The first century BC was a time of great men
in Rome.
00:07
Great, but destructive men such as Sulla,
Marius, Cicero, Cato, Crassus, Pompey, and
00:11
Caesar.
00:17
Each individually had the skills and abilities
to bring glory and prosperity to Rome, but
00:19
they were often in conflict and the conflict
between Caesar and Pompey would lead to the
00:24
destruction of the Republic which had lasted
for almost 450 years.
00:29
This is the story of the Great Roman Civil
War.
00:35
In order to fully understand how the Great
Roman Civil War, also known as Caesar’s
00:46
Civil War, began, we need to grasp the cultural
and historical background.
00:51
Since the mid-2nd century BC the Roman Republic
had started fracturing with the assassination
00:56
of the Gracchi brothers, who had campaigned
for land redistribution.
01:03
Their deaths underlined the growing social
divide between the upper and lower classes
01:09
in Rome, and the instability carried on into
the following decades with revolts in Sicily,
01:13
the Social war with Italian allies, and ultimately
the civil wars of Sulla and Marius at the
01:19
start of the first century BC.
01:25
Those two showed the political rift between
those who believed power came from the plebs,
01:27
the Populares like Marius, and those who believed
power came from the Senate, the Optimates,
01:34
such as Sulla.
01:39
Moreover, their war had exposed flaws in the
Roman Republican system, proving that politics
01:41
could be easily subverted through military
power.
01:47
Though after his victory Sulla had, as Dictator,
introduced legislation to try and stop anyone
01:50
following in his footsteps, the precedent
had already been set; a general could march
01:57
on Rome, take it by force, and impose his
own will on the Republic.
02:02
If enough soldiers were personally loyal to
an individual general, the Senators could
02:07
do little to curtail that man's power.
02:12
Furthermore, the Republic’s constitution,
with its numerous checks and balances, was
02:15
proving to be one of the crucial factors in
its destruction: powerful politicians were
02:21
able to paralyze the government by blocking
the legislation they disagreed with.
02:26
Often it took either a dictatorship or martial
law to break the stalemate.
02:31
It was in this political environment that
the first triumvirate had emerged.
02:36
Consisting of Crassus, Pompey and Caesar the
triumvirate dictated political life for the
02:41
majority of the era.
02:47
Crassus was an established politician and
the richest man in Rome, bankrolling the triumvirate
02:49
and paying bribes as necessary.
02:55
Pompey was Rome’s most accomplished general.
02:58
Following the Social War, he fought alongside
Sulla in his Civil War and later led campaigns
03:01
in Sicily, Africa, Pontus and Syria.
03:07
This brought him large amounts of wealth,
numerous political allies, and the loyalty
03:10
of thousands of veterans.
03:15
Caesar, at 41 years old, was the youngest
and least established of the 3.
03:17
He had held the positions of quaestor and
aedile, and had shown promise as a praetor
03:23
in Spain.
03:28
However, Caesar was pontifex maximus, the
highest religious official in Rome.
03:29
Through this office, Caesar had the power
to pass divine laws and to postpone elections
03:35
due to signs from the gods.
03:41
Additionally, as one of the leaders of the
Populares, Caesar had already established
03:44
himself as a populist, and had significant
clout with the masses.
03:48
By 59 BC the Triumvirate was established.
03:53
Caesar was already indebted to Crassus, and
his alliance with Pompey was solidified by
03:57
marrying his daughter Julia to Pompey.
04:02
Though never an official coalition, these
three men controlled almost every aspect of
04:05
the Republic.
04:11
Crassus influenced the Senate and aristocracy,
the Optimates, with bribes.
04:12
Pompey's military prestige effectively gave
him control of the veterans and the way they
04:17
would vote.
04:22
And Caesar could control the masses.
04:24
With the support of Pompey and Crassus, Caesar
was elected to the consulship in 59 BC, and
04:27
immediately passed land reform legislation
to provide land to Pompey's veterans, and
04:33
ratified Pompey’s Eastern conquests.
04:38
Initially, following Caesar’s consulship,
the Senate made him an overseer of woods and
04:41
pastures in Italy rather than a governor of
a province as was the norm for an ex-consul.
04:46
However, the Triumvirate was able to overturn
this decision: Caesar was given the governorship
04:52
of Illyria, Cisalpine Gaul and Transalpine
Gaul, along with four legions, for the extent
04:58
of 5 years as opposed to the usual one.
05:04
Though it is clear that the Triumvirates did
abuse their power to achieve their own means,
05:07
it did benefit Rome in some ways, pushing
through much-needed laws, such as the settling
05:13
of veterans, without risk of the Senate creating
a stalemate.
05:18
In this same year, Clodius Pulcher became
Tribune of the Plebs.
05:23
Clodius had given up his patrician status
to hold the position, and used it to push
05:27
a number of populist reforms with the support
of the Triumvirate, such as the establishment
05:33
of a grain dole.
05:38
Clodius had also learned how effective violence
could be in politics and had put together
05:39
trained gangs who would harass and assault
any politicians who got in his way, and he
05:45
was even able to force the influential Cicero
into exile.
05:50
After just one year of Clodius and his gangs
ruling the streets of Rome, it became clear
05:55
that the Triumvirate would not be able to
control him.
06:00
Clodius had even gone so far as to attempt
to assassinate Pompey when the latter suggested
06:03
recalling Cicero from exile.
06:09
In response, Pompey allowed another tribune,
Milo, an Optimate, to raise his own gangs
06:11
to counter Clodius’.
06:17
No weapons were meant to be allowed in Rome,
but each side secretly armed themselves with
06:19
daggers and swords, employing thugs and even
gladiators.
06:24
For the next few years, the two tribunes and
their gangs battled regularly in the streets.
06:29
Rome was in chaos.
06:34
In 56 BC Pompey and Crassus forced the extension
of Caesar’s governorship by another 5 years
06:36
meaning that his term would now total 10 years,
from 59-49BC, while Caesar sent his veterans
06:44
to Rome to ensure their election to the consulate
for the year 55-54BC.
06:51
However, soon after, the Triumvirate began
to fracture.
06:57
In 54 BC Julia died in childbirth, severing
the personal connection between the two triumvirs.
07:01
In 53 BC Crassus embarked on his disastrous
Parthian campaign, subsequently dying at the
07:09
Battle of Carrhae.
07:16
Moreover, the following year, Clodius was
killed by Milo.
07:17
With Clodius dead and the Triumvirate broke,
Pompey and Caesar were left as the two most
07:22
powerful men in Rome.
07:27
Chaos in the city only increased, as during
Clodius’ funeral, his supporters started
07:30
a riot.
07:35
His body was taken to the Senate house to
be burnt on a pyre, and the Senate building
07:36
itself was destroyed.
07:41
In desperation, the Senate turned to Pompey.
07:44
In 52BC Pompey was named sole Consul and given
extraordinary powers.
07:47
Soldiers were marched into the capital, trials
held under armed guard, and executions made.
07:54
This was ruthless but effective, and order
was restored.
08:01
The Senate awarded Pompey with an extended
term of governance of Hispania, as well as
08:06
powers similar to those that Caesar held in
Gaul.
08:10
Pompey decided to leave the governance of
his provinces to lieutenants.
08:14
His quelling of the riots had bought him the
adoration of the Senate and Optimates, and
08:19
he was not willing to give up such power and
influence by leaving Rome.
08:23
The Senate had their own ambitions.
08:28
With Clodius dead, Caesar was left as the
leader of the Populares.
08:31
Cato and other Senators were becoming increasingly
worried that Caesar might choose to exploit
08:36
his popularity and march on Rome.
08:41
He was, in the Senate’s mind, a threat to
the Republic.
08:45
The more this was said, the more Pompey agreed.
08:49
When the Triumvirate was first formed, Pompey
had little to fear from Caesar.
08:53
However, Caesar's Gallic Wars allowed him
to accumulate wealth, popularity with the
08:58
masses, and a core of loyal, battle-hardened
veterans.
09:04
Caesar had grown his army to around 10 Legions,
approximately 50,000 men, more than double
09:08
what he had originally been assigned.
09:14
Moreover, the majority of these legions had
been raised by Caesar personally, led by Caesar
09:17
in battle, and thus would undoubtedly be loyal
to him.
09:23
It had taken Sulla only six legions to march
on Rome, and there was every chance that Caesar
09:28
could do the same.
09:33
As a result, the Senate, and in particular
the prominent Cato the Younger, begun rallying
09:35
an anti-Caesar alliance in the Senate, mainly
consisting of Optimates.
09:41
With Pompey and Caesar already positioned
to confront each other as the two most powerful
09:46
men in Rome, the Senate turned to Pompey to
lead the Optimates and remove Caesar as a
09:51
threat.
09:57
Caesar was simply too powerful: His army was
too large to be confronted head-on, and his
09:58
popularity was too great for him to be defeated
in an election.
10:04
At this time in 52 BC Caesar was still governor
of Gaul, and had applied to run for the office
10:08
of consul in absentia for the year 48BC, his
term as governor ending at the end of 49BC.
10:15
With 52BC being such a chaotic year with riots
in Rome, Caesar’s application had been allowed
10:23
with little thought, but now presented a problem.
10:29
Holding the office of governor or consul gave
Caesar legal immunity.
10:33
If he ran in absentia for the consulship,
he would certainly win due to his vast popularity,
10:38
and his legal immunity would continue.
10:45
Moreover, he would be able to use this term
as consul to push legislation to protect himself.
10:47
It was undeniable that Caesar had committed
crimes as consul, including stirring political
10:54
violence against a fellow consul, as well
as crimes as a governor by instigating wars
10:59
in Gaul and Britain that were not authorized
by the Senate.
11:04
The Senate could not defeat Caesar militarily,
nor could they defeat him in the voting booths.
11:08
A solution was needed.
11:14
Cato had already made it clear that given
an opportunity, he would put Caesar on trial
11:15
himself.
11:20
All that was needed was for Caesar to be a
private citizen.
11:22
To achieve this, in 52BC Cato ran for consulships
for the year 51BC, hoping to use consular
11:26
power to deprive Caesar of his command.
11:33
Cato lost, however, and Caesar’s governance
continued.
11:36
For the next two years, the Senate, headed
by Cato, increasingly demanded Caesar’s
11:40
resignation, whilst the Caesarean, headed
by Curio and Mark Antony, both Plebeian Tribunes,
11:46
blocked and vetoed such legislation.
11:50
Through a somewhat contrived reading of the
law that Pompey and Crassus had passed extending
11:55
Caesar’s term, the Senate insisted that
Caesar’s term ended in 50BC, ordering him
12:00
to relinquish his command.
12:06
Caesar refused, knowing that as soon as he
lost his legal immunity the Senate would have
12:08
him put on trial.
12:13
He also knew that his governorship was, in
fact, legal, and that he had the right to
12:15
continue it until the previously agreed date
at the end of 49BC.
12:20
In December 50BC, Pompey offered to resign
his command if Caesar would first.
12:25
The Caesareans opposed this, insisting that
Pompey be first to resign.
12:31
Neither side was willing to be exposed.
12:36
That same month, Caesar marched with one Legion
to Ravenna, and wrote a letter to the Senate
12:40
attempting to negotiate, again insisting that
if Pompey resigned his command first, so would
12:45
he.
12:51
Whether Caesar marched his Legion to Ravenna
simply to winter there, or if he meant it
12:52
as an actual threat, is not clear.
12:56
However, rumours spread that Caesar, in fact,
had 4 Legions with him, not just one.
12:59
To the Senate, it appeared Caesar was attempting
to threaten and blackmail them.
13:05
In response, they again ordered him to step
down immediately, and authorised Pompey to
13:10
start amassing legions to defend Rome.
13:15
Caesar, once again, attempted to negotiate.
13:18
He offered to resign his governorship of Transalpine
Gaul, Cisalpine Gaul and the majority of his
13:21
Legions, but requested to keep governorship
of Illyricum, along with two Legions, until
13:27
the original deadline - the end of 49BC - and
that he be allowed to run for consul for 48BC,
13:33
hoping to extend his legal immunity.
13:40
However, this was still a reasonable deal
for the Senate, and it would achieve their
13:43
aim of severely limiting Caesar’s power
and influence.
13:48
Cicero acted as a mediator for the deal and
negotiated Caesar down to just one Legion
13:52
and one province.
13:57
Pompey was willing to accept, however, key
Optimates, including Cato and the consul Lentulus,
14:00
refused the deal.
14:06
Not an idealist, Pompey was viewing the Optimate
as useful political allies, but hard-line
14:07
Optimates like Cato and Lentulus hated the
idea of the Senate being pressured to negotiate.
14:13
On the 7th of January, the Senate voted again
to immediately strip Caesar of all his powers
14:21
and armies.
14:27
Once again, Caesar’s Tribunes in the Senate,
Curio and Antony, vetoed the legislation.
14:28
The Senate had expected as much and passed
the Senatus Consultum Ultimum, the Final Act,
14:34
an un-vetoable act that suspended all laws
and gave all powers to the Consuls, effectively
14:41
declaring a national emergency, and they declared
Caesar an enemy of the state.
14:48
The Consuls for the year, Lentulus and Marcellus,
both hard-line Optimates, immediately passed
14:53
all their powers to Pompey, effectively giving
Pompey full control of the Roman Republic.
14:59
That same night, Caesar’s allies in Rome
fled to Ravenna to join him.
15:05
The stage was now set.
15:10
After years of attempted negotiations, a complete
impasse had been reached.
15:12
The division between the two parties, the
Populares and Optimates, was the same division
15:17
that had led to the deaths of the Gracchi,
and the wars of Sulla and Marius.
15:22
The Populares largely consisted of younger
men from less established families, such as
15:27
Mark Anthony, Trebonius and Curio, or lesser
members of noble families, such as Decimus
15:32
Brutus.
15:37
The Pompeiian Optimates, on the other hand,
were mainly aristocrats of noble families,
15:39
including Pompey's two sons, Gnaeus and Sextus,
Ahenobarbus, Metellus Scipio, a descendant
15:44
of the famous Scipio Africanus, Cato the Younger,
and Cicero.
15:50
The societal rift between these two groups,
which had first become apparent almost 100
15:55
years ago with the deaths of the Gracchi,
was about to plunge the Republic into chaos
16:01
once again.
16:05
On the 10th of January 49BC, Caesar left Ravenna
with the 13th Legion and his allies from Rome.
16:07
They halted at a small river that marked the
border of the province of Italy; the Rubicon.
16:15
It was forbidden for any general to cross
this boundary with arms or an army; to do
16:21
so would be a clear declaration of war.
16:26
Caesar spent a long time weighing his options.
16:29
Caesar’s own family had been persecuted
and hunted in the aftermath of Sulla’s Civil
16:32
War, he knew well how destructive such wars
were.
16:37
However, he also knew that if he disbanded
his army, he would be likely exiled or executed.
16:41
After almost a day’s deliberation, Caesar
made his choice.
16:49
Alea iacta est - the die is cast.
16:53
The Great Roman Civil War had begun.
16:54
Following the crossing, Caesar had moved with
his tell-tale swiftness and quickly seized
17:04
key locations in Northern Italy in a matter
of days.
17:09
There was little resistance; these cities
had not been garrisoned to defend against
17:12
any significant force, and there were many
who sympathised with Caesar against Pompey
17:17
and the Optimates.
17:22
As he went, he sent orders to his Gallic Legions
for reinforcements to march south and join
17:23
him.
17:29
In Rome itself, there was mass confusion.
17:32
Pompey may have thought that if Caesar was
to go to war, he would wait for his Legions
17:35
from Gaul.
17:40
He hesitated and did not know whether to defend
Rome, abandon the city and fight in Italy,
17:41
or abandon the peninsula altogether.
17:47
If Pompey had reacted quickly, he may have
been able to levy enough troops to defeat
17:50
Caesar, stopping the war before it truly began.
17:55
However, conflicting reports kept Pompey in
the dark, and he had no idea that Caesar had
17:58
just one under-strength Legion with him.
18:05
Though Pompey could levy large numbers in
Italy, he currently only had two full Legions
18:08
in the area: the veteran 1st Legion and the
15th.
18:14
Both had recently been handed over by Caesar
to the Senate to fight a planned war in Syria.
18:18
The 1st, having been raised by Pompey could
be trusted to fight on his behalf, but the
18:24
15th was raised by Caesar and its loyalty
was questionable.
18:30
Most of Pompey’s best Legions were abroad
in either Hispania or the East.
18:35
Pompey knew he could not risk being trapped
or forced into a battle he wasn’t prepared
18:41
for.
18:45
He had the resources of the Republic at his
disposal and could afford to fight a prolonged
18:46
war.
18:51
As a result, Pompey made the difficult decision
to abandon Rome.
18:55
With him went the majority of the Senate,
including the two Consuls.
19:00
Plutarch wrote that many Romans considered
wherever Pompey went as their country.
19:05
Cassius Dio gives a much more divisive picture
of the Roman mentality, saying that in doing
19:11
this Pompey had made an enemy of his supporters.
19:17
Moreover, in the rush to evacuate the city,
the treasury of Rome and the temple treasures
19:20
were abandoned.
19:26
For Caesar, this was ideal.
19:28
With the city and treasure undefended, he
was content to bypass it and claim it later,
19:32
focusing instead on trying to catch Pompey,
and capturing other cities in Italy to cut
19:38
off support for the Pompeians and rally more
men to his cause.
19:43
Despite this fortuitous start, Caesar also
suffered a blow in these early stages of the
19:49
war.
19:54
When the Final Act had been passed by the
Senate, the majority of Caesar’s supporters
19:55
in Rome, including Mark Anthony and Curio,
had fled to join their general.
20:00
However, one of Caesar’s lieutenants was
not so eager to abandon the Senate's cause:
20:05
Labienus.
20:11
Labienus was still in Gaul when Caesar crossed
the Rubicon, and it’s likely that Caesar
20:13
would have wanted Labienus to march his Gallic
Legions to Italy and join the fight with him
20:19
there.
20:24
Instead, Labienus disavowed Caesar, promising
his allegiance to the Senate, and fleeing
20:25
Gaul with a personal bodyguard to join Pompey.
20:31
This was a blow to Caesar personally and militarily,
as Labienus was Caesar’s right-hand man
20:35
and a highly capable general, who was familiar
with his tactics, and comparable even to both
20:41
Pompey and Caesar.
20:47
Despite Labienus fleeing Gaul, Caesar’s
Legions still followed their orders to move
20:49
towards Italy.
20:54
Two of the closest Legions, the 8th and 12th,
were already beginning to cross into Italy
20:55
to support their general.
21:01
As Caesar continued his push south, Pompey
began to rally the defences around Capua and
21:05
raise an army in the South.
21:11
He still had the veteran 1st Legion, the 15th
Legion had remained loyal to him, and he had
21:13
ordered many cities to raise levies against
Caesar, quickly building his numbers.
21:19
However, one man, Domitius Ahenobarbus, decided
to take the initiative against Caesar.
21:24
Counter to Pompey’s orders he took 30 newly
levied cohorts, equivalent to around 3 Legions
21:30
to Corfinium, an important crossroads town.
21:37
By the time Caesar reached Corfinium, the
8th and 12th Legion had caught up with him,
21:43
giving him 3 battle-hardened Legions.
21:48
Faced with such a formidable force, the Pompeian
levies lost all desire to fight.
21:51
They implored Ahenobarbus to surrender, and
he reluctantly agreed.
21:56
Caesar showed clemency to both the levies
and Ahenobarbus.
22:01
Ahenobarbus was pardoned, but he quickly returned
to Pompey in Southern Italy to continue the
22:03
fight.
22:09
The levies, on the other hand, were made to
swear allegiance to Caesar, forming the 15th,
22:11
16th and 17th Legions, swelling his numbers
even further, and reducing Pompey’s without
22:16
a battle even being fought.
22:22
He immediately sent these men to prepare for
an invasion of Sicily and Sardinia whilst
22:25
he continued south.
22:30
Caesar’s leniency at Corfinium gained him
popularity across Italy, ensuring that there
22:32
would be no popular uprising against him on
behalf of Pompey, and he was able to raise
22:39
a further 3 Legions, the 18th, 19th and 20th,
as he marched.
22:45
Pompey now had to change his plan.
22:51
He knew that he would no longer be able to
fight Caesar in Italy any time soon.
22:53
He abandoned his plan of fighting Caesar in
the South, and instead marched his force to
22:58
Brundisium, preparing to evacuate from the
peninsula.
23:03
He would go across the Adriatic and into Greece,
where Legions from the East, battle-tested
23:07
and loyal, would join him, and he would be
able to muster even more men from allies and
23:12
cities of the East.
23:17
Moreover, he had numerous legions in Hispania,
and with their help could encircle Caesar
23:19
in Italy.
23:25
But first, he had to escape.
23:26
Caesar needed to move fast.
23:31
If he could catch Pompey in Southern Italy,
he would be able to corner and defeat him,
23:33
much as had happened to Spartacus decades
earlier.
23:38
As he pursued Pompey into the South, he continuously
sent envoys, insisting he would step down
23:42
from command if Pompey would do the same.
23:47
All such offers were refused: Pompey legally
had the authority to command armies, and Caesar
23:51
was now a criminal.
23:57
The time for negotiations was long gone and
it is likely Caesar himself knew this, so
23:59
the envoy's true intention was likely to continue
to buy him favour with the populace as he
24:05
continued to chase the Senate.
24:10
In early March, Caesar and his 6 Legions caught
up with Pompey at Brundisium.
24:13
By the time that Caesar arrived, Pompey had
already managed to transport half his force
24:20
across the Adriatic.
24:25
Caesar wasted no time, immediately besieging
the city and beginning construction of a breakwater
24:28
across the harbour to block it.
24:33
In response, Pompey built large towers on
merchant ships that could fire down on Caesar’s
24:36
engineers to hamper their progress.
24:42
The strategy was effective, and Caesar’s
engineers were unable to complete the breakwater
24:44
in time.
24:49
Pompey’s navy returned from Greece and,
at night, Pompey was able to evacuate his
24:51
remaining force from the city.
24:56
Once in Greece, Pompey marched to Thessalonica.
25:01
He established his base, levying new Legions
and sending envoys to all the client kings
25:04
he had made in the East, gathering Roman Legions
and foreign soldiers alike to his banner.
25:10
Meanwhile, he sent subordinates to Sicily,
Sardinia and North Africa, the three key grain
25:16
suppliers of Rome.
25:22
Pompey would mobilise forces from across the
world to effectively besiege the whole of
25:24
Italy, cutting off the grain supplies and
starving Caesar into submission.
25:29
It had taken Caesar just 3 months to force
Pompey out of Rome and take Italy.
25:36
Despite this, Caesar’s initial plan to end
the war quickly by capturing Pompey and the
25:42
Senate, had failed.
25:47
With Pompey’s escape, and with no ships
to pursue him, the chance for any quick resolution
25:49
disappeared.
25:55
Caesar began preparing for a prolonged war.
25:57
He first marched on Rome, entering in a triumph.
26:00
Quickly, he convened what was left of the
Senate in Rome, professing his ambition to
26:04
save the Republic and declaring Pompey an
enemy of the state.
26:09
He also plundered the treasury and temples
of Rome, allowing him to fully equip the 6
26:13
newly acquired Legions, and issued orders
for ships from all the provinces loyal to
26:19
him to gather at Brundisium.
26:24
These ships would take at least a year to
muster though, and Caesar could not linger
26:27
for long.
26:33
He realised that he could not risk being trapped
in Italy and resolved to secure his western
26:34
flank.
26:40
Spanish Legions constituted a significant
number of Pompey’s best soldiers and posed
26:42
a threat to Gaul.
26:47
Furthermore, with Pompey in the East, the
Spanish Legions, though well trained, were
26:49
in Caesar’s words “an army without a leader”.
26:54
Caesar would attack Pompey’s force in the
west individually, attempting to defeat them
26:58
in detail before turning to Pompey.
27:02
To achieve this, he sent one of the newly
raised Legions, the 16th, under his Legate
27:07
Valerius to Sardinia, and two Legions, likely
the 15th and 17th, under Curio to Sicily.
27:12
Together, they were to take control of the
islands and then push into Africa, securing
27:19
the grain supply.
27:25
Sardinia was currently held by Cotta on behalf
of Pompey, and Sicily by Cato.
27:27
Cotta had no real force to speak of, and as
soon as the citizens of Sardinian capital
27:33
of Caralis heard that Valerius was en route
with a Legion, they ejected Cotta, seeing
27:38
no sense in attempting to resist the Caesareans.
27:43
Cotta fled to Africa, and Valerius quickly
took control of the province.
27:47
Cato in Sicily had attempted to make better
preparations, raising levies across Sicily,
27:54
but had also not been provided with any Legions
by Pompey.
28:00
He too saw a fight against two Legions with
his levies as a fruitless task, also deciding
28:04
to abandon the province, joining Pompey in
Greece.
28:10
With the islands taken without any resistance,
Valerius and Curio gathered their force in
28:14
Sicily and prepared for the attack on Africa.
28:19
Meanwhile, Caesar, after spending less than
a month in Rome, took the newly raised 18th
28:23
and 19th and began his march to Spain, leaving
Mark Anthony in charge of Rome and the 8th,
28:30
12th and 13th Legions in Italy to recover,
with the 20th ready to support Curio if needed.
28:37
Caesar himself aimed to march through Gaul
to Spain and meet 7 of his Legions along the
28:44
way.
28:49
However, Ahenobarbus, who had previously attempted
to stall Caesar at Corfinium, had already
28:50
been dispatched by Pompey to Gaul and he was
currently on his way to the city of Massilia,
28:55
an important city on the route to Spain.
29:01
Caesar arrived at the city before Ahenobarbus
sometime in early April, but found the gates
29:06
already closed and the Massilians preparing
their defences, calling on local tribes for
29:11
help and collecting in grain.
29:17
Caesar attempted to negotiate with the Massilians
who, perhaps stalling for time, stated their
29:20
neutrality in the war.
29:25
However, once Ahenobarbus did arrive they
became more proactive, attacking nearby shipping
29:27
in order to bolster their supplies.
29:33
With their force numbering approximately 8,000
men, this could have developed into a prolonged
29:38
siege, something Caesar simply did not have
the time for.
29:44
He needed to be in Spain, not bogged down
in a siege in Gaul.
29:47
As such, he left the 3 legions with Trebonius
in control, while Decimus Brutus, who had
29:52
proved his knack for naval command against
the Venetii, was to command 12 ships.
29:58
Caesar then continued to Spain with a bodyguard
of approximately 900 cavalry.
30:04
Another Legate of Caesar’s, Fabius, had
been sent with 3 Legions in advance to make
30:12
a foothold in Spain, taking control of the
Pyrenean passes.
30:17
Soon another 3 legions from Gaul, as well
as auxiliaries, joined them.
30:22
Caesarion forces would have been approximately
25-30,000 legionaries, 5,000 auxiliaries and
30:27
6,000 cavalry, all veterans of the Gallic
Wars.
30:33
Now united, they began to push past the Pyrenees
and into the Iberian Peninsula.
30:38
The Pompeian forces in Spain were just as
formidable.
30:46
Spain had been assigned to Pompey as his province
to govern, but he had left this responsibility
30:50
to three of his Legates: Marcus Varro was
more a scholar than a soldier, but Lucius
30:56
Afranius and Marcus Petreius each had almost
30 years military experience behind them,
31:01
as well as experience fighting in Iberia during
the Sertorian Wars.
31:07
Afranius and Petreius would take 5 Legions
plus auxiliaries to confront Caesar, while
31:12
Varro would defend Further Spain with two
Legions as a reserve.
31:18
In total, by Caesar’s account, Afranius
and Petreius commanded approximately 27,500
31:22
legionaries, 8,000 auxiliaries, and perhaps
10,000 cavalry.
31:28
The Pompeian forces had encamped in a strong
position on high ground on the west side of
31:37
the River Sicoris, just outside the hilltop
town of Ilerda which controlled a stone bridge
31:42
- a key access point into the peninsula.
31:47
When Fabius arrived with Caesar’s Legions,
he saw that crossing the bridge would be nigh
31:51
impossible given the Pompeians strong position,
and so constructed two new wooden bridges
31:56
across the river, 6km apart, and also encamped
on the western bank.
32:02
As the Pompeians had arrived beforehand, they
had already stripped the western bank of most
32:08
supplies, forcing Fabius to send foraging
parties across the bridges to the eastern
32:13
bank.
32:18
These foraging parties and their escorts often
skirmished with the Pompeian cavalry, but
32:19
there was no major conflict.
32:25
However, on one of these occasions, Fabius
sent two Legions across to the east bank to
32:28
forage, with a strong cavalry escort to follow
and protect the foraging parties, when a sudden
32:34
storm swept in, destroying the bridge nearest
to the Fabian camp.
32:40
The cavalry was stuck on the western bank,
with the Legions and foraging party on the
32:45
eastern bank.
32:50
Afranius wasted no time in seizing upon such
an opportunity, immediately sending 4 Legions
32:52
and all his cavalry across the stone bridge
to attack the beleaguered Caesareans.
32:58
The Caesarean Legions were well trained and
experienced, quickly forming a defensive square
33:05
on high ground with the foraging party in
the center.
33:10
Heavily outnumbered, the Caesarean forces
held their formation while being assaulted
33:14
from all sides by Pompeian infantry and cavalry.
33:19
Despite their discipline, it would only be
a matter of time before the formation broke
33:23
and the soldiers were slaughtered.
33:27
Fortunately, Fabius had also reacted quickly
to the situation, sending another 2 Legions
33:30
across the river via the second bridge 6km
away.
33:35
Upon their arrival, the Pompeians broke off
their attack, not wanting to wholly commit
33:40
without their full force.
33:44
They returned to camp, allowing the Caesareans
to make an orderly retreat back to theirs.
33:46
The sources do not give us an idea of how
many casualties the Caesareans sustained,
33:52
but it is likely given the situation that
they would have been significant, and certainly
33:57
more than the Pompeians.
34:02
A couple of days after this engagement, sometime
in June, Caesar arrived at the camp with his
34:05
bodyguard.
34:12
Fabius, despite the prior engagement, had
fulfilled his duties well; he had pushed through
34:13
the Pyrenees, established a foothold, and
kept Afranius in place until Caesar arrived.
34:18
Nonetheless, Caesar quickly took control of
the situation, finishing the repairs on the
34:25
first bridge started by Fabius and then going
on the offensive.
34:30
Leaving just 500 men in the first Fabian camp,
Caesar marched the rest of his force nearer
34:34
the town of Ilerda, offering battle to Afranius.
34:40
Afranius did bring his force out of camp,
but held them on the high ground refusing
34:45
to attack.
34:49
He was no fool, and would not sacrifice his
strong position so easily.
34:50
Seeing that Afranius would not be drawn into
a pitched battle, Caesar deployed his Legions
34:58
in three lines just 200m from Afranius’
camp.
35:03
The first two acted as a screen whilst the
backline dug trenches as the start of a fortified
35:07
camp.
35:13
The plan worked, and Caesar’s force was
able to retreat behind these defences for
35:14
the night.
35:19
The next day, he expanded on the defences,
assigning one Legion to each side of the camp,
35:20
the other 3 acting as a defensive line.
35:25
Afranius tried to use his force to harass
the workers, but Caesar’s 3 defensive Legions
35:29
were able to prevent them from doing any real
damage.
35:34
With the camp now fully fortified, Caesar
ordered the 500 men and baggage from the Fabian
35:38
camp to join him in the new camp.
35:44
Caesar soon noted a mound between Afranius’
camp and Ilerda, and determined to take and
35:49
fortify it, thereby cutting off Afranius from
the supplies in the town.
35:55
Starving out an enemy by such tactics was
a favoured strategy of Caesar, and he had
36:00
tried something very similar at Gergovia against
Vercingetorix.
36:05
Gathering 3 legions, the 9th, 14th and likely
the 10th, he drew them up for battle.
36:10
Caesar first sent the vanguard of the 14th
to charge the mound, hoping to take it quickly
36:16
and hold it while the rest of Caesar’s Legions
followed up in good order.
36:21
However, Afranius was quick to react, sending
his own force to charge the mound.
36:26
Afranius’ men gained the top first and with
the advantage of the high ground, forced the
36:33
men of the 14th to retreat back to their standards.
36:39
Afranius reinforced his men and attempted
to push his advantage, chasing Caesar’s
36:43
men and beginning to push the now shaken 14th
Legion on Caesar’s right flank.
36:48
Caesar himself notes how fiercely Afranius’
men fought.
36:54
Long campaigns against Iberian tribes had
made these men battle-hardened and fierce
36:59
fighters, who fought in a looser formation
than Caesar’s Legions.
37:04
Caesar’s right flank began slowly giving
ground, the 14th attempting to retreat to
37:09
higher ground.
37:14
Seeing his line on the brink of breaking,
Caesar ordered the 9th legion to support his
37:15
right flank, pushing back the Pompeian forces.
37:20
The Pompeians quickly retreated to a stronger
defensive location, taking up positions on
37:23
the high ground outside the walls of Ilerda.
37:28
The 9th Legion, thinking the Pompeians were
routing, pursued them, but quickly found themselves
37:34
caught in a precarious situation.
37:39
The slope of the hill that Ilerda was situated
on was narrow, funneling the 9th, and exposing
37:42
them to a hail of missiles from the Pompeians
on the high ground.
37:48
The fighting was bitter, with each force sending
reinforcing cohorts to refresh the front lines.
37:52
For 5 hours the two forces struggled on the
slope below the town.
37:58
In a last bid to salvage the situation, Caesar
ordered his infantry to charge the lines,
38:06
pushing over the crest of the slope and forcing
the Pompeians against the walls of the city.
38:12
With the crest of the slope gained, Caesar’s
cavalry was finally allowed room to maneuver,
38:18
and charged between the forces, allowing Caesar’s
Legions to retreat in good order to their
38:23
camp.
38:29
In Caesar’s account, he portrays this as
a draw, saying 70 of his men died, with 600
38:30
wounded, compared to 200 Pompeiians dead.
38:38
The reality is that Caesar lost the day.
38:42
Given the situation that Caesar’s Legions
were fighting in and their need to retreat,
38:46
it is far more likely that Caesar’s men
suffered more casualties.
38:51
Moreover, Caesar had failed to take the mound
as he had originally hoped.
38:55
Instead, by the end of the day, the Pompeians
held and fortified the mound.
39:00
This was Caesar’s first fight against other
Roman Legions.
39:06
He had underestimated them, overcommitted
his forces, and paid the consequences.
39:09
Caesar’s situation then continued to worsen.
39:16
A second storm brought a huge flood down the
river, destroying both the bridges constructed
39:21
by himself and Fabius.
39:26
Caesar was cut off from his supply line, and
the supplies he did have were dwindling.
39:29
Afranius, on the other hand, had an abundance
of supplies he had collected in Ilerda prior
39:34
to Fabius’ arrival, as well as control of
the Ilerdan stone bridge.
39:40
Caesar did have supplies and almost 6,000
auxiliary reinforcements of archers and cavalry
39:45
en route from Gaul, but with control of the
bridge, Afranius was able to send 3 Legions
39:51
to attack them, killing 200 and forcing the
rest to make camp on high ground.
39:57
Caesar’s campaign in Spain seemed to be
on the edge of disaster.
40:04
He was stuck in the middle of enemy territory,
cut off from his almost 6,000 auxiliary reinforcements
40:11
and the precious supplies they were bringing,
and was days from being starved out.
40:17
If he was to reclaim the situation, Caesar
would need to retake control of the eastern
40:23
bank of the river Sicoris and secure his supply
line.
40:28
With the bridges unable to be repaired due
to high water and marauding Pompeian forces,
40:33
Caesar came up with a different plan.
40:39
He began construction of several small boats
of the kind he had seen in Brittany, made
40:43
of lightweight timber and animal hides.
40:48
He then ordered a small detachment to take
these boats by wagon at night almost 34km
40:51
up the river.
40:57
These men then crossed the river, fortifying
a small hill, giving Caesar a small foothold
40:58
on the eastern bank.
41:04
Once this was established, a Legion was sent
from the main Caesarean camp up the river
41:06
to construct a bridge from the western bank,
while the initial detachment assisted from
41:11
the eastern bank.
41:16
Within days of beginning, they had the bridge
constructed, providing a route between the
41:18
eastern bank and Caesar’s camp, stabilising
his supply line and allowing the reinforcements
41:22
from Gaul to meet up with his Legion encamped
on the west side.
41:28
With this influx of troops, particularly the
prized Gallic cavalry, Caesar was finally
41:32
able to harass Pompeian foraging parties on
the Eastern bank and begin to regain control
41:38
of the situation.
41:44
While the Ilerdan campaign was underway, the
Siege of Massilia was still being fought.
41:48
For the most part, the siege had thus far
been uneventful; Ahenobarbus had largely spent
41:53
his time amassing a larger navy, and the Romans
had been building siege equipment while Brutus’
41:59
ships blockaded the port.
42:05
But once his fleet was suitably built up,
Ahenobarbus sailed his force out of harbour,
42:07
hoping to break the blockade and thus bring
supplies into the city.
42:13
He had managed to put together a force of
17 warships, as well as several smaller vessels
42:20
manned by archers, against Brutus’ 12.
42:25
The Massilian ships were also lighter and
more navigable, compared to the rather cumbersome
42:29
ships that the Legions had built.
42:34
However, Brutus did have the advantage in
quality of fighters.
42:36
Ahenobarbus’ men were largely farmers and
local Massilians pressed into service, alongside
42:41
allied archers, while Brutus’ ships were
crewed by legionaries who had specifically
42:47
volunteered for the task.
42:52
If Brutus could catch Ahenobarbus in close
quarters fighting, the battle would be his.
42:54
As the fleets met, the Massilians used their
agility and range to their advantage, circling
43:02
the Caesarean ships and peppering them with
missiles, or sailing past to sweep Brutus’
43:08
decks with arrows and smash his oars.
43:13
But when the Massilians got too close in this
manner, the legionaries would throw across
43:16
grappling hooks, pulling the Massilian ships
close, holding them fast and boarding them.
43:21
In these situations, the Legions had a clear
advantage.
43:27
Their heavy armour and training allowed them
to cut through the Massilians on board, on
43:31
occasion even boarding two Massilians ships
at once, one on either side.
43:36
Though Caesar notes the bravery of the Massilians,
they were simply not equipped to fight hand
43:42
to hand with legionaries like this.
43:47
The Massilians were forced back into port
having lost more than half their ships, and
43:49
the blockade continued.
43:54
This victory at Massilia coincided with a
continuous change of fortune at Ilerda.
43:58
With the new bridge completed Caesar’s superior
Gallic horsemen were able to harass the Pompeian
44:03
foragers, and were even able to force them
to resort to foraging at night.
44:09
The odds were turning in Caesar’s favour.
44:14
As a result, numerous local tribes began supporting
him with grain, as well as some more auxiliaries.
44:17
Seeking to apply even more pressure to Afranius,
he began construction of a number of ditches
44:24
to divert the river Sicoris and create a ford
close to his camp, which would allow even
44:29
more of his men easy access to the eastern
bank, rather than taking the circuitous route
44:35
to the bridge up the river, thus completely
removing the Pompeians’ chances of foraging.
44:40
Afranius recognised how precarious his situation
was becoming.
44:48
Running out of food and with local tribes
pledging allegiance to Caesar threatening
44:53
to surround his position, he decided to make
a tactical withdrawal to Further Spain to
44:57
continue the fight on his own terms with the
advantage of Varro’s two extra legions.
45:03
Afranius ordered a few ships on the River
Ebro to construct a pontoon bridge 30 miles
45:09
to the south, providing an escape route.
45:14
At the same time, Afranius ordered two Legions
across the stone bridge to the eastern bank,
45:17
establishing a fortified position in preparation
for the evacuation of the rest of the army.
45:24
When Caesar learned of this, he saw his opportunity
to catch Afranius.
45:31
He ordered his men to work day and night on
the river works, managing to lower the water
45:36
level enough to move his cavalry across the
Sicoris to try and harass the Pompeians.
45:41
However, the Pompeian Legions had been quick
and were already dug in, leaving little for
45:47
the cavalry to do.
45:52
Afranius then moved his full force across
the Sicoris into the new camp, leaving just
45:54
two auxiliary cohorts to garrison Ilerda itself.
45:59
In the early hours of the following morning,
Afranius and Petreius began moving their entire
46:05
army out of camp and to the south, heading
towards the Ebro and the pontoon bridge.
46:10
Caesar needed to act fast.
46:17
If the Pompeians could reach the pontoon bridge,
they would be able to escape to Further Spain,
46:19
merging with Varro’s legions and prolonging
the Spanish campaign.
46:24
He first sent his cavalry to harass the Pompeians,
attacking the rear of their column, slowing
46:29
the Pompeian Legions to a crawl as they fended
off the attackers.
46:34
Though the ford was not wholly completed,
Caesar ordered pack animals to wade into the
46:38
river to help slow the current, and marched
five of his Legions across, leaving one to
46:44
guard the camp.
46:49
Taking these legions, Caesar marched quickly
to try and cut off his enemies’ escape,
46:51
and, thanks to the harassment of the Caesarean
cavalry, by mid-afternoon his army had caught
46:56
up with the Pompeian Legions.
47:01
Both armies were now camped on the eastern
bank, the Pompeians slightly further south
47:04
than the Caesareans.
47:10
Scouts for both sides reported that the only
way south to the Ebro was through the mountain
47:12
passes, just under 8km away.
47:17
Whoever controlled these passes would easily
be able to defend them from the other, and
47:20
a brief standoff ensued.
47:25
Afranius did not want to risk attempting to
march his army through the narrow defiles
47:27
with Caesar pursuing him, and Caesar did not
want to try and force a way through the Pompeians
47:32
to the mountains.
47:37
Afranius did consider attempting a night march
to the mountains but decided that, with Caesar’s
47:39
cavalry patrolling the area at night, they
would quickly be found out.
47:44
Night battles were extremely risky and difficult,
and so Afranius decided that it was better
47:49
instead to attempt a fighting retreat the
next day.
47:55
Caesar, meanwhile, had also concocted a plan.
47:59
At first light, he feigned a withdrawal to
the Sicoris and Ilerda, then rapidly changed
48:04
direction, marching quickly for the mountains.
48:10
Seeing this maneuverer, the Pompeians immediately
broke camp, racing towards the mountain passes.
48:13
The Caesarean route was a harder march, with
the terrain slowing down the Legions, but
48:19
the Pompeian forces found themselves constantly
harassed by Caesar’s cavalry, and this proved,
48:24
once again, to be the difference.
48:30
Caesar reached the passes first, drawing his
army into a line, cutting off the Pompeian
48:32
escape.
48:37
Afranius tried sending light auxiliaries to
quickly seize high ground ahead of his main
48:39
force, but the Caesarean cavalry was quickly
able to surround them, and, without support,
48:43
they were easily cut down.
48:50
With his opportunity to escape cut off, Afranius
saw little choice but to encamp on a small
48:52
hill and contemplate his next move.
48:57
Caesar was happy to let him do so and saw
no point in risking the lives of his men in
49:03
another battle.
49:08
With the road south now blocked, it would
only be a matter of time before Afranius ran
49:09
out of food and water.
49:14
The Pompeians could try and retreat back to
Ilerda, but Caesar’s Legion left in the
49:16
camp would be able to cross the ford and block
the stone bridge, whilst Caesar’s main force
49:21
could attack them from behind.
49:26
If the Pompeiians stayed, they would eventually
run out of supplies.
49:28
If they retreated, they would be caught in
a pincer.
49:32
Caesar fortified his position, setting up
outposts in the mountains, and awaited his
49:36
enemy’s next move.
49:41
Afranius’ priority was to secure his water
supply.
49:44
He had sent men to the river to gather water,
but they had faced constant harassment from
49:49
the Caesarean cavalry.
49:54
In response, his Legions had built a rampart
from his camp to the river, allowing his men
49:56
to collect water from behind the defences,
bringing the fighting to a pause.
50:01
As the Caesarean troops also came to the river
for water, men from both sides began talking
50:08
to the other.
50:14
Caesar’s Legions contained many Iberians,
and they began to ask the Pompeian Legions
50:15
about family, friends, and discussed the politics
of the war.
50:20
Old friends and acquaintances from both sides
met, bringing them back to their camps to
50:25
drink and reconnect.
50:29
Some of Afranius’ Spanish allies, and even
some officers, went over to Caesar’s camp
50:31
to speak with Caesar personally.
50:36
Caesar attributes these actions to his not
having committed to a full pitched battle
50:39
the day prior, and that the Pompeians saw
this as an act of leniency.
50:43
While this might be true to an extent, the
main motivator was more likely that the Pompeian
50:49
forces understood the situation they were
in; it was only a matter of time before they
50:55
would be starved into defeat, and they were
losing the will to fight.
51:00
Afranius did little to quell such stirrings.
51:06
It seems that he too had lost the desire to
continue the battle.
51:09
Petreius, however, had not.
51:13
To restore discipline in the camp, he demanded
oaths of loyalty from Afranius and the entire
51:15
army, and then ordered any Caesarean soldier
found in the camp to be executed.
51:21
There had been a brief moment of peace in
the chaos of the Civil War where men, who
51:26
just the day before had been fighting each
other, had come together in peace.
51:31
But now the peace was broken.
51:35
The soldiers returned to their respective
camps and prepared once again for battle.
51:37
In a last-ditch attempt to retake control
of the situation, Petreius attempted to retreat
51:45
back to Ilerda.
51:51
The entire way the Pompeians were harassed
by Caesar’s cavalry, and shadowed by his
51:53
legions, blocking them from crossing the Sicoris
at every turn, and slowing them down to a
51:58
gruelling pace.
52:03
On the third day of this harassment, the Pompeians
were forced to set up camp on unfavourable
52:05
terrain.
52:10
Caesar saw his opportunity and began work
on his own earthworks surrounding the Pompeian
52:12
camp, a similar tactic to Alesia, cutting
off any possibility of foraging.
52:17
Blockaded on all sides, devoid of water and
having been harassed for days, the Pompeians
52:23
finally sued for peace.
52:29
Caesar, never one to miss out on a public
relations opportunity, promised leniency for
52:31
all the men and officers, including Afranius
and Petreius, in exchange for the complete
52:36
surrender of the army and the promise that
none of them would take up arms against him.
52:42
The Pompeians gratefully accepted.
52:47
With the surrender of this main Pompeian army,
Caesar assigned 4 legions, the 6th, 9th, 11th,
52:53
and 14th, to accompany the Pompeians to a
safe location and disband them, before heading
52:59
back to Italy.
53:05
Caesar, meanwhile, took the 10th and 7th into
Further Spain to confront Varro.
53:06
Varro, who had initially been encouraged by
the early reports of Afranius’ success at
53:13
Ilerda, had been gathering more forces, raising
another two legions, giving him a total of
53:19
four.
53:26
When news came to him of Caesar’s victory
at Ilerda, he began to march 2 legions to
53:27
Gades, where he planned to hold out and prolong
Caesar’s war in Spain.
53:31
However, news of Caesar’s victory at Ilerda
had spread fast and the locals had seen the
53:36
writing on the wall.
53:42
The chiefs of local tribes met Caesar at Corduba
and pledged allegiance to him, and the chief
53:44
of the Gades closed the gates of the city
to Varro.
53:50
To make matters worse, one of Varro’s legions
that was with him mutinied, striking their
53:54
colours.
53:59
Having lost the support of his army and the
locals, Varro sent word to Caesar that he
54:02
was ready to surrender.
54:06
Quintus Cassius Longinus was assigned as governor
of Spain by Caesar, and assumed command of
54:08
Varro’s four legions, making them the 21st,
22nd 23rd, and 24th.
54:14
Pompey’s entire Spanish army had now either
been disbanded, or had sided with Caesar,
54:20
after just a couple of months.
54:26
Taking his two veteran Legions, the 7th and
10th, Caesar left Hispania to re-join his
54:29
forces at Massilia.
54:34
The siege of Massilia was still ongoing.
54:38
Trebonius, who had been left in command of
legions during the siege, had constructed
54:41
trenches, walls and towers blocking off the
peninsula upon which the city stood.
54:46
Brutus maintained the blockade from the sea,
so together they effectively surrounded Massilia.
54:52
The city would not be easy to take though.
54:58
Its position was ideal for defence, funnelling
any land forces on to one front, and the city
55:01
was protected by high, strong walls, topped
with ballistae.
55:07
Trebonius had ordered the construction of
a siege ramp, as well as a battering ram,
55:12
but the Massilian ballistae and numerous sorties
had been effective in slowing the Romans’
55:16
construction of their engines and had, so
far, dissuaded any serious assault on the
55:22
city's walls.
55:26
The Massilians had also made repairs to their
fleet following their previous defeat, bringing
55:30
the number of warships back up to 17.
55:35
However, most of these ships were refitted
merchant vessels or old warships, crewed by
55:38
lightly armed archers.
55:44
The Massilians simply could not afford to
move their best infantry from the walls to
55:46
the ships.
55:50
Fortunately for them, however, Pompey had
sent a fleet of 16 ships to reinforce them.
55:51
These were commanded by Lucius Nasidius, and
though most were hastily built smaller ships,
55:57
some had bronze rams, presenting a serious
threat to Brutus’ navy.
56:02
A small vessel was sent to the Massilians
to alert them of the coming reinforcements,
56:10
and Ahenobarbus seized the opportunity.
56:15
Sending the Massilian navy out, they slipped
Brutus’ blockade and met Nasidius’ fleet
56:18
at Taurois, just down the coast from Massilia.
56:23
Brutus too had increased the size of his fleet,
having captured 6 ships in the previous battle,
56:27
and manned them with legionaries.
56:32
Although outnumbered almost 2:1 by the combined
navies of Nasidius and the Massilians, Brutus
56:34
had the distinct advantage in quality when
it came to hand to hand fighting.
56:40
Buoyed by his previous victory, Brutus gave
chase and set sail for Taurois.
56:45
The Massilian ships were stationed on the
right, with Nasidius and his fleet on the
56:53
left.
56:58
Knowing that the Massilians would favour a
missile battle, Brutus determined that it
56:59
would be best to engage the Massilians first,
catching them in close quarters, before facing
57:03
Nasidius’ ships.
57:09
He therefore determined to focus almost all
his ships on the Massilians.
57:10
As they had done previously, the Massilians
attempted to use their agility and superior
57:16
seamanship to outmanoeuvre and separate Brutus’
ships.
57:21
This was an effective tactic, and when they
could separate a Caesarean ship, they would
57:26
pepper it with javelins and arrows, inflicting
numerous casualties.
57:31
However, once again, whenever they drifted
too close, Brutus’ men would cast their
57:35
grappling hooks, pulling their foes close
and boarding them.
57:40
Once boarded, despite the bravery and determination
of the Massilians and their allies, they were
57:45
simply outclassed by Roman discipline and
weaponry and were butchered on the decks.
57:50
In a frantic attempt to win the engagement
in one decisive move, the Massilians targeted
57:58
Brutus’ own ship, distinguished by its standard.
58:03
Two Massilians ships attempted to ram the
ship from either side, catching Brutus in
58:07
a pincer.
58:11
Just as they closed in though, Brutus’ ship
darted forward, the two Massilian vessels
58:13
colliding into each other head on.
58:18
Now disabled, they made easy prey for Brutus’
ships who quickly set on them, sinking them
58:20
both.
58:26
It was at this point that Nasidius abandoned
the battle, taking his entire fleet with him.
58:27
Seeing there was no chance of victory, the
Massilians quickly followed suit.
58:33
Brutus had won without losing a single ship
and sustaining only light casualties, while
58:38
the Massilians lost a total of 9 ships; 5
sunk and 4 captured.
58:43
It is unknown why Nasidius did not commit
his men.
58:51
Caesar blames it on cowardice, however, given
that he and the fleet sailed to Spain immediately
58:55
following the battle, it is possible that
Nasidius, upon seeing the Massilians being
59:00
decimated by Brutus’ men, thought it better
to pick a later engagement where the odds
59:04
would be more in his favour.
59:10
Whatever the reason, he had not lost a man,
never having engaged in the battle.
59:12
The remainder of the Massilian fleet limped
back to its home port and would not emerge
59:19
from it again.
59:24
Caesar was consistently complimentary of the
Massilians who manned their ships, most only
59:26
being citizens wanting to fight for their
city, and he admired their bravery and determination.
59:31
Against the skill and heavy arms of Roman
legionaries however, they simply did not stand
59:38
a chance.
59:42
With the naval battle won, the Romans turned
in earnest to the land assault.
59:46
A way was needed to assault the walls without
risk of missile fire, and without risk of
59:51
the siege engines being burnt during a sortie.
59:56
As such, Trebonius began work on a huge tower.
59:59
The tower was 9 metres each way with walls
almost 2 metres thick of brick and clay.
00:03
The Romans built the first layer of this tower,
topping it with a lid with long screens attached
00:10
to the sides.
00:15
They then used screws and levers to raise
this lid, the screens hanging down to cover
00:17
the gap between lid and wall and would then
build the wall up to the height of the lid.
00:22
They continued this process until the tower
was 6 stories, building in shooting platforms
00:28
for archers and ballistae as they did, allowing
their men to fire down on the enemies on the
00:34
wall.
00:39
With this completed, Trebonius’ men next
began work on a 20m long gallery, starting
00:43
from the base of the tower, which provided
protection.
00:48
In effect, this was almost like a huge, covered
sledge.
00:52
It could be pushed forward and backward and
was topped by a sloped roof covered in tiles
00:56
and clay to prevent it being burnt down.
01:01
When it was completed, it was pushed forward
from the base of the Roman tower, to the base
01:05
of a tower in the Massilian wall.
01:09
Under this protection, legionary engineers
began the work of undermining the Massilian
01:12
tower, removing bricks with crowbar and chisel.
01:18
The Massilians attempted to throw rocks and
pitch down onto the engineers, but the Roman
01:21
defences proved sturdy and the men were protected.
01:26
In due time, the undermining began to pay
off; the Massilian wall began to crumple and
01:30
tilt.
01:36
The Massilians quickly came out of the city.
01:39
They acknowledged that Trebonius had now won
the siege, realising that as soon as their
01:42
tower collapsed, the Legions would flood the
city.
01:47
They requested a truce, asking if they could
await Caesar’s arrival to negotiate with
01:50
him personally.
01:56
Trebonius, seeing little reason in risking
his men’s life, accepted, and the Legions
01:57
pulled back from the walls to wait for Caesar.
02:03
But the Massilians were bluffing.
02:06
Once the Romans’ guard was down, they sallied
out at night, burning down the Roman siege
02:08
ramp and battering ram.
02:13
Though Trebonius’ and his men quickly caught
on to what was happening and tried to fight
02:15
back the sortie, missiles from the Massilian
walls prevented them from doing so effectively.
02:20
The Massilians were even able to set fire
to the Roman tower from the inside, as well
02:26
as the gallery, destroying months of work
in a single night.
02:30
However, this was only a small success for
the Massilians.
02:36
The siege had been going on now for 4 and
a half months.
02:41
With their navy destroyed, they had no means
of bringing in fresh supplies into the city.
02:45
The supplies they did have were running low,
and disease had begun to spread among the
02:51
populace.
02:56
Moreover, the Romans had once again started
constructing siege works, this time building
02:57
a gallery extending to the walls made of brick.
03:02
To make matters worse, Caesar arrived with
his two extra Legions.
03:05
His arrival also made it clear to the Massilians
that Spain had indeed fallen to Caesar, and
03:10
that they would not be receiving any reinforcements
or supplies.
03:16
Diseased, starved and now horrifically outnumbered,
the Massilians finally surrendered.
03:22
Just before they did, however, Ahenobarbus
escaped.
03:29
He was still not ready to give up the fight
and, commandeering 3 ships, made a daring
03:32
dash past Brutus’ blockade during a storm.
03:38
Brutus’ ships pursued, catching 2, but the
one Ahenobarbus was on slipped away in the
03:41
storm.
03:47
He would live to fight another day.
03:48
Caesar left the 18th and 19th legions to garrison
the city, while he marched to Italy with the
03:51
5th, 7th and 10th to rejoin his main army.
03:57
In 7 months, Caesar had chased Pompey from
Italy, secured his western flank, disbanded
04:02
5 of Pompey’s Legions and absorbed a further
4.
04:10
So far, the war was going very much in Caesar’s
favour.
04:14
But this was still just the start.
04:18
Ahenobarbus had managed to escape to Greece
to re-join Pompey, and was soon followed by
04:21
Varro, Afranius and Petreius, despite the
latter two’s oath to Caesar.
04:26
Pompey was amassing a vast army in Greece,
and he still held the lucrative territories
04:32
in the East, as well as the important grain
hub of North Africa.
04:37
The war in the West might have been over for
now, but the war for the rest of the Roman
04:42
world was about to begin.
04:46
While Caesar was on his way to confront Pompey’s
Legions in Spain, his Legates were fighting
04:51
the Civil War in the Mediterranean and African
theatre.
04:56
Before Caesar even reached Spain, Valerius
had taken Sardinia with the 16th Legion, and
05:00
Curio had claimed Sicily with the 15th and
17th.
05:06
Together, around the end of April - early
May of 49BC, they combined their forces in
05:10
Sicily, along with the 20th Legion from Italy,
making a total of 4 Legions and about 1500
05:16
cavalry, and began preparing to invade North
Africa.
05:22
Alongside Sardinia and Sicily, North Africa,
specifically, modern Tunis, was one of the
05:28
biggest suppliers of grain feeding the Roman
Republic at the time.
05:33
Taking North Africa would, therefore, give
Caesar control of all the major grain centers,
05:38
ensuring he could supply his armies throughout
the war, and robbing Pompey of any opportunity
05:43
to starve him out of Italy.
05:49
Command of this invasion was assigned to Curio,
who was a skilled politician, but lacked military
05:52
command experience.
05:57
He had been crucial to Caesar in the Senate,
however, and this was his reward.
05:59
To compensate for his lack of experience,
he was assigned a body of talented Legates,
06:04
including Rebilus, a Legate who had served
with Caesar in Gaul and fought with distinction
06:09
at Alesia.
06:14
The Legions Curio commanded were largely raw,
all having been raised just a few months earlier
06:16
while Caesar was pushing south through Italy.
06:21
However, Caesar knew that Pompey’s best
troops were in Spain and the East, and so
06:24
any Pompeian troops in Africa would be equally
raw.
06:30
It was thought that, with four Legions, Curio
had enough men and talented advisors to invade
06:34
successfully.
06:40
However, Curio did not want to invade Africa
without first hearing news from Spain, just
06:41
in case his men would be needed to support
Caesar, so, for now, he remained in Sicily.
06:47
Africa was under the control of the Pompeian
Publius Attius Varus.
06:56
Varus had previously been propraetor of the
province, and was dismayed to find it woefully
07:00
unprepared for war with only 1 Legion present
in Hadrumetum.
07:06
He immediately took control and strengthened
the province, raising another 2 Legions and
07:11
encamping them outside Utica.
07:15
Furthermore, he requested the aid of the nearby
client king, Juba of Numidia.
07:17
Juba was an old ally of Pompey, who owed his
kingship to Pompey’s earlier campaign, and
07:23
had a personal hatred of Caesar and Curio
as both had insulted him in the past.
07:29
He readily agreed to side with the Pompeians,
and would prove to be a crucial ally for Varus.
07:35
It wasn’t until August, after receiving
word of Caesar’s victory in Spain, that
07:43
Curio began his crossing into Africa.
07:48
Curio did not think much of his opponents,
disdaining both Varus and Juba, and so instead
07:51
of bringing his full force across, he only
brought 2 Legions, likely the 15th and 16th,
07:57
and 500 cavalry, along with a sizable navy.
08:04
Landing at Anquillaria, between Utica and
Hadrumetum, Curio decided to engage the larger
08:09
force first, and so began his march to Utica,
reaching the River Bagradas 2 days later.
08:14
Here, he left Rebilus in charge of the Legions
while he took the cavalry ahead to scout the
08:20
Castra Cornelia, an old Roman fort on a small,
elevated peninsula that was left over from
08:26
the Punic Wars.
08:32
This camp was just 5km from Utica, and from
the higher ground, Curio reconnoitered Varus’
08:33
camp.
08:41
The Pompeian camp was in a strong position,
using the walls of Utica as part of its defences
08:43
on one side, and the outdoor amphitheatre
of Utica blocking another, making any approach
08:48
to the camp narrow and difficult.
08:54
When observing the town Curio saw a large
number of supplies being brought into the
08:57
city on the roads from the local populace
seeking refuge.
09:01
Looking to hamper Varus’ supplies and take
some for himself, Curio sent his cavalry to
09:05
attack them.
09:10
Varus was quick to react though and sent his
own force of 600 Numidian horsemen and 400
09:12
Numidian infantry to defend them.
09:19
The Numidian cavalry, which had raced ahead
of the infantry, clashed with the Roman horse
09:22
first.
09:27
But the Numidians were lightly armed and best
accustomed to skirmishing rather than melee
09:28
fighting.
09:32
Curio’s men were able to inflict significant
casualties in the fight, forcing the Numidian
09:33
cavalry to flee back to the town and camp,
quickly followed by the infantry.
09:39
Traders and their goods were seized by Curio
and taken back to the Castra Cornelia, which
09:44
he planned to use as his main base for the
invasion.
09:49
Meanwhile, Curios’ navy had moved into position
outside the port of Utica, which harboured
09:53
possibly as many as 200 merchant ships with
no military ships for protection.
10:01
Curio sent a proclamation declaring that any
merchant ship that did not transfer their
10:07
supplies to the Castra Cornelia would be treated
as an enemy, and boarded by his navy.
10:12
With no naval protection, the merchants saw
little choice and sailed their goods to the
10:18
Castra Cornelia, providing the Caesareans
with a further abundance of supplies.
10:23
Curio’s campaign was off to a good start.
10:29
Leaving a small force in the Castra Cornelia
to guard the supplies, he returned to his
10:34
troops at the Bagradas with news of his achievements,
where they recognised him as Imperator.
10:39
Bolstered by this success, the next day he
moved his army to go on the offensive, aiming
10:45
to encamp just outside the town of Utica,
displaying a similar kind of aggression to
10:50
Caesar.
10:56
While this camp was being constructed, Curio
received word from the pickets that a large
10:57
Numidian force was approaching.
11:02
Curio had failed to scout the area properly
and was surprised by this sudden new force.
11:04
Quickly, he ordered his men to abandon the
construction of the camp and form battle lines,
11:11
while he sent his cavalry to engage the Numidians
in a delaying action.
11:18
The Numidians did not march in a tight formation
and so were vulnerable to cavalry charges.
11:22
As soon as Curio’s cavalry made contact,
the Numidian cavalry fled into Utica, followed
11:28
swiftly by the infantry.
11:34
The Roman cavalry harassed the Numidian infantry,
inflicting some casualties, but the bulk of
11:36
the Numidian force successfully made it into
the camp.
11:41
Caesar describes the Numidians as having been
routed, but it seems more likely that this
11:45
was a tactical withdrawal.
11:50
The Numidians likely had not been seeking
an engagement in the first place and prioritised
11:52
combining with Varus’ forces rather than
being drawn into a pitched battle.
11:57
Though Curio had, so far, been largely successful,
the following day, 2 of his centurions and
12:03
22 of their men defected to Varus.
12:10
They told Varus that Curio’s army did not
have faith in him, and that Varus would be
12:13
able to win them over to his side.
12:18
Their motivation for doing this is not known.
12:21
Curio had performed well so far, aside from
poor scouting, and had apparently been hailed
12:24
as Imperator, so it is unlikely that Curio’s
men lacked confidence in him as is portrayed.
12:30
The more likely reason is that Curio’s men
were still effectively raw recruits.
12:37
They had not fought a pitched battle before,
and some of the officers in Varus’ army
12:42
had trained and led Curio’s men at Corfinium.
12:47
It is likely, therefore, that the men were
motivated more out of either fear, or an unwillingness
12:51
to fight former comrades, than dissatisfaction
with Curio.
12:56
Nevertheless, the next day Varus marched his
force out of camp, Curio following suit.
13:02
An officer in Varus’ army, Sextus Varus,
who had been one of the officers at Corfinium,
13:09
appealed to Curio’s men.
13:15
He reminded them that they had previously
sworn oaths to Pompey, Ahenobarbus, and to
13:17
himself, and that they should not fight the
men they trained with and had been prepared
13:22
to fight alongside.
13:27
Though Curio’s army showed little reaction,
Varus withdrew his force back into camp, confident
13:28
that, given time, this appeal would strike
a chord with Curio’s men.
13:34
Though the message had been received in silence
at first, when Curio’s Legions were back
13:41
in camp, the men began to talk amongst themselves.
13:47
Oaths held a strong religious connotation,
and they were not broken easily.
13:50
The more the men talked, the more they began
to fear that they had made a mistake by switching
13:56
their allegiance from Pompey to Caesar.
14:01
Rumour likely exaggerated the number of men
who were of this mindset, though some certainly
14:03
were, and Curio was soon worried that his
whole army was on the brink of mutiny.
14:08
Curio gathered his officers and sought advice
for how to address the situation.
14:16
The officers suggested two options.
14:22
Firstly, that they attack the Pompeian camp
immediately, thinking that keeping the men
14:24
busy would be best, rather than allowing any
rumours to circulate; or secondly, to withdraw
14:29
back to the Cornelia Castra to try and calm
the men there.
14:35
Curio was not convinced of either option.
14:39
He saw an all-out attack on the camp as foolhardy,
and a retreat as a show of cowardice.
14:42
Furthermore, he believed the number of men
who were genuinely feeling disloyal had been
14:48
overplayed.
14:53
As such, he gathered the soldiers and addressed
them.
14:54
He gave a rousing speech, pointing out that
Ahenobarbus had surrendered at Corfinium,
14:58
voiding any oaths the men had made to him,
and that their oaths to Caesar now took precedent.
15:05
He espoused the achievements of Caesar in
Spain, saying that they were on the winning
15:11
side, so why join the losing one?
15:16
Finally he listed his own achievements in
Africa so far, and that they had hailed him
15:19
as imperator.
15:23
The men were moved by the speech and acclaimed
Curio, putting to rest any ideas of mutiny.
15:25
It’s possible that not a lot of men felt
that way in the first place, but either way,
15:31
Curio was continuing to show himself as a
man with leadership potential; with a simple
15:36
speech he had regained full control of the
army without needing to resort to any harsh
15:41
discipline or excessive time wasting.
15:47
Determined to draw Varus into a pitched battle,
Curio marched his men out of camp the following
15:50
day.
15:57
Varus followed suit, the two armies facing
off with each other across a large ditch.
15:58
The ditch was not particularly deep, only
around 2.5 meters, but its sides were steep
16:04
and would present a disadvantage to any trying
to scramble up.
16:10
Varus made the first move, sending his Numidian
cavalry from the left flank supported by light
16:16
infantry to flank Curio’s force.
16:22
Curio countered by sending two cohorts of
the 16th along with all his cavalry.
16:24
The Numidian cavalry charged the Roman legionaries,
but lightly armed, they were easily repulsed
16:30
and routed.
16:36
The light infantry was left exposed and, surrounded
by Curio’s heavy infantry and cavalry, were
16:37
slaughtered.
16:43
Rebilus urged Curio to capitalise on this
success and charge Varus’ force to instigate
16:44
a mass rout.
16:50
Curio heeded the advice and led his men across
the ditch, but even as they were scaling the
16:52
other side, Varus’ force, seeing that Curio
now had a cavalry advantage and could easily
16:57
outflank them, had begun to flee the battlefield.
17:03
They did not retreat in good order, and Varus
himself was wounded and almost killed in the
17:07
retreat.
17:12
As his army tried to push through the narrow
pass to their camp, they became caught in
17:14
a bottle neck and many were slain by Curio’s
pursuing force.
17:18
Indeed, more of Varus’ men died here than
in the battle.
17:23
However, when Varus’ men had made the safety
of the camp, Curio did not push any further,
17:28
not having the equipment needed to siege the
camp.
17:35
Caesar gives Curio’s casualties as being
just 1 man; this is surely not accurate, but
17:39
it is likely that his casualties were minimal,
while Varus had lost almost 600 dead and 1,000
17:44
wounded.
17:52
This battle might seem unbelievable in how
quickly Varus’ men broke, but there are
17:54
a few points to consider.
17:59
Firstly, Varus misused his Numidian cavalry.
18:01
The Numidians were light cavalry and skilled
skirmishers, but due to their light arms and
18:05
armour, were not equipped for melee fighting
against heavy cavalry and infantry.
18:10
Secondly, Varus’ whole army had only recently
been levied, less than 6 months ago.
18:15
Likely, very few of his men had any military
experience, which explains why they were so
18:20
quick to rout.
18:26
Compare for instance, the actions of Caesar’s
Legions in Spain who, when cut off from the
18:28
army and in risk of being surrounded, retreated
in order to high ground and formed a defensive
18:34
square.
18:39
That is the difference between veterans and
raw recruits.
18:41
Under the cover of darkness, Varus moved what
was left of his force into the city of Utica,
18:47
leaving just a small detachment of men, trumpeters
and tents in the camp to give the illusion
18:53
it was still garrisoned.
18:58
Curio was quick to discover the ploy and began
the creation of earthworks around Utica to
19:00
besiege the city.
19:05
Initially, the citizens of Utica appealed
to Varus to surrender, not wanting to go through
19:07
the gruelling experience of a siege.
19:12
However, a messenger arrived in Utica with
information that Juba, king of Numidia, was
19:15
on his way and nearby to support Varus.
19:20
It is not known how large Juba’s army was,
aside from 60 elephants, but given that this
19:24
was the royal army, it surely numbered in
the 10s of thousands.
19:30
With these reinforcements on the way, Varus
soothed the citizens' concerns, confident
19:34
that he would be able to defeat Curio.
19:39
Curio soon discovered the same information.
19:44
Initially he did not believe the reports,
confident that he was on the brink of victory,
19:48
and continued the siege.
19:52
More reports came in, however, verifying the
information and saying that Juba was now just
19:55
36km miles away.
20:00
Upon learning this, Curio abandoned his plans
of besieging Utica, withdrawing to the Castra
20:03
Cornelia instead.
20:08
He began further fortifying the fort and sent
word to Sicily to send over the 2 Legions
20:10
and all the cavalry left in Sicily.
20:16
This was a good plan; the Castra Cornelia
could be easily defended, and with access
20:18
to the sea, Curio could maintain a supply
line and safely await reinforcements.
20:23
Juba was a cunning opponent though.
20:30
He sent men from Utica under the guise of
deserters to Curio, saying that Juba had had
20:34
to redirect his force to suppress a rebellion,
and that the Numidian force was only a small
20:39
force commanded by his lieutenant Saburra.
20:45
Curio, still riding the wave of his previous
victories and keen to prove himself, believed
20:48
these reports and sought to crush the Numidians
in a pitched battle.
20:54
Abandoning his defensive position around 3am,
he marched his force to the Bagradas to confront
20:59
them, leaving 5 cohorts in the Castra Cornelia.
21:04
Having learnt his lesson previously, Curio
sent his cavalry ahead of his Legions as a
21:10
scouting party, and they quickly discovered
Saburra’s own advanced units.
21:15
Curio’s cavalry fell upon the Numidians
who, taken by surprise and with no encampment,
21:20
suffered heavy casualties before retreating
back to Saburra’s main force.
21:27
However, instead of staying to hold the area
or scouting further ahead, Curio’s cavalry
21:31
headed back to Curio’s main force with a
few prisoners to tell him of their success.
21:37
Curio had already marched 10km from the Castra
Cornelia when his cavalry returned.
21:42
He questioned the prisoners as to who their
commander was, and they replied that Saburra
21:48
was, confirming in Curio’s mind that he
was only facing a small portion of the Numidian
21:53
army.
21:59
Determined, Curio pushed his men to march
on.
22:00
In the meantime, however, Saburra had sent
word to Juba about the night battle and in
22:05
response, Juba had sent ahead 2,000 Spanish
and Gallic cavalry, part of his personal guard,
22:11
and his best infantry to bolster Saburra’s
army, while Juba continued his advance with
22:17
the main force.
22:22
Saburra kept withdrawing his force, feigning
retreats and pulling the Romans after him.
22:23
Curio was being lured into a trap.
22:29
Curio’s army had now marched almost 28km
since breaking camp, and his men were exhausted
22:33
from the early start.
22:41
They now found themselves a large, flat open
plain.
22:43
This was what Saburra had been waiting for.
22:46
He lined up his infantry for battle but kept
them a fair distance from the Roman force:
22:49
enough to be a threat but far away enough
to not be caught by the Romans, and left most
22:54
of the fighting to his cavalry.
23:00
The previous engagements had already depleted
Curio’s cavalry, and still more had paused
23:04
to rest and water their horses, leaving Curio
with just 200 horsemen when the forces engaged,
23:10
and the Numidians used this to their advantage.
23:16
Their heavier Gallic and Spanish cavalry would
charge the Roman flanks and rear, while the
23:20
lighter Numidian cavalry skirmished and harassed
them.
23:25
Curio tried to use his cavalry to chase away
the enemy charges, but they were too tired
23:29
to pursue and Saburra’s men would simply
withdraw and then strike in another place.
23:34
When the Numidians could draw a cohort into
breaking ranks and charging, the cohort would
23:40
find itself utterly surrounded by horsemen
and cut down.
23:45
Fighting in such a manner and on such open
and flat terrain was ideal for the Numidians.
23:49
By this point, the whole of Curio’s army
was surrounded by Saburra’s force and more
23:55
of Juba’s men were trickling in, providing
a constant supply of fresh reinforcements
24:01
against the exhausted Romans.
24:06
Desperately, Curio ordered some of his men
to take the Legion’s standards and to fight
24:09
their way out of the encirclement to some
nearby hills.
24:14
The Numidians allowed them to break through
the ring at first, but soon quickly surrounded
24:17
them and cut them down to a man.
24:22
The battle was a disaster.
24:25
Curio’s army had lost all hope, some men
broke down and cried to the gods or their
24:26
mothers, others simply abandoned their weapons
and waited to die.
24:32
Gnaeus Domitius, the prefect of horse, gathered
what little cavalry was left around Curio
24:37
and urged him to try and save himself and
retreat to the Castra Cornelia.
24:43
Curio replied that he would never be able
to face Caesar after such a disaster.
24:47
He died fighting alongside his men.
24:53
Both the 15th and 16th Legions were completely
destroyed, around 11,000 men.
24:56
The Roman cavalry that had been watering their
horses had watched the destruction from a
25:04
distance and raced back to the Cornelia Castra
to inform the 5 cohorts and the quaestor left
25:09
in charge, Marcius Rufus, of the disaster.
25:15
He tried to organise an evacuation by sea
back to Sicily of the men left, but panic
25:18
had already taken over as rumour spread that
Varus might be closing in for the kill.
25:24
Men pushed past one another to scramble onto
the ships, and some became so overburdened
25:30
that they sank.
25:35
The captains of the ships grew equally as
nervous and, in the end, only a few high-ranking
25:36
officers, including Rebilus and Rufus, made
it onto the ships before the captains set
25:42
sail.
25:46
The men that were left in the Castra Cornelia
sent centurions to Varus and surrendered.
25:48
The African campaign had been an unmitigated
disaster and Africa would remain in Pompeian
25:56
hands.
26:02
So far, Caesar himself had been largely successful
in the Civil War.
26:03
His campaign in Spain had secured the west
as well as neutralising some of Pompey’s
26:08
best Legions, and he had been recruiting in
Gaul and Italy, adding at least another 6
26:13
Legions.
26:19
However, his subordinates had not been as
effective.
26:20
Curio had lost 2 Legions in North Africa,
and his inability to take the province meant
26:23
that supplies of grain in Rome would still
be stretched.
26:29
Around the same time, Gaius Antonius, the
brother of Mark Antony, had lost a Legion
26:33
and a half in Illyria to defection.
26:38
To make matters worse, the veteran 9th, dismayed
at their recent heavy casualties in Ilerda
26:41
and lack of promised pay, had mutinied.
26:47
Consular elections were due in Rome and, with
both the consuls having fled with Pompey,
26:51
there was no one to oversee them, threatening
the legitimacy of Caesar’s cause.
26:56
His first priority was the 9th Legion, as
he wanted to stop mutiny from spreading to
27:02
other legions in similar position.
27:07
Rushing to their camp, Caesar made an impassioned
speech, pointing out that as a general renowned
27:10
for his quick action he could not be blamed
for prolonging the war.
27:16
He then chastised the men, saying that he
had brought them fame and fortune and they
27:20
now repaid him by mutineering; the only suitable
punishment for the Legion would be decimation.
27:25
The legion begged Caesar to reconsider.
27:32
Magnanimous as ever, Caesar only executed
12 of the ringleaders and brought the legion
27:35
back into the fold.
27:40
Caesar needed to maintain an air of legitimacy,
but with no consuls in Rome the elections
27:45
could not be held.
27:50
Lepidus, a praetor and close ally of Caesar,
suggested Caesar be named Dictator so that
27:52
he could preside over the election.
27:58
This was done and Caesar was appointed Consul,
alongside another ally, Publius Servilius.
28:00
With consular power, Caesar no longer needed
the position of Dictator and resigned after
28:07
just 11 days.
28:13
With these issues now handled, Caesar gathered
his force at Brundisium to finally confront
28:15
Pompey.
28:20
The latter was gathering a huge force from
all corners of the Roman world in Thessalonica.
28:23
In total, Pompey had around 60,000 men; 9
full Legions, approximately 4,000 archers
28:28
and slingers, 7,000 cavalry, plus some auxiliaries.
28:36
There were a further 2 Legions en route from
Syria under the command of Metellus Scipio.
28:39
Pompey had spent time drilling and equipping
his men.
28:46
However, only 4 of his Legions were veterans.
28:49
Cicero, who was with Pompey, described the
bulk of the force as raw recruits.
28:52
Mixed cultures and languages made organisation
difficult.
28:58
Trusting in his numbers though, Pompey marched
to the west of Greece, preparing to create
29:03
a defensive line down the coast.
29:07
Caesar, in Brundisium, had gathered his 10
veteran legions, all understrength due to
29:10
years of campaigning, and 2 newly recruited
ones.
29:17
However, he only had enough ships to move
half his force across, and the Adriatic was
29:21
being guarded by Pompey’s vast navy under
the command of Bibulus.
29:26
With the path through Illyria being too mountainous
for rapid movement, Caesar would have to find
29:31
a way of crossing the sea.
29:36
However, he did have one key advantage.
29:38
The Roman calendar drifted over time and needed
to be constantly updated by the Pontifex Maximus.
29:44
Caesar had not performed this duty due to
his constant campaigning, but he nonetheless
29:51
knew the true date – it was late Autumn.
29:56
Bibulus was operating under the impression
that it was Winter, and had therefore kept
30:00
his ships in port, confident that Caesar would
not attempt a winter crossing.
30:05
Ordering his men to leave slaves and baggage
behind, Caesar set sail with 7 of his veteran
30:11
legions.
30:16
By the time Bibulus found out, Caesar and
his men had already landed.
30:18
Frustrated, Bibulus began a blockade, capturing
and burning 30 of Caesar’s ships as they
30:23
returned to Brundisium, and preventing the
rest from transporting the remainder of Caesar’s
30:28
army.
30:34
Soon after his landing Caesar was able to
take both Oricum and Apollonia.
30:35
He then sent Vibullius Rufus, a man who Caesar
had captured twice, once at Corfinium and
30:40
once at Ilerda, to treat with Pompey.
30:46
With his force divided, Caesar was possibly
having second thoughts and was seeking a truce,
30:50
offering the same terms as before.
30:56
Nonetheless, Caesar continued marching his
force towards Dyrrhachium, an important supply
30:58
center for the Pompeians.
31:04
Caesar’s sending Vibullius was a mistake,
as the latter met Pompey and informed him
31:07
of Caesar’s location, army composition,
and strategy and Pompey would exploit it.
31:14
He could not allow Dyrrhachium to fall into
Caesar’s hands, and pushed his men on a
31:20
forced march.
31:24
Caesar still had 70 miles and 3 rivers to
cross before reaching the city, and Pompey
31:26
could still beat him there.
31:31
The march took its toll on his more inexperienced
men, with some of his Epirote allies deserting
31:34
due to this push and their fear of Caesar,
but he was ultimately successful, reaching
31:40
Dyrrhachium first.
31:45
Labienus quickly restored morale by publicly
swearing to follow Pompey at whatever cost,
31:46
and the army encamped outside Dyrrhachium,
forcing Caesar to stop his advance, withdrawing
31:53
to a defensible position on the southern bank
of the river Apsus.
31:59
Pompey knew that Caesar had legitimacy as
consul and could force his claim to be the
32:06
rightful leader of Rome, so he had to defeat
Caesar in the field.
32:11
He moved his army south, encamping on the
opposite side of the river to Caesar.
32:16
Once again though, Pompey proved indecisive.
32:21
Caesar had just around 30,000 men, compared
to Pompey’s 60,000.
32:24
But Pompey did not trust his less experienced
men to be able to defeat Caesar’s veterans
32:29
in a strong defensive position.
32:35
A standoff continued for weeks.
32:37
Caesar used this time to his advantage.
32:43
Bibulus’ navy had to constantly come ashore
to resupply.
32:45
Caesar dispatched small raiding parties to
attack these men whenever they came ashore,
32:50
forcing Bibulus to go further and further
afield to get supplies.
32:55
Bibulus knew he could not abandon his position,
but after weeks of harassment, his men were
32:59
resorting to drinking the dew collected on
leather awnings.
33:04
In desperation, he tried to parley with Caesar,
offering to send peace envoys on his behalf
33:08
to Pompey if Caesar would stop.
33:13
Caesar countered by saying that he would want
to send his own envoys, and that if Bibulus
33:16
wanted to resupply unmolested, he would have
to allow Caesar’s transports to pass.
33:21
All these talks had done was reveal to Caesar
how effective his strategy was.
33:27
Soon after, old and now in increasingly poor
health, Bibulus died, leaving the fleet leaderless.
33:33
Antony had tried numerous times to break the
blockade, but had been stopped every time.
33:41
The Pompeians had kept him under significant
pressure, even taking a small island in the
33:47
harbour to try and trap Antony even further.
33:52
However, Antony was a talented lieutenant,
and quickly retook the island and kept his
33:55
men on alert for any opportunity.
34:01
It came in January 48BC.
34:04
Antony only had enough ships to transport
the three remaining veteran legions and one
34:07
newly recruited.
34:12
He made a dash for Caesar with these ships,
and was almost intercepted by Pompey's ships,
34:13
being forced to land at Nymphaeum.
34:18
Both Pompey and Caesar had to rush to Antony’s
position, Pompey to cut him off, and Caesar
34:23
to unite his forces.
34:29
Pompey had a head start and a shorter route,
Caesar having to march a considerable distance
34:33
in order to be able to ford the river, and
Pompey got to Antony’s position first.
34:37
He ordered his men not to light any fires
and lie in wait to try and ambush Antony as
34:43
he moved to meet Caesar.
34:49
However, some locals sympathetic to the Caesarean
cause alerted Antony, and he set up camp,
34:50
sending a messenger to inform Caesar of his
location.
34:57
When Pompey found Antony encamped and Caesar
closing in, he realised he was in danger of
35:00
being attacked on two sides and withdrew to
a safer position near Asparagium.
35:05
With his full army now joined, Caesar started
to be more aggressive.
35:14
Hearing that Scipio was now in Macedonia with
his Syrian legions, Caesar sent two Legions
35:18
under Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus to cut him
off.
35:25
The Thessalians and Aetolians had sent envoys
saying they’d support Caesar in return for
35:28
garrisons, and so Caesar sent the rookie 27th
Legion under Cassius Longinus to Thessaly
35:33
and G. Calvisius Sabinus with 5 cohorts to
Aetolia to acquire more grain.
35:39
Scipio did march his force towards Thessaly,
threatening Longinus, but Calvinus and his
35:45
Legions were able to apply enough pressure
to stop him uniting his force with Pompey.
35:51
Meanwhile, one of Pompey’s son, Gnaeus,
attacked Caesar’s ships, destroying his
35:56
whole navy in the area, leaving Caesar stranded
in Greece and cut off from Italy.
36:01
With his navy destroyed, Caesar knew he had
to force an engagement with Pompey soon.
36:09
He first attempted to do this at Asparagium,
drawing up his army for battle.
36:15
But Pompey, on the high ground, refused to
commit.
36:20
In order to force Pompey’s hand, Caesar
decided to march on Dyrrhachium.
36:24
By threatening this crucial supply centre,
Pompey would be forced to respond.
36:28
However, he did not want to reveal his strategy
to Pompey, and so planned on taking a circuitous
36:33
route to hide his intentions.
36:39
He struck camp early in the morning in April.
36:42
The plan worked: initially Pompey thought
Caesar was withdrawing due to lack of supplies,
36:45
and it was only after his scouts reported
Caesar’s movements that Pompey realised
36:51
what Caesar was planning.
36:55
He then gave chase.
36:57
Caesar marched through the night, only giving
his men a brief break, and was able to reach
36:59
Dyrrhachium first, setting up his camp on
high ground outside the city.
37:04
Pompey arrived soon after and encamped his
force on high ground just south of Caesar’s
37:09
position.
37:15
Pompey’s army outnumbered Caesar’s considerably.
37:17
Having sent part of his force to stall Scipio
and part to southern Greece, Caesar had just
37:21
35,000-40,000 men and 3,000 cavalry.
37:26
Pompey, on the other hand, had around 53,000
infantry and 7,000 cavalry.
37:31
Though Caesar’s men were more experienced,
Pompey did have the crucial advantage of having
37:37
a better supply line.
37:43
Using his navy, he could ship supplies from
Dyrrhachium to his camp, whereas Caesar would
37:45
be forced to live off the land and requisition
food from local tribes; even this would be
37:50
difficult as Pompey’s forces had already
plundered the area in the previous months.
37:56
Noting the particularly hilly topography of
the area, Caesar decided to fall back on one
38:04
of his most favoured tactics and fortify the
hills around Pompey’s position, encircling
38:09
his enemy and cutting off their supplies.
38:14
This would be a difficult task considering
the size of the armies but the natural topography
38:17
simplified the task.
38:23
When Pompey realised what Caesar was doing,
he countered by constructing his own defences.
38:27
He ordered his men to fortify as many hills
as possible, forcing Caesar to extend his
38:33
own fortifications further and further, stretching
his army.
38:38
Frequent skirmishes broke out between the
two forces, each harassing the other to try
38:43
and slow their build.
38:47
On one occasion, the 9th legion, attempting
to fortify a camp on a hilltop, came under
38:50
intense masses of missile fire from the Pompeians
on a nearby hill.
38:55
Caesar, who was with the 9th at the time,
ordered them to abandon the construction and
39:00
retreat down the slope, commanding legionary
engineers to place wattle screens to dig trenches
39:05
behind to hinder the enemy from pursuing the
legion.
39:11
He then placed slingers in commanding positions
to cover the withdrawal.
39:14
The 9th was pursued by the Pompeian missiles
and light infantry who pushed the screens
39:18
into the trenches to cross them.
39:24
Caesar, fearing a rout, ordered Antony, commander
of the 9th, to charge the Pompeians.
39:26
In a brilliant display of discipline, the
9th immediately turned, flung their javelins
39:32
and charged back up the slope.
39:37
The Pompeians, only being lightly armed, retreated
and the 9th was able to withdraw in good order.
39:40
Soon after, Caesar’s defences were complete;
it was now late June.
39:49
Due to his men’s greater experience and
discipline, he now had Pompey’s force pinned
39:54
against the sea.
39:59
This was a great achievement.
40:01
A smaller, less supplied force had never done
this before against superior numbers.
40:03
Though low on grain, Caesar did manage to
level the playing field by having control
40:08
of all the sources of fresh water in the area.
40:13
Pompey was now forced to dig wells and rely
on supplies from the sea.
40:17
Furthermore, Caesar could now send his men
further afield to gather supplies without
40:22
fear of harassment.
40:27
Pompey, however, was a skilled general and
had his own strategies to keep Caesar under
40:29
pressure, sending missile units to harass
Caesar’s lines at night, targeting the light
40:37
of their campfires.
40:42
He also attempted to bring his cavalry into
play which, stuck behind the fortifications,
40:43
had done little so far.
40:49
Boarding them onto ships, he sent them up
the coast to Dyrrhachium; from here they would
40:51
be free from the confines of the fortifications
and could forage without putting a burden
40:56
on Pompey’s supplies, as well as attack
Caesar’s line from the rear.
41:02
Around this same time, in early July, Caesar
received word that there were citizens of
41:09
Dyrrhachium who were willing to be bribed
and give him the town.
41:14
Looking to capitalise, Caesar went to the
town with a small armed escort, leaving Publius
41:18
Cornelius Sulla in charge.
41:23
However, when he reached the outskirts of
the city, he was attacked by the Pompeian
41:25
cavalry who attempted to surround Caesar,
and he only just managed to cut his way out
41:31
with his men and survive the ambush.
41:36
While Caesar was away from the main line,
Pompey had also launched three simultaneous
41:39
offensives on the fortifications.
41:44
He ordered 4 Legions to concentrate on a point
in the center of the line, and one Legion
41:47
each to attack two other points in the line.
41:52
The point the 4 Legions were attacking was
atop a hill, and well-fortified, but only
41:57
defended by 500 men of the 6th Legion.
42:02
The cohort was hard pressed, thousands of
missiles being fired into their position,
42:06
but the men held on doggedly, confident that
reinforcements would be arriving soon.
42:11
They were correct; quickly as he could, Sulla
had marched two Legions to their relief, and,
42:17
upon seeing this new force, the Pompeians’
retreated.
42:23
According to Caesar, every man of this unit
suffered some kind of injury.
42:27
The other two attacks had also been repelled,
one by 3 cohorts, and another by Caesar’s
42:32
German auxiliaries, who sallied out taking
heavy losses.
42:37
In total, Caesar claims that the Pompeians
lost 2000 men, and the Caesareans just 20,
42:41
though his own losses were surely much higher.
42:48
It is likely that the citizens of Dyrrhachium
were Pompey’s agents who had lured Caesar
42:52
into a trap.
42:57
Pompey was proving a worthy and cunning enemy,
but Caesar’s veterans had proved their mettle.
42:59
Bolstered by the confidence of their victories,
Caesar marched his army out in battle formation
43:05
to offer battle to Pompey, as a sign of strength.
43:10
Pompey also drew his army up for battle so
as not to lose face but refused to engage.
43:14
He would need to orchestrate a situation where
he could use his overwhelming numbers in order
43:20
to contend with Caesar’s veterans.
43:25
Meanwhile, Longinus and Sabinus had been successful
in taking Aetolia and had taken all the towns
43:28
between Epirus and Corinth.
43:36
They now planned to push past the Isthmus
of Corinth and into the Peloponnese but found
43:37
their path blocked by a Pompeian force.
43:43
Nonetheless, their success was crucial in
giving Caesar an abundance of supplies from
43:46
these new Greek territories.
43:52
With more successes under his belt, Caesar
again sent a peace delegation, this time to
43:54
Scipio, hoping to convince the latter to talk
to Pompey.
43:59
But even though Scipio at first listened with
interest, his officers were having none of
44:03
it.
44:09
At Dyrrhachium, Caesar fortified the two approaches
to the town, cutting the Pompeian cavalry
44:13
in the area off from the supplies there.
44:18
With the cavalry now unable to sustain themselves,
Pompey withdrew them by sea back to his entrenchments.
44:21
But Pompey’s food was still running low
and he knew he would have to soon force a
44:27
breakout.
44:32
To try and achieve this, Pompey’s men occupied
the original fortifications of the 9th, which
44:34
were between the two armies’ fortifications,
and expanded on them, making a second larger
44:39
camp that encompassed the first.
44:45
He also added a long wall from the camp to
a nearby river to secure a water supply.
44:47
This would act as a forward base from where
Pompey could strike.
44:53
Pompey suddenly had a stroke of luck when
two Gallic officers who served Caesar during
44:58
the Gallic Wars deserted.
45:02
They had detailed intel about Caesar’s defences
and knew where the weak points were, and they
45:05
now passed all this information to Pompey.
45:11
At the southern end of Caesar’s defences,
where the fortifications met the coast, Caesar’s
45:16
9th legion was stationed under Marcellinus.
45:21
After having been forced to withdraw from
their original camp, they had constructed
45:25
a second camp and fortifications that stretched
to the coast.
45:29
Behind this, they had constructed a second
line of defences facing south, preventing
45:34
Pompey landing troops behind and attacking
their rear.
45:38
To complete the defences, an extra line of
defences would need to be made between the
45:42
2 walls, linking them together and blocking
any attack from the sea.
45:47
But these defences were incomplete.
45:52
Pompey formulated his plan.
45:57
He would attack the inner wall with his legions,
landing light infantry and missile troops
45:59
to the south to attack the outer wall, while
even more troops would be landed between the
46:04
2 walls.
46:09
In doing so, he would attack the 9th from
3 sides.
46:10
This took a lot of careful planning and timing,
and he withdrew his legions from the 9th’s
46:14
old fort and behind his own lines to coordinate.
46:19
After a couple days of preparation, he was
ready.
46:25
He moved 60 cohorts of legionaries, around
30,000 men, to attack Caesar’s inner fortifications,
46:28
while the light infantry was moved by boat
behind the outer wall.
46:36
As they began their attack, more men were
simultaneously landed at the gap between the
46:40
entrenchments.
46:45
There were only 2 cohorts of the 9th present
at the time, the rest still being in camp.
46:46
These 1,000 men now found themselves under
furious attack from 3 sides by overwhelming
46:53
numbers.
46:58
Desperately they tried to form a line and
sent word to Marcellinus for help.
47:00
But the numbers were too much and the men
broke and ran.
47:04
As they did, they ran into the reinforcing
cohorts sent by Marcellinus, causing chaos
47:08
in the narrow gap between the walls.
47:13
The Pompeians closed in on Marcellinus’
camp, which was now only defended by a couple
47:16
of cohorts.
47:21
Luckily, Antony, who was close at hand, managed
to organize 6000 men, and came to their aid,
47:22
stopping the Pompeian advance.
47:29
He was soon joined by Caesar, alerted by smoke
signals, and another 6500 men.
47:31
Both forces now had most of their men committed
to this part of the line.
47:38
While Pompey's main force had been pushing
onto the 9th’s camp, more men had already
47:45
begun construction of a fort outside of Caesar’s
fortifications to the south; the blockade
47:50
had been broken.
47:55
Caesar ordered his men to begin construction
of a trench plugging the gap between the two
47:57
walls.
48:02
While this was being done, Caesar’s scouts
spotted a Pompeian Legion moving back into
48:03
the 9th Legion’s old fort.
48:08
If Pompey took this fort, he would be able
to make a link between his new fort in the
48:10
south and his old fortifications.
48:15
Caesar was determined to stop this from happening.
48:18
Gathering around 17,000 men and leaving 1000
to continue entrenching, Caesar took a circuitous
48:22
route, concealing his force as long as possible,
and then launched the attack.
48:28
His left wing, where Caesar himself was, pushed
into the fort, forcing the Pompeian Legion
48:36
back into the inner camp.
48:41
Caesar’s right wing however, had stumbled
across the Pompeian entrenchments that lead
48:43
to the river.
48:48
Thinking these were part of the fort, they
followed them looking for a gate through.
48:49
When they reached the river and realised their
mistake, they managed to break down points
48:54
in the defences, breaking through followed
by the cavalry, but they had wasted precious
48:59
time.
49:04
Pompey had seen what was happening and sent
all his heavy infantry - 25,000 men - to assist
49:07
the Legion in the fort.
49:14
The cavalry rode ahead of the legions and
fell upon the Caesarean cavalry of the right
49:15
flank, routing them almost instantly.
49:20
The infantry around them, seeing their comrades
fleeing and Pompey’s men closing in, also
49:22
ran.
49:28
The narrow passages they had made through
the entrenchments became clogged and some
49:29
men took to jumping from the ramparts into
the ditches to try and escape.
49:34
Many were trampled to death.
49:39
Inside the fort itself, Pompey’s legion
was fighting back with renewed courage.
49:43
Caesar’s left, afraid that they were about
to be trapped inside the narrow confines of
49:47
the fort, also began to break, retreating
through the gate.
49:52
Caesar tried to stop the rout, grabbing onto
fleeing standard bearers and ordering them
49:57
to stand their ground.
50:01
One, overcome by panic, even tried to stab
Caesar but he was saved by his bodyguards.
50:03
Caesar’s entire force that had been committed
to the attack had retreated, broken.
50:10
But Pompey, fearing Caesar had laid a trap,
did not pursue, and the narrow breaches in
50:16
the defences stopped his cavalry pursuing
further.
50:22
If he had, he may well have been able to to
destroy Caesar’s army.
50:26
In total, Caesar gives his dead as being 32
officers, centurions and tribunes, almost
50:30
1000 legionaries and 200 hundred horsemen.
50:36
He had also lost many men as prisoners, perhaps
as many as 1,000.
50:39
On the orders of Labienus, all of these men
were killed.
50:44
Pompey was hailed as imperator, but as a sign
of respect, refused the symbolic bay leaves
50:51
that went with the title, due to his victory
being over fellow Romans.
50:57
Caesar, after having committed almost 3 months
to the battle, pulled away his full force
51:02
from Dyrrhachium, defeated.
51:07
The Pompeians took this as a full retreat,
and word was sent to eastern kings that the
51:10
war was already won.
51:15
However, Pompey had failed to strike a killing
blow.
51:17
He had done well to break out of Caesar’s
encirclement, but had missed the opportunity
51:21
to use his overwhelming numbers.
51:26
Caesar was a dangerous enemy who could not
be left any space to regroup.
51:29
Nonetheless, Caesar was able to carry out
an ordered withdrawal of his army with only
51:34
light harassment from Pompey’s forces, pulling
back to Apollonia.
51:39
As he did so, he comforted his men, saying
that just as Gergovia had preceded Alesia,
51:45
so too would this defeat at Dyrrhachium would
be followed by a far greater victory.
51:50
Still, Caesar was in a precarious position.
52:05
The army under his command was by now heavily
depleted, and his other Legions were scattered
52:18
around Greece; two under Domitius Calvinus
around Macedonia, and one in Southern Greece
52:24
under Longinus and Sabinus.
52:30
Caesar’s defeat also meant that his supporters
would be wavering.
52:32
He needed a victory soon, and it would need
to be decisive.
52:37
Caesar’s priority was to get his army back
into fighting condition, so he first marched
52:42
to Apollonia where he left his wounded, and
sent 7 cohorts to garrison various towns and
52:49
cities under his control.
52:55
Longinus’ legion would be safe in Southern
Greece, but Domitius and his two veteran Legions
52:57
of Gallic campaigns, who had been stalling
and pinning Scipio Metellus during Dyrrhachium,
53:03
were now exposed.
53:08
All of Caesar’s plans now revolved around
merging his depleted army with Domitius: if
53:10
Pompey marched on Italy, Caesar would meet
up with Domitius and march through Illyria
53:16
to attack Pompey from the rear; if Pompey
marched on Caesar, Caesar would march to Domitius
53:22
and fight a battle with the merged army; if
Pompey besieged Caesar’s allied towns in
53:28
Greece, Caesar would march to Domitius and
attack Scipio, forcing Pompey to react or
53:33
lose an ally.
53:40
Before any of these plans could be put into
effect though, Caesar had to get to Domitius.
53:41
He began his march at full pace from Apollonia.
53:47
Pompey, however, had also come to a similar
conclusion: If Scipio was caught unsupported,
53:51
his legions would surely be lost.
54:00
Both Caesar and Pompey were once again in
a race with each other, each hoping to reach
54:03
their ally before the other.
54:08
Leaving Cato in control of Dyrrhachium, Pompey
began his march to Scipio.
54:10
As he did, he took measures to slow Caesar,
spreading the word of his defeat at Dyrrhachium
54:16
and as a result, Caesar found little support
on his march, and his scouts and messengers
54:22
found it impossible to reach Domitius.
54:28
When both armies were just 4 hours from the
positions of Domitius and Scipio, Caesar had
54:31
a stroke of luck.
54:37
Some of the Gauls who had defected to Pompey
at Dyrrhachium had yet another change of heart,
54:39
racing to Domitius and warning him of Pompey’s
approach and Caesar’s location.
54:45
Armed with this knowledge, Domitius was able
to safely reposition and merge with Caesar.
54:50
Caesar’s whole army in the region, aside
from the 27th, was now united.
54:56
Nonetheless, Pompey still held the upper hand;
he had more local support and supplies and
55:03
so his intention was now to avoid another
confrontation with Caesar.
55:10
Despite his numbers, he was still aware of
both how much more experienced the enemy forces
55:15
were compared to many of his own, and how
dangerous Caesar was in the field.
55:20
In Plutarch’s words: “Caesar and that
army, who had stormed a thousand cities, subdued
55:27
over 3000 nations, gained numberless battles
of the Germans and Gauls, taken a million
55:32
prisoners and killed as many in the field”.
55:38
Pompey was confident that, in time, Caesar
would run out of supplies and that his army
55:42
would break down.
55:48
This was known as the Fabian strategy and
had been used to great effect by Fabius Maximus
55:50
against Hannibal in the Second Punic War.
55:55
Many high-ranking members of Pompey’s army,
however, were pushing for a decisive battle.
56:00
Ahenobarbus, Scipio, Afranius, and Cicero
applied pressure to Pompey, accusing the general
56:05
variously of cowardice and even of having
been bribed.
56:12
Pompey would have to act soon or risk his
army fracturing.
56:16
Caesar, on the other hand, had wasted no time.
56:22
He marched quickly to Gomphi, an important
town with many supplies and home to the praetor
56:27
of Thessaly, Androsthenes.
56:33
Andrsothenes had previously promised his and
Thessaly’s support for Caesar but following
56:35
Dyrrhachium had defected to Pompey, closing
the gates of the city to Caesar.
56:41
Caesar did not have the supplies or time to
conduct a prolonged siege, so he decided to
56:47
storm the town.
56:52
The attack started at 3 in the afternoon and
was all over by sunset; a number of nobles,
56:54
likely including Androsthenes, committing
suicide.
57:01
Despite their defeat at Dyrrhachium, Caesar’s
veterans were still a force to be reckoned
57:05
with.
57:09
After resupplying, Caesar marched to Metropolis,
which surrendered upon hearing the fate of
57:11
Gomphi.
57:16
Many other towns soon followed suit, and Caesar
soon had enough local support to resupply
57:18
his army for the time being.
57:23
Pompey knew that if he could keep Caesar pinned
in Thessaly, he would still eventually run
57:28
out of supplies and be starved out.
57:33
But the pressure from his officers was continually
mounting.
57:36
Finally, Pompey relented to their demands
and marched his army to Pharsalus to give
57:40
battle, setting up his camp on the high ground.
57:45
Morale amongst Pompey’s men was high and
his officers were confident of victory; they
57:53
had a huge numerical advantage and had already
defeated Caesar once.
57:58
Already, talks were being had about who would
be the consuls and praetors after the war,
58:03
who would get the property of Caesar and his
allies, and who would hold Caesar’s position
58:08
of pontifex maximus after his defeat.
58:13
According to Caesar, “they were not concerned
with the means by which they could gain the
58:17
upper hand, but with the way in which they
ought to use their victory”.
58:21
Their confidence was not unfounded: Pompey’s
army numbered around 47,000 infantry and 7,000
58:26
cavalry.
58:33
Caesar’s army, on the hand, now numbered
only around 21,000 infantry and 500 cavalry,
58:34
according to his own account.
58:42
It is likely that Caesar underplayed his numbers,
and Appian suggests he had nearer 30,000 infantry
58:44
and 2,000 cavalry, as Caesar failed to add
his auxiliaries to his total.
58:51
Caesar was equally confident though.
58:59
His army was not as numerous, but it was more
experienced and disciplined.
59:01
Only a handful of Pompey’s Legions were
true veterans, most having been recruited
59:07
specifically for the war and only having seen
their first action at Dyrrhachium.
59:11
Furthermore, while the bulk of Pompey’s
infantry were Roman Legions, they were supported
59:16
by auxiliaries and allies from the East making
up the majority of light infantry and cavalry.
59:22
These men, though all skilled warriors, would
not have been trained to fight in the Roman
59:28
style, and the multitude of languages spoken
in Pompey’s army would have made coordination
59:34
difficult.
59:39
The men Caesar had under his command were
from his 10 veteran Legions, all of whom had
59:41
fought with him since his Gallic campaigns,
some for as many as 12 years.
59:46
Every day, Caesar would march his army out
of the camp to the base of Pompey’s hill,
59:54
offering battle.
59:59
Pompey each time refused to commit, pulling
his men out of camp but never moving from
00:00
the high ground; it is clear that he was still
not wholly committed to a pitched battle and
00:05
did not want to give up his advantageous position,
only being willing to commit to minor skirmishes.
00:11
While these manoeuvres were going on, Caesar
also mounted some of his infantry, drilling
00:19
them each day to increase his cavalry to 2,000;
it was still much less than Pompey’s, but
00:23
enough to at least stall them.
00:30
It had been almost a month now since the Battle
of Dyrrhachium and Caesar eventually decided
00:34
that if Pompey would not give battle, his
best strategy would be to keep his army on
00:39
the march, moving camp every day, forcing
Pompey to shadow him and wearing out Pompey’s
00:45
less disciplined force.
00:51
On the 9th August 48 BC, Caesar was about
to put this plan into action and had his army
00:53
prepared to decamp, when Pompey’s army suddenly
moved off from their position on the hill
01:00
to the plains to give battle.
01:05
It is not entirely clear why Pompey chose
to do this.
01:08
The most likely answer is that he was pressured
by his supporters who, upon seeing Caesar
01:11
ready to move, were worried Caesar would slip
away and had pressed Pompey to seize the opportunity
01:17
and give battle.
01:23
Whatever the reason, Caesar took it as a blessing
and also prepared his army for a battle on
01:25
now even terrain.
01:30
Pompey knew that his key advantages were his
cavalry and his numbers, and he drew up his
01:35
army to best maximize their effectiveness.
01:40
His infantry was formed into the classic Roman
triplex acies, but slightly deeper than the
01:43
usual 10 men depth order to better hold a
defensive line.
01:48
On his left wing, he stationed two Legions
under the command of Lucius Lentulus.
01:53
These were two of Pompey’s most experienced
Legions, one raised by himself, and the other
01:59
having been raised by Caesar for the Gallic
Wars and later handed to Pompey just before
02:04
the Civil War.
02:10
In his centre, he stationed Scipio and his
Syrian Legions, while the right would be held
02:12
by two legions combined into one with a river
to their right protecting their flank.
02:17
Within this Twin Legion were veterans from
Cilicia and from Spain, likely survivors from
02:23
the Battle of Ilerda.
02:29
They were commanded by Ahenobarbus, one of
Caesar’s most active opponents.
02:30
All these Legions were Pompey’s best men;
they would take the brunt of the attack while
02:38
Pompey’s less experienced Legions, allies
and auxiliaries, would form the two back lines.
02:44
On Pompey’s extreme left were his 7,000
cavalry under the command of Labienus, supported
02:50
by Pompey’s skirmishers and archers.
02:56
A further 2,000 infantry were held in reserve
in Pompey’s camp under the command of Afranius
02:59
and Pompey’s son, Gnaeus.
03:05
Pompey positioned himself on the left.
03:07
His plan was to use the tactic of his hero,
Alexander the Great; with Ahenobarbus and
03:10
the river guarding his right flank, Pompey’s
infantry would hold the line, while the entire
03:15
cavalry force would flank left, destroying
Caesar’s cavalry before falling on his Legions
03:21
from behind, becoming the hammer to the anvil
of the defending legions.
03:26
Caesar also drew his army up in the triplex
axis formation.
03:34
The 10th Legion, Caesar’s personal favourite
and some of his best troops, were stationed
03:38
on his right opposite Pompey.
03:43
These men were commanded by Sulla, who had
distinguished himself at Dyrrhachium, and
03:46
this was also where Caesar positioned himself.
03:51
On the left, Caesar positioned two of his
other most experienced Legions, the 8th and
03:54
9th, with the river to their left.
04:00
These two Legions had suffered so many casualties
over recent campaigns that they were ordered
04:03
to work as one Legion under the command of
Antony.
04:08
The centre would be held by the 11th and 12th
under the command of Domitius.
04:12
Caesar’s remaining Legions filled the second
and third lines, the third having strict orders
04:17
not to engage until Caesar gave the signal.
04:23
In order to match Pompey’s line, Caesar
had to stretch his own thin, only 6 men deep.
04:26
Caesar’s cavalry was stationed opposite
Pompey’s.
04:32
They were hopelessly outnumbered, and Caesar
was well aware that they would not be able
04:38
to stall Pompey’s horse for long.
04:43
As such, he also pulled 3,000 men from various
Legions, arming them with spears, forming
04:45
them into a 4th line.
04:51
Caesar was the one to begin the engagement,
ordering his front two lines to charge Pompey’s.
04:56
Caesar’s men expected Pompey’s infantry
to counter-charge, as was standard military
05:02
custom, but they instead stood fast holding
their line.
05:08
In a brilliant display of discipline, Caesar’s
men spontaneously halted mid charge and reassembled.
05:12
After a brief pause to regain their stamina,
they moved slowly forward only breaking into
05:20
a charge once again when nearer to Pompey’s
line.
05:25
Javelins were hurled from both sides, and
Pompey’s men, braced and with interlocked
05:29
shields, held the line.
05:35
An intense melee ensued with brutal close-quarters
fighting.
05:36
Pompey now put his plan into action.
05:44
Labienus led the Pompeian cavalry to Caesar’s
right flank supported by the skirmishers and
05:46
archers, smashing into the Caesarian cavalry.
05:52
Caesar’s men could not hold off the onslaught
for long, gradually being forced back, before
05:55
retreating entirely.
06:00
They had, however, performed their role.
06:02
Whilst Pompey’s cavalry had been fighting
with Caesar’s, Caesar had given the order
06:05
for his 4th line of spear-armed infantry to
wheel around to face Labienus and his cavalry.
06:10
The Pompeian cavalry had been preparing to
charge Caesar’s Legions in the rear, but
06:17
with Caesar’s cavalry acting as a screen,
they hadn’t seen Caesar’s 4th line move
06:22
into position and they now found themselves
being attacked by 3,000 heavily armoured spearmen.
06:27
Pompey’s cavalry, though numerous, were
not heavy cavalry and many were young nobles
06:33
with little experience of warfare; fighting
veteran spearmen head-on was not something
06:39
they were cut out for.
06:45
They were routed quickly, being forced to
retreat to distant high ground to try and
06:47
regroup, but the damage had already been done.
06:52
Caesar’s fourth line pushed on into Pompey’s
missile troops, easily crushing them.
06:56
As they pushed on, it was now Pompey who was
being flanked.
07:03
His left flank legions, both who had previously
fought alongside Caesar and his Legions, now
07:07
found themselves attacked on multiple fronts
by their old comrades, the 10th Legion from
07:13
the front, and the 4th line from the left
flank and rear.
07:18
It was at this point that Caesar committed
his 3rd line of fresh troops, throwing every
07:25
man he had into the battle.
07:30
Under this huge pressure, Pompey’s line
began to break, starting with the 1st and
07:32
3rd.
07:38
This was also where Pompey had stationed himself
and, almost becoming surrounded, he had little
07:39
choice but to flee the battlefield and retreat
to his camp.
07:45
The rest of Pompey’s line broke in quick
succession, Caesar’s 4th line rolling up
07:49
the flank while his fresh 3rd line pushed
from the front.
07:54
Some attempted to follow their general and
retreat to their camp, others simply fled
07:58
the battlefield.
08:03
Caesar, knowing his victory needed to be complete,
stormed the camp, easily overwhelming the
08:04
few thousand reserves and men who had retreated.
08:10
Those that had retreated from the battlefield
were soon surrounded on a hill and forced
08:14
to surrender.
08:19
Caesar had won.
08:20
By the time Caesar stormed the camp, however,
Pompey had already gone, fleeing with 30 bodyguards.
08:24
Many other high ranking Pompeians, such as
Labienus, Afranius, Scipio, and Pompey’s
08:31
son Gnaeus, had also managed to escape.
08:36
Nonetheless, not all had been so lucky.
08:40
Ahenobarbus “brave but ill-starred” had
been cut down in the retreat, possibly by
08:44
Antony himself.
08:49
Many others had been captured in Pompey’s
camp and in the immediate aftermath.
08:51
Among these was a young man, Marcus Junius
Brutus.
08:57
The son of Caesar’s mistress, Brutus was
held in high regard by Caesar, who had given
09:01
his men orders not to kill Brutus.
09:06
When Brutus surrendered, Caesar was overjoyed,
welcoming him with open arms.
09:09
Caesar showed his customary leniency to Pompey’s
soldiers as well, with more than 24,000 surrendering
09:15
to him.
09:22
In total, Caesar claims to only have lost
200 men and 30 centurions in the battle while
09:25
giving the Pompeian losses as 15,000 dead
and the 24,000 surrendered.
09:31
These numbers seem suspiciously exaggerated
and Appian suggests it was more likely 1,200
09:38
of Caesar’s men dead, and 6,000 of Pompey’s,
the rest surrendering or fleeing.
09:44
Whichever is closer to the truth, the fact
remains that Caesar’s victory was decisive.
09:51
Aside from having broken Pompey’s largest
army, he had scattered the Pompeian officers,
09:57
many fleeing to North Africa, and absorbed
many of Pompey’s surrendered men into his
10:03
army, almost doubling its size.
10:08
Pompey himself sailed first to the Greek islands
of Lesbos and Mytilene meeting his wife Cornelia
10:13
and his youngest son, Sextus.
10:19
His intent was to get his family far away
from Caesar and use his connections in the
10:22
East to rebuild an army to resist Caesar.
10:27
By the time he reached Cyprus, he had taken
out private loans and put together a fleet
10:31
along with 2,000 men.
10:36
His defeat, however, had cost him much public
support.
10:38
Pompey had initially planned to head to the
province of Syria, but they turned against
10:43
him and he was forced to look elsewhere.
10:47
He decided on Egypt.
10:51
The boy-pharaoh, Ptolemy XIII owed his throne
to Pompey; Pompey having supported Ptolemy’s
10:53
father, and guaranteeing his will that made
Ptolemy pharaoh.
10:59
Pompey had also lent a number of officers
and soldiers from his Eastern command to the
11:04
pharaoh’s army.
11:09
Confident he would find support there, Pompey
sailed to Egypt.
11:11
He was met off the coast by a small rowing
boat which would take Pompey to shore.
11:15
Aboard were a man called Savius, the head
of the Egyptian army Achillas, and an ex-officer
11:20
of Pompey’s, Lucius Septimius.
11:26
Pompey’s wife was worried about this lack
of pomp and suspected something was not right,
11:29
but Pompey was reassured by the presence of
Septimius.
11:35
Stepping off his ship, he quoted a line of
Sophocles to his wife: “He who enters a
11:39
tyrant’s door becomes his slave, even if
he leaves a free man”.
11:44
As the small boat rowed to shore, Pompey tried
to alleviate the tense atmosphere, telling
11:50
Septimius he was an old comrade; he received
only a nod of recognition in response.
11:56
Septimius then struck, stabbing the old general,
quickly followed by both Achillas and Savius.
12:02
Septimius then beheaded his corpse, throwing
the body naked into the sea.
12:08
Ptolemy, upon the counsel of his advisors,
had betrayed Pompey in order to try and win
12:14
approval from Caesar.
12:19
Pompey the Great, 3 times consul, conqueror
of the East and one of the Roman Republic’s
12:21
most prolific generals was dead.
12:27
It is worth noting how revered Pompey was.
12:30
Plutarch despaired that he and Caesar had
gone to war: “Had they been willing to enjoy
12:33
the fruits of their labours in peace and tranquillity,
the greatest and best part of the world was
12:39
their own.
12:44
If they must have victories and triumphs…what
Scythian horse, what Parthian arrows, what
12:46
Indian treasures could have resisted 70,000
Romans, led on by Pompey and Caesar?”.
12:51
Though arguably past his prime at Pharsalus,
Pompey had not at all fought badly; his plan
12:58
was solid and the best that could be done.
13:05
The reason for his defeat was not poor generalship,
but the skill and experience of Caesar and
13:08
his infantry, and the lack of experience of
Pompey’s cavalry.
13:14
Pompey and Caesar were both incredibly talented
generals, and it is telling how often the
13:19
two decided on similar strategies.
13:24
When Caesar reached Egypt having pursued Pompey,
he was first presented with Pompey’s head.
13:27
Disgusted, he turned away.
13:34
He was next presented the seal of Pompey,
at which point Caesar broke down in tears.
13:36
Though enemies in later life, it is worth
remembering that Caesar and Pompey had been
13:42
political allies for around 8 years, had effectively
ruled Rome together and had even been related
13:47
by marriage.
13:54
Caesar was well aware that, despite being
his enemy, Pompey had been a titan of his
13:56
time, worthy of his respect.
14:01
Caesar’s victory marked a turning point
in the war.
14:04
It was now the Optimates who would find themselves
on the back foot.
14:09
Nevertheless, the war was far from over.
14:13
Pompey’s staunchest supporters, Cato, Scipio,
and Pompey’s sons Gnaeus and Sextus, had
14:17
all fled to North Africa to continue the resistance.
14:23
With them also was Labienus, now undoubtedly
the best commander amongst the Optimates.
14:27
The war against Pompey was done, but the Civil
War was still ongoing and there were external
14:33
enemies daring to challenge Caesar.
14:39
In our next video we will talk about Caesar’s
battles, military and political, that took
14:41
place after the death of Pompey, so make sure
you are subscribed and pressed the bell button
14:46
in order to be notified.
14:51
These long episodes are very difficult to
make, so consider supporting us by commenting,
14:53
liking and sharing – it helps immensely.
14:58
Our videos would be impossible without our
kind patrons and youtube channel members,
15:00
whose ranks you can join via the links in
the description to know our schedule, get
15:05
early access to our videos, access our discord,
and much more.
15:09
This is the Kings and Generals channel, and
we will catch you on the next one.
15:13
歌词与翻译
即将推出！
我们正在更新此部分，敬请期待！
重点词汇
开始练习
| 词汇 | 含义 |
|---|---|
|
war /wɔːr/ A1 |
|
|
power /ˈpaʊər/ A2 |
|
|
Senate /ˈsenət/ B1 |
|
|
general /ˈdʒenrəl/ B1 |
|
|
political /pəˈlɪtɪkəl/ B1 |
|
|
military /ˈmɪləteri/ B2 |
|
|
Republic /rɪˈpʌblɪk/ B2 |
|
|
legislation /ˌledʒɪsˈleɪʃən/ B2 |
|
|
dictator /dɪkˈteɪtər/ B2 |
|
|
ally /ˈælaɪ/ B2 |
|
|
veteran /ˈvetərən/ B2 |
|
|
violence /ˈvaɪələns/ B2 |
|
|
constitution /ˌkɒnstɪˈtjuːʃən/ C1 |
|
|
triumvirate /traɪˈʌmvɪrət/ C1 |
|
|
exploit /ɪkˈsplɔɪt/ C1 |
|
|
stalemate /ˈsteɪlmeɪt/ C1 |
|
重点语法结构
即将推出！
我们正在更新此部分，敬请期待！
相关歌曲