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The Russian unprovoked and illegal  invasion of Ukraine began in 2014,   00:11
but in 2022 it entered a full-scale phase. So far,  our videos have been summaries of the most recent   00:16
important events happening on the battlefield in  Ukraine, along with crucial diplomatic, economic,   00:23
and political developments which have had a  direct impact on this battlefield. But enough   00:29
time has passed as the three-day operation  turned into a year-long bloody conflict,   00:34
so we can start looking back at some of  the most defining battles of the war.   00:38
Undoubtedly, the Battle of Kyiv is at the top of  this list. Despite the odds being stacked against   00:43
it, despite its chief allies lacking confidence  in its abilities to prevent the Russian army from   00:49
reaching its objectives, Ukraine was bracing for  a battle to defend its capital, which may well be   00:55
the defining moment of the Russo-Ukrainian  war and the Ukrainian statehood at large.  01:01
After months of warnings from the United States  and the United Kingdom about the imminent Russian   01:09
invasion of Ukraine, after several ill-fated  attempts to reach a diplomatic solution amidst   01:14
Russia’s uncompromising stance, after a long  period of speculations, Vladimir Putin finally   01:20
declared a so-called Special Military Operation  for demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine   01:26
on February 24. The Russian army attacked  Ukraine from the north towards Kyiv, from   01:32
the northeast towards Kharkiv, from the southeast  towards the Ukrainian-controlled part of Donbas,   01:56
and from the South towards Kherson, Mykolaiv,  and Odesa. Later we will dedicate videos to   02:01
other most important battles of the war  in Ukraine, but today our focus is Kyiv.  02:07
The war started with a massive airstrike campaign  by Russia on Ukrainian air defense systems,   02:13
military bases, military aircraft, and critical  infrastructure to cripple the Ukrainian military   02:19
potential to respond, overwhelm Ukraine and  demonstrate the futility of any resistance in   02:24
the face of the mighty Russian army and its sheer  firepower. But before the start of a full-scale   02:30
invasion, the Ukrainian command relocated much  of its military equipment and personnel outside   02:36
their usual bases, significantly decreasing the  effectiveness of the initial Russian mass strike.   02:42
Nevertheless, this did not force the Russian  command to rethink its second step of moving   02:48
its land forces into Ukraine. Investigations and  reports of Western media indicate that Putin and   02:53
his intelligence community were convinced that the  Ukrainian government would be too weak to resist,   03:00
the Ukrainian public would welcome  the Russian army as liberators,   03:05
and the Ukrainian military would collapse  upon facing the Russian military. Hence, the   03:09
Russian military prepared logistics for a short  conflict, during which Kyiv was supposed to fall.  03:14
This calculation went horribly wrong, as the  Ukrainian president Volodimir Zelensky and his   03:20
government decided to stay and fight instead  of relocating to western Ukraine or Europe,   03:26
as the Ukrainian public resisted the occupation.  Thousands joined the Territorial Defense Brigades,   03:31
and the Ukrainian military proved to be  a much more formidable foe than expected.   03:37
Moreover, Kyiv, specifically, is a difficult place  to invade. The city and its surroundings have many   03:43
forests, rivers, numerous towns and villages, and  narrow roads between them, all factors beneficial   03:49
for the defending side. Also, the weather in late  February was warm, causing the snow to melt and   03:55
the muddy terrain, making it very difficult for  heavily armoured vehicles to move anywhere but on   04:02
the roads. Commander of Kyiv’s defense, Colonel  General Oleksandr Syrskyi, ordered the erection   04:07
of two rings of defense - a smaller one inside  Kyiv and a larger one on the city’s outskirts.   04:13
Kyiv was divided into sectors, each getting its  commander to manage the defenses. Artillery was   04:19
deployed in the Northwestern and  Northeastern outskirts of Kyiv.  04:25
On February 24, elements of the Russian  35th Combined Arms Army entered Ukraine   04:29
through Chornobyl, the elements of the 36th  Combined Arms Army advanced towards Chernihiv,   04:34
while the elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army  invaded Sumy oblast with a common goal of reaching   04:39
the capital Kyiv. Estimated 15k-20k Russian  soldiers moved in from the west bank of Dnipro,   04:45
while an additional 20k-25k advanced on Kyiv  from Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts. The vicinity   04:53
of Kyiv was defended only by the 72nd Mechanized  Brigade, elements of the Ukrainian National Guard,   04:59
special forces, and newly established volunteer  groups of the Territorial Defense Brigades.   05:06
The Russian electronic warfare tools  immediately disabled Ukrainian communications,   05:12
but the reforms enacted in the Ukrainian  army, making it more decentralized,   05:17
allowed it to counter this. Reported 26k Ukrainian  soldiers trained by the US and NATO since 2014   05:22
helped them to become more capable commanders and  soldiers. As a result, the Ukrainian military was   05:30
relatively prepared to operate when the advancing  Russian army disabled their communications.   05:37
Moreover, Elon Musk started supplying Ukraine with  his Starlink satellite broadband service early   05:42
in the war, allowing the Ukrainian military  to find alternative communication methods.  05:48
On the morning of February 24, Russian columns  started moving toward Kyiv from Chornobyl,   05:54
Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts. Two days before  that, the Ukrainian border patrols fell back   05:59
towards Benevka, Vilcha, and the abandoned city  of Chornobyl on the western bank of Dnipro in   06:05
anticipation of the reported 30 Russian Battalion  Tactical Groups (around 20k men) invading from   06:10
this direction. Reportedly these BTGs belonged  to the 76th Guards Air Assault Division,   06:17
the 98th Guards Airborne Division, and the  155th Separate Marine Brigade. The 1st Separate   06:23
Battalion defended the notorious Chornobyl Power  Plant, but it reportedly lacked heavy weapons to   06:30
oppose the Russian onslaught and was forced to  surrender. At this point, the elements of the   06:35
80th Air Assault Brigade, border patrol units,  and two groups of Omega Special unit were the   06:41
main Ukrainian forces defending against the  Russian attack on the Western bank of Dnipro.   06:46
Russian units advancing in this direction enjoyed  an immense firepower and manpower advantage,   06:51
so stopping them was unrealistic. Taking that into  account, the main goal of the Ukrainian defenders   06:57
was to delay the Russian forces by destroying  bridges and roads, and harassing their lines.  07:03
While most of the Russian force pushed back the  Ukrainian defenders and advanced, 4-5 BTGs of the   07:09
Russian army served as a vanguard unit, aiming to  reach the Antonov Airport in Hostomel by bypassing   07:15
residential areas and avoiding Ukrainian  forces. The supply lines of these forward   07:21
units were vulnerable to hit-and-run attacks by  Ukrainian mobile units armed with Javelin and NLAW   07:27
anti-tank missiles. According to a Ukrainian  participant of the Battle of Kyiv, Russians   07:33
were careless and moved in parade-like formations  without units covering their advance and flanks.   07:39
As a result, Ukrainians successfully harassed  Russian armored columns, which sometimes had   07:45
to push through narrow roads, and this made  the destruction of front and rear vehicles   07:51
sufficient to stop whole columns. Notable  battles took place near Ivankiv and Dymer,   07:55
as the 72nd brigade, the aforementioned Ukrainian  units, territorial defense battalions, and special   08:01
forces withdrew while delaying the Russian  movement and inflicting damage on its lines.   08:07
But Ukraine was suffering losses too. For  instance, according to Ukrainian sources,   08:13
the Omega group of the National Guard  had to abandon 3 of its vehicles,   08:18
which Russian Spetsnaz groups later used to enter  Kyiv. These vehicles still had Ukrainian insignia,   08:22
allowing Russian Spetsnaz to enter the  capital in the first chaotic days of the war.  08:30
The number of Russian saboteurs in Kyiv is  unclear, but Russian Spetsnaz operatives,   08:35
Wagner mercenaries, and GRU operatives were  in Kyiv to reportedly kill President Zelensky,   08:40
wreak havoc in the capital and create an illusion  of a significant Russian presence in the city.   08:46
Most of these saboteurs entered Kyiv in the early  days of the conflict, including through Hostomel,   08:52
which we will talk about a bit later. At the same  time, it is claimed that a portion of the Russian   08:57
agents entered the capital before the beginning  of the war. One should remember that in February,   09:02
the Ukrainian defeat was considered a matter of  days. The Ukrainian government was expected to   09:08
crumble under pressure, but Zelensky’s defiance  and refusal to leave the capital was a critical   09:14
moment that helped mobilize the Ukrainians  to fight. In the early days of the invasion,   09:20
citizens were armed with guns and were encouraged  to await Russian invaders with Molotov cocktails.   09:25
Russian saboteurs failed in their mission  in Kyiv. There were separate incidents of   09:31
fighting inside Kyiv, most notably near the  Beresteiska metro station, but the situation   09:37
inside the city never became too threatening.  Soon the activity of Russian saboteurs died down.  09:42
While the Russian columns were advancing from  Belarus, Russia simultaneously deployed airborne   09:49
troops to the Antonov Airport in Hostomel, some 20  kilometers northwest of the capital. The Russian   09:55
command assessed the earlier massive campaign  of strikes on Ukrainian targets as sufficient   10:01
to destroy most of its air defense capabilities.  It was confident it could deploy 200-300 elite   10:06
paratroopers from the 11th Guards Assault Brigade  deep behind Ukrainian lines with the help of Mi-8   10:13
Hip assault transport aircraft protected  by 34 Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopters.   10:19
This operation aimed to secure the Antonov Airport  and use it as a foothold for deploying troops,   10:25
military equipment, and supplies for the upcoming  attack on Kyiv. The Antonov Airport was defended   10:31
by the 4th Rapid Response Brigade of the Ukrainian  National Guard, which had around 300 soldiers,   10:37
at this time primarily conscripts, as some of  the most experienced soldiers were relocated to   10:43
Luhansk oblast since Ukraine expected the most  significant Russian attack from there. The 4th   10:48
Rapid Response Brigade also reportedly possessed  several T-64BV tanks, an artillery battery,   10:55
surveillance drones, portable surface-to-air  systems, and ZU-32-2 anti-aircraft weapons.   11:01
Inexperienced Ukrainian defenders were reportedly  overwhelmed and shocked at the beginning of the   11:08
battle. Still, the mood changed as soon as  one of the Russian helicopters was shot down   11:13
by Igla man-portable surface-to-air missile.  Overall, Ukrainians managed to down 3 Russian   11:19
helicopters. Ukrainians fought hard to defend the  airport, but the unit commander, Colonel Vitaliy   11:25
Rudenko, was forced to order a retreat since they  ran out of ammo. As soon as the 4th Rapid Response   11:32
Brigade withdrew, Ukrainian artillery started  pounding the airport’s landing strip to make   11:38
it unusable for deploying additional troops and  vehicles by Russia. Ukrainian Su-24 aircraft also   11:43
joined the attack on the Antonov airport. This  was followed by the attack of the 72nd Mechanized   11:50
Brigade, the 4th Rapid Response Brigade, and  Ukrainian special forces to retake the airport.   11:56
Ukrainian forces sieged the airport, where the  Russian VDV was under heavy pressure from the   12:02
Ukrainian artillery and air force. By the evening  of February 24, the 4th Rapid Response Brigade   12:07
reported its victory in Hostomel, as the Russian  11th Guards Assault Brigade had to withdraw to   12:14
the surrounding woods. Even though the Russian  ground forces in and around the Hostomel airport   12:19
did not get reinforcements to hold the area,  the Russian air forces actively supported them.  12:24
Battles in Ivankiv, Dymer, and other areas  Northwest of Kyiv were raging simultaneously,   12:30
but the group of 4-5 BTGs spearheading the  Russian advance by bypassing the Ukrainian units   12:36
and strongholds reached Hostomel on the morning of  February 26. Ukrainians had to withdraw and create   12:42
the next line of defense along the Irpin River,  as their special forces detonated the nearest   12:49
bridge delaying the advance of the Russian units.  Even though Russians managed to secure the Antonov   12:54
airport, its runway was severely damaged,  making it for further Russian deployment,   13:01
according to the Ukrainian command. There are conflicting reports about the   13:06
Russian attempt to capture another  airfield in the vicinity of Kyiv.   13:10
According to Ukrainian officials, on February  26, Russia sent two IL-76 transport airplanes   13:14
to land Russian airborne troops at the Vasylkiv  airport, which Ukrainians shot down. So far,   13:21
no conclusive evidence of two shot planes has been  presented. But Russians also attempted a ground   13:28
assault on the airport, most likely conducted  by the forward units coming from the north. The   13:34
mayor of Vasylkiv also claimed that some of the  Russian soldiers who fought to capture the airport   13:40
were sleeper agents who moved to the Kyiv oblast  with their families a few months before the war.   13:44
There is no public evidence to corroborate that  claim, but a battle in Vasylkiv indeed took place.   13:51
An interviewed Ukrainian soldier claimed  that the Russian unit fighting in Vasylkiv   13:57
was the Alpha group of the Russian Spetsnaz. On  February 26, Ukrainians repelled their attack.  14:01
The next targets of Russian forward units  were the towns of Hostomel, Bucha, and Irpin.   14:09
Russians quickly overwhelmed the Ukrainian defense  in Ivankiv and Dymer by the end of February.   14:15
That notorious 40-mile-long armored Russian  column was advancing towards Kyiv to join   14:20
the siege of Ukrainian forces along the  Irpin River. As we mentioned earlier,   14:26
the commander of Kyiv’s defense, Colonel General  Oleksandr Syrskyi, stated in an interview that   14:31
there were two circles of defense of the capital.  One of them was the outer circle, in villages   14:36
and settlements of the Kyiv Oblast, while the  inner circle was inside the city limits of Kyiv.   14:41
This outer circle was Hostomel, Bucha, Irpin, and  Moshchun, and the Ukrainian defenders were ordered   14:47
to stand their ground to prevent the Russian  advance into the capital. Losing this battle   14:53
would mean urban combat in Kyiv. Knowing how  the Russian army conducts urban warfare, namely   14:58
massing artillery around the city and razing it  to the ground, the Ukrainian command understood   15:04
that they would have to keep Russians to the  perimeter to save Kyiv from destruction. As the   15:09
destruction of numerous Ukrainian cities in the  east showed, they were right in that assessment.  15:15
In late February, battles for Hostomel, Bucha,  and Irpin started almost simultaneously as Russian   15:21
ground forces entered all three towns looking  to penetrate Ukrainian defenses and enter the   15:27
capital. It is still difficult to determine  the exact units fighting on both sides in   15:32
these battles. Still, reports indicated that from  the Russian side these were the 31st Guards Air   15:37
Assault Brigade, 76th Guards Air Assault Division,  56th Guards Air Assault Regiment, 64th Motor Rifle   15:44
Brigade, Chechen National Guard regiment  loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov and special forces.   15:51
At the same time, the Ukrainian defense  consisted of the 72nd Mechanized Brigade,   15:57
the 112th Territorial Defense Brigade, several  elements of the Ukrainian Special Forces and the   16:02
National Guard, as well as the newly-created  International Brigade, which, contrary to the   16:08
rumors, was not in the 10s of thousands but merely  in hundreds. On February 27, while Russian units   16:13
were still fighting to capture Hostomel, several  broke through in the direction of Bucha and Irpin.   16:20
In Irpin, the battle started outside the Giraffe  shopping mall as a formidable armored column   16:26
entered the town. But this column, reportedly  belonging to the 76th Guards Air Assault Division,   16:31
advanced through the road leading to Irpin,  and the Ukrainian defenders were prepared.  16:37
Russians were still confident that Ukrainians  would crumble when they saw an overwhelming   16:43
armored force and moved in a parade-like  formation. As soon as the Russian armored column   16:47
approached, Ukrainian paratroopers destroyed  several Russian vehicles with RPGs, which quickly   16:52
caused chaos in the Russian ranks. It is reported  that Ukrainian defenders were learning how to use   16:58
the western-supplied Javelins and NLAWs on  Youtube on the fly and used these anti-tank   17:04
weapons to destroy the first and last vehicles  in the columns. This tactic, successfully used   17:09
by Chechen resistance in the Chechen wars of the  1990s, was ideally suited for narrow roads in the   17:16
suburbs of Kyiv, as destroying the first and the  last vehicle in the column forced other vehicles   17:22
to choose between staying on the road or moving to  muddy terrain, and either option could be deadly.   17:27
Surviving vehicles entered the shopping mall and  hid behind other buildings to avoid destruction.   17:34
With Ukrainian communications down,  Ukrainian commanders passed instructions   17:39
and targets for artillery fire via runners  and WhatsApp. A Russian unit tried to flank   17:44
the Ukrainians through a deserted brick  factory, but their attempt was repelled.   17:49
After two hours, the Russians had to withdraw.  But the initial setback did not stop the Russians   17:54
from continuing their attempts to take Irpin. On February 27, Ukrainian defenders blew up the   18:00
bridge connecting Bucha to Irpin. The invaders  had to use the longer route through the M06   18:06
highway to bring more men and vehicles to Irpin.  Ukrainians were aware of this, and on February 28,   18:12
a Russian armored column suffered heavy losses on  the M06 Highway. The Ukrainian official, Oleksiy   18:18
Arestovich, claimed that Russia lost more than  200 vehicles on the highway, which sounds like an   18:25
exaggeration, but is also an indication of fierce  resistance by Ukrainian forces in this direction.   18:31
By early March, Russians managed to gain  a foothold in Irpin, but they failed to   18:37
capture the town despite all their attempts. This  led to increased Russian airstrikes on Irpin,   18:42
bringing the town to the brink  of a humanitarian catastrophe.   18:47
At one point in mid-March, it was reported  that Russia managed to take half of the town   18:51
under its control, but they never managed  to drive the Ukrainian army out of Irpin.  18:56
We still don’t have a detailed step-by-step  report of battles in Irpin, but there was an   19:01
episode that showed the negligence of the Russian  units. A Russian airborne company parked its   19:07
vehicles at the base of a multi-story building  in Irpin and was visible to Ukrainian defenders.   19:13
Ukrainians threw smoke grenades at the Russian  airborne company, which got confused and ran   19:19
away in panic, leaving all their vehicles  and equipment behind for the Ukrainians.  19:24
Heavy battles took place in Bucha as well.  The 64th Separate Motorized Brigade, the 76th   19:29
Guards Air Assault Division, pro-Kadyrov Chechen  battalions, riot control units known as OMON were   19:35
among the units fighting to drive away the 72nd  Mechanized Brigade, the Territorial Defense units,   19:42
the National Guard units, and the Special forces.  After the initial advance in late February and   19:47
early March amidst significant losses in armored  vehicles, Russia was pushed back to the outskirts   19:53
of Bucha on March 3. But by March 5, Russians  again took most of the town under their control.   19:59
This allowed them to move  troops to Irpin more freely.   20:05
Heavy fighting in the northeast of the Kyiv oblast  led to a catastrophic humanitarian situation,   20:08
which prompted the authorities to  organize the evacuation of up to 20k   20:14
civilians on March 9. On March 12, it was reported  that Russia fully captured Bucha. Despite several   20:18
counter-attacks, it was impossible to drive  Russian troops from the area. For the time being,   20:26
the aim of the Ukrainian forces in this area was  to prevent a Russian advance from Bucha to Irpin.  20:32
After taking the Antonov Airport in Hostomel on  February 26, the Russian aviation and artillery   20:38
continued shelling this town in preparation for  a ground offensive. Despite the initial success   20:43
of the Ukrainian defenders in repelling the  assault of the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade,   20:49
the highlights of which were the destruction of  dozens of Russian armored vehicles and the killing   20:54
of the deputy commander of the 41st Combined  Arms Army, Major general Andrei Sukhovetsky by   20:59
sniper fire, on March 5, Hostomel was captured  by Russia. The mayor of Hostomel was killed   21:05
two days later while delivering humanitarian  aid to residents. For the next several weeks,   21:11
Ukrainians continued counter-offensive actions  to retake Hostomel. Russians heavily outnumbered   21:17
Ukrainian defenders in this direction, and it  is reported that the deployment of the 80th   21:23
Air Assault Brigade helped the Ukrainians  to stabilize the situation in Kyiv oblast.  21:28
We do not want to diminish the significance of  battles in other towns of the Kyiv oblast. Still,   21:33
perhaps the single most important victory of the  Ukrainian army took place in the town of Moshchun,   21:39
immediately north of the capital. After the  occupation of the Antonov Airport, the elements   21:44
of the 72nd Mechanized Brigade entered Moshchun  in anticipation of a Russian attack from there.   21:50
On February 27, the Russian Spetsnaz  troops were already in Moshchun.   21:55
Still, as the River Irpin separated Hostomel from  Moshchun and the bridge between these towns had   22:00
been blown up, it was difficult for the Russian  army to deploy a formidable force in this area.   22:05
Ukraine had a natural advantage in this  direction and constantly targeted pontoon   22:11
bridges via artillery and airstrikes to prevent  the Russian units from moving to Moshchun.   22:16
For days, Russian deployment to Moshchun was  stopped before, on March 6, a large Russian   22:21
group finally managed to enter the town. Despite  the fierce resistance from the company of the 72nd   22:27
Mechanized Brigade led by captain Roman Kovalenko,  they had to retreat to the edge of the town,   22:33
allowing the Russian army to create a bridgehead  in Moshchun. He regrouped with the Ukrainian   22:38
special forces, territorial defense brigades,  and newly-arrived international volunteers.  22:43
Both sides dug trenches in anticipation of battles  for Moshchun, and Ukrainians had to find a way to   22:49
prevent more Russian reinforcements from coming  there. On March 8, Ukrainian special forces did   22:55
just that by blowing the dam in Dymer at the  mouth of the River Irpin, which significantly   23:01
increased the water flow into the river, made it  broader, and created boggy terrain on the banks.   23:06
This made using existing pontoon bridges  and building new ones very difficult. It   23:12
became nearly impossible to bring additional  manpower and armored vehicles into Moshchun.   23:18
But the situation for the Ukrainian defenders  inside Moshchun was already quite difficult.   23:23
Russians attacked Ukrainian positions with  artillery, drones, helicopters, and airstrikes.   23:28
Ukrainian communications were destroyed,  too, making Ukrainian drones mostly unusable.   23:33
Ukrainian defenders in this direction were  running low on 152-mm artillery shells.  23:39
On March 10-11, the situation became even worse,  as according to an interview with one of the   23:45
Ukrainian defenders, close to 100 Russians somehow  managed to cross Irpin with armored vehicles. They   23:51
reportedly gathered in the forest in the North of  Moshchun unbeknownst to the Ukrainian units. But a   23:58
local farmer spotted a concentration of tanks and  armored vehicles and informed the Ukrainian army   24:04
about it. Ukrainian drones could not spot them.  But once the Ukrainian artillery fired on the   24:09
forest, they saw a secondary explosion, confirming  the placement of vehicles there. Being exposed,   24:15
Russians pressed to attack. They moved South  towards Kyiv, aiming to advance on Horenka and   24:22
then Pushcha-Vodytsa. The success of this movement  would have meant the invasion of the capital from   24:27
the north. The National Guard units were the first  to engage with the advancing Russian soldiers.   24:33
Then the company of the 72nd brigade joined the  fight. Russians lacked night-vision equipment,   24:38
while Ukrainians did not have armored vehicles.  But equipped with NLAWs, they managed to destroy   24:44
several IFVs. Ukrainian artillery was active too.  After losing 20-30 men, the remaining Russian   24:50
troops fled toward the river. But Moshchun was  still in danger. According to General Syrsky,   24:57
Moshchun was on the brink of a fall as Russians  managed to deploy their airborne troops to the   25:03
settlement. Ukraine strengthened its defenses  with another battalion from the 72nd Mechanized   25:09
Brigade, but this brigade suffered heavy losses  as Russian artillery and airstrikes continued.   25:14
Russia reportedly had a 20:1 artillery  advantage in the Kyiv oblast.  25:20
At one point, on March 21, the commander of the  72nd Mechanized Brigade, Oleksandr Vdovychenko,   25:25
requested the Commander-in-Chief General Zaluzhny  to withdraw from Moshchun. Zaluzhny reportedly   25:32
ordered Vdovychenko to fight no matter what since  the fall of Moshchun would mean losing Kyiv and   25:38
possibly the war. The 72nd Brigade and other  defenders of Kyiv did precisely that. We don’t   25:44
have details of how the rest of the battle of  Moshchun unfolded, but we know that the Ukrainians   25:50
continued resisting and bleeding Russians out  with Stingers, TB-2 drones, NLAWs, and Javelins.   25:56
In Bucha, Irpin, Hostomel, and Moshchun, Ukrainian  mobile units actively employed hit-and-run tactics   26:02
to destroy Russian vehicles. The deployment  of the 80th Air Assault Brigade helped offset   26:09
the manpower advantage of the Russian army. It was looking increasingly unlikely that   26:14
Russians would manage to break through to  Kyiv, as they could not even take Irpin and   26:20
Moshchun under complete control more than a month  after the start of the invasion. Ukrainian units   26:24
started counter-attacking movements in Irpin and  Bucha. Almost simultaneously, the Russian command   26:30
informed about their intended de-escalation  in Kyiv Oblast as a “gesture of goodwill.”   26:35
In late March-early April, Russians started to  retreat from Kyiv Oblast, leaving the wake of   26:41
destruction and death behind it. This is when  the world found out about the Bucha massacre.  26:46
Another critical battlefield of the Battle  of Kyiv was Makariv, a town west of Kyiv.   26:53
It is on the E40 highway, which was reportedly  crucial for transporting weapons and vehicles   26:59
to the defenders of Kyiv from the West. In late  February, the 37th Separate Guards Motor Rifle   27:04
Brigade entered Makariv and engaged in battle  with the 14th Separate Mechanized Brigade and the   27:10
95th Air Assault Brigade. Heavy fighting continued  for several days before, in early March, Russians   27:16
were pushed away from the bridge in Makariv  towards the area known as the Makariv Dachas.   27:23
March was tense in Makariv, as Ukrainians  harassed Russian columns with hit-and-run   27:28
tactics while Russians constantly shelled the  town. Towards the end of the month, Russians   27:33
launched another attack with armored vehicles  and put immense pressure on Ukrainian units. It   27:39
is reported that Russians were repelled only after  the arrival of the special forces unit of Ukraine.   27:45
On March 29, it was the Ukrainian  turn to attack Russian positions,   27:51
but it did not bring any positive results for  the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, 2-3 days later,   27:55
Russians withdrew from Makariv, just like  from other occupied areas of the Kyiv oblast.  28:02
As we noted earlier in this video, Russia advanced  from two other axes toward Kyiv. From Chernihiv   28:07
oblast and Sumy oblast. Since our main focus in  this video is Kyiv, we do not intend to describe   28:14
all of the battles and processes that took place  in the Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts as it is the   28:20
topic of our future video. But let’s briefly  remind you about what happened in the Chernihiv   28:25
and Sumy oblasts to give context. On February 24,  the elements of the 41st CAA, including the 90th   28:29
Tank Brigade and the 55 Motor Rifle Brigade,  invaded the Chernihiv oblast from Belarus.   28:36
Russians had 10-15k men on this axis. The  Ukrainian 1st Tank Brigade, with some 2k men,   28:42
was tasked with defending the city of Chernihiv  and preventing the Russian advance on Kyiv.   28:49
After initially failing to take the  city of Chernihiv under control,   28:55
Russians decided to bypass and encircle the city  while also continuing their movement towards Kyiv.  28:58
A similar scenario developed in the Sumy  oblast. 10-15k large Russian forces faced   29:05
fierce resistance from the 56th Motorized Brigade  and the 150th Territorial Defense Battalion.   29:11
Hence, in this direction, they also decided to  bypass the oblast center and continued advancing   29:17
towards Kyiv, being stopped by the Ukrainian  army in Zghurivka. This tactic over-extended   29:23
the Russian supply lines making it vulnerable to  hit-and-run tactics of Ukrainian mobile units.   29:29
In the Chernihiv axis, the key battle took  place in the village of Lukashivka in mid-March.   29:35
1 Russian BTG with around 750 people, 7 tanks, and  19 armored infantry vehicles tried to take this   29:40
town to complete the encirclement of Chernihiv and  cut the last highway connecting the city to Kyiv.   29:48
But they ignored that plains and villages around  Lukashivka were still under Ukrainian control,   29:54
making them vulnerable to Ukrainian artillery.  Russia took heavy losses in this direction.  29:59
Despite its inability to encircle Chernihiv,  Russia still advanced on Kyiv from this direction.   30:06
They went as far as Brovary, Kyiv Oblast.  On March 9, a battalion of the 72nd brigade,   30:11
commanded by Lt.Colonel Roman Darmohrai, prepared  to ambush a Russian armored column from the 6th   30:17
Guards Tank Regiment moving from Zalissya towards  Brovary. Locals and Ukrainian reconnaissance   30:23
drones informed about Russian movements, so the  Ukrainian ambush unit was ready. Ukrainians struck   30:29
the first tank in the Russian column with NLAW  causing confusion in the Russian ranks. Russian   30:36
tanks moved onto the muddy roadside, which made  their movement even more difficult. They became   30:42
easy targets for the Ukrainians. Ukrainian Korsar  missiles and artillery started pounding them.   30:47
When the Russians retreated, they left 17 tanks,  3 other armored vehicles, and dozens of men on the   30:53
battlefield. On March 19, Russia made another  attempt to take Brovary, but as soon as their   31:00
first tank was hit, they retreated. Russian  attempts to take Kyiv from the Chernihiv and   31:06
Sumy oblasts failed, too, as they withdrew from  the occupied areas in late March-early April.  31:11
The Battle of Kyiv ended in a Ukrainian victory.  Being significantly outnumbered and suffering   31:18
from a firepower disadvantage did not prevent  Ukraine from standing its ground and inflicting   31:24
hefty damage on Russians. Ultimately, the Kremlin  understood that its losses were unsustainable and   31:29
that the available manpower and firepower were  insufficient to break through the Ukrainian   31:36
defenses of the capital. The fighters grew more  confident and gained valuable experience as they   31:40
kept holding the Russians back. Evidently, Russia  intended to conduct a short victorious war based   31:46
on the dubious conviction that Ukrainians  would welcome Russians as liberators.   31:53
The Ukrainian military and the government  would crumble in the face of the assumed second   31:58
strongest army in the world. Russian logistics  throughout the battle of Kyiv was in shambles,   32:02
which is proved by scores of images of  Russian tanks out of fuel in the Kyiv oblast.   32:08
Russia was unprepared for a long war and did not  make appropriate preparations. Russians severely   32:14
underestimated the Ukrainian army and evidently  thought that this was still the same Ukrainian   32:21
army of 2014. Russians over-extended their supply  lines in the Battle of Kyiv, with a goal in mind   32:26
to advance on the capital no matter what. This  left them vulnerable to Ukrainian mobile units,   32:32
who regularly ambushed Russian armored columns. It  was often enough to destroy the first vehicle in   32:38
the column from RPGs like Javelin and NLAW, which  have the capability to strike from a significant   32:44
distance. The rest was up to Ukrainian artillery,  who targeted confused Russian tanks and other   32:49
armored vehicles. For instance, it is reported  that the infamous Russian 40-mile-long armored   32:55
column saw 19 of its vehicles destroyed  by artillery, before it had to disperse.   33:01
Also, the initial strike on the Ukrainian  military infrastructure did not yield the   33:07
results the Russians hoped for. Too many Ukrainian  aircraft and air-defense systems survived, as they   33:12
were moved out of their bases in anticipation of  an attack. This prevented Russians from securing   33:18
complete air domination. Instead, they saw the  emergence of the myth of the Ghost of Kyiv,   33:24
a collective identity of pilots, who defended  the sky of the capital from intruders.   33:29
Moreover, Stingers caused significant problems  for Russian aircraft, the story carried over from   33:34
the ill-fated Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  Lastly, the Russian army demonstrated an almost   33:40
complete inability to coordinate the  work of different military branches.   33:47
Hence, most of the Russian offensives were  carried out by only one or two BTGs, which allowed   33:51
Ukrainians to adapt and prevent significant  breakthroughs. The Ukrainian defense strategy   33:57
of Kyiv primarily relied on the so-called tactic  of trading space for time - retreating to urban   34:02
settlements and bogging Russians down in extremely  costly and complicated urban warfare, while also   34:08
employing small mobile units, which harassed the  Russian supply lines. Also, we should not overlook   34:14
the morale component of this battle. The Ukrainian  defenders knew precisely what they were fighting   34:20
for. But Russian soldiers expected a different  welcome, and some were shocked when Ukrainians   34:26
met them like fascists. Their morale has been low  throughout the Kyiv battle and the Ukraine war.   34:32
These factors forced Russians to withdraw  from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts   34:38
by early April to redeploy in Donbas, where they  hoped that they could turn the tide of the war.  34:43
The Battle of Kyiv is one of the greatest upsets  in military history. Despite expectations of the   34:49
fall of the capital in 96 hours, the Ukrainian  defenders stood tall and wrote their names   34:55
into the pages of history. Kyiv did not fall.  The Ukrainian military and the government did   35:00
not crumble. This victory saved Ukrainian  statehood and set the stage for further   35:06
successes of the Ukrainian army in this war. More videos on the Russian invasion of Ukraine   35:12
are on the way, so make sure you have subscribed  and pressed the bell button. Recently, we have   35:17
started releasing weekly patron and youtube  member exclusive videos. Join the ranks of   35:22
patrons and youtube members via the link in the  description or by pressing the button under the   35:27
video to watch these weekly videos, learn about  our schedule, get early access to our videos,   35:32
join our private discord, and much more. Please,  consider liking, commenting, and sharing - it   35:37
helps immensely. This is the Kings and Generals  channel, and we will catch you on the next one. 35:43

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词汇 含义

invasion

/ɪnˈveɪʒən/

B2
  • noun
  • - 入侵

conflict

/ˈkɒnflɪkt/

B2
  • noun
  • - 冲突

battle

/ˈbætl/

B1
  • noun
  • - 战斗

defend

/dɪˈfend/

B1
  • verb
  • - 保卫

attack

/əˈtæk/

A2
  • verb
  • - 攻击
  • noun
  • - 攻击

military

/ˈmɪlɪtəri/

B1
  • adjective
  • - 军事的
  • noun
  • - 军队

forces

/fɔːrsɪz/

A2
  • noun
  • - 部队

resistance

/rɪˈzɪstəns/

B2
  • noun
  • - 抵抗

command

/kəˈmɑːnd/

B2
  • noun
  • - 命令
  • verb
  • - 命令

equipment

/ɪˈkwɪpmənt/

A2
  • noun
  • - 装备

army

/ˈɑːrmi/

A1
  • noun
  • - 军队

capital

/ˈkæpɪtl/

B1
  • noun
  • - 首都

forces

/fɔːrs/

A2
  • noun
  • - 力量

retreat

/rɪˈtriːt/

B2
  • verb
  • - 撤退

damage

/ˈdæmɪdʒ/

A2
  • noun
  • - 损害
  • verb
  • - 损害

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