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This idea of moes is so pervasive and so 00:00
important. 00:03
It is interesting how moes have just 00:03
become much more discussed by aspiring 00:05
startup founders now than they were pre- 00:08
AI. 00:10
What is going to prevent you from being 00:11
basically subject to infinite 00:13
competition? 00:15
Like a mode is inherently a defensive 00:16
thing and you have to have something to 00:18
defend otherwise like 00:19
if you got nothing to defend, don't 00:20
worry about your mode. 00:22
[Music] 00:24
Welcome back to another episode of the 00:30
Light Cone. Today we're going to talk 00:32
about Moes. So, in your head you might 00:35
be thinking about barbarians storming 00:37
your gate. You've got this little 00:39
startup and you've got every other 00:41
company out there who wants to come and 00:43
eat your lunch. Uh, and you know, right 00:45
outside your castle is a moat that keeps 00:48
them away. Jared, when you were going to 00:51
college campuses, this isn't sort of 00:53
this trivial thing that people are 00:54
thinking about. It's actually uh 00:57
something that keeps them from starting 00:59
companies right now. 01:00
Yeah, this is a question that we got 01:01
from a lot of very smart college 01:03
students on on our on our our recent 01:05
scholarships. And basically, their 01:07
question is like they don't see how 01:08
these new AI agent companies like a lot 01:10
of the ones that we've talked about on 01:12
on this podcast could have moes. um it 01:14
plays into this meme of like the chat 01:16
GBT rapper that like all of these 01:18
companies could be easily cloned and so 01:20
they can see how you could build a 01:22
business that makes some amount of 01:23
revenue, but they don't really see how 01:24
you can build a long enduring business. 01:25
And so I think it's actually not true. I 01:28
actually think these businesses do have 01:31
quite deep and interesting modes, but 01:33
they're not totally obvious what they 01:35
would be. So I think this is an 01:37
interesting topic for us to to explore. 01:38
At our recent AI startup school 01:40
backstage, I had this exchange with Sam 01:42
Alman that I thought was kind of funny. 01:44
You know, we spend a lot of time 01:46
thinking about, you know, make something 01:48
people want. Very simple maxims that are 01:50
sort of anti- business school. And yet 01:52
this idea of Moes is so pervasive and so 01:55
important. We sort of remarked how funny 01:59
it is that uh one of the more important 02:01
books to read these days is actually 02:04
business school fodder. um this book 02:06
called the seven powers. So today we 02:09
thought that we would actually go 02:11
through those seven powers. What are 02:13
they? What are some concrete examples 02:15
and ways that a startup founder who's 02:17
just starting out uh could or should be 02:20
thinking about these things from real 02:22
world examples that we've seen. 02:24
So Diana, can you tell us a bit about 02:26
this book? 02:28
This book was written by Hamilton Helmer 02:29
who taught at Stanford Economics School 02:32
and was published in 2016. And the book 02:34
title was the seven powers the 02:38
foundations of business strategies. And 02:40
a lot of the examples are more with the 02:43
era of uh internet companies from the 02:45
2000s. So a lot of the examples are like 02:48
Oracle, Facebook, 02:50
Netflix, which is a older generation. So 02:53
we want to do a bit of a reboot right 02:56
now how he applies now 2025 with AI. 02:58
I think it's a little bit confusing the 03:01
way he uses the terminology in the book. 03:03
It's called the seven powers, but it 03:05
would make a lot more sense if he just 03:07
called the thing the seven moes because 03:08
that's really what he's talking about. 03:10
He's really talking about seven 03:11
categories of moes that a business can 03:12
have. And I it's true that the examples 03:14
are out of date, but I think the 03:17
framework is actually pretty timeless. 03:18
Like it turns out there's just only so 03:19
many kinds of modes that a business can 03:21
have and they don't really change. And 03:22
so like even though the specific like 03:24
versions of these modes are different in 03:27
the AI agent world, like the categories 03:29
haven't changed. Thankfully, we live in 03:30
a world where there's markets and 03:32
there's free markets, where there's lots 03:34
and lots of competition. And these moes 03:36
in a lot of ways are the only way if 03:39
you're running a business, you can sort 03:42
of fight against all of the other people 03:43
who might want to do exactly what you're 03:46
doing. And um you know, famously Peter 03:48
Teal talks about uh competition is for 03:50
losers. And so the profound view there 03:53
is that given infinite competition, what 03:56
is going to prevent you from being 03:58
basically subject to infinite 04:01
competition and then as a result uh you 04:02
know your margins, how much you can 04:05
actually profit off of what you're 04:07
selling goes down to zero. And what that 04:09
means is like actually your business 04:12
will die and so you know having a moat 04:14
is uh relatively existential eventually. 04:17
You made a great point earlier, Gary, 04:20
that like this is actually like you kind 04:21
of have to worry about this at the right 04:24
time of of a startup. Do you want to 04:25
talk about like how like early stage 04:28
founders should think about Moes? 04:29
I mean, this is sort of why we generally 04:31
tell people to go find a person with a 04:34
real problem and then go solve that 04:36
problem first. It's um what's funny 04:39
about the world uh that's a little 04:41
surprising is that you can go almost 04:44
anywhere and find some painoint, some 04:46
problem that could be solved with 04:49
software and especially with AI that 04:50
frankly just isn't being solved. And if 04:53
that and they're they're so numerous and 04:55
so severe that if you find that thing 04:58
and solve it, you literally can mint a 05:01
billion dollar or 10 billion or even 05:04
hundred or hundreds of billions of 05:06
dollars uh market cap business and it's 05:08
just lying in plain sight. That's really 05:11
the first thing that people should do. 05:14
Like you should just find a problem and 05:15
go solve it. And then along the way you 05:17
will probably as you work with customers 05:20
as as you build the product itself and 05:23
engineer it and figure out what data you 05:26
need for it and all of these things like 05:28
you will stumble upon these seven 05:30
powers. 05:32
Yeah. The moes come later like it would 05:32
be like pretty dumb for somebody to 05:34
decide not to work on a startup idea 05:36
because they can't see what the 05:38
long-term modes of that idea could be. 05:40
Right. It is interesting how moes have 05:42
just become um much more discussed by 05:43
aspiring startup founders now than they 05:47
were pre- AI. Seems like the main reason 05:49
for that presumably is just that big the 05:51
original chat GBT rapper meme and that 05:54
the the moat that most people are 05:56
worried about is moat against the big 05:58
model companies and how like are you not 06:00
going to get crushed by one of the big 06:02
labs when they decide the product you're 06:04
working on is really valuable and they 06:06
want to own it too. And I think Varun uh 06:08
from Windsorf who we hosted some time 06:11
ago he said it himself the early stages 06:13
at the beginning the only model that 06:17
startups have is really just speed. Once 06:20
you pass that and build something that 06:23
people want then you figure out and go 06:26
deeper into these type of modes that 06:28
we're going to discuss. 06:30
I really like Verun's point that the 06:31
only moat is speed. That is not one of 06:33
the seven powers in the book, but I 06:35
think it probably should be. 06:37
I think it also comes with a lot of the 06:39
essays from PD because one of the 06:41
tenants really at the beginning is yes, 06:42
your big company, let's say OpenAI at 06:45
this OpenAI is the new Google. It's like 06:47
sure OpenAI or Anthropic could build all 06:49
these features let's say like cloud code 06:52
and then compete directly let's say with 06:54
cursor or etc. And for a startup like 06:56
cursor to really win even in the 06:59
beginning is they had relentless 07:02
execution because a larger company like 07:06
a Google or Anthropic it they just have 07:09
a lot of uh more craft that they need to 07:12
do in order to ship a product. They just 07:15
have all these product managers all the 07:17
operations. It needs to go through a PRD 07:19
some spec dog and it takes mo a lot more 07:21
time to ship a feature as opposed to 07:23
cursor. the incredible story about 07:26
cursor. When we hosted Michael Truel to 07:28
come talk to the badge, he was sharing 07:31
how his product development cycle for 07:33
shipping features and sprint cycles were 07:36
one day 07:39
one day. So one day sprint 07:39
in the at the beginning during a 2023 07:42
2024 around era they would start the 07:44
every day would restart the clock and 07:49
try to ship things every day. I mean 07:50
that's like insane speed. Like there's 07:52
no big company that could ship something 07:55
at that speed 07:57
at most weeks, couple weeks and maybe 07:59
like larger companies. I don't know your 08:02
Google maybe like multiple months or 08:03
sometimes years. I mean they had Google 08:06
Bard or Gemini a long time ago that took 08:08
years to get out, right? 08:10
I think Kurser and Windsor are great 08:11
examples of when you should start 08:13
thinking about the modes because for the 08:15
first few years I don't think it really 08:17
matter that much. They just had to like 08:19
they proved out that hey like codegen is 08:21
going to be a really valuable 08:23
application of AI. The development 08:24
environment is going to be very very 08:26
important to own. they like got rapid 08:28
growth and then it's only when they're 08:30
at scale that you know like they have to 08:31
start thinking about how are we going to 08:33
defend against like clawed code or 08:34
codeex or all the other things coming in 08:36
and sort of like the mental model that's 08:39
really stuck with me is when we spoke to 08:41
Bob Mcgru a couple of weeks ago um and 08:42
how I think Jared you brought this up 08:44
actually was one way you could think 08:46
about it is that sort of all of these 08:47
startups are kind of forward deployed 08:49
engineering teams like for for the labs 08:51
maybe and so like early on actually 08:54
because this is all green field we don't 08:56
actually know what the valuable 08:58
verticals and products to build are. So 09:00
in a sense you don't you step one is 09:02
just figure out what that is and it 09:04
wasn't actually even two years ago it 09:05
wasn't actually clear it was codegen or 09:07
um the IDE once you figure that out and 09:10
you find and you sort of struggle then 09:12
you keep digging that's when you have to 09:13
probably assume at some point you're 09:15
going to get more competition because 09:17
people are going to realize oh this is 09:18
really valuable there's lots of money to 09:19
be made here and then you have to start 09:20
like defending like the treasure you 09:22
found. So, I mean, all the things that 09:24
we're about to cover aside from speed 09:25
are sort of 1 to a billion, 1 to 10 09:28
billion, 1 to a 100red billion, one to a 09:31
trillion dollar sort of problems and 09:33
then uh the real stupid thing that 09:36
people might do is watch this and look 09:39
for this as a reason to not even get to 09:43
one. 09:45
Yes. So that would be 09:46
they try to use it to like pick between 09:47
two different startup ideas because 09:49
they're like trying to forecast five 09:50
years in the future which one will have 09:52
a greater moat 09:53
which just isn't how it works. I mean 09:54
literally you shouldn't do that. 09:56
Like a moat is inherently a defensive 09:58
thing and you have to have something to 10:00
defend otherwise like 10:01
maybe you have nothing. 10:03
Yeah. Hey nothing to defend. Don't worry 10:04
about your moat. 10:05
Yeah. Otherwise it's just like a puddle 10:06
in a field. 10:09
Yeah. Exactly. 10:09
Let's assume that someone has found 10:11
something that's valuable that is worth 10:12
defending. Should we talk through what 10:13
some of the modes they they could think 10:14
about are? 10:16
Yeah. So process power again like the 10:17
terminology is kind of funky but like 10:18
basically it means you built something 10:20
that's like you built a very complicated 10:22
business with a lot of stuff that's just 10:24
hard for people to replicate just 10:27
because you like built all this stuff. 10:28
Um and so the example that he uses in 10:30
his book is like the Toyota assembly 10:32
line. And I think the AI version, the AI 10:34
agent version of this is just a really 10:37
complicated AI agent that's been like 10:39
finely honed over like multiple years to 10:41
work really well under real world 10:44
conditions. We've we've talked about a 10:45
bunch of these on this podcast like Jake 10:47
Heler with um Case Text is like the 10:49
original example. A couple other ones I 10:52
was thinking about from more recent 10:54
companies. We have like a couple 10:56
companies that sell AI agents to banks. 10:58
We have Greenlight who worked with Tom. 11:00
They do KYC for banks. And we have Casa 11:02
which like does loan origination for 11:05
banks. So it is essentially tells banks 11:07
like which loans they should give. And I 11:08
think these are interesting examples 11:11
because for all of these AI agents you 11:13
could build a version of green light or 11:16
CASA or case text like a like a demo 11:18
version in like a weekend hackathon. And 11:20
I think when college students are 11:22
thinking about these AI agents I think 11:23
what they have in their mind is like the 11:24
weekend hackathon version of the product 11:26
and they're like like I could build that 11:27
in a week. Like how could that be 11:29
defensible? And like the reason is like 11:30
the the version you build in a hackathon 11:32
isn't useful to anyone. It's like like 11:34
like like if Casca or or Greenlight fail 11:37
like the the banks will lose millions of 11:40
dollars. This is like missionritical 11:42
infrastructure. So it's it's more like a 11:44
self-driving car. 11:45
One way to look at it is way better 11:47
engineering 11:49
uh is actually that's like the most 11:50
profound form of process power. Like one 11:53
example might be Plaid which you know 11:55
the surface area of the number of uh 11:57
financial institutions that they have to 12:00
support is so giant it's you know 12:02
probably thou on the order of thousands 12:04
to tens of thousands of different 12:06
different websites different crawlers 12:08
and then all of the different you know 12:10
can you imagine like Plaid's CI/CD 12:12
structure and then you know this is pure 12:15
speculation but if I were uh Zach 12:17
running plaid like I you know know that 12:20
I would want to be using codegen tool, 12:22
the latest codegen tools to be able to 12:24
uh you know basically add every new 12:27
financial institution on the planet 12:30
quicker than anyone else. Like that's 12:32
sort of a very profound form of process 12:33
power uh in the modern AI age. 12:36
I think this is probably the main form 12:38
of defensibility for the existing SAS 12:40
companies. Like if you look one 12:41
generation before the AI agent companies 12:43
like why is Stripe or Rippling or Gusto 12:44
defensible? I think it's mostly this 12:47
right. It's just like they've just built 12:48
a lot of software and it'd be really 12:51
expensive and hard to replicate all of 12:52
it and like you can't just copy it from 12:54
their landing page. Like there's like 12:56
like the backend logic is like super 12:57
deep. 12:59
There's also I feel like kind of a shle 12:59
blindness aspect to this going on too 13:01
where like the the hackathon version of 13:03
any AI tool is like quicker than ever to 13:06
get to. But actually the last like 10% 13:08
of getting it to work reliably across 13:11
like tens of thousands of KYC requests 13:13
like per day is sort of like a 13:16
particular type of painstaking 13:18
drudgery work in a way that I think like 13:21
lots of engineers just not excited to 13:24
do. And then that is also kind of like 13:26
the teams at OpenAI are going to 13:28
experience this too, right? Like if 13:30
you're if you're working in one of the 13:31
big model labs and there's teams of 13:33
people trying to invent AGI, um it's 13:34
going to be hard to get jazzed about 13:36
nailing the like final 5% consistency on 13:38
your like KYC tool. 13:40
Yeah. And so I I think this is 13:42
especially true for like verticals like 13:43
KYC that are require specialized 13:45
knowledge to even know what to even to 13:48
know what the edge cases are. Like if if 13:50
we had to pick from the seven powers 13:52
like I think speed and this these are 13:53
probably like the two dominant ones that 13:56
come up the most often 13:58
and those are most related to execution 14:00
is where uh the hardcore builders win. 14:02
having really good product taste and 14:04
building the best product really matters 14:06
and I think it comes to a lot of the 14:08
point maybe the the misconception is I 14:10
think a lot of these products you can 14:12
probably build the 80% solution with 20% 14:14
of the effort but for these solutions 14:16
and products to work you need the 99% 14:19
accuracy one which then takes like 10 14:22
times or even sometimes 100 times the 14:26
amount of effort right it's sort of that 14:28
parto principle type of thing what about 14:29
uh the the other power for corner for 14:32
resources. 14:34
I think the classic view is they're just 14:35
coveted assets or things that uh you 14:37
know they're not arbitrageable. Um they 14:39
must be independently valuable and then 14:42
I sometimes they offer preferential 14:45
access with you know rates that are way 14:47
lower. So uh the classic example that 14:49
you know you could look at is you know 14:52
pharma companies have these patents that 14:53
are very hard to get. Um they have to 14:55
come up with them and then prove them 14:57
and get through regulatory approval. And 14:59
the sheer fact that they have a patent 15:02
plus you know uh getting through FDA 15:04
approval is something that can be very 15:07
durable and it's uh you know so powerful 15:09
that patents have a uh limited lifespan 15:11
because you know you don't want people 15:15
to have that forever. A more modern 15:16
example I think you know on the 15:18
regulatory side might be you know scale 15:20
AI is doing a ton of work with the DoD 15:22
um you know Palunteer as well. Uh, in 15:25
order to even get there, it's, you know, 15:28
a painstaking process. You've got to 15:30
hire the right people. You've got to 15:33
spend a lot of time in DC and Langley or 15:34
wherever, you know, you're trying to 15:37
sell to. And, uh, you've got to 15:38
literally build um, uh, skiffs, like 15:41
these like sort of, you know, special 15:44
data uh, centers where, you know, it's 15:46
at great pain and expense. Um, you have 15:49
to get embedded with the government. But 15:52
then when you do, like, well, you've got 15:54
it. you know the corner resource in some 15:56
sense is even the brain space in people 15:58
who work in the government like you 16:01
right now if you're working with AI like 16:03
you've got to go through a palunteer or 16:06
a scale and that's like literally 16:08
written into their uh public documents 16:10
around like how they're thinking about 16:12
the nature of warfare and the nature of 16:14
uh you know everything that they want to 16:17
do having to do with AI moving forward. 16:18
So, you know, the corner resource 16:20
doesn't have to be a diamond mind. It 16:22
could be the diamond mind in your 16:24
customer's heads. Those examples are 16:26
sort of uh closer to like being way up 16:28
in the sky having this like insane 16:32
decacorn like worth hundreds of billions 16:35
of dollars sort of situation. But what's 16:37
relevant for startups that I think all 16:40
of us uh sort of see every day is sort 16:42
of what you were mentioning with uh this 16:44
forward deployed engineer you know FTE 16:46
forward deployed engineer model that uh 16:48
that is what a lot of startups that are 16:51
extremely successful today are literally 16:53
doing like they're going out and getting 16:56
a cornered resource in the form of real 16:57
data and real workflows um literally 17:00
sitting with a customer who normally 17:03
would never get access to good software 17:05
and then spotting Okay. Uh this is sort 17:07
of the tailored time in motion. You 17:10
know, first the uh you know a request 17:12
comes in by email. Then we take this and 17:15
we enrich it in this way. Uh sometimes 17:18
we have to have a call center call this 17:20
person like you know actually 17:22
understanding what um might be a very 17:24
boring process um and then translating 17:27
that into your own prompts, your own 17:30
evals, eventually your own uh data sets 17:31
to tune your own models. Like those are 17:34
all things that are incredibly valuable. 17:36
And then uh clearly there are examples 17:39
you know earlier uh we're saying like 17:41
character AI for instance um you know 17:44
took LLMs you know obviously built some 17:47
of the first LLMs then took many of them 17:49
and then fine-tuned them in a way so 17:52
that they could bring down the cost of 17:54
uh serving those models by 10x and so 17:56
you know that itself is also a form of a 17:59
cornered resource. the best cornered 18:02
resource to have is your own model that 18:04
can like do the specific work. Yeah. 18:05
Better, right? 18:09
And for a while, people thought that 18:09
that was the only mode that you could 18:10
have in this space. If you didn't have 18:12
your own model, like you were totally 18:13
hosed. Turns out that's not true. Turns 18:15
out there's just one of the possible 18:16
modes. 18:17
Partly that is a threat people are 18:18
worried about in in the big picture. The 18:19
10,000 foot scary thing is if the labs 18:22
at some point decide to treat their 18:24
models as a cornered resource and they 18:25
restrict access. I guess the interesting 18:28
thing right now is like it may well be 18:30
true that the you know platonic ideal 18:32
perfect manifestation of an AI system 18:36
will require a lot of both you know 18:39
maybe uh pre-training post-training RHF 18:41
like just so many different things that 18:44
you have to throw at it to get it to 18:46
like chat GPT level but we're also so 18:48
early in the revolution that um you know 18:51
even if just context engineering gets 18:54
you 80 or 90% of the way there. That's 18:58
plenty. That's actually all people need 19:00
to do for like the first 2 years of 19:03
their startup almost always. You know, 19:06
Cursor didn't start out by doing, you 19:08
know, full parameter fine-tunes of GPD5, 19:11
which they probably have access to now. 19:14
Um, they started just by making 19:17
something people want. You earlier we 19:19
were saying like don't use these 19:21
frameworks to count yourself out 19:22
prematurely. And this is a very profound 19:25
version of that. 19:27
So the third power we're going to 19:28
discuss is switching costs. That is uh 19:31
the concept where you get a mode when 19:34
your customers 19:37
are kind of trapped because it becomes 19:39
very expensive for them to find a other 19:41
solution. Even if the other solution 19:44
might be like a little bit better, it's 19:46
just very painful for them to switch 19:48
financially or in terms of the 19:50
operations times or effort because they 19:52
just have so much of it in the current 19:55
solution. And examples that are given in 19:58
the book are um like databases like 20:00
Oracle. When you have all of your system 20:03
of record and all your data in Oracle, 20:06
it becomes incredibly hard to migrate. 20:10
like database migration is something 20:12
that people don't do. Other example 20:14
given is a Salesforce and because once 20:16
you have all your customer records in 20:19
Salesforce you build all these workflows 20:21
the UI and it's just a lot to retrain a 20:22
lot of your sales team to use like a new 20:25
software you need to like migrate all 20:27
the data and then at that point for the 20:29
company to switch to a new CRM is 20:32
probably going to take I don't know lose 20:34
like a whole year of productivity or 20:35
something even if the new solution is a 20:37
little bit better. I think how AI 20:39
companies are building mode with this 20:41
has to do with a version of what Gary 20:45
mentioned with the forward deploy 20:47
engineer. We've given examples of this 20:48
with Happy Robot or Salient where they 20:50
start with specific workflows that are 20:53
very customized per company and they 20:56
work uh with large enterprises and part 20:59
of it is actually with the forward 21:02
deploy engineer they may have actually 21:04
very long pilot pilot periods which 21:06
might last like six months to a year but 21:09
if they succeed these convert into seven 21:11
figure contracts and the reason why 21:15
these pilots are so long is because 21:16
They're very much building custom 21:18
software for the specific operations in 21:20
these companies. And the examples for uh 21:22
Happy Robot, they got customers like DHL 21:26
where they went deep into integrating 21:30
into a lot of the workflows for how all 21:32
their logistic operations are done which 21:34
is very accustomed to the DHL operation 21:36
or the example for salient who's 21:39
building AI voice agent for the 21:41
financial industry. They integrate with 21:43
banks and a lot of the banks have very 21:46
different workflows on how they do a lot 21:49
of the loan 21:52
consilation, how do you do the debt 21:55
recovery, 21:58
how they do a lot of the fraud 21:59
monitoring 22:01
and risk and compliance and it's all a 22:02
little bit different because all these 22:05
companies have built kind of internal 22:07
tools and the whole part of u being an 22:09
AI company that builds these workflows 22:11
they build custom workflows then that 22:14
work with them. But as a result, the 22:17
trade-off is you do have very long pilot 22:18
cycles, but the pot of gold is worth it 22:21
because you end up with this big 22:23
contract and once you're in, you're kind 22:25
of minted and the big enterprise is not 22:27
going to do another bake off because 22:31
it's gonna it's going to be a huge waste 22:32
of time for them to let's try the other 22:35
whatever cool AI voice agent company. At 22:37
that point, it's like we just want to 22:40
get the benefits. So that's how these AI 22:42
companies are winning. I think it's like 22:45
at once a moat and it's also uh in it's 22:47
interesting in the age of AI that uh 22:50
simultaneously you could how see how AI 22:52
brings down the cost of switching by a 22:56
lot and that's you know sort of another 22:58
lever that a startup could use like if 23:00
you can write um use codegen to 23:02
basically extract data out of old oified 23:05
systems or your competitors then you you 23:09
know there are things that might have 23:12
really relied on switching costs that 23:14
you could potentially bring it down to 23:16
zero. 23:18
Yeah, there's actually two different 23:18
flavors of switching costs, right? 23:19
There's the the old school ones from the 23:21
SAS era, all the system of records like 23:24
Salesforce, but also ATS's like like 23:28
Lever and Ashb where the switching cost 23:30
was the painfulness of migrating data 23:33
from one system to another. And I agree 23:36
with Gary. LLMs might significantly 23:37
reduce the switching cost because the 23:40
LMS can figure out how to like morph the 23:41
data from the old schema into the new 23:44
schema. You use brower like use browser 23:46
automation on both sides to like solve 23:48
issues where like people don't let you 23:51
export the data. But then there's this 23:52
new form of switching costs that I think 23:54
is pretty native to the AI era like 23:57
you're talking about to Tayiana which is 23:59
like this these these lengthy onboarding 24:01
processes that lead to like deep 24:05
customizations of the logic of the agent 24:06
not just the data that didn't really 24:08
exist in the SAS era. Like I guess you'd 24:10
like customize your like your Zenesk 24:12
implementation a little bit but like not 24:14
that much. 24:15
Yeah. I mean and then for AI companies 24:16
on the consumer side, I mean this is all 24:19
very nent, but like I think memory is 24:21
already becoming a bit of a switching 24:24
cost for me. Like it actually blew me 24:26
away that Claude was so behind on memory 24:28
and then you know uh my relationship 24:31
with Chetch I feel like has evolved very 24:33
significantly in the last year where I'm 24:36
like oh I actually just generally it 24:38
seems to know you know what I'm into and 24:40
what I care about. So you know that 24:42
switching cost I think over time will 24:45
only become greater and greater and so 24:46
personalization for consumer is actually 24:49
a huge piece of that. 24:51
What about counterpositioning the other 24:53
moat on the book? 24:54
The definition of counterpositioning is 24:56
doing something that is difficult for 24:58
the incumbent that you are competing 25:01
with to copy because it would 25:03
cannibalize their business. I think 25:04
there's a couple of ways that this plays 25:07
out. In every category, there is a 25:09
Darwinian competition between the 25:12
existing SAS incumbents building their 25:15
own AI agents and the new AI native 25:19
companies building AI agents on top of 25:22
the existing SAS companies. So like for 25:24
customer support, the existing SAS 25:26
incumbents like Zenesk and uh Intercom 25:30
and front are all building their own AI 25:33
agents. But then we have like a new wave 25:35
of companies that grew up in the last 25:37
couple years that are building AI agents 25:39
that interface with with those systems. 25:40
I think it's like I don't know this 25:42
could be a topic of a whole like Lite 25:43
Cone episode which like who will win in 25:45
in in each of these fights I think is 25:47
really interesting. Um 25:49
unstoppable force meets the movable 25:51
object. 25:53
One way where this is playing out in the 25:54
counterpositioning is that all almost 25:57
all these companies their pricing model 25:59
is they charge per seat i.e. per 26:01
employee. And this is I think a very big 26:03
Achilles heel that they have 26:06
strategically which is that if their AI 26:07
agents do a good job and actually work 26:10
those companies will need fewer 26:12
employees doing this work because 26:13
they're like the work will be automated 26:15
by AI agents and in a and in a 26:17
simplistic way that will just actually 26:19
reduce the more successful they are the 26:21
more they will reduce the revenue. My 26:24
guess is like some of them will be able 26:26
to navigate this like especially if 26:27
they're still founder controlled. I 26:28
think like intercom for example like the 26:30
I think the founder controlled versions 26:33
of these companies are smart enough to 26:34
recognize that this is existential and 26:36
they may be able to cannibalize 26:37
themselves. I think the ones that are 26:38
not founder controlled I don't have a 26:40
lot of hope for it's super hard to 26:41
cannibalize your own revenue. 26:42
The alternative as we're seeing is so 26:45
much of the startups um pricing models 26:47
are around sort of like work delivered 26:49
or tasks completed. I think it's it's 26:51
exactly what you said, but it's also 26:54
that then switches the product towards 26:55
having to actually be able to complete 26:57
the work. And um something I actually 26:59
repeat at the last YC batch um at the 27:01
end as closing advice is that I wish the 27:03
founders in a batch could just somehow 27:06
go spend a month at some of the latest 27:08
stage companies. Um uh cuz the top thing 27:10
we hear from the founders running those 27:13
companies is how hard a time they're 27:15
having sort of resetting the engineering 27:16
culture in their org to actually embrace 27:19
AI to use the tools to want to do like 27:22
context engineering and prompt 27:24
engineering and and the the net result 27:25
of these teams not actually being able 27:29
to be AI native one of a better term uh 27:31
is that they just can't deliver the 27:34
products that work right and so like 27:35
they both don't want to switch from 27:37
Percy pricing because like that's what 27:38
they're used to um uh and in a world of 27:40
AI being able to do the work, there's 27:43
going to be less seats to sell to, but 27:45
they also just cannot deliver on 27:47
products that can do the work. And so 27:48
they they wouldn't that that pricing 27:50
model is not going to make any sense for 27:52
them either. 27:53
Yeah, it's it's like the process 27:54
engineering part. They're not good at 27:55
the process engineering part for this 27:56
new kind of engineering. 27:57
I mean something sort of uh emerging 27:59
that's very interesting in a bunch of YC 28:01
startups like uh Aoka for instance, 28:03
they're doing customer support software 28:05
kind of like Service Titan but for um 28:06
HVAC. So literally like people who help 28:10
you with heating and uh air conditioning 28:12
and uh you know I think service titan 28:15
has something like 1% wallet share 1% of 28:17
the gross transaction value of like a 28:21
given HVAC company um which is very 28:23
small right I mean people don't spend 28:26
that much money on software because 28:27
these are relatively low margin service 28:29
businesses but the wild thing that Aoka 28:31
discovered is that you know they can 28:34
come in as software but then over time 28:36
they're actually getting a bigger and 28:40
bigger chunk of the wallet share because 28:41
they can get the HVAC people to pay them 28:43
uh actually for the customer support 28:47
piece which is not 1% of their spend but 28:49
four to 10% of their spend. So what you 28:52
may well find is that uh this new breed 28:55
of AI startup will actually have more 28:58
growth uh and uh higher wallet share. 29:01
So, you know, actually, we may well be 29:05
all uh undervaluing how powerful and how 29:08
big the vertical SAS uh AI companies 29:12
will actually be because you're not like 29:15
1% of wallet share. You can get to 10. 29:18
That's what we talked in that episode 29:20
where vertical AI SAS agents will be 10 29:22
times at least 10 times bigger than SAS 29:24
because it's really to your point Gary 29:26
tapping into a whole different part of 29:28
the spend of the companies is not the 29:31
wallet of software where you're kind of 29:35
at this point I suppose is a bit of a a 29:38
finite budget but is really new space 29:40
where with things that were not possible 29:44
and it was mostly workflows from from 29:46
people 29:49
and I you know I know that people are 29:49
like pretty sensitive about uh workforce 29:51
displacement but you know customer 29:54
support for an HVAC services company is 29:56
not a fun job and you can tell because 29:59
all of these customer support jobs 30:02
actually have like 50 80% annual 30:03
attrition rates. like they're just such 30:06
torturous, not fun jobs that uh the 30:08
companies themselves and the call 30:11
centers themselves spend almost all of 30:12
their time trying to vet and bring in 30:14
more people to work on these terrible 30:17
jobs. And so when you have better 30:19
software, what's sort of happening is 30:21
that instead of like people aren't 30:22
losing their jobs, these people are 30:25
quitting their jobs anyway because it's 30:27
terrible job. And then if anything uh 30:28
what Avoka has told me is that many of 30:31
the people who were in those customer 30:34
support uh you sort of roles uh now 30:37
they're actually having more fun jobs 30:40
because instead of like managing a whole 30:42
set of people who don't want to be there 30:45
uh they're actually managing AI agents 30:48
and then handling the interesting weird 30:50
cases. The coolest part of it is like 30:52
they actually can go in and sometimes 30:54
alter the prompts and sometimes you 30:56
actually have an imp direct impact on uh 30:59
both the experience of the customer but 31:02
then also their own day-to-day and that 31:04
immediately is like a 10 times more 31:06
interesting job like wrangling a bunch 31:08
of AI agents and making uh the support 31:10
process better and better over time. 31:13
Like that's you know as knowledge work 31:16
goes like way more interesting than 31:17
follow this script and read what the 31:19
computer says. 31:21
So Harj you you had a really interesting 31:23
point about a second form of 31:25
counterpositioning. this space has moved 31:27
so quickly that in every vertical um or 31:29
many verticals there's sort of early on 31:34
emerged one company that's seen as the 31:36
early winner in the space and often it's 31:38
actually like the second movers at least 31:41
within the YC context we have seen over 31:42
and over again that like there's 31:44
advantage to being the second mover in a 31:45
space like stripe came after uh Brainree 31:47
and authorized.net then a bunch of 31:50
things and was able to like actually win 31:52
by just building a better product. Door 31:54
Dash came after Grubhub, Postmates, 31:55
various other delivery services and 31:58
eventually went on to win. And so I 31:59
think it's interesting to sort of just 32:02
consider about if you're entering a 32:04
vertical where it's already feels 32:05
competitive or there are already there's 32:08
already seem to be like a early winner 32:10
in the space. How do you counter 32:12
position against them? One thing I think 32:13
is really interesting here is Legora 32:15
versus Harvey. Lagora is obviously uh 32:17
both in the legal AI space. Harvey was 32:20
the early winner. The counterpositioning 32:22
that I see from Lorraa is Harvey came in 32:24
early and maybe got early sales um but 32:27
focused a lot on fine-tuning and sort of 32:30
like their product differentiation when 32:33
over time it's seen that that was 32:36
probably not the right move. You wanted 32:37
to actually focus in on the application 32:38
layer and actually just sort of building 32:40
a better product and and Lora has 32:41
focused on that. That's what their 32:44
branding and positioning is and it seems 32:45
to be working really well for them as a 32:47
second mover into the space. A company 32:48
that I've worked more closely with, Giga 32:50
ML, enter the customer service space and 32:51
they're competing with Sierra and 32:54
Deacon, like really well-known customer 32:55
support companies and from having seen 32:57
their sales motion, how they've been 33:00
able to sign up some big customers. 33:01
They're I think their counterpositioning 33:03
is their product fundamentally just 33:05
works better out of the box and as a 33:08
result they can have a much faster sales 33:10
and onboarding process. So it's like 33:12
their counterpitching is if you want to 33:13
sort of get your customer support 33:15
working as quickly as possible um you 33:17
should go through like the Gig ML 33:20
onboarding process versus like the 33:21
decong and I think that's actually 33:23
worked quite well for them. 33:24
Yeah, Giga ML is an interesting example 33:26
of how to your point about like hybrid 33:28
displacement. 33:31
It's clear that an AI agent can do this 33:32
job not just as well as a human but 33:35
actually much better than a human. like 33:36
the Door Dashers that the Giga ML agents 33:38
are talking to, a lot of them don't 33:40
speak very good English. They speak all 33:42
kinds of languages. You can't hire a 33:43
customer support person who's fluent in 33:45
200 languages. Um but 33:47
but LMS are actually out of box. 33:49
Out of the box. Um and they're 33:51
infinitely patient if like there's a bad 33:52
connection or so that's pretty 33:55
interesting. 33:58
I think you have other example where to 33:58
your point of superhuman abilities is 34:00
where the AI version of the product 34:04
actually works. I think Hargie you had 34:06
the example of a Dualingo versus speak. 34:09
Dualingo is obviously the biggest 34:11
language learning app I think um most 34:13
consumers know. The emerging criticism 34:15
of it I would say is that um what it's 34:17
actually just sort of like a gaming app 34:20
versus a language learning app that like 34:22
the way the app works is orthogonal to 34:24
learning a true language. And then you 34:25
have speak um which is a uses LLM like 34:27
uses voice to actually like help you 34:30
practice and actually learn the 34:33
language. Um, and that 34:34
counterpositioning is working really 34:35
well for them, right? And sort of 34:37
speakers has got explosive growth and 34:38
it's not trying to compete with Dualingo 34:41
on the we're we've got like lots of 34:43
gamification and points and sort of like 34:45
a great game mechanic. It's competing on 34:47
hey, we're actually just a place you 34:49
should come if you want to learn the 34:50
language by speaking it. I think the 34:52
counterpositioning mode is very um sort 34:54
of close and overlaps with the branding 34:58
mode idea. I think in the book he talks 34:59
about you know like brand is it's 35:01
essentially a mode when you become so 35:04
well known that even if you have an 35:06
equivalent product um consumers will 35:09
still choose you um because the the 35:11
brand effects and I think the the 35:13
example uses like Coca-Cola in the AI 35:15
context I think it's probably harder to 35:17
apply brand as a moat directly to 35:18
startups it just takes time to acquire 35:20
brand um but you can certainly see its 35:22
effects like the thing that still stuns 35:24
me is open AI chat GBT has more 35:26
consumers is using it per day than 35:30
Google's Gemini. I think anyone who 35:31
understands the models and uses them um 35:33
daily would say that Gemini Pro 2.5 and 35:36
Gemini Flash 2.5 are like equivalent 35:39
models 35:41
and Google also had all the users like 35:42
basically everyone in the world is a 35:44
user of Google. 35:46
OpenAI had no users initially. 35:47
Google was already one of the biggest 35:50
consumer brands on the planet. It was 35:51
almost certainly the biggest consumer 35:52
brand on the internet and yet somebody 35:54
else came along and built the brand as 35:57
the consumer AI app and Google is like 35:59
playing catch-up. 36:03
If someone had try had told me in 2022 36:04
that that's how it would play out, I 36:07
would have been fairly incredulous. 36:08
It's also a perfect example of 36:10
counterpositioning. Again, I mean, this 36:11
is Google had a uh a business model that 36:13
required it to continue to support ads 36:17
and an organization that uh they 36:20
shipped. And so, you have the greatest 36:23
cash cow in the history of man. So, why 36:26
would you disrupt it um even at the cost 36:29
of setting back uh human access to 36:32
knowledge by a few years? Even if that's 36:35
like the core stated goal of Google 36:37
itself to organize the world's 36:39
information, 36:40
there's also the untold story of how uh 36:41
the origin story of Chachib how it came 36:44
to be which is really the original mode 36:46
for startups with speed. It shipped very 36:49
quickly in a matter of months with a 36:52
very small team of a couple engineers. I 36:54
mean, it required uh you know, Sam Alman 36:57
and YC Research and Greg Brockman to go 36:59
uh hire Ilia Suskgiver out of DeepMind 37:03
because he was there and you know he all 37:06
the people a lot of the people who went 37:09
on to help create OpenAI uh they came 37:11
from DeepMind like it was already in the 37:14
right place. It's just that that place 37:17
didn't nurture exactly the thing that 37:18
society really needed 37:21
for speed. 37:22
So there's that mode again speed number 37:23
one. Do you want to talk about network 37:25
economy Diana? Yeah, on the book a 37:27
network economy is described as uh where 37:29
the value of the product increases as 37:32
more users or customer get and use the 37:35
product and everyone deres more value as 37:38
a effect of more people using it and 37:41
examples that were given in the book are 37:44
uh Facebook where as you use it and your 37:46
friends use it is more fun for me to use 37:49
Facebook because all my friends are in 37:51
there as more users come in then is the 37:53
social network becomes more valuable. 37:55
And this was very much the era of uh the 37:58
internet where people talked about uh 38:00
network effects that came to be. And the 38:02
other example he gives is like visa the 38:05
visa network where the more merchants 38:07
are using Visa 38:10
the more value the consumer gets because 38:12
you're can swipe the Visa card in more 38:14
places. then that becomes the the moat 38:16
because it's harder to then acquire and 38:19
amass this number and large number of uh 38:22
users or merchants in order to to win. 38:25
So that becomes very defensible. In the 38:28
current era for AI, the shape of uh 38:30
network effects is different. It really 38:33
comes into the shape of data. I think a 38:35
lot of uh the data that a lot of AI 38:38
companies get access to becomes the mode 38:41
where the more data they get the custom 38:44
models they build become better and the 38:47
better models it becomes a better 38:49
product for users and there's lots of 38:51
examples of these and um besides like 38:53
the big foundation 38:56
lab companies where they probably use 38:58
some of the data I don't know I mean 39:00
they probably use some of the data from 39:01
the users they probably do 39:03
checkpt almost certainly like feeds a 39:04
lot of that back because you have a 39:07
certain reward function for right 39:09
each training run, right? 39:11
So all the history of every chat from 39:12
chat GBD 1 2 3 4 5 now goes fed into 39:15
GPD6 and then so on and so forth helps 39:18
create the the next model version. And 39:21
there's uh even smaller versions of 39:24
this. For example, cursor, they have 39:26
probably one of the best uh tap tap 39:29
autocomplete because one the the free 39:32
version of cursor they actually say it 39:35
when you sign up that they they will use 39:38
the data and they use that to train it 39:39
and the more users they get 39:41
I think it's like all the data like I 39:42
think it's like quite literally like 39:43
every mouse click and every keystroke 39:45
that you that you emit when you're using 39:48
cursor like is fed into a model which is 39:50
like kind of crazy 39:53
which then the more developers cursor 39:55
the better the product gets and then 39:57
they compound a lot of the a lot of the 39:59
wins with that. And the version where 40:01
this applies to AI startup is when they 40:04
go work with enterprises and large 40:07
companies they get access to private 40:10
data. I mentioned earlier salient or 40:12
happy robot when the employees of the 40:14
companies where they become customers as 40:17
they use their product they have a lot 40:20
of that private data that makes a lot of 40:21
the workflows better and the way they 40:24
improve that which is the second way of 40:26
having modes with networks is really 40:29
evals we we talked a lot about evals 40:31
being the key mode for AI startups is 40:33
evals is where you get a lot of the this 40:36
workflow work or didn't work and then 40:39
take that back and iterate and improve 40:41
your context engineering. And that is a 40:43
flywheel that you can only achieve when 40:45
you get more and more usage of your 40:48
product whether being in a consumer or a 40:50
or a AI vertical SAS agent. So now the 40:53
last mode in the book is uh scale 40:57
economies. Jared, do you want to tell us 41:00
about it? 41:02
Scale economies or economies of scale. 41:03
you've invested a lot of money to build 41:05
something that's really big and as a 41:07
result you have economies of scale and 41:09
you can offer the service cheaper than 41:11
anybody else. So like the the classic 41:13
example would be like UPS or FedEx or 41:15
the Amazon delivery network. They built 41:18
like massive like physical 41:20
infrastructure and as a result they have 41:22
like a lower cost per unit um compared 41:24
to a smaller competitor. Um I think the 41:27
way this has played out in the AI world 41:29
I don't think it's actually played out 41:32
that much at the application layer. It's 41:33
really played at at the model layer, 41:35
right? Like training a state-of-the-art 41:37
LLM is very capital inensive. Only a few 41:39
companies can afford to do it. Once 41:43
you've done it, you can afford to like 41:45
let people do inference on that model 41:46
very inexpensively. This is why the 41:48
DeepC announcement was so um was so 41:50
earthshattering last year because it 41:53
seemed like it might be a lot cheaper 41:55
than people previously thought to train 41:57
a Frontier LLM which would greatly 41:59
diminish the power of this like 42:02
economies of scale mode that people 42:03
thought the the AI labs had. 42:05
The key thing about Deepseek was they 42:07
figure out and made public this new 42:09
unlock for models which is uh how to do 42:11
RL. They still built on top of one of 42:13
the large foundation models so it's 42:16
still expensive. the rail part is 42:17
cheaper, but you still need the very 42:19
expensive big foundation model. So 42:21
that's one of the things that the media 42:23
got wrong. 42:25
There's a separate question that people 42:25
talk about, which is like how will the 42:27
foundation model companies be defensible 42:28
against each other? And like this is 42:30
certainly one way, right? It's just like 42:32
it's it's very hard to be a new entrant 42:34
into that game now because of this 42:36
economies of scale. And we were we were 42:37
thinking earlier about like how this had 42:39
played out with startups and there's not 42:40
that many examples, but I think a couple 42:43
of good ones. Well, one one good one is 42:45
is a company of yours, EXA. Harge, do 42:47
you want to explain what what Exa does? 42:49
Yeah, Exa is essentially search for AI 42:50
agents. Um, it provides an API for 42:53
anyone building AI applications that 42:56
wants to search the web. 42:57
And the way I I think this is playing 42:58
out for Exa is in order to provide that 43:00
service, they need to crawl the web. Not 43:02
the whole web like Google does, but a 43:03
big chunk of it. And that's very 43:05
expensive to do. It requires like a 43:07
large like fixed capital uh investment. 43:09
But then once once you crawl a big chunk 43:12
of the web, you can reuse that same 43:14
crawl for for many different customers. 43:15
I think what's interesting about X the 43:17
parallel to the model companies is that 43:19
they they had invested in that like sort 43:21
of before agents had really taken off 43:24
like they were fairly early to this. I 43:26
think they were working on this actually 43:27
even prehat GBT launching. So they made 43:28
the investment early on took a bet same 43:31
way that the lab companies took a bet on 43:34
like transformers and um uh and scaling 43:35
laws. 43:38
Yeah. And there are two companies in 43:38
just the most recent batch, Channel 3 43:40
and Orange Slice, that are both doing 43:42
exod.ai like plays where they crawl a 43:44
big chunk of the web, have a big like 43:46
static crawl on their own servers, and 43:48
then have agents that run on top of 43:50
those of that crawl. So, I think we're 43:52
going to see more and more of this, 43:54
especially as the web agents work 43:55
better. 43:57
You need to mainly focus on uh the first 43:57
moat that isn't even in the book, which 44:00
is speed. like you know if you're really 44:02
breaking your brain about like oh well 44:06
are we going to be a cornered resource 44:08
or not you're just thinking about it in 44:10
the wrong way like you should not start 44:11
there you should start with do I have a 44:13
specific person who has some sort of 44:16
pain point and it's pretty painful it's 44:19
not like a oh it'd be nice if I could do 44:22
this it's a oh I am not going to get 44:24
promoted this year maybe I will get 44:26
fired like this is so painful that I 44:28
don't want to go to work today Like 44:31
that's sort of the type of pain that 44:33
you're looking for. And if you can write 44:34
software or build things that actually 44:36
alleviate that pain, like existential 44:39
pain, like the business is going to go 44:41
out of business or oh my god, we could 44:42
totally take over everything next year. 44:45
Like that's sort of the feeling that you 44:47
want in your customer. Uh if you can 44:48
find things like that, go go Z, you 44:51
know, go find that and go zero to one on 44:54
that first. With that, see you guys next 44:56
time. 44:59

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[English]
This idea of moes is so pervasive and so
important.
It is interesting how moes have just
become much more discussed by aspiring
startup founders now than they were pre-
AI.
What is going to prevent you from being
basically subject to infinite
competition?
Like a mode is inherently a defensive
thing and you have to have something to
defend otherwise like
if you got nothing to defend, don't
worry about your mode.
[Music]
Welcome back to another episode of the
Light Cone. Today we're going to talk
about Moes. So, in your head you might
be thinking about barbarians storming
your gate. You've got this little
startup and you've got every other
company out there who wants to come and
eat your lunch. Uh, and you know, right
outside your castle is a moat that keeps
them away. Jared, when you were going to
college campuses, this isn't sort of
this trivial thing that people are
thinking about. It's actually uh
something that keeps them from starting
companies right now.
Yeah, this is a question that we got
from a lot of very smart college
students on on our on our our recent
scholarships. And basically, their
question is like they don't see how
these new AI agent companies like a lot
of the ones that we've talked about on
on this podcast could have moes. um it
plays into this meme of like the chat
GBT rapper that like all of these
companies could be easily cloned and so
they can see how you could build a
business that makes some amount of
revenue, but they don't really see how
you can build a long enduring business.
And so I think it's actually not true. I
actually think these businesses do have
quite deep and interesting modes, but
they're not totally obvious what they
would be. So I think this is an
interesting topic for us to to explore.
At our recent AI startup school
backstage, I had this exchange with Sam
Alman that I thought was kind of funny.
You know, we spend a lot of time
thinking about, you know, make something
people want. Very simple maxims that are
sort of anti- business school. And yet
this idea of Moes is so pervasive and so
important. We sort of remarked how funny
it is that uh one of the more important
books to read these days is actually
business school fodder. um this book
called the seven powers. So today we
thought that we would actually go
through those seven powers. What are
they? What are some concrete examples
and ways that a startup founder who's
just starting out uh could or should be
thinking about these things from real
world examples that we've seen.
So Diana, can you tell us a bit about
this book?
This book was written by Hamilton Helmer
who taught at Stanford Economics School
and was published in 2016. And the book
title was the seven powers the
foundations of business strategies. And
a lot of the examples are more with the
era of uh internet companies from the
2000s. So a lot of the examples are like
Oracle, Facebook,
Netflix, which is a older generation. So
we want to do a bit of a reboot right
now how he applies now 2025 with AI.
I think it's a little bit confusing the
way he uses the terminology in the book.
It's called the seven powers, but it
would make a lot more sense if he just
called the thing the seven moes because
that's really what he's talking about.
He's really talking about seven
categories of moes that a business can
have. And I it's true that the examples
are out of date, but I think the
framework is actually pretty timeless.
Like it turns out there's just only so
many kinds of modes that a business can
have and they don't really change. And
so like even though the specific like
versions of these modes are different in
the AI agent world, like the categories
haven't changed. Thankfully, we live in
a world where there's markets and
there's free markets, where there's lots
and lots of competition. And these moes
in a lot of ways are the only way if
you're running a business, you can sort
of fight against all of the other people
who might want to do exactly what you're
doing. And um you know, famously Peter
Teal talks about uh competition is for
losers. And so the profound view there
is that given infinite competition, what
is going to prevent you from being
basically subject to infinite
competition and then as a result uh you
know your margins, how much you can
actually profit off of what you're
selling goes down to zero. And what that
means is like actually your business
will die and so you know having a moat
is uh relatively existential eventually.
You made a great point earlier, Gary,
that like this is actually like you kind
of have to worry about this at the right
time of of a startup. Do you want to
talk about like how like early stage
founders should think about Moes?
I mean, this is sort of why we generally
tell people to go find a person with a
real problem and then go solve that
problem first. It's um what's funny
about the world uh that's a little
surprising is that you can go almost
anywhere and find some painoint, some
problem that could be solved with
software and especially with AI that
frankly just isn't being solved. And if
that and they're they're so numerous and
so severe that if you find that thing
and solve it, you literally can mint a
billion dollar or 10 billion or even
hundred or hundreds of billions of
dollars uh market cap business and it's
just lying in plain sight. That's really
the first thing that people should do.
Like you should just find a problem and
go solve it. And then along the way you
will probably as you work with customers
as as you build the product itself and
engineer it and figure out what data you
need for it and all of these things like
you will stumble upon these seven
powers.
Yeah. The moes come later like it would
be like pretty dumb for somebody to
decide not to work on a startup idea
because they can't see what the
long-term modes of that idea could be.
Right. It is interesting how moes have
just become um much more discussed by
aspiring startup founders now than they
were pre- AI. Seems like the main reason
for that presumably is just that big the
original chat GBT rapper meme and that
the the moat that most people are
worried about is moat against the big
model companies and how like are you not
going to get crushed by one of the big
labs when they decide the product you're
working on is really valuable and they
want to own it too. And I think Varun uh
from Windsorf who we hosted some time
ago he said it himself the early stages
at the beginning the only model that
startups have is really just speed. Once
you pass that and build something that
people want then you figure out and go
deeper into these type of modes that
we're going to discuss.
I really like Verun's point that the
only moat is speed. That is not one of
the seven powers in the book, but I
think it probably should be.
I think it also comes with a lot of the
essays from PD because one of the
tenants really at the beginning is yes,
your big company, let's say OpenAI at
this OpenAI is the new Google. It's like
sure OpenAI or Anthropic could build all
these features let's say like cloud code
and then compete directly let's say with
cursor or etc. And for a startup like
cursor to really win even in the
beginning is they had relentless
execution because a larger company like
a Google or Anthropic it they just have
a lot of uh more craft that they need to
do in order to ship a product. They just
have all these product managers all the
operations. It needs to go through a PRD
some spec dog and it takes mo a lot more
time to ship a feature as opposed to
cursor. the incredible story about
cursor. When we hosted Michael Truel to
come talk to the badge, he was sharing
how his product development cycle for
shipping features and sprint cycles were
one day
one day. So one day sprint
in the at the beginning during a 2023
2024 around era they would start the
every day would restart the clock and
try to ship things every day. I mean
that's like insane speed. Like there's
no big company that could ship something
at that speed
at most weeks, couple weeks and maybe
like larger companies. I don't know your
Google maybe like multiple months or
sometimes years. I mean they had Google
Bard or Gemini a long time ago that took
years to get out, right?
I think Kurser and Windsor are great
examples of when you should start
thinking about the modes because for the
first few years I don't think it really
matter that much. They just had to like
they proved out that hey like codegen is
going to be a really valuable
application of AI. The development
environment is going to be very very
important to own. they like got rapid
growth and then it's only when they're
at scale that you know like they have to
start thinking about how are we going to
defend against like clawed code or
codeex or all the other things coming in
and sort of like the mental model that's
really stuck with me is when we spoke to
Bob Mcgru a couple of weeks ago um and
how I think Jared you brought this up
actually was one way you could think
about it is that sort of all of these
startups are kind of forward deployed
engineering teams like for for the labs
maybe and so like early on actually
because this is all green field we don't
actually know what the valuable
verticals and products to build are. So
in a sense you don't you step one is
just figure out what that is and it
wasn't actually even two years ago it
wasn't actually clear it was codegen or
um the IDE once you figure that out and
you find and you sort of struggle then
you keep digging that's when you have to
probably assume at some point you're
going to get more competition because
people are going to realize oh this is
really valuable there's lots of money to
be made here and then you have to start
like defending like the treasure you
found. So, I mean, all the things that
we're about to cover aside from speed
are sort of 1 to a billion, 1 to 10
billion, 1 to a 100red billion, one to a
trillion dollar sort of problems and
then uh the real stupid thing that
people might do is watch this and look
for this as a reason to not even get to
one.
Yes. So that would be
they try to use it to like pick between
two different startup ideas because
they're like trying to forecast five
years in the future which one will have
a greater moat
which just isn't how it works. I mean
literally you shouldn't do that.
Like a moat is inherently a defensive
thing and you have to have something to
defend otherwise like
maybe you have nothing.
Yeah. Hey nothing to defend. Don't worry
about your moat.
Yeah. Otherwise it's just like a puddle
in a field.
Yeah. Exactly.
Let's assume that someone has found
something that's valuable that is worth
defending. Should we talk through what
some of the modes they they could think
about are?
Yeah. So process power again like the
terminology is kind of funky but like
basically it means you built something
that's like you built a very complicated
business with a lot of stuff that's just
hard for people to replicate just
because you like built all this stuff.
Um and so the example that he uses in
his book is like the Toyota assembly
line. And I think the AI version, the AI
agent version of this is just a really
complicated AI agent that's been like
finely honed over like multiple years to
work really well under real world
conditions. We've we've talked about a
bunch of these on this podcast like Jake
Heler with um Case Text is like the
original example. A couple other ones I
was thinking about from more recent
companies. We have like a couple
companies that sell AI agents to banks.
We have Greenlight who worked with Tom.
They do KYC for banks. And we have Casa
which like does loan origination for
banks. So it is essentially tells banks
like which loans they should give. And I
think these are interesting examples
because for all of these AI agents you
could build a version of green light or
CASA or case text like a like a demo
version in like a weekend hackathon. And
I think when college students are
thinking about these AI agents I think
what they have in their mind is like the
weekend hackathon version of the product
and they're like like I could build that
in a week. Like how could that be
defensible? And like the reason is like
the the version you build in a hackathon
isn't useful to anyone. It's like like
like like if Casca or or Greenlight fail
like the the banks will lose millions of
dollars. This is like missionritical
infrastructure. So it's it's more like a
self-driving car.
One way to look at it is way better
engineering
uh is actually that's like the most
profound form of process power. Like one
example might be Plaid which you know
the surface area of the number of uh
financial institutions that they have to
support is so giant it's you know
probably thou on the order of thousands
to tens of thousands of different
different websites different crawlers
and then all of the different you know
can you imagine like Plaid's CI/CD
structure and then you know this is pure
speculation but if I were uh Zach
running plaid like I you know know that
I would want to be using codegen tool,
the latest codegen tools to be able to
uh you know basically add every new
financial institution on the planet
quicker than anyone else. Like that's
sort of a very profound form of process
power uh in the modern AI age.
I think this is probably the main form
of defensibility for the existing SAS
companies. Like if you look one
generation before the AI agent companies
like why is Stripe or Rippling or Gusto
defensible? I think it's mostly this
right. It's just like they've just built
a lot of software and it'd be really
expensive and hard to replicate all of
it and like you can't just copy it from
their landing page. Like there's like
like the backend logic is like super
deep.
There's also I feel like kind of a shle
blindness aspect to this going on too
where like the the hackathon version of
any AI tool is like quicker than ever to
get to. But actually the last like 10%
of getting it to work reliably across
like tens of thousands of KYC requests
like per day is sort of like a
particular type of painstaking
drudgery work in a way that I think like
lots of engineers just not excited to
do. And then that is also kind of like
the teams at OpenAI are going to
experience this too, right? Like if
you're if you're working in one of the
big model labs and there's teams of
people trying to invent AGI, um it's
going to be hard to get jazzed about
nailing the like final 5% consistency on
your like KYC tool.
Yeah. And so I I think this is
especially true for like verticals like
KYC that are require specialized
knowledge to even know what to even to
know what the edge cases are. Like if if
we had to pick from the seven powers
like I think speed and this these are
probably like the two dominant ones that
come up the most often
and those are most related to execution
is where uh the hardcore builders win.
having really good product taste and
building the best product really matters
and I think it comes to a lot of the
point maybe the the misconception is I
think a lot of these products you can
probably build the 80% solution with 20%
of the effort but for these solutions
and products to work you need the 99%
accuracy one which then takes like 10
times or even sometimes 100 times the
amount of effort right it's sort of that
parto principle type of thing what about
uh the the other power for corner for
resources.
I think the classic view is they're just
coveted assets or things that uh you
know they're not arbitrageable. Um they
must be independently valuable and then
I sometimes they offer preferential
access with you know rates that are way
lower. So uh the classic example that
you know you could look at is you know
pharma companies have these patents that
are very hard to get. Um they have to
come up with them and then prove them
and get through regulatory approval. And
the sheer fact that they have a patent
plus you know uh getting through FDA
approval is something that can be very
durable and it's uh you know so powerful
that patents have a uh limited lifespan
because you know you don't want people
to have that forever. A more modern
example I think you know on the
regulatory side might be you know scale
AI is doing a ton of work with the DoD
um you know Palunteer as well. Uh, in
order to even get there, it's, you know,
a painstaking process. You've got to
hire the right people. You've got to
spend a lot of time in DC and Langley or
wherever, you know, you're trying to
sell to. And, uh, you've got to
literally build um, uh, skiffs, like
these like sort of, you know, special
data uh, centers where, you know, it's
at great pain and expense. Um, you have
to get embedded with the government. But
then when you do, like, well, you've got
it. you know the corner resource in some
sense is even the brain space in people
who work in the government like you
right now if you're working with AI like
you've got to go through a palunteer or
a scale and that's like literally
written into their uh public documents
around like how they're thinking about
the nature of warfare and the nature of
uh you know everything that they want to
do having to do with AI moving forward.
So, you know, the corner resource
doesn't have to be a diamond mind. It
could be the diamond mind in your
customer's heads. Those examples are
sort of uh closer to like being way up
in the sky having this like insane
decacorn like worth hundreds of billions
of dollars sort of situation. But what's
relevant for startups that I think all
of us uh sort of see every day is sort
of what you were mentioning with uh this
forward deployed engineer you know FTE
forward deployed engineer model that uh
that is what a lot of startups that are
extremely successful today are literally
doing like they're going out and getting
a cornered resource in the form of real
data and real workflows um literally
sitting with a customer who normally
would never get access to good software
and then spotting Okay. Uh this is sort
of the tailored time in motion. You
know, first the uh you know a request
comes in by email. Then we take this and
we enrich it in this way. Uh sometimes
we have to have a call center call this
person like you know actually
understanding what um might be a very
boring process um and then translating
that into your own prompts, your own
evals, eventually your own uh data sets
to tune your own models. Like those are
all things that are incredibly valuable.
And then uh clearly there are examples
you know earlier uh we're saying like
character AI for instance um you know
took LLMs you know obviously built some
of the first LLMs then took many of them
and then fine-tuned them in a way so
that they could bring down the cost of
uh serving those models by 10x and so
you know that itself is also a form of a
cornered resource. the best cornered
resource to have is your own model that
can like do the specific work. Yeah.
Better, right?
And for a while, people thought that
that was the only mode that you could
have in this space. If you didn't have
your own model, like you were totally
hosed. Turns out that's not true. Turns
out there's just one of the possible
modes.
Partly that is a threat people are
worried about in in the big picture. The
10,000 foot scary thing is if the labs
at some point decide to treat their
models as a cornered resource and they
restrict access. I guess the interesting
thing right now is like it may well be
true that the you know platonic ideal
perfect manifestation of an AI system
will require a lot of both you know
maybe uh pre-training post-training RHF
like just so many different things that
you have to throw at it to get it to
like chat GPT level but we're also so
early in the revolution that um you know
even if just context engineering gets
you 80 or 90% of the way there. That's
plenty. That's actually all people need
to do for like the first 2 years of
their startup almost always. You know,
Cursor didn't start out by doing, you
know, full parameter fine-tunes of GPD5,
which they probably have access to now.
Um, they started just by making
something people want. You earlier we
were saying like don't use these
frameworks to count yourself out
prematurely. And this is a very profound
version of that.
So the third power we're going to
discuss is switching costs. That is uh
the concept where you get a mode when
your customers
are kind of trapped because it becomes
very expensive for them to find a other
solution. Even if the other solution
might be like a little bit better, it's
just very painful for them to switch
financially or in terms of the
operations times or effort because they
just have so much of it in the current
solution. And examples that are given in
the book are um like databases like
Oracle. When you have all of your system
of record and all your data in Oracle,
it becomes incredibly hard to migrate.
like database migration is something
that people don't do. Other example
given is a Salesforce and because once
you have all your customer records in
Salesforce you build all these workflows
the UI and it's just a lot to retrain a
lot of your sales team to use like a new
software you need to like migrate all
the data and then at that point for the
company to switch to a new CRM is
probably going to take I don't know lose
like a whole year of productivity or
something even if the new solution is a
little bit better. I think how AI
companies are building mode with this
has to do with a version of what Gary
mentioned with the forward deploy
engineer. We've given examples of this
with Happy Robot or Salient where they
start with specific workflows that are
very customized per company and they
work uh with large enterprises and part
of it is actually with the forward
deploy engineer they may have actually
very long pilot pilot periods which
might last like six months to a year but
if they succeed these convert into seven
figure contracts and the reason why
these pilots are so long is because
They're very much building custom
software for the specific operations in
these companies. And the examples for uh
Happy Robot, they got customers like DHL
where they went deep into integrating
into a lot of the workflows for how all
their logistic operations are done which
is very accustomed to the DHL operation
or the example for salient who's
building AI voice agent for the
financial industry. They integrate with
banks and a lot of the banks have very
different workflows on how they do a lot
of the loan
consilation, how do you do the debt
recovery,
how they do a lot of the fraud
monitoring
and risk and compliance and it's all a
little bit different because all these
companies have built kind of internal
tools and the whole part of u being an
AI company that builds these workflows
they build custom workflows then that
work with them. But as a result, the
trade-off is you do have very long pilot
cycles, but the pot of gold is worth it
because you end up with this big
contract and once you're in, you're kind
of minted and the big enterprise is not
going to do another bake off because
it's gonna it's going to be a huge waste
of time for them to let's try the other
whatever cool AI voice agent company. At
that point, it's like we just want to
get the benefits. So that's how these AI
companies are winning. I think it's like
at once a moat and it's also uh in it's
interesting in the age of AI that uh
simultaneously you could how see how AI
brings down the cost of switching by a
lot and that's you know sort of another
lever that a startup could use like if
you can write um use codegen to
basically extract data out of old oified
systems or your competitors then you you
know there are things that might have
really relied on switching costs that
you could potentially bring it down to
zero.
Yeah, there's actually two different
flavors of switching costs, right?
There's the the old school ones from the
SAS era, all the system of records like
Salesforce, but also ATS's like like
Lever and Ashb where the switching cost
was the painfulness of migrating data
from one system to another. And I agree
with Gary. LLMs might significantly
reduce the switching cost because the
LMS can figure out how to like morph the
data from the old schema into the new
schema. You use brower like use browser
automation on both sides to like solve
issues where like people don't let you
export the data. But then there's this
new form of switching costs that I think
is pretty native to the AI era like
you're talking about to Tayiana which is
like this these these lengthy onboarding
processes that lead to like deep
customizations of the logic of the agent
not just the data that didn't really
exist in the SAS era. Like I guess you'd
like customize your like your Zenesk
implementation a little bit but like not
that much.
Yeah. I mean and then for AI companies
on the consumer side, I mean this is all
very nent, but like I think memory is
already becoming a bit of a switching
cost for me. Like it actually blew me
away that Claude was so behind on memory
and then you know uh my relationship
with Chetch I feel like has evolved very
significantly in the last year where I'm
like oh I actually just generally it
seems to know you know what I'm into and
what I care about. So you know that
switching cost I think over time will
only become greater and greater and so
personalization for consumer is actually
a huge piece of that.
What about counterpositioning the other
moat on the book?
The definition of counterpositioning is
doing something that is difficult for
the incumbent that you are competing
with to copy because it would
cannibalize their business. I think
there's a couple of ways that this plays
out. In every category, there is a
Darwinian competition between the
existing SAS incumbents building their
own AI agents and the new AI native
companies building AI agents on top of
the existing SAS companies. So like for
customer support, the existing SAS
incumbents like Zenesk and uh Intercom
and front are all building their own AI
agents. But then we have like a new wave
of companies that grew up in the last
couple years that are building AI agents
that interface with with those systems.
I think it's like I don't know this
could be a topic of a whole like Lite
Cone episode which like who will win in
in in each of these fights I think is
really interesting. Um
unstoppable force meets the movable
object.
One way where this is playing out in the
counterpositioning is that all almost
all these companies their pricing model
is they charge per seat i.e. per
employee. And this is I think a very big
Achilles heel that they have
strategically which is that if their AI
agents do a good job and actually work
those companies will need fewer
employees doing this work because
they're like the work will be automated
by AI agents and in a and in a
simplistic way that will just actually
reduce the more successful they are the
more they will reduce the revenue. My
guess is like some of them will be able
to navigate this like especially if
they're still founder controlled. I
think like intercom for example like the
I think the founder controlled versions
of these companies are smart enough to
recognize that this is existential and
they may be able to cannibalize
themselves. I think the ones that are
not founder controlled I don't have a
lot of hope for it's super hard to
cannibalize your own revenue.
The alternative as we're seeing is so
much of the startups um pricing models
are around sort of like work delivered
or tasks completed. I think it's it's
exactly what you said, but it's also
that then switches the product towards
having to actually be able to complete
the work. And um something I actually
repeat at the last YC batch um at the
end as closing advice is that I wish the
founders in a batch could just somehow
go spend a month at some of the latest
stage companies. Um uh cuz the top thing
we hear from the founders running those
companies is how hard a time they're
having sort of resetting the engineering
culture in their org to actually embrace
AI to use the tools to want to do like
context engineering and prompt
engineering and and the the net result
of these teams not actually being able
to be AI native one of a better term uh
is that they just can't deliver the
products that work right and so like
they both don't want to switch from
Percy pricing because like that's what
they're used to um uh and in a world of
AI being able to do the work, there's
going to be less seats to sell to, but
they also just cannot deliver on
products that can do the work. And so
they they wouldn't that that pricing
model is not going to make any sense for
them either.
Yeah, it's it's like the process
engineering part. They're not good at
the process engineering part for this
new kind of engineering.
I mean something sort of uh emerging
that's very interesting in a bunch of YC
startups like uh Aoka for instance,
they're doing customer support software
kind of like Service Titan but for um
HVAC. So literally like people who help
you with heating and uh air conditioning
and uh you know I think service titan
has something like 1% wallet share 1% of
the gross transaction value of like a
given HVAC company um which is very
small right I mean people don't spend
that much money on software because
these are relatively low margin service
businesses but the wild thing that Aoka
discovered is that you know they can
come in as software but then over time
they're actually getting a bigger and
bigger chunk of the wallet share because
they can get the HVAC people to pay them
uh actually for the customer support
piece which is not 1% of their spend but
four to 10% of their spend. So what you
may well find is that uh this new breed
of AI startup will actually have more
growth uh and uh higher wallet share.
So, you know, actually, we may well be
all uh undervaluing how powerful and how
big the vertical SAS uh AI companies
will actually be because you're not like
1% of wallet share. You can get to 10.
That's what we talked in that episode
where vertical AI SAS agents will be 10
times at least 10 times bigger than SAS
because it's really to your point Gary
tapping into a whole different part of
the spend of the companies is not the
wallet of software where you're kind of
at this point I suppose is a bit of a a
finite budget but is really new space
where with things that were not possible
and it was mostly workflows from from
people
and I you know I know that people are
like pretty sensitive about uh workforce
displacement but you know customer
support for an HVAC services company is
not a fun job and you can tell because
all of these customer support jobs
actually have like 50 80% annual
attrition rates. like they're just such
torturous, not fun jobs that uh the
companies themselves and the call
centers themselves spend almost all of
their time trying to vet and bring in
more people to work on these terrible
jobs. And so when you have better
software, what's sort of happening is
that instead of like people aren't
losing their jobs, these people are
quitting their jobs anyway because it's
terrible job. And then if anything uh
what Avoka has told me is that many of
the people who were in those customer
support uh you sort of roles uh now
they're actually having more fun jobs
because instead of like managing a whole
set of people who don't want to be there
uh they're actually managing AI agents
and then handling the interesting weird
cases. The coolest part of it is like
they actually can go in and sometimes
alter the prompts and sometimes you
actually have an imp direct impact on uh
both the experience of the customer but
then also their own day-to-day and that
immediately is like a 10 times more
interesting job like wrangling a bunch
of AI agents and making uh the support
process better and better over time.
Like that's you know as knowledge work
goes like way more interesting than
follow this script and read what the
computer says.
So Harj you you had a really interesting
point about a second form of
counterpositioning. this space has moved
so quickly that in every vertical um or
many verticals there's sort of early on
emerged one company that's seen as the
early winner in the space and often it's
actually like the second movers at least
within the YC context we have seen over
and over again that like there's
advantage to being the second mover in a
space like stripe came after uh Brainree
and authorized.net then a bunch of
things and was able to like actually win
by just building a better product. Door
Dash came after Grubhub, Postmates,
various other delivery services and
eventually went on to win. And so I
think it's interesting to sort of just
consider about if you're entering a
vertical where it's already feels
competitive or there are already there's
already seem to be like a early winner
in the space. How do you counter
position against them? One thing I think
is really interesting here is Legora
versus Harvey. Lagora is obviously uh
both in the legal AI space. Harvey was
the early winner. The counterpositioning
that I see from Lorraa is Harvey came in
early and maybe got early sales um but
focused a lot on fine-tuning and sort of
like their product differentiation when
over time it's seen that that was
probably not the right move. You wanted
to actually focus in on the application
layer and actually just sort of building
a better product and and Lora has
focused on that. That's what their
branding and positioning is and it seems
to be working really well for them as a
second mover into the space. A company
that I've worked more closely with, Giga
ML, enter the customer service space and
they're competing with Sierra and
Deacon, like really well-known customer
support companies and from having seen
their sales motion, how they've been
able to sign up some big customers.
They're I think their counterpositioning
is their product fundamentally just
works better out of the box and as a
result they can have a much faster sales
and onboarding process. So it's like
their counterpitching is if you want to
sort of get your customer support
working as quickly as possible um you
should go through like the Gig ML
onboarding process versus like the
decong and I think that's actually
worked quite well for them.
Yeah, Giga ML is an interesting example
of how to your point about like hybrid
displacement.
It's clear that an AI agent can do this
job not just as well as a human but
actually much better than a human. like
the Door Dashers that the Giga ML agents
are talking to, a lot of them don't
speak very good English. They speak all
kinds of languages. You can't hire a
customer support person who's fluent in
200 languages. Um but
but LMS are actually out of box.
Out of the box. Um and they're
infinitely patient if like there's a bad
connection or so that's pretty
interesting.
I think you have other example where to
your point of superhuman abilities is
where the AI version of the product
actually works. I think Hargie you had
the example of a Dualingo versus speak.
Dualingo is obviously the biggest
language learning app I think um most
consumers know. The emerging criticism
of it I would say is that um what it's
actually just sort of like a gaming app
versus a language learning app that like
the way the app works is orthogonal to
learning a true language. And then you
have speak um which is a uses LLM like
uses voice to actually like help you
practice and actually learn the
language. Um, and that
counterpositioning is working really
well for them, right? And sort of
speakers has got explosive growth and
it's not trying to compete with Dualingo
on the we're we've got like lots of
gamification and points and sort of like
a great game mechanic. It's competing on
hey, we're actually just a place you
should come if you want to learn the
language by speaking it. I think the
counterpositioning mode is very um sort
of close and overlaps with the branding
mode idea. I think in the book he talks
about you know like brand is it's
essentially a mode when you become so
well known that even if you have an
equivalent product um consumers will
still choose you um because the the
brand effects and I think the the
example uses like Coca-Cola in the AI
context I think it's probably harder to
apply brand as a moat directly to
startups it just takes time to acquire
brand um but you can certainly see its
effects like the thing that still stuns
me is open AI chat GBT has more
consumers is using it per day than
Google's Gemini. I think anyone who
understands the models and uses them um
daily would say that Gemini Pro 2.5 and
Gemini Flash 2.5 are like equivalent
models
and Google also had all the users like
basically everyone in the world is a
user of Google.
OpenAI had no users initially.
Google was already one of the biggest
consumer brands on the planet. It was
almost certainly the biggest consumer
brand on the internet and yet somebody
else came along and built the brand as
the consumer AI app and Google is like
playing catch-up.
If someone had try had told me in 2022
that that's how it would play out, I
would have been fairly incredulous.
It's also a perfect example of
counterpositioning. Again, I mean, this
is Google had a uh a business model that
required it to continue to support ads
and an organization that uh they
shipped. And so, you have the greatest
cash cow in the history of man. So, why
would you disrupt it um even at the cost
of setting back uh human access to
knowledge by a few years? Even if that's
like the core stated goal of Google
itself to organize the world's
information,
there's also the untold story of how uh
the origin story of Chachib how it came
to be which is really the original mode
for startups with speed. It shipped very
quickly in a matter of months with a
very small team of a couple engineers. I
mean, it required uh you know, Sam Alman
and YC Research and Greg Brockman to go
uh hire Ilia Suskgiver out of DeepMind
because he was there and you know he all
the people a lot of the people who went
on to help create OpenAI uh they came
from DeepMind like it was already in the
right place. It's just that that place
didn't nurture exactly the thing that
society really needed
for speed.
So there's that mode again speed number
one. Do you want to talk about network
economy Diana? Yeah, on the book a
network economy is described as uh where
the value of the product increases as
more users or customer get and use the
product and everyone deres more value as
a effect of more people using it and
examples that were given in the book are
uh Facebook where as you use it and your
friends use it is more fun for me to use
Facebook because all my friends are in
there as more users come in then is the
social network becomes more valuable.
And this was very much the era of uh the
internet where people talked about uh
network effects that came to be. And the
other example he gives is like visa the
visa network where the more merchants
are using Visa
the more value the consumer gets because
you're can swipe the Visa card in more
places. then that becomes the the moat
because it's harder to then acquire and
amass this number and large number of uh
users or merchants in order to to win.
So that becomes very defensible. In the
current era for AI, the shape of uh
network effects is different. It really
comes into the shape of data. I think a
lot of uh the data that a lot of AI
companies get access to becomes the mode
where the more data they get the custom
models they build become better and the
better models it becomes a better
product for users and there's lots of
examples of these and um besides like
the big foundation
lab companies where they probably use
some of the data I don't know I mean
they probably use some of the data from
the users they probably do
checkpt almost certainly like feeds a
lot of that back because you have a
certain reward function for right
each training run, right?
So all the history of every chat from
chat GBD 1 2 3 4 5 now goes fed into
GPD6 and then so on and so forth helps
create the the next model version. And
there's uh even smaller versions of
this. For example, cursor, they have
probably one of the best uh tap tap
autocomplete because one the the free
version of cursor they actually say it
when you sign up that they they will use
the data and they use that to train it
and the more users they get
I think it's like all the data like I
think it's like quite literally like
every mouse click and every keystroke
that you that you emit when you're using
cursor like is fed into a model which is
like kind of crazy
which then the more developers cursor
the better the product gets and then
they compound a lot of the a lot of the
wins with that. And the version where
this applies to AI startup is when they
go work with enterprises and large
companies they get access to private
data. I mentioned earlier salient or
happy robot when the employees of the
companies where they become customers as
they use their product they have a lot
of that private data that makes a lot of
the workflows better and the way they
improve that which is the second way of
having modes with networks is really
evals we we talked a lot about evals
being the key mode for AI startups is
evals is where you get a lot of the this
workflow work or didn't work and then
take that back and iterate and improve
your context engineering. And that is a
flywheel that you can only achieve when
you get more and more usage of your
product whether being in a consumer or a
or a AI vertical SAS agent. So now the
last mode in the book is uh scale
economies. Jared, do you want to tell us
about it?
Scale economies or economies of scale.
you've invested a lot of money to build
something that's really big and as a
result you have economies of scale and
you can offer the service cheaper than
anybody else. So like the the classic
example would be like UPS or FedEx or
the Amazon delivery network. They built
like massive like physical
infrastructure and as a result they have
like a lower cost per unit um compared
to a smaller competitor. Um I think the
way this has played out in the AI world
I don't think it's actually played out
that much at the application layer. It's
really played at at the model layer,
right? Like training a state-of-the-art
LLM is very capital inensive. Only a few
companies can afford to do it. Once
you've done it, you can afford to like
let people do inference on that model
very inexpensively. This is why the
DeepC announcement was so um was so
earthshattering last year because it
seemed like it might be a lot cheaper
than people previously thought to train
a Frontier LLM which would greatly
diminish the power of this like
economies of scale mode that people
thought the the AI labs had.
The key thing about Deepseek was they
figure out and made public this new
unlock for models which is uh how to do
RL. They still built on top of one of
the large foundation models so it's
still expensive. the rail part is
cheaper, but you still need the very
expensive big foundation model. So
that's one of the things that the media
got wrong.
There's a separate question that people
talk about, which is like how will the
foundation model companies be defensible
against each other? And like this is
certainly one way, right? It's just like
it's it's very hard to be a new entrant
into that game now because of this
economies of scale. And we were we were
thinking earlier about like how this had
played out with startups and there's not
that many examples, but I think a couple
of good ones. Well, one one good one is
is a company of yours, EXA. Harge, do
you want to explain what what Exa does?
Yeah, Exa is essentially search for AI
agents. Um, it provides an API for
anyone building AI applications that
wants to search the web.
And the way I I think this is playing
out for Exa is in order to provide that
service, they need to crawl the web. Not
the whole web like Google does, but a
big chunk of it. And that's very
expensive to do. It requires like a
large like fixed capital uh investment.
But then once once you crawl a big chunk
of the web, you can reuse that same
crawl for for many different customers.
I think what's interesting about X the
parallel to the model companies is that
they they had invested in that like sort
of before agents had really taken off
like they were fairly early to this. I
think they were working on this actually
even prehat GBT launching. So they made
the investment early on took a bet same
way that the lab companies took a bet on
like transformers and um uh and scaling
laws.
Yeah. And there are two companies in
just the most recent batch, Channel 3
and Orange Slice, that are both doing
exod.ai like plays where they crawl a
big chunk of the web, have a big like
static crawl on their own servers, and
then have agents that run on top of
those of that crawl. So, I think we're
going to see more and more of this,
especially as the web agents work
better.
You need to mainly focus on uh the first
moat that isn't even in the book, which
is speed. like you know if you're really
breaking your brain about like oh well
are we going to be a cornered resource
or not you're just thinking about it in
the wrong way like you should not start
there you should start with do I have a
specific person who has some sort of
pain point and it's pretty painful it's
not like a oh it'd be nice if I could do
this it's a oh I am not going to get
promoted this year maybe I will get
fired like this is so painful that I
don't want to go to work today Like
that's sort of the type of pain that
you're looking for. And if you can write
software or build things that actually
alleviate that pain, like existential
pain, like the business is going to go
out of business or oh my god, we could
totally take over everything next year.
Like that's sort of the feeling that you
want in your customer. Uh if you can
find things like that, go go Z, you
know, go find that and go zero to one on
that first. With that, see you guys next
time.

Key Vocabulary

Start Practicing
Vocabulary Meanings

startup

/ˈstɑːrtʌp/

B2
  • noun
  • - a new business venture or company that is in the early stages of development

business

/ˈbɪznɪs/

A2
  • noun
  • - an organization or company for commercial activities

competition

/ˌkɒmpəˈtɪʃən/

B1
  • noun
  • - the situation in which people or organizations compete

product

/ˈprɒdʌkt/

B1
  • noun
  • - a thing produced by labor or effort

build

/bɪld/

A2
  • verb
  • - to construct something by putting parts together

defend

/dɪˈfɛnd/

B1
  • verb
  • - to protect against attack or criticism

important

/ɪmˈpɔːrtənt/

A1
  • adjective
  • - having great value or significance

pervasive

/pərˈveɪsɪv/

C1
  • adjective
  • - spreading widely throughout an area or group of people

power

/ˈpaʊər/

B1
  • noun
  • - the ability or capacity to do something or act in a particular way

cost

/kɒst/

B1
  • noun
  • - the amount of money needed to buy or obtain something
  • verb
  • - to require a certain amount of effort or money

speed

/spiːd/

B1
  • noun
  • - the rate at which someone or something moves or operates

scale

/skeɪl/

B2
  • noun
  • - the size or extent of something, especially when compared
  • verb
  • - to change in size, especially to become larger

resource

/ˈriːsɔːrs/

B1
  • noun
  • - a source of supply or support that can be drawn upon

network

/ˈnɛtwɜːrk/

B1
  • noun
  • - a group of people or organizations connected for a common purpose

data

/ˈdeɪtə/

B1
  • noun
  • - facts, statistics, or items of information

market

/ˈmɑːrkɪt/

B1
  • noun
  • - a regular gathering of people for buying and selling goods and services

work

/wɜːrk/

A1
  • verb
  • - to perform a job or task
  • noun
  • - activity involving mental or physical effort done in order to achieve a result

value

/ˈvæljuː/

B1
  • noun
  • - the worth or importance of something
  • verb
  • - to consider something important or beneficial

AI

/ˌeɪˈaɪ/

C1
  • noun
  • - artificial intelligence, the simulation of human intelligence processes by machines

moat

/moʊt/

C1
  • noun
  • - a deep, wide ditch surrounding a castle, as a defense barrier; metaphorically, a competitive advantage

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