploy.

In fact, it is arguably much closer to a joke in bad taste, or charade to amuse the masses.

Finally, one must also consider the question of why Caesar would have wanted to be King?

As Plutarch and Dio both point out, he effectively had all the power of a king, so why also have

a title that carried such heavy political baggage in Rome?

It is hard to think that Cesar would not have known how foolhardy such an idea was.

Some modern historians have suggested that the conspirators’ idea that they were saving

the Republic was mere propaganda, and that many were motivated by more personal factors.

In total there were 60 conspirators, all senators.

We know the names of 20, but only 12 are described in enough detail in the sources for their

personal motives to be assumed: Marcus Junius Brutus had fought with Pompey,

and was spared after Pharsalus.

Welcomed by Caesar, he was appointed governor of Cisalpine Gaul.

Brutus’ mother was a lover of Caesar, and the two men were close.

False, but still humiliating rumours circulated that he was Caesar’s bastard, and even that

his mother had prostituted his half-sister to Caesar.

Ancient and modern historians have claimed that they were likely a key motivator for

him.

However, Brutus was a supposed descendant of the semi-legendary Brutus who had ousted

the last King of Rome, so many insisted that he be the one to take action against Caesar’s

kingship.

He was the conspirator who had the most genuinely idealistic motive to assassinate Caesar.

An experienced general with a solid military career, Gaius Cassius Longinus was also forgiven

by Caesar in the aftermath of the battle of Pharsalus.

He became a legate in Caesar’s army in Egypt, but refused to fight against Pompeians.

Nevertheless, he was earmarked by Caesar to be governor of Syria.

However, Caesar had hampered his career a few times, preventing him from becoming aedile,

and postponing his consulship.

Though he was made Legate, Cassius probably deserved a higher command based on experience.

It is apparent that Caesar never really trusted him, and he was right not to.

Cassius had plotted to kill Caesar from as early as 47BC, and genuinely hated Caesar.

Certainly, motivated in part by his Pompeian loyalties, Cassius disliked Caesar for personal

reasons and was the most active about the plot.

Decimus Junius Brutus had fought with Caesar in Gaul and was one of his most promising

subordinates.

He was made Praetor by Caesar and was set to be the governor of Cisalpine Gaul after

Marcus Brutus’ term.

Caesar loved Decimus, as shown in Caesar’s will that named him as a second-degree heir,

a fact unknown to Decimus.

This meant that if Octavian had died before, Decimus would have been legally adopted by

Caesar and been his heir.

His motivation is incredibly difficult to ascertain, the best argument usually coming

down to pure greed for power.

Another veteran of the Gallic Wars Gaius Trebonius was one of Caesar’s most reliable Legates.

Caesar had appointed him as Urban Praetor, then governor of Hispania Ulterior, and finally

Consul in 45BC.

However, his year as consul was undermined by Caesar who appointed a replacement consul

for Trebonius’ colleague who died just one day before the end of his term, which was

considered a mockery of the consulship.

Trebonius may well have seen this as an insult, motivating him to join the plot.

Previously he also participated in a failed plot against Caesar suggesting to Antony that

they should murder Caesar.

The latter rejected the offer, and the plot had not developed any further.

One of Caesar’s strongest supporters Tillius Cimber was rewarded for his loyalty with the

governorship of Bithynia and Pontus.

However, he was deeply annoyed that Caesar did not recall his brother, Publius, who was

exiled for unknown reasons, possibly leading to his involvement.

Publius Servillius Casca was one of the oldest friends of Caesar.

Casca appears to have fallen on hard times financially and may well have been angry that

his old friend had not helped him more in this regard.

His brother Gaius joined the plot to support Publius.

A Tribune of the Plebs Pontius Aquila was publicly mocked by Caesar when he refused

to stand during one of Caesar’s triumphs.

He also had some land confiscated and given to Brutus’ mother, Caesar’s lover, giving

him a deeply personal motivation for joining the plot.

Another man who was Caesar’s legate in the Gallic Wars, Servius Sulpicius Galba, was

a thrifty man.

He had guaranteed a loan of Pompey’s and when Pompey’s land was confiscated, he inherited

the debt.

Galba was annoyed, and had complained to Caesar who promptly paid the debt himself.

Another debt later emerged from these same circumstances, which Caesar was less willing

to help with, much to Galba’s outrage.

There were also rumours that Caesar may have been sleeping with his wife.

Quintus Ligarius’s life was spared by Caesar after the battle of Thapsus, but he was later

put on trial for apparently conspiring with Juba of Numidia, and threatened with exile.

Cicero defended him, and Caesar pardoned him.

Nevertheless, he had been deeply depressed at the idea of being exiled.

Furthermore, Caesar had executed a relative of his for taking up arms against Caesar despite

already having been pardoned.

These reasons and friendship with Brutus likely brought him into the conspiracy.

Another Caesarian legate Lucius Minucius Basilus – who served in the Gallic Wars was made

praetor in 45BC, but instead of being given a province afterwards, was given a huge sum

of money.

This apparently deeply insulted him, motivating him to join the conspirators.

The last in this group was Quintus Antistius – who seems to have joined the plot purely

out of devotion to his close friend Brutus.

Little to nothing is known of the other 8 named conspirators.

In all likelihood, some really did believe that they were ridding Rome of a tyrant, as

they would later claim.

However, modern historians are also right to suggest that it is equally likely that

a good many of them were involved either based on personal grudges or wanting to be a part

of the creation of the new order.

The sources vary on precisely who was the instigator, but Cassius and Brutus were the

ringleaders.

The former doing much of the recruiting, with the latter being more of a figurehead, his

name and reputation crucial in convincing many others to join.

Gradually, they convinced the 58 other conspirators to join the plot.

The Conspirators did consider one of the most influential Senators - Cicero, but concluded

that he would not commit or would simply slow things down.

At first, it was proposed that they kill Caesar, Antony, and Lepidus.

The latter two were the next most powerful Caesareans, so killing them would effectively

remove all the faction’s significant leadership.

Brutus, however, opposed this.

He argued that this was to be surgical removal of a tyrant, not a widespread political purge.

The other conspirators relented.

Caesar would soon be leaving on his Parthian campaign, where, surrounded by soldiers, he

would be untouchable, so they had to strike while he was in Rome.

When Caesar announced a Senate meeting on the Ides of March, just 4 days before he was

scheduled to leave, the Conspirators decided that this would be the perfect opportunity.

Caesar would be separated from his entourage, the Conspirators could all be in the same

place without raising suspicion, and they were confident that, when the attack began,

other Senators would quickly come to help them.

Gladiators were scheduled to fight in the Theatre adjacent to the Senate chamber the

day of the meeting, and this would give the conspirators the perfect excuse to have armed

soldiers nearby, as Decimus Brutus owned many gladiators.

The night before the session, Caesar invited Lepidus and Decimus to his house for dinner.

They talked long into the night, and, eventually, the philosophical question was asked: “What

is the best way to die?”, to which Caesar responded without hesitation that a sudden

death was best.

Throughout the night, Caesar’s wife Calpurnia is said to have had dreams of Caesar’s death,

and in the morning, when Caesar was making his sacrifices, they were all foreboding.

A superstitious man, Caesar decided to cancel the meeting, sending Antony to dismiss the

Senate.

Caesar had also been drinking late the previous night, and a hangover might have been influencing

his decision.

When the Conspirators heard of this, they sent Decimus to convince Caesar to come to

the Senate.

Decimus told Caesar that the Senate would be insulted unless he dismissed them in person,

and Caesar relented, trusting his friend’s judgment.

Meanwhile, word of the conspiracy had started to leak.

A friend of Caesar’s had heard of the plot but didn’t know the details.

He immediately ran to Caesar’s house to warn him but finding Caesar had already left

for the Senate decided to wait at his house.

Another friend would also find out about it that same day, and ran to the Theatre of Pompey

to try and warn Caesar but would arrive too late.

Lastly, as Caesar was making his way to the Theatre, someone slipped him a message.

Surrounded by crowds of supporters, and constantly having messages passed to him, Caesar slipped

it into his robes without reading.

Later found on his body, it was a warning of the upcoming assassination.

When Caesar arrived at the Theatre, Antony, the Conspirators, and other Senators were

all there.

The Conspirators were acting casual despite the daggers hidden under their togas, but

they were secretly nervous.

A man approached Casca and said “Brutus has told me everything!” which shocked Casca

before he realised that the man was referring to his intention to run for aedile.

Another Senator approached Caesar, talking to him in hushed tones.

The Conspirators grew anxious, Brutus subtly signaling that they were to kill themselves

rather than be captured before it became clear that the Senator had simply been petitioning

Caesar on another matter.

Despite more bad sacrifices, Caesar was convinced to go ahead with the meeting and entered the

Chambers.

The Senators followed, but Antony was quickly pulled aside by Trebonius.

Caesar, a veteran with 35 years of experience, was in good shape despite his age.

Although Antony was known as a hedonist, he was also a veteran of 10 years, strong, quick

to anger, and an incredible soldier.

Together, the two of them might have been able to fight a way out, so the Conspirators

had entrusted Trebonius, one of Antony’s closest friends, with keeping him out of the

way.

Caesar was seated at the front of the Senate under a statue of Pompey.

Cimber approached Caesar, petitioning him to recall his brother from exile.

The other Conspirators gathered around, encircling Caesar, and suddenly Cimber pulled Caesar’s

toga down, exposing his shoulder, the signal for the attack.

Caesar, who as Dictator was protected by law, pushed Cimber back saying “This is violence!”.

Casca, Caesar’s childhood friend, then attacked the seated Caesar, but missed only cutting

his shoulder.

Caesar grabbed Casca’s hand, shouting “Casca what are you doing?!” while Casca simultaneously

shouted “Brother help me!”.

Caesar was able to rise and violently throw Casca away from him, but by the time he did,

Casca’s brother Servillius had attacked, stabbing him in the side.

Caesar continued to fight back but was attacked from all directions, Cassius slashing his

face, Bucolianus stabbing him in the back, and Decimus slicing his thigh.

Still, Caesar fought back as much as he could.

Brutus was the next to approach him, and Caesar sunk down, either due to blood loss, or having

now lost the will to fight and Brutus stabbed him in the groin.

Caesar pulled his toga over his head to hide his face, just as Pompey had done when he

had been betrayed and murdered.

Caesar resigned to his fate and died in a pool of blood at the base of the statue of

Pompey.

Suggestions that his last words were either “And you, Brutus?” or “And you, my son?”

are largely disproven by the ancient sources, most simply saying he groaned in pain.

His body had 23 stab wounds, many of which happened after his death when the Conspirators

had gathered around to stab his body, some even wounding each other.

Only the 6 mentioned senators stabbed him while he was alive, which means that less

than 1% of the Senate had actually taken part in the assassination.

Furthermore, the analysis of his corpse at the time determined that only one, the attack

from Servillius, was fatal.

The fact that they could not strike a fatal blow on an unarmed, already wounded man, perhaps

tells us something about quite how panicked they were.

Out of 60 Conspirators, most did not even take part in the stabbing, suggesting that

many had joined simply out of political opportunism.

Gaius Julius Caesar had been assassinated by men who had either been spared by him or

trusted as friends.

Dio later wrote of Caesar that if he could have chosen, he probably would have wished

he could have died at Munda, as a soldier.

Even the ancient historians who are critical of Caesar, such as Dio, recognise that such

a death was somewhat of a tragic end.

For some, Caesar was a war-mongering tyrant driven by a lust for personal glory.

To others, Caesar was a leader who tried to fix a system that was clearly broken and was

killed before that goal could be reached.

Some see Caesar as a combination of both or something in between.

What all can agree on, however, is that Caesar changed the world.

By accident or design, his actions ultimately led to the rise of the Roman Empire and all

the effects, good and bad, that would bring.

Two of the most interesting things that Caesar has left us today are two questions.

Did Caesar make the world a better place?

And what would have happened if he had survived?

We are currently working on the third season of this series that will cover the events

that happened after the assassination of Caesar, including various civil wars and the so-called

Last War of the Republic that allowed the Roman Republic to transform into the Principate.

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This is the Kings and Generals channel, and we will catch you on the next one.

Key Vocabulary

Vocabulary	Meanings
civil /ˈsɪvəl/ B2	adjective - relating to ordinary citizens and their concerns, as distinct from military or ecclesiastical matters.
battle /ˈbætl/ A2	noun - a sustained fight between opposing forces verb - to fight or struggle
defeat /dɪˈfiːt/ B1	verb - to win a victory over someone in a battle or contest noun - the act of losing a battle or contest
political /pəˈlɪtɪkl/ B1	adjective - relating to government or public affairs
power /ˈpaʊər/ A2	noun - the ability to influence or control people or events verb - to supply with mechanical or electrical energy
ships /ʃɪps/ A1	noun - large boats used for transporting people or goods by sea
death /dɛθ/ A2	noun - the end of the life of a person or organism
relations /rɪˈleɪʃənz/ B1	noun - the way in which two or more people or things are connected
capture /ˈkæptʃər/ B2	verb - to take into one's possession or control by force or skill noun - the act of seizing someone or something
news /njuːz/ A1	noun - newly received or noteworthy information, especially about recent events
general /ˈdʒɛnərəl/ A2	noun - a commander of an army, or an army officer of very high rank adjective - affecting or concerning all or most people, places, or things
emergency /ɪˈmɜːrdʒənsi/ B1	noun - a serious, unexpected, and often dangerous situation requiring immediate action
army /ˈɑːrmi/ A1	noun - an organized military force equipped for fighting on land
royal /ˈrɔɪəl/ B1	adjective - belonging or relating to a king or queen
secret /ˈsiːkrɪt/ A2	adjective - not known or seen or not meant to be known or seen by others noun - something that is kept hidden or that is known only to a few people
influence /ˈɪnfluəns/ B2	noun - the capacity to have an effect on the character, development, or behavior of someone or something verb - have an effect on the character, development, or behavior of someone or something