The Russian unprovoked and illegal
invasion of Ukraine began in 2014,
00:11
but in 2022 it entered a full-scale phase. So far,
our videos have been summaries of the most recent
00:16
important events happening on the battlefield in
Ukraine, along with crucial diplomatic, economic,
00:23
and political developments which have had a
direct impact on this battlefield. But enough
00:29
time has passed as the three-day operation
turned into a year-long bloody conflict,
00:34
so we can start looking back at some of
the most defining battles of the war.
00:38
Undoubtedly, the Battle of Kyiv is at the top of
this list. Despite the odds being stacked against
00:43
it, despite its chief allies lacking confidence
in its abilities to prevent the Russian army from
00:49
reaching its objectives, Ukraine was bracing for
a battle to defend its capital, which may well be
00:55
the defining moment of the Russo-Ukrainian
war and the Ukrainian statehood at large.
01:01
After months of warnings from the United States
and the United Kingdom about the imminent Russian
01:09
invasion of Ukraine, after several ill-fated
attempts to reach a diplomatic solution amidst
01:14
Russia’s uncompromising stance, after a long
period of speculations, Vladimir Putin finally
01:20
declared a so-called Special Military Operation
for demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine
01:26
on February 24. The Russian army attacked
Ukraine from the north towards Kyiv, from
01:32
the northeast towards Kharkiv, from the southeast
towards the Ukrainian-controlled part of Donbas,
01:56
and from the South towards Kherson, Mykolaiv,
and Odesa. Later we will dedicate videos to
02:01
other most important battles of the war
in Ukraine, but today our focus is Kyiv.
02:07
The war started with a massive airstrike campaign
by Russia on Ukrainian air defense systems,
02:13
military bases, military aircraft, and critical
infrastructure to cripple the Ukrainian military
02:19
potential to respond, overwhelm Ukraine and
demonstrate the futility of any resistance in
02:24
the face of the mighty Russian army and its sheer
firepower. But before the start of a full-scale
02:30
invasion, the Ukrainian command relocated much
of its military equipment and personnel outside
02:36
their usual bases, significantly decreasing the
effectiveness of the initial Russian mass strike.
02:42
Nevertheless, this did not force the Russian
command to rethink its second step of moving
02:48
its land forces into Ukraine. Investigations and
reports of Western media indicate that Putin and
02:53
his intelligence community were convinced that the
Ukrainian government would be too weak to resist,
03:00
the Ukrainian public would welcome
the Russian army as liberators,
03:05
and the Ukrainian military would collapse
upon facing the Russian military. Hence, the
03:09
Russian military prepared logistics for a short
conflict, during which Kyiv was supposed to fall.
03:14
This calculation went horribly wrong, as the
Ukrainian president Volodimir Zelensky and his
03:20
government decided to stay and fight instead
of relocating to western Ukraine or Europe,
03:26
as the Ukrainian public resisted the occupation.
Thousands joined the Territorial Defense Brigades,
03:31
and the Ukrainian military proved to be
a much more formidable foe than expected.
03:37
Moreover, Kyiv, specifically, is a difficult place
to invade. The city and its surroundings have many
03:43
forests, rivers, numerous towns and villages, and
narrow roads between them, all factors beneficial
03:49
for the defending side. Also, the weather in late
February was warm, causing the snow to melt and
03:55
the muddy terrain, making it very difficult for
heavily armoured vehicles to move anywhere but on
04:02
the roads. Commander of Kyiv’s defense, Colonel
General Oleksandr Syrskyi, ordered the erection
04:07
of two rings of defense - a smaller one inside
Kyiv and a larger one on the city’s outskirts.
04:13
Kyiv was divided into sectors, each getting its
commander to manage the defenses. Artillery was
04:19
deployed in the Northwestern and
Northeastern outskirts of Kyiv.
04:25
On February 24, elements of the Russian
35th Combined Arms Army entered Ukraine
04:29
through Chornobyl, the elements of the 36th
Combined Arms Army advanced towards Chernihiv,
04:34
while the elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army
invaded Sumy oblast with a common goal of reaching
04:39
the capital Kyiv. Estimated 15k-20k Russian
soldiers moved in from the west bank of Dnipro,
04:45
while an additional 20k-25k advanced on Kyiv
from Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts. The vicinity
04:53
of Kyiv was defended only by the 72nd Mechanized
Brigade, elements of the Ukrainian National Guard,
04:59
special forces, and newly established volunteer
groups of the Territorial Defense Brigades.
05:06
The Russian electronic warfare tools
immediately disabled Ukrainian communications,
05:12
but the reforms enacted in the Ukrainian
army, making it more decentralized,
05:17
allowed it to counter this. Reported 26k Ukrainian
soldiers trained by the US and NATO since 2014
05:22
helped them to become more capable commanders and
soldiers. As a result, the Ukrainian military was
05:30
relatively prepared to operate when the advancing
Russian army disabled their communications.
05:37
Moreover, Elon Musk started supplying Ukraine with
his Starlink satellite broadband service early
05:42
in the war, allowing the Ukrainian military
to find alternative communication methods.
05:48
On the morning of February 24, Russian columns
started moving toward Kyiv from Chornobyl,
05:54
Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts. Two days before
that, the Ukrainian border patrols fell back
05:59
towards Benevka, Vilcha, and the abandoned city
of Chornobyl on the western bank of Dnipro in
06:05
anticipation of the reported 30 Russian Battalion
Tactical Groups (around 20k men) invading from
06:10
this direction. Reportedly these BTGs belonged
to the 76th Guards Air Assault Division,
06:17
the 98th Guards Airborne Division, and the
155th Separate Marine Brigade. The 1st Separate
06:23
Battalion defended the notorious Chornobyl Power
Plant, but it reportedly lacked heavy weapons to
06:30
oppose the Russian onslaught and was forced to
surrender. At this point, the elements of the
06:35
80th Air Assault Brigade, border patrol units,
and two groups of Omega Special unit were the
06:41
main Ukrainian forces defending against the
Russian attack on the Western bank of Dnipro.
06:46
Russian units advancing in this direction enjoyed
an immense firepower and manpower advantage,
06:51
so stopping them was unrealistic. Taking that into
account, the main goal of the Ukrainian defenders
06:57
was to delay the Russian forces by destroying
bridges and roads, and harassing their lines.
07:03
While most of the Russian force pushed back the
Ukrainian defenders and advanced, 4-5 BTGs of the
07:09
Russian army served as a vanguard unit, aiming to
reach the Antonov Airport in Hostomel by bypassing
07:15
residential areas and avoiding Ukrainian
forces. The supply lines of these forward
07:21
units were vulnerable to hit-and-run attacks by
Ukrainian mobile units armed with Javelin and NLAW
07:27
anti-tank missiles. According to a Ukrainian
participant of the Battle of Kyiv, Russians
07:33
were careless and moved in parade-like formations
without units covering their advance and flanks.
07:39
As a result, Ukrainians successfully harassed
Russian armored columns, which sometimes had
07:45
to push through narrow roads, and this made
the destruction of front and rear vehicles
07:51
sufficient to stop whole columns. Notable
battles took place near Ivankiv and Dymer,
07:55
as the 72nd brigade, the aforementioned Ukrainian
units, territorial defense battalions, and special
08:01
forces withdrew while delaying the Russian
movement and inflicting damage on its lines.
08:07
But Ukraine was suffering losses too. For
instance, according to Ukrainian sources,
08:13
the Omega group of the National Guard
had to abandon 3 of its vehicles,
08:18
which Russian Spetsnaz groups later used to enter
Kyiv. These vehicles still had Ukrainian insignia,
08:22
allowing Russian Spetsnaz to enter the
capital in the first chaotic days of the war.
08:30
The number of Russian saboteurs in Kyiv is
unclear, but Russian Spetsnaz operatives,
08:35
Wagner mercenaries, and GRU operatives were
in Kyiv to reportedly kill President Zelensky,
08:40
wreak havoc in the capital and create an illusion
of a significant Russian presence in the city.
08:46
Most of these saboteurs entered Kyiv in the early
days of the conflict, including through Hostomel,
08:52
which we will talk about a bit later. At the same
time, it is claimed that a portion of the Russian
08:57
agents entered the capital before the beginning
of the war. One should remember that in February,
09:02
the Ukrainian defeat was considered a matter of
days. The Ukrainian government was expected to
09:08
crumble under pressure, but Zelensky’s defiance
and refusal to leave the capital was a critical
09:14
moment that helped mobilize the Ukrainians
to fight. In the early days of the invasion,
09:20
citizens were armed with guns and were encouraged
to await Russian invaders with Molotov cocktails.
09:25
Russian saboteurs failed in their mission
in Kyiv. There were separate incidents of
09:31
fighting inside Kyiv, most notably near the
Beresteiska metro station, but the situation
09:37
inside the city never became too threatening.
Soon the activity of Russian saboteurs died down.
09:42
While the Russian columns were advancing from
Belarus, Russia simultaneously deployed airborne
09:49
troops to the Antonov Airport in Hostomel, some 20
kilometers northwest of the capital. The Russian
09:55
command assessed the earlier massive campaign
of strikes on Ukrainian targets as sufficient
10:01
to destroy most of its air defense capabilities.
It was confident it could deploy 200-300 elite
10:06
paratroopers from the 11th Guards Assault Brigade
deep behind Ukrainian lines with the help of Mi-8
10:13
Hip assault transport aircraft protected
by 34 Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopters.
10:19
This operation aimed to secure the Antonov Airport
and use it as a foothold for deploying troops,
10:25
military equipment, and supplies for the upcoming
attack on Kyiv. The Antonov Airport was defended
10:31
by the 4th Rapid Response Brigade of the Ukrainian
National Guard, which had around 300 soldiers,
10:37
at this time primarily conscripts, as some of
the most experienced soldiers were relocated to
10:43
Luhansk oblast since Ukraine expected the most
significant Russian attack from there. The 4th
10:48
Rapid Response Brigade also reportedly possessed
several T-64BV tanks, an artillery battery,
10:55
surveillance drones, portable surface-to-air
systems, and ZU-32-2 anti-aircraft weapons.
11:01
Inexperienced Ukrainian defenders were reportedly
overwhelmed and shocked at the beginning of the
11:08
battle. Still, the mood changed as soon as
one of the Russian helicopters was shot down
11:13
by Igla man-portable surface-to-air missile.
Overall, Ukrainians managed to down 3 Russian
11:19
helicopters. Ukrainians fought hard to defend the
airport, but the unit commander, Colonel Vitaliy
11:25
Rudenko, was forced to order a retreat since they
ran out of ammo. As soon as the 4th Rapid Response
11:32
Brigade withdrew, Ukrainian artillery started
pounding the airport’s landing strip to make
11:38
it unusable for deploying additional troops and
vehicles by Russia. Ukrainian Su-24 aircraft also
11:43
joined the attack on the Antonov airport. This
was followed by the attack of the 72nd Mechanized
11:50
Brigade, the 4th Rapid Response Brigade, and
Ukrainian special forces to retake the airport.
11:56
Ukrainian forces sieged the airport, where the
Russian VDV was under heavy pressure from the
12:02
Ukrainian artillery and air force. By the evening
of February 24, the 4th Rapid Response Brigade
12:07
reported its victory in Hostomel, as the Russian
11th Guards Assault Brigade had to withdraw to
12:14
the surrounding woods. Even though the Russian
ground forces in and around the Hostomel airport
12:19
did not get reinforcements to hold the area,
the Russian air forces actively supported them.
12:24
Battles in Ivankiv, Dymer, and other areas
Northwest of Kyiv were raging simultaneously,
12:30
but the group of 4-5 BTGs spearheading the
Russian advance by bypassing the Ukrainian units
12:36
and strongholds reached Hostomel on the morning of
February 26. Ukrainians had to withdraw and create
12:42
the next line of defense along the Irpin River,
as their special forces detonated the nearest
12:49
bridge delaying the advance of the Russian units.
Even though Russians managed to secure the Antonov
12:54
airport, its runway was severely damaged,
making it for further Russian deployment,
13:01
according to the Ukrainian command.
There are conflicting reports about the
13:06
Russian attempt to capture another
airfield in the vicinity of Kyiv.
13:10
According to Ukrainian officials, on February
26, Russia sent two IL-76 transport airplanes
13:14
to land Russian airborne troops at the Vasylkiv
airport, which Ukrainians shot down. So far,
13:21
no conclusive evidence of two shot planes has been
presented. But Russians also attempted a ground
13:28
assault on the airport, most likely conducted
by the forward units coming from the north. The
13:34
mayor of Vasylkiv also claimed that some of the
Russian soldiers who fought to capture the airport
13:40
were sleeper agents who moved to the Kyiv oblast
with their families a few months before the war.
13:44
There is no public evidence to corroborate that
claim, but a battle in Vasylkiv indeed took place.
13:51
An interviewed Ukrainian soldier claimed
that the Russian unit fighting in Vasylkiv
13:57
was the Alpha group of the Russian Spetsnaz. On
February 26, Ukrainians repelled their attack.
14:01
The next targets of Russian forward units
were the towns of Hostomel, Bucha, and Irpin.
14:09
Russians quickly overwhelmed the Ukrainian defense
in Ivankiv and Dymer by the end of February.
14:15
That notorious 40-mile-long armored Russian
column was advancing towards Kyiv to join
14:20
the siege of Ukrainian forces along the
Irpin River. As we mentioned earlier,
14:26
the commander of Kyiv’s defense, Colonel General
Oleksandr Syrskyi, stated in an interview that
14:31
there were two circles of defense of the capital.
One of them was the outer circle, in villages
14:36
and settlements of the Kyiv Oblast, while the
inner circle was inside the city limits of Kyiv.
14:41
This outer circle was Hostomel, Bucha, Irpin, and
Moshchun, and the Ukrainian defenders were ordered
14:47
to stand their ground to prevent the Russian
advance into the capital. Losing this battle
14:53
would mean urban combat in Kyiv. Knowing how
the Russian army conducts urban warfare, namely
14:58
massing artillery around the city and razing it
to the ground, the Ukrainian command understood
15:04
that they would have to keep Russians to the
perimeter to save Kyiv from destruction. As the
15:09
destruction of numerous Ukrainian cities in the
east showed, they were right in that assessment.
15:15
In late February, battles for Hostomel, Bucha,
and Irpin started almost simultaneously as Russian
15:21
ground forces entered all three towns looking
to penetrate Ukrainian defenses and enter the
15:27
capital. It is still difficult to determine
the exact units fighting on both sides in
15:32
these battles. Still, reports indicated that from
the Russian side these were the 31st Guards Air
15:37
Assault Brigade, 76th Guards Air Assault Division,
56th Guards Air Assault Regiment, 64th Motor Rifle
15:44
Brigade, Chechen National Guard regiment
loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov and special forces.
15:51
At the same time, the Ukrainian defense
consisted of the 72nd Mechanized Brigade,
15:57
the 112th Territorial Defense Brigade, several
elements of the Ukrainian Special Forces and the
16:02
National Guard, as well as the newly-created
International Brigade, which, contrary to the
16:08
rumors, was not in the 10s of thousands but merely
in hundreds. On February 27, while Russian units
16:13
were still fighting to capture Hostomel, several
broke through in the direction of Bucha and Irpin.
16:20
In Irpin, the battle started outside the Giraffe
shopping mall as a formidable armored column
16:26
entered the town. But this column, reportedly
belonging to the 76th Guards Air Assault Division,
16:31
advanced through the road leading to Irpin,
and the Ukrainian defenders were prepared.
16:37
Russians were still confident that Ukrainians
would crumble when they saw an overwhelming
16:43
armored force and moved in a parade-like
formation. As soon as the Russian armored column
16:47
approached, Ukrainian paratroopers destroyed
several Russian vehicles with RPGs, which quickly
16:52
caused chaos in the Russian ranks. It is reported
that Ukrainian defenders were learning how to use
16:58
the western-supplied Javelins and NLAWs on
Youtube on the fly and used these anti-tank
17:04
weapons to destroy the first and last vehicles
in the columns. This tactic, successfully used
17:09
by Chechen resistance in the Chechen wars of the
1990s, was ideally suited for narrow roads in the
17:16
suburbs of Kyiv, as destroying the first and the
last vehicle in the column forced other vehicles
17:22
to choose between staying on the road or moving to
muddy terrain, and either option could be deadly.
17:27
Surviving vehicles entered the shopping mall and
hid behind other buildings to avoid destruction.
17:34
With Ukrainian communications down,
Ukrainian commanders passed instructions
17:39
and targets for artillery fire via runners
and WhatsApp. A Russian unit tried to flank
17:44
the Ukrainians through a deserted brick
factory, but their attempt was repelled.
17:49
After two hours, the Russians had to withdraw.
But the initial setback did not stop the Russians
17:54
from continuing their attempts to take Irpin.
On February 27, Ukrainian defenders blew up the
18:00
bridge connecting Bucha to Irpin. The invaders
had to use the longer route through the M06
18:06
highway to bring more men and vehicles to Irpin.
Ukrainians were aware of this, and on February 28,
18:12
a Russian armored column suffered heavy losses on
the M06 Highway. The Ukrainian official, Oleksiy
18:18
Arestovich, claimed that Russia lost more than
200 vehicles on the highway, which sounds like an
18:25
exaggeration, but is also an indication of fierce
resistance by Ukrainian forces in this direction.
18:31
By early March, Russians managed to gain
a foothold in Irpin, but they failed to
18:37
capture the town despite all their attempts. This
led to increased Russian airstrikes on Irpin,
18:42
bringing the town to the brink
of a humanitarian catastrophe.
18:47
At one point in mid-March, it was reported
that Russia managed to take half of the town
18:51
under its control, but they never managed
to drive the Ukrainian army out of Irpin.
18:56
We still don’t have a detailed step-by-step
report of battles in Irpin, but there was an
19:01
episode that showed the negligence of the Russian
units. A Russian airborne company parked its
19:07
vehicles at the base of a multi-story building
in Irpin and was visible to Ukrainian defenders.
19:13
Ukrainians threw smoke grenades at the Russian
airborne company, which got confused and ran
19:19
away in panic, leaving all their vehicles
and equipment behind for the Ukrainians.
19:24
Heavy battles took place in Bucha as well.
The 64th Separate Motorized Brigade, the 76th
19:29
Guards Air Assault Division, pro-Kadyrov Chechen
battalions, riot control units known as OMON were
19:35
among the units fighting to drive away the 72nd
Mechanized Brigade, the Territorial Defense units,
19:42
the National Guard units, and the Special forces.
After the initial advance in late February and
19:47
early March amidst significant losses in armored
vehicles, Russia was pushed back to the outskirts
19:53
of Bucha on March 3. But by March 5, Russians
again took most of the town under their control.
19:59
This allowed them to move
troops to Irpin more freely.
20:05
Heavy fighting in the northeast of the Kyiv oblast
led to a catastrophic humanitarian situation,
20:08
which prompted the authorities to
organize the evacuation of up to 20k
20:14
civilians on March 9. On March 12, it was reported
that Russia fully captured Bucha. Despite several
20:18
counter-attacks, it was impossible to drive
Russian troops from the area. For the time being,
20:26
the aim of the Ukrainian forces in this area was
to prevent a Russian advance from Bucha to Irpin.
20:32
After taking the Antonov Airport in Hostomel on
February 26, the Russian aviation and artillery
20:38
continued shelling this town in preparation for
a ground offensive. Despite the initial success
20:43
of the Ukrainian defenders in repelling the
assault of the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade,
20:49
the highlights of which were the destruction of
dozens of Russian armored vehicles and the killing
20:54
of the deputy commander of the 41st Combined
Arms Army, Major general Andrei Sukhovetsky by
20:59
sniper fire, on March 5, Hostomel was captured
by Russia. The mayor of Hostomel was killed
21:05
two days later while delivering humanitarian
aid to residents. For the next several weeks,
21:11
Ukrainians continued counter-offensive actions
to retake Hostomel. Russians heavily outnumbered
21:17
Ukrainian defenders in this direction, and it
is reported that the deployment of the 80th
21:23
Air Assault Brigade helped the Ukrainians
to stabilize the situation in Kyiv oblast.
21:28
We do not want to diminish the significance of
battles in other towns of the Kyiv oblast. Still,
21:33
perhaps the single most important victory of the
Ukrainian army took place in the town of Moshchun,
21:39
immediately north of the capital. After the
occupation of the Antonov Airport, the elements
21:44
of the 72nd Mechanized Brigade entered Moshchun
in anticipation of a Russian attack from there.
21:50
On February 27, the Russian Spetsnaz
troops were already in Moshchun.
21:55
Still, as the River Irpin separated Hostomel from
Moshchun and the bridge between these towns had
22:00
been blown up, it was difficult for the Russian
army to deploy a formidable force in this area.
22:05
Ukraine had a natural advantage in this
direction and constantly targeted pontoon
22:11
bridges via artillery and airstrikes to prevent
the Russian units from moving to Moshchun.
22:16
For days, Russian deployment to Moshchun was
stopped before, on March 6, a large Russian
22:21
group finally managed to enter the town. Despite
the fierce resistance from the company of the 72nd
22:27
Mechanized Brigade led by captain Roman Kovalenko,
they had to retreat to the edge of the town,
22:33
allowing the Russian army to create a bridgehead
in Moshchun. He regrouped with the Ukrainian
22:38
special forces, territorial defense brigades,
and newly-arrived international volunteers.
22:43
Both sides dug trenches in anticipation of battles
for Moshchun, and Ukrainians had to find a way to
22:49
prevent more Russian reinforcements from coming
there. On March 8, Ukrainian special forces did
22:55
just that by blowing the dam in Dymer at the
mouth of the River Irpin, which significantly
23:01
increased the water flow into the river, made it
broader, and created boggy terrain on the banks.
23:06
This made using existing pontoon bridges
and building new ones very difficult. It
23:12
became nearly impossible to bring additional
manpower and armored vehicles into Moshchun.
23:18
But the situation for the Ukrainian defenders
inside Moshchun was already quite difficult.
23:23
Russians attacked Ukrainian positions with
artillery, drones, helicopters, and airstrikes.
23:28
Ukrainian communications were destroyed,
too, making Ukrainian drones mostly unusable.
23:33
Ukrainian defenders in this direction were
running low on 152-mm artillery shells.
23:39
On March 10-11, the situation became even worse,
as according to an interview with one of the
23:45
Ukrainian defenders, close to 100 Russians somehow
managed to cross Irpin with armored vehicles. They
23:51
reportedly gathered in the forest in the North of
Moshchun unbeknownst to the Ukrainian units. But a
23:58
local farmer spotted a concentration of tanks and
armored vehicles and informed the Ukrainian army
24:04
about it. Ukrainian drones could not spot them.
But once the Ukrainian artillery fired on the
24:09
forest, they saw a secondary explosion, confirming
the placement of vehicles there. Being exposed,
24:15
Russians pressed to attack. They moved South
towards Kyiv, aiming to advance on Horenka and
24:22
then Pushcha-Vodytsa. The success of this movement
would have meant the invasion of the capital from
24:27
the north. The National Guard units were the first
to engage with the advancing Russian soldiers.
24:33
Then the company of the 72nd brigade joined the
fight. Russians lacked night-vision equipment,
24:38
while Ukrainians did not have armored vehicles.
But equipped with NLAWs, they managed to destroy
24:44
several IFVs. Ukrainian artillery was active too.
After losing 20-30 men, the remaining Russian
24:50
troops fled toward the river. But Moshchun was
still in danger. According to General Syrsky,
24:57
Moshchun was on the brink of a fall as Russians
managed to deploy their airborne troops to the
25:03
settlement. Ukraine strengthened its defenses
with another battalion from the 72nd Mechanized
25:09
Brigade, but this brigade suffered heavy losses
as Russian artillery and airstrikes continued.
25:14
Russia reportedly had a 20:1 artillery
advantage in the Kyiv oblast.
25:20
At one point, on March 21, the commander of the
72nd Mechanized Brigade, Oleksandr Vdovychenko,
25:25
requested the Commander-in-Chief General Zaluzhny
to withdraw from Moshchun. Zaluzhny reportedly
25:32
ordered Vdovychenko to fight no matter what since
the fall of Moshchun would mean losing Kyiv and
25:38
possibly the war. The 72nd Brigade and other
defenders of Kyiv did precisely that. We don’t
25:44
have details of how the rest of the battle of
Moshchun unfolded, but we know that the Ukrainians
25:50
continued resisting and bleeding Russians out
with Stingers, TB-2 drones, NLAWs, and Javelins.
25:56
In Bucha, Irpin, Hostomel, and Moshchun, Ukrainian
mobile units actively employed hit-and-run tactics
26:02
to destroy Russian vehicles. The deployment
of the 80th Air Assault Brigade helped offset
26:09
the manpower advantage of the Russian army.
It was looking increasingly unlikely that
26:14
Russians would manage to break through to
Kyiv, as they could not even take Irpin and
26:20
Moshchun under complete control more than a month
after the start of the invasion. Ukrainian units
26:24
started counter-attacking movements in Irpin and
Bucha. Almost simultaneously, the Russian command
26:30
informed about their intended de-escalation
in Kyiv Oblast as a “gesture of goodwill.”
26:35
In late March-early April, Russians started to
retreat from Kyiv Oblast, leaving the wake of
26:41
destruction and death behind it. This is when
the world found out about the Bucha massacre.
26:46
Another critical battlefield of the Battle
of Kyiv was Makariv, a town west of Kyiv.
26:53
It is on the E40 highway, which was reportedly
crucial for transporting weapons and vehicles
26:59
to the defenders of Kyiv from the West. In late
February, the 37th Separate Guards Motor Rifle
27:04
Brigade entered Makariv and engaged in battle
with the 14th Separate Mechanized Brigade and the
27:10
95th Air Assault Brigade. Heavy fighting continued
for several days before, in early March, Russians
27:16
were pushed away from the bridge in Makariv
towards the area known as the Makariv Dachas.
27:23
March was tense in Makariv, as Ukrainians
harassed Russian columns with hit-and-run
27:28
tactics while Russians constantly shelled the
town. Towards the end of the month, Russians
27:33
launched another attack with armored vehicles
and put immense pressure on Ukrainian units. It
27:39
is reported that Russians were repelled only after
the arrival of the special forces unit of Ukraine.
27:45
On March 29, it was the Ukrainian
turn to attack Russian positions,
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but it did not bring any positive results for
the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, 2-3 days later,
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Russians withdrew from Makariv, just like
from other occupied areas of the Kyiv oblast.
28:02
As we noted earlier in this video, Russia advanced
from two other axes toward Kyiv. From Chernihiv
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oblast and Sumy oblast. Since our main focus in
this video is Kyiv, we do not intend to describe
28:14
all of the battles and processes that took place
in the Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts as it is the
28:20
topic of our future video. But let’s briefly
remind you about what happened in the Chernihiv
28:25
and Sumy oblasts to give context. On February 24,
the elements of the 41st CAA, including the 90th
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Tank Brigade and the 55 Motor Rifle Brigade,
invaded the Chernihiv oblast from Belarus.
28:36
Russians had 10-15k men on this axis. The
Ukrainian 1st Tank Brigade, with some 2k men,
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was tasked with defending the city of Chernihiv
and preventing the Russian advance on Kyiv.
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After initially failing to take the
city of Chernihiv under control,
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Russians decided to bypass and encircle the city
while also continuing their movement towards Kyiv.
28:58
A similar scenario developed in the Sumy
oblast. 10-15k large Russian forces faced
29:05
fierce resistance from the 56th Motorized Brigade
and the 150th Territorial Defense Battalion.
29:11
Hence, in this direction, they also decided to
bypass the oblast center and continued advancing
29:17
towards Kyiv, being stopped by the Ukrainian
army in Zghurivka. This tactic over-extended
29:23
the Russian supply lines making it vulnerable to
hit-and-run tactics of Ukrainian mobile units.
29:29
In the Chernihiv axis, the key battle took
place in the village of Lukashivka in mid-March.
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1 Russian BTG with around 750 people, 7 tanks, and
19 armored infantry vehicles tried to take this
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town to complete the encirclement of Chernihiv and
cut the last highway connecting the city to Kyiv.
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But they ignored that plains and villages around
Lukashivka were still under Ukrainian control,
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making them vulnerable to Ukrainian artillery.
Russia took heavy losses in this direction.
29:59
Despite its inability to encircle Chernihiv,
Russia still advanced on Kyiv from this direction.
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They went as far as Brovary, Kyiv Oblast.
On March 9, a battalion of the 72nd brigade,
30:11
commanded by Lt.Colonel Roman Darmohrai, prepared
to ambush a Russian armored column from the 6th
30:17
Guards Tank Regiment moving from Zalissya towards
Brovary. Locals and Ukrainian reconnaissance
30:23
drones informed about Russian movements, so the
Ukrainian ambush unit was ready. Ukrainians struck
30:29
the first tank in the Russian column with NLAW
causing confusion in the Russian ranks. Russian
30:36
tanks moved onto the muddy roadside, which made
their movement even more difficult. They became
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easy targets for the Ukrainians. Ukrainian Korsar
missiles and artillery started pounding them.
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When the Russians retreated, they left 17 tanks,
3 other armored vehicles, and dozens of men on the
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battlefield. On March 19, Russia made another
attempt to take Brovary, but as soon as their
31:00
first tank was hit, they retreated. Russian
attempts to take Kyiv from the Chernihiv and
31:06
Sumy oblasts failed, too, as they withdrew from
the occupied areas in late March-early April.
31:11
The Battle of Kyiv ended in a Ukrainian victory.
Being significantly outnumbered and suffering
31:18
from a firepower disadvantage did not prevent
Ukraine from standing its ground and inflicting
31:24
hefty damage on Russians. Ultimately, the Kremlin
understood that its losses were unsustainable and
31:29
that the available manpower and firepower were
insufficient to break through the Ukrainian
31:36
defenses of the capital. The fighters grew more
confident and gained valuable experience as they
31:40
kept holding the Russians back. Evidently, Russia
intended to conduct a short victorious war based
31:46
on the dubious conviction that Ukrainians
would welcome Russians as liberators.
31:53
The Ukrainian military and the government
would crumble in the face of the assumed second
31:58
strongest army in the world. Russian logistics
throughout the battle of Kyiv was in shambles,
32:02
which is proved by scores of images of
Russian tanks out of fuel in the Kyiv oblast.
32:08
Russia was unprepared for a long war and did not
make appropriate preparations. Russians severely
32:14
underestimated the Ukrainian army and evidently
thought that this was still the same Ukrainian
32:21
army of 2014. Russians over-extended their supply
lines in the Battle of Kyiv, with a goal in mind
32:26
to advance on the capital no matter what. This
left them vulnerable to Ukrainian mobile units,
32:32
who regularly ambushed Russian armored columns. It
was often enough to destroy the first vehicle in
32:38
the column from RPGs like Javelin and NLAW, which
have the capability to strike from a significant
32:44
distance. The rest was up to Ukrainian artillery,
who targeted confused Russian tanks and other
32:49
armored vehicles. For instance, it is reported
that the infamous Russian 40-mile-long armored
32:55
column saw 19 of its vehicles destroyed
by artillery, before it had to disperse.
33:01
Also, the initial strike on the Ukrainian
military infrastructure did not yield the
33:07
results the Russians hoped for. Too many Ukrainian
aircraft and air-defense systems survived, as they
33:12
were moved out of their bases in anticipation of
an attack. This prevented Russians from securing
33:18
complete air domination. Instead, they saw the
emergence of the myth of the Ghost of Kyiv,
33:24
a collective identity of pilots, who defended
the sky of the capital from intruders.
33:29
Moreover, Stingers caused significant problems
for Russian aircraft, the story carried over from
33:34
the ill-fated Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Lastly, the Russian army demonstrated an almost
33:40
complete inability to coordinate the
work of different military branches.
33:47
Hence, most of the Russian offensives were
carried out by only one or two BTGs, which allowed
33:51
Ukrainians to adapt and prevent significant
breakthroughs. The Ukrainian defense strategy
33:57
of Kyiv primarily relied on the so-called tactic
of trading space for time - retreating to urban
34:02
settlements and bogging Russians down in extremely
costly and complicated urban warfare, while also
34:08
employing small mobile units, which harassed the
Russian supply lines. Also, we should not overlook
34:14
the morale component of this battle. The Ukrainian
defenders knew precisely what they were fighting
34:20
for. But Russian soldiers expected a different
welcome, and some were shocked when Ukrainians
34:26
met them like fascists. Their morale has been low
throughout the Kyiv battle and the Ukraine war.
34:32
These factors forced Russians to withdraw
from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts
34:38
by early April to redeploy in Donbas, where they
hoped that they could turn the tide of the war.
34:43
The Battle of Kyiv is one of the greatest upsets
in military history. Despite expectations of the
34:49
fall of the capital in 96 hours, the Ukrainian
defenders stood tall and wrote their names
34:55
into the pages of history. Kyiv did not fall.
The Ukrainian military and the government did
35:00
not crumble. This victory saved Ukrainian
statehood and set the stage for further
35:06
successes of the Ukrainian army in this war.
More videos on the Russian invasion of Ukraine
35:12
are on the way, so make sure you have subscribed
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