In the previous episode, we talked about the
beginning of the Great Roman Civil War.
00:06
This first phase was underlined by the conflict
between Caesar and Pompey – 2 former allies
00:11
who became mortal enemies.
00:17
The winner was decided during the last battle
– Pharsalus.
00:19
Pompey was defeated, but that wasn’t the
end of the war, as Caesar had to contend with
00:22
the remainder of the Optimate party and external
enemies.
00:27
Welcome to the second episode on Caesar’s
civil war.
00:31
Throughout Caesar’s campaigns in Greece,
he had continued to levy Legions elsewhere,
00:43
adding the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd to his ranks.
00:49
Following the Battle of Pharsalus, he also
inducted some of Pompey’s surrendered men
00:54
into his army, making the 34th, 35th, 36th
and 37th Legions.
00:58
Caesar, by this stage of the war, now had
the numerical advantage, but the Optimate
01:04
faction still harboured some of the most influential
politicians of the day; the war was far from
01:11
over.
01:17
Caesar’s first priority after the Battle
of Pharsalus was Pompey himself.
01:19
He immediately left in pursuit, leaving Antony
to oversee the political situation in Rome.
01:25
It was the time of year where the elections
for next year’s consul would usually be
01:31
decided, and Caesar’s term as consul of
the year 48BC would be coming to an end.
01:36
Caesar would entrust Antony with ensuring
that his political power continued.
01:43
Having picked up on Pompey’s trail through
informants in Asia Minor, Caesar pursued Pompey
01:50
to Egypt with a fleet of 10 Rhodian ships,
as well as a few more from Asia Minor.
01:55
Onboard were two Legions, the 6th and 27th,
totalling just around 3,200 infantry, as many
02:02
soldiers had been lost to war and illness
over the years, and 800 cavalry.
02:09
Caesar only learned of his ex-triumvirs’
death upon his arrival in Alexandria at the
02:16
start of October 48BC, just a few days after
Pompey’s death.
02:22
According to Plutarch and Cassius Dio when
Caesar was first presented with Pompey’s
02:28
head, he turned away disgusted.
02:33
He was next presented the seal-ring of Pompey,
at which point Caesar broke down in tears.
02:36
Both historians interpret this grief differently.
02:44
Plutarch claims that it was genuine; after
all, though enemies in later life, Caesar
02:48
and Pompey had been political allies for around
8 years, had effectively ruled Rome together,
02:53
and had even been related by marriage.
03:00
Dio, on the other hand, claims that this grief
was only for show and that Caesar had always
03:02
hated Pompey from the start.
03:09
It is impossible to say which is true.
03:11
However, it is likely that Caesar was incredibly
frustrated at Pompey’s death.
03:13
Caesar had a genius for public relations;
capturing Pompey, forcing him to renounce
03:19
the senate, and then pardoning him, as was
Caesar’s habit, would have been the ultimate
03:24
coup de grace.
03:30
Instead, Pompey’s assassination made him
a martyr for the Optimate cause, something
03:31
Caesar would have surely wished to avoid.
03:36
In Rome however, Antony was able to capitalise
on the news of Pompey’s death.
03:42
Many in Rome had refused to believe that Pompey
had been defeated, but upon being presented
03:48
with Pompey’s ring, which Caesar had sent
to Rome, they finally accepted that the old
03:53
general had lost and was dead.
03:59
Rome now acclaimed Caesar as the victor, bestowing
countless honours on him.
04:02
Seizing upon the situation, Antony labeled
the Pompeiians in Africa as conspirators,
04:08
declared a national emergency, and that a
Dictator was needed.
04:13
The man chosen to be a Dictator was, of course,
Caesar.
04:18
Rather than the regular 6 months, his term
as Dictator was also set at one year, running
04:23
through until October 47BC.
04:28
In return for his continued loyalty and effectiveness,
Antony was named by Caesar as Master of Horse,
04:31
effectively his second-in-command, and was
entrusted with the governance of Italy and
04:39
Rome in Caesar’s absence.
04:43
Many Optimate politicians, such as Gaius Cassius
now returned to Rome and appealed for forgiveness
04:48
from Caesar - all were spared and welcomed
into the new regime.
04:54
Cicero also returned to Rome and was forgiven.
04:59
He returned to the Senate where he hoped to
use his influence to do what he could to preserve
05:03
the Republic.
05:08
With Caesar in Egypt now being Dictator, he
decided to turn his attention to Roman interests
05:12
in the area, namely the rulership of the kingdom,
and its debt to Rome.
05:18
As we have seen, Egypt was ruled by the boy
pharaoh Ptolemy XIII.
05:23
The pharaoh’s father, Ptolemy XII, had made
an alliance with Rome during Caesar’s tenure
05:29
as consul in 60BC.
05:34
Before his death, Ptolemy XII named his eldest
son, Ptolemy XIII, and his eldest daughter,
05:37
Cleopatra VII, as co-rulers, with Rome as
the guarantor of the will.
05:43
Tensions between the two sibling rulers quickly
escalated, however, both raising armies against
05:49
each other.
05:55
Furthermore, both had inherited the debts
of their father.
05:56
Ptolemy XII had borrowed huge sums of money
from Rome throughout his life, and by his
06:01
death, there was still an unpaid debt of 17.5
million drachmae to the Republic, which constituted
06:06
approximately half of Egypt’s yearly revenue.
06:13
Caesar was badly in need of money to pay his
growing armies and also saw an opportunity
06:17
to solidify Roman influence in the area.
06:22
As consul when the alliance with Egypt was
first made, and the current Dictator Caesar
06:26
thought it his obligation to see that pro-Roman
rule in Egypt was maintained, and that the
06:31
debt was paid.
06:37
Caesar first attempted to take a diplomatic
approach, suggesting that Ptolemy and Cleopatra
06:41
both disband their armies and that he acts
as an arbitrator to see their father’s will
06:47
fulfilled.
06:53
He also requested the debt be paid but was
willing to reduce it to 10 million drachmae.
06:54
Ptolemy, though pharaoh by title, was still
young and, as such, was being advised by a
06:59
council who effectively ruled Egypt through
their regency.
07:06
Pothinus, a eunuch, was one of the most influential
of these advisors.
07:10
It had been on his advice that Pompey had
been assassinated as a ploy to curry favour
07:15
with Caesar.
07:20
Now, he opposed Caesar’s suggestions.
07:21
He saw Caesar’s arrival as a threat to the
royal authority, and initially refused to
07:24
pay the debt.
07:29
He even went so far as to bring Ptolemies’
Royal Army into Alexandria under the command
07:31
of Achillas, one of Pompey’s killers.
07:36
This was clear defiance of Caesar’s demands
that Ptolemies army be disbanded and, in response,
07:39
Caesar sent messengers to Cleopatra, perhaps
thinking she would be able to better fulfill
07:46
his demands without requiring a regent.
07:51
Cleopatra decided to meet Caesar in secret
within Alexandria.
07:57
Plutarch gives an extraordinary account of
this meeting, in which Cleopatra, with the
08:01
help of her right-hand man Appolodorus, smuggled
herself into the city in a bed sack, laundry
08:06
bag, or carpet.
08:12
Cassius Dio gives the much more reasonable
account, that the two simply met in secret
08:13
with no reference to her being smuggled in.
08:19
Both sources, however, agree that Cleopatra
was quickly able to seduce Caesar.
08:22
Cleopatra is described as being beautiful,
charming, and above all, clever.
08:28
She was a brilliant orator, and could speak
as many as eight languages, and was the first
08:32
Ptolemaic ruler to learn Egyptian.
08:38
Caesar immediately tried to reconcile the
two monarchs, proclaiming them co-monarchs
08:41
and offering the island of Cyprus recently
annexed from the Egyptians by Rome to the
08:46
other two siblings, Arsinoe and Ptolemy XIV,
thus removing other potential claimants to
08:51
the Egyptian throne.
08:57
Pothinus, however, was not happy with this
arrangement.
08:59
He was worried that, due to Cleopatra’s
now very close relationship with Caesar, she
09:04
would be the more powerful of the two siblings,
and that Pothinus would, as a result, lose
09:10
his influence.
09:15
He began stirring up unrest in the city, even
having gold from the temples and royal treasury
09:16
melted down in a deliberate attempt to show
Caesar as being extortionate.
09:23
With the situation worsening, Caesar sent
emissaries to Achillas and the Egyptian army,
09:28
attempting to explain that he wanted only
to be an arbitrator of the will, as was his
09:34
legal right.
09:39
These emissaries were killed on Achillas orders.
09:40
The message was clear; a fight was imminent.
09:44
Caesar was aware that he did not have enough
men to fight in the open, only having the
09:49
4,000 he had brought from Greece.
09:54
Instead, he ordered his men to seize the royal
quarters where he had been housed.
09:57
Within these quarters were Cleopatra, Pothinus,
Arsinoe, and the boy pharaoh Ptolemy himself.
10:03
Having taken control of the pharaoh, Caesar
awaited Achillas next move.
10:09
Achillas’ army numbered around 20,000 plus
a further 2,000 cavalry, all experienced veterans.
10:14
Their numbers were swelled still further by
the rioting Alexandrian citizens, and even
10:22
slaves, who aligned with the army and took
up arms, making a kind of militia.
10:28
Things were descending into chaos and Caesar
was forced to begin further fortifying his
10:33
position and send messengers to allies and
his forces in Asia Minor requesting reinforcements.
10:39
What had started as a simple political mission
had now devolved into a siege.
10:46
Achillas army occupied the majority of the
city to the west, including the Euonstos Harbour,
10:52
while Caesar only held the royal quarters
and the royal harbour.
11:00
Achillas regularly attacked Caesar’s position,
probing for weaknesses, but the narrow streets
11:05
helped to mitigate the difference in numbers,
Caesar’s men consistently repulsing these
11:10
attacks.
11:15
Achillas next turned his attention to the
Great Harbour where both the Egyptian fleet
11:17
and Caesar’s fleet lay at anchor.
11:22
If Achillas could seize this harbour and the
ships, he would be able to cut off any chance
11:25
of Caesar being resupplied or receiving reinforcements.
11:30
Sending a diversionary force to attack Caesar’s
defences, Achillas simultaneously sent a larger
11:35
force to seize the harbour.
11:40
Caesar was well aware of the strategic value
of the harbour and so, leaving as small a
11:43
force as was necessary to hold the defences,
led his men to the harbour.
11:49
The fighting around the harbour was particularly
brutal and Caesar quickly realised he did
11:54
not have the men to win this fight and defend
the harbour.
11:59
Instead, Caesar effectively fought a delaying
action, holding off the Egyptian force long
12:03
enough for his men to set fire to the Egyptian
fleet and pull their own fleet back to the
12:08
Royal Harbour.
12:14
The fire was ferocious and spread quickly,
partially burning the Great Library of Alexandria.
12:18
The damage was relatively minor, fortunately,
and the library would continue for a number
12:24
of centuries afterwards.
12:29
Seizing the opportunity of having naval supremacy,
Caesar sailed a portion of his men to the
12:32
island of Pharos, which controlled access
to all Alexandria’s harbours, establishing
12:37
a small garrison there, likely around the
promenade on which the lighthouse itself was
12:43
situated.
12:48
Caesar and the rest of his forces then retreated
back to the royal quarters.
12:49
While Caesar persisted in improving his defences,
Pothinus continued his resistance from the
12:57
inside.
13:03
Secretly, he sent messages to Achillas encouraging
him to continue his attacks and plotted to
13:04
assassinate Caesar.
13:10
Caesar’s men, however, were able to catch
some of Pothinus’ messengers who were forced
13:11
to reveal the plot.
13:17
Caesar immediately had Pothinus killed.
13:19
Arsinoe, Ptolemy’s sister, had greater success,
escaping Caesar’s defences and joining Achillas.
13:21
Following this, an uneasy status-quo developed.
13:31
Caesar continued to fortify his position against
any assaults, even making makeshift battering
13:35
rams to break down the walls of houses to
keep a continuous line of defence.
13:41
The Alexandrians also constructed their own
barricades to keep Caesar penned in, some
13:47
as high as 12 meters.
13:52
Achillas frequently sent some of the militia
forces to assault various points of Caesar’s
13:54
defences to look for weaknesses, keeping his
veterans in reserve, but with little success.
14:00
Perhaps frustrated by this lack of success,
a rift began to form between Arsinoe and Achillas,
14:07
and eventually, Arsinoe had Achillas killed
and replaced by her own man, Ganymedes.
14:13
Ganymedes was a cunning general and immediately
took steps to try and break the stalemate.
14:21
Alexandria was supplied by subterranean watercourses
that ran throughout the city.
14:28
Ganymedes, therefore, ordered that those sections
that flowed into the parts of the city controlled
14:33
by Caesar be blocked, and then had these sections
polluted with sea water, rendering them undrinkable.
14:39
Such a tactic would have been difficult to
pull off, but the Alexandrians were renowned
14:46
engineers and were quickly able to complete
the project, thus making Caesar’s position
14:51
even more precarious.
14:57
Some of Caesar’s men started to panic, some
saying they should have retreated much earlier.
14:59
Fortunately for them, Caesar quickly took
control of the situation.
15:05
He made it clear that if they were to attempt
to retreat, the Alexandrians would catch them
15:09
before they could successfully evacuate everyone.
15:14
He instead ordered wells to be dug day and
night, and freshwater was soon found, avoiding
15:17
disaster.
15:24
Though the situation had been quickly rectified,
it was clear that Ganymedes was a dangerous
15:25
enemy, not to be taken lightly.
15:31
As time passed Caesar’s situation in Alexandria
improved.
15:37
His lieutenant in Asia Minor, Domitius Calvinus,
had received Caesar’s request for reinforcements
15:41
and had responded by dispatching two Legions,
the 37th by sea, and the 35th by land.
15:47
The 35th was still far from reaching Egypt,
but the 37th had now arrived.
15:55
Strong winds had prevented them pulling into
Alexandria’s harbour, instead making land
16:01
further down the coast and sending a small
boat to inform Caesar of their arrival.
16:07
Caesar badly needed these men and so, leaving
all his infantry to hold their positions in
16:12
Alexandria, he left with his fleet and their
respective crews to meet the 37th.
16:18
En route, he dispatched small parties to collect
what water they could, but these were attacked
16:23
by Egyptian cavalry patrols and captured.
16:30
The Egyptians, thus finding out Caesar’s
position, manned a number of small vessels
16:33
with their infantry, hoping to catch Caesar
separated from his Legions.
16:38
Caesar was not eager for battle; he needed
all his ships for the 37th and with no infantry
16:43
or marines on his ships, the Egyptians would
have the advantage in boarding.
16:49
He tried to slip away.
16:54
A Rhodian ship, however, drifted too far from
the formation and was caught by the Egyptians,
16:57
forcing Caesar to turn to rescue them.
17:04
Caesar, in his account, is rather damning
of these Rhodians for being caught, but also
17:07
notes that they fought bravely with remarkable
seamanship.
17:12
They were able to buy enough time for the
rest of Caesar’s fleet to close in.
17:16
With no heavy infantry to carry out the customary
Roman tactic of boarding an enemy, Caesar
17:21
trusted his crew’s seamanship to ram and
cripple as many ships as possible while avoiding
17:27
boarding.
17:32
The plan worked, and the superior ships of
Caesar’s fleets were able to sink one ship
17:33
and capture another.
17:39
With night closing in, the Egyptians gave
up the battle and retreated.
17:41
Caesar was able to continue to the 37th, adding
a much needed 5,000 men to his numbers, towing
17:46
their transports into harbour and arriving
back in Alexandria the following morning.
17:52
The Alexandrians were disheartened by this
reversal, but Ganymedes was resilient and
18:00
decided that he needed to rob Caesar of his
naval capacity.
18:05
More than a hundred ships had been burnt by
Caesar in the harbour, but not all were beyond
18:10
repair.
18:15
He ordered the Alexandrians to make repairs
on as many ships as possible.
18:16
The citizens and soldiers of Alexandria committed
wholly to the task, even going so far as to
18:20
pull wood from the buildings of Alexandria
to suit their needs.
18:27
After just a few days, Ganymedes had a fleet
of 27 warships and a number of small ships
18:31
ready for duty and prepared for battle.
18:37
Caesar was well aware of the importance of
naval supremacy, and also began drawing up
18:40
his fleet, approximately 19 warships and 15
smaller vessels, manning them with infantry
18:45
from the Legions.
18:52
With Caesar setting off from the Royal Harbour,
and Ganymedes from the Eunostos the two fleets
18:53
met just off the coast of the Pharos island.
18:59
Caesar and Ganymedes both drew their fleets
into two lines.
19:04
Between the two fleets were shoals, with a
narrow channel being the only path through.
19:08
Both sides held their position, neither wanting
to be caught being the first to pass through
19:14
this channel.
19:19
Eventually, the Rhodian commander, Euphranor,
a skilled and well-known admiral, offered
19:20
to break the stalemate.
19:26
He insisted that he and his men would be able
to push through and hold for long enough for
19:28
Caesar’s remaining ships to pass through
the channel.
19:33
Caesar allowed this, sending Euphranor with
4 Rhodian ships through the channel.
19:36
They quickly passed through, and formed a
line to receive the Egyptian ships rapidly
19:41
closing in, delaying long enough for the rest
of Caesar’s ship to make it through the
19:46
channel.
19:50
Caesar was extremely admiring of the Rhodian's
skill and bravery, saying that not one ship
19:52
was boarded or had its oars broken, each time
meeting their enemy head-on.
19:58
With Caesar’s fleet now through the channel,
he was fully committed.
20:02
The channel would block any chance of an organised
retreat, Caesar would need a win.
20:09
Caesar had made this clear to his men prior
to the battle, stressing that the fate of
20:15
the Egyptian campaign rested on their soldiers.
20:20
Though the Alexandrians were renowned sailors,
the Romans did have a crucial advantage.
20:23
The coast and shoals meant there was little
room to manoeuvre, not only negating Ganymedes
20:29
numerical advantage, but also preventing his
men from capitalising on their superior seamanship.
20:34
Instead, the ships were forced into close
quarters combat with numerous boarding parties.
20:41
This was the style of naval warfare the Romans
excelled at, effectively making a naval battle
20:47
a land battle, where the superior skill and
training of the Legions could truly come into
20:54
its own.
21:00
By the end of the battle, 2 Egyptian ships
had been captured, 3 sunk and the remnants
21:02
being forced to retreat back to harbour.
21:08
Seeking to capitalise on his naval supremacy,
Caesar immediately turned his attention to
21:13
the Pharos island.
21:18
The island was crucial for controlling access
to the harbours and was linked to the mainland
21:20
by a bridge which connected two moles, one
extending from the island, one from the mainland.
21:26
As has already been mentioned, Caesar had
already stationed a small garrison on the
21:32
promenade on the east of the island, and he
now saw a chance to completely control the
21:37
Pharos island.
21:41
Leaving just a few cohorts to hold the now
completed defences in the city, Caesar ordered
21:43
10 cohorts - approximately 5,000 men, some
light infantry and his best Gallic cavalry
21:48
to their transports to prepare for an amphibious
assault.
21:55
He then ordered them to attack, at the same
time attacking the island’s garrison with
21:59
his warships from the west.
22:03
The fighting on the island was some of the
bloodiest so far.
22:05
The narrow streets and rooftops were ideal
for the defenders, while Caesar’s men disembarking
22:08
from the ships were forced to wade through
shallow waters and across a beach under constant
22:15
missile fire.
22:20
Caesar’s tactic of attacking from two sides
had been effective in splitting the island's
22:21
defenders however, and finally the Romans
were able to force the Alexandrians to retreat
22:26
across the mole back to Alexandria.
22:32
The retreat was not organised, many choosing
to jump from the bridge and mole and swim
22:35
to Alexandria, rather than be caught in the
bottleneck.
22:40
Caesar gives the Alexandrian losses as being
6,000 captured and killed.
22:44
Following this victory, Caesar fortified defences
around the bridge controlling access to the
22:52
Pharos, the Alexandrians garrisoning the bridge
linking the mainland city to the mole.
22:57
This bridge had a large arch, through which
the Alexandrians could potentially send ships.
23:02
In order to stop the Egyptians being able
to harass his own ships, Caesar would need
23:09
to control this bridge.
23:14
The day after taking the island, he first
sent ships with artillery and archers to attack
23:16
the Alexandrian garrison holding the bridge,
forcing them to retreat, and then landed himself
23:21
and 3 cohorts, about 1, 500 men, on the mole.
23:27
These men were then ordered to build a rampart
to defend the bridge from the Alexandrian
23:32
side, while men from the Pharos brought up
stones from destroyed buildings to block the
23:37
arch of the bridge.
23:42
All seemed to be going well, when the Alexandrians
suddenly made a huge push from the city to
23:43
retake the bridge, simultaneously bringing
up light ships to try and land some of their
23:49
own men on the mole.
23:54
With Caesar on the mole, some of his ships
tried to take the initiative themselves, landing
23:58
marines, slingers and archers on the mole.
24:03
Initially, these missiles were effective at
fending off the Alexandrian light ships, but
24:06
eventually the ships bypassed their position,
landing behind them on the mole.
24:10
These lightly armed troops were quickly outfought
by the Alexandrians and panic ensued as they
24:16
attempted to retreat back to their ships.
24:21
Caesar and the three cohorts were now caught
in a pincer.
24:24
Seeing their allied light infantry in disarray,
the cohorts also began to break.
24:27
Some fought a desperate last stand and were
cut down, many more desperately tried to retreat
24:33
to their transports.
24:38
Amongst these was Caesar.
24:40
Due to the sheer number and panic, however,
many of these transports began to capsize.
24:42
Thinking fast, Caesar was forced to strip
his armour and dive off the boat, swimming
24:48
to his nearby ships to save his life.
24:53
The battle had been a disaster for Caesar.
24:56
Though the Pharos island was in Caesar’s
hands, the bridge was not and so the Alexandrians
24:59
could still use the arch to harass his own
ships.
25:04
Moreover, according to Caesar himself, he
lost 400 legionaries and another 400 sailors
25:08
and marines.
25:14
Seeking to capitalize on their good fortune
the Alexandrians sent emissaries to Caesar,
25:17
requesting Ptolemy be returned to them, in
exchange for an end in the hostilities.
25:23
Caesar relented, and handed the pharaoh over,
with the understanding that Ptolemy would
25:28
then negotiate peace terms.
25:33
The young king betrayed Caesar, however, and
took control of the army, continuing the assaults
25:35
on Caesar’s defences.
25:41
The decision to hand over Ptolemy was clearly
a mistake.
25:43
In his own account, Caesar relays how his
own officers and centurions strongly criticised
25:47
him for his lack of judgement and trust in
the king.
25:52
Caesar attempts to justify his decision, claiming
“it was part of a far-sighted strategy’
25:56
which his men did not understand, and that
Ptolemy had cried and begged Caesar to let
26:01
him stay.
26:06
This seems a clear point where Caesar was
using his narrative to try and revise the
26:07
events and put a positive spin on things.
26:13
It is far more likely, given Caesar’s situation,
that he was grasping at straws by letting
26:16
Ptolemy go and, judging by how much Caesar
attempts to mask this, he was well aware that
26:21
he had made a mistake.
26:27
Nevertheless, roughly a month later, around
the end of February/start of March, Caesar’s
26:31
fortunes began to turn.
26:37
His allies in Asia Minor had been rallying
a force together and marching through Syria
26:39
and the Levant to Egypt, while supplies were
being sent by ship to Caesar.
26:44
Word of this had already reached the Alexandrians,
however, who sent a fleet to intercept the
26:49
supplies.
26:54
As soon as Caesar heard of this, he sent his
own ships, commanded by Tiberius Nero and
26:55
Euphranor to defend his allies' supply ships.
27:00
Though the Romans were able to win the battle,
Euphranor’s ship was surrounded and the
27:03
Rhodian was killed.
27:08
The army was also having success.
27:12
The force was around 13,000 strong and commanded
by Mithridates of Pergamum, an experienced,
27:15
talented general and close friend of Caesar.
27:21
He had now made it to the Nile Delta, having
already stormed and seized the strategically
27:25
important town of Pelusium.
27:30
An Egyptian force was hastily gathered and
sent to attack Mithridates at the river, hoping
27:32
to either destroy his army or at the very
least, prevent him from reaching Alexandria
27:38
and supporting Caesar.
27:43
Mithridates had been well trained in the Roman
style of warfare however and successfully
27:45
fortified his position, holding the Egyptians
in check and inflicting heavy casualties as
27:50
he did so.
27:56
Messengers were sent to both Caesar and Ptolemy
of these events, both learning of them around
28:00
the same time.
28:04
Ptolemy knew Mithridates had to be crushed,
or else risk Mithridates attacking his force
28:06
in Alexandria from the rear while they were
busy besieging Caesar.
28:11
Similarly, Caesar was well aware that any
hope of victory now rested in the Mithridates
28:16
army.
28:21
Both decided to move to the Nile, Ptolemy
leaving just the militia in Alexandria, and
28:22
sailing his army down the river, Caesar leaving
a light garrison in Alexandria before taking
28:27
the sea route.
28:32
Ptolemy had the quicker route and was able
to reach the Nile Delta before Caesar, merging
28:34
with the force already there and taking a
strong defensive position on high ground with
28:39
their rear protected by the Nile, one flank
by rocky high ground, and the other flank
28:44
by marsh land.
28:50
Caesar arrived shortly afterwards, before
Ptolemy could launch on Mithridates position,
28:54
meeting Mithridates approximately 7 miles
away from Ptolemies camp.
29:00
In order to reach the king, they would need
to ford a small river.
29:04
Ptolemy sent a force of cavalry and light
infantry to this river, hoping to harass Caesar
29:09
and his allies as they crossed.
29:14
However, Caesar’s Germanic and Gallic cavalry,
by now well experienced in river crossings,
29:16
had been sent ahead of Caesar's main army,
crossing the river undetected.
29:21
Meanwhile, Caesar had his Legions cut down
trees, placing them across the river as makeshift
29:26
bridges and ordered them to charge across.
29:31
The Legions poured across, falling upon the
Egyptian light infantry and cavalry.
29:35
As they did, Caesar’s Gallic and Germanic
cavalry appeared, charging into the Egyptian
29:40
flank, routing them almost immediately.
29:45
Only a few managed to make it to Ptolemies
camp, the rest being cut down by Caesar’s
29:48
cavalry.
29:53
As was his custom, Caesar encamped close to
the enemy stationing his men at the bottom
29:54
of the hill, eager to tempt his enemy into
battle.
29:59
With Ptolemy in command of the army, a victory
here would put an end to all Egyptian resistance.
30:03
Caesar had with him the 37th Legion, the remnants
of the 6th and 27th, plus the reinforcements
30:12
brought by Mithridates; roughly 20,000 infantry
and another 1,000 cavalry.
30:18
Ptolemies force was slightly larger, perhaps
27,000, including the 20,000 veterans who
30:25
had been at Alexandria, and 2,000 cavalry.
30:31
With Ptolemies force being larger and holding
the better position, Caesar attempted to draw
30:35
the young king out of position by attacking
a nearby hamlet that had been lightly garrisoned
30:41
by Ptolemies men.
30:46
He committed his whole force to this attack
routing the garrison, but Ptolemy did not
30:48
take the bait.
30:54
Caesar ordered his men to pursue the fleeing
Egyptians up the hill to Ptolemies position,
30:55
hoping that the panicked garrison might trigger
a mass rout.
31:01
Ptolemies men held their positions however,
and Caesar’s men now found themselves in
31:05
a tough uphill battle against an entrenched
enemy.
31:09
Some of his men tried to circle around the
Egyptian position, attempting to attack Ptolemy
31:13
from the rear, but these men were soon peppered
by missiles not just from the high ground,
31:18
but also from Ptolemies ships on the river.
31:24
Effectively cut off from the rest of Caesar’s
force, these men took brutal casualties, having
31:27
little choice but to try and hide behind their
shields.
31:32
So far, Caesar was making little headway and
his men were starting to lose ground.
31:38
As they were being pushed back though, the
Alexandrians were pushing forward, out of
31:44
their camp and slowly moving further off the
high ground.
31:49
Noticing this crucial error, Caesar sent a
detachment of cohorts to skirt around the
31:53
battle lines to seize Ptolemies camp.
31:57
They quickly stormed the defences, overrunning
the few Egyptians there, before rushing down
32:01
the hill to attack Ptolemies main force in
the rear.
32:06
This move proved decisive, triggering mass
panic along Ptolemies line which quickly broke.
32:09
They retreated in chaos to the river, piling
onto their ships, many of which capsized in
32:15
the confusion.
32:21
Many Egyptians, weighed down by their armour,
drowned in the river, among them the young
32:22
king Ptolemy himself.
32:27
Wasting no time after this victory, Caesar
immediately rode to Alexandria with his cavalry,
32:32
proclaiming his success and Ptolemies death.
32:38
With the king dead, the militia there immediately
surrendered.
32:41
Caesar had won.
32:45
We do not know how many casualties there were
on either side.
32:46
Caesar’s men who had tried to attack the
camp from the Nile side are said to have taken
32:50
heavy casualties, and Caesar’s force had
been forced to fight a difficult battle.
32:56
Given these circumstances, an approximation
of around 1,000-2,000 losses for Caesar seems
33:02
probable, and perhaps as many as 10,000 for
the Egyptians.
33:08
Following the campaign Caesar embarked on
a 3-month long pleasure cruise with Cleopatra
33:15
down the Nile where he, in Appian’s words,
“generally enjoyed himself with her.”
33:20
Soon afterwards, Cleopatra gave birth to a
boy, Ptolemy XV, who would later be nicknamed
33:26
Caesarion.
33:32
Though Caesar never officially acknowledged
Caesarion as being his son, his birth, in
33:33
June 47BC, would align with Cleopatra’s
first meeting with Caesar at the end of 48BC.
33:41
Cleopatra insisted that Caesar was the father,
and it is also worth remembering that Cleopatra
33:47
had spent most of that time besieged in Alexandria
and so did not have access to a large number
33:53
of suitors.
33:59
Cleopatra agreed to pay the 10 million drachmae
debt requested by Caesar and was named co-ruler
34:00
with her brother Ptolemy XIV in sibling marriage,
naming both friends of Rome.
34:07
In total, Caesar’s escapade in Egypt had
taken a full 9 months.
34:15
Plutarch calls it “not necessary…inglorious
and full of peril”.
34:20
It is hard to disagree with this assessment.
34:24
Though Caesar had successfully had the Egyptian
debt paid and a pro-Roman rule installed,
34:27
he had wasted a lot of time and his attention
had been badly needed elsewhere.
34:33
In the 9 months Caesar was in Egypt, Antony,
though talented on the battlefield, had proved
34:38
to be a poor governor.
34:44
His refusal to cancel outstanding debts was
unpopular not only with senators, but also
34:46
with plebs and veterans, the core of Caesar’s
supporters.
34:51
The unrest this caused was so great, that
Antony had resorted to bringing soldiers into
34:56
the city of Rome itself in a desperate attempt
to contain the situation.
35:01
Caesar’s lieutenant Quintus Cassius Longinus,
who had been left to govern Hispania Ulterior,
35:07
had been equally disastrous.
35:14
His tyrannical governance of the province
had even led to a short-lived pro-Optimate
35:16
rebellion.
35:22
Furthermore, some of his men had rebelled
and proclaimed Marcellus as the new praetor
35:23
instead.
35:28
The province of Illyricum had also been stirred
to revolt by Marcus Octavius, who was constantly
35:29
assaulting towns in the area.
35:35
In Asia Minor, Pharnaces II of Pontus, another
son of Mithridates VI, had taken advantage
35:38
of the chaos caused by the Civil War, attacking
a number of Roman allies.
35:44
Meanwhile, throughout the past 9 months, Cato,
Scipio, the sons of Pompey and Labienus had
35:50
been consolidating their strength in North
Africa, amassing a vast army.
35:57
Caesar had entered Alexandria as Dictator
and effectively master of the Roman world,
36:03
save for a rebellious faction in North Africa.
36:08
He was now leaving with dissent, war, and
rebellion in North Africa, Spain, Italy, Illyricum,
36:11
and Asia Minor.
36:17
Leaving three Legions in Egypt, Caesar took
the remains of the veteran Sixth and marched
36:19
for Asia Minor through Syria.
36:29
At the end of 48BC, while Caesar was besieged
in Alexandria, the fruits of his victory at
36:34
Pharsalus seemed to be crumbling.
36:41
Rome, governed by Antony, was in chaos, the
Pompeian faction in North Africa was rebuilding
36:43
a large army and there had been rebellions
and pro-Pompeian insurrections in Spain and
36:49
Illyria.
36:56
Caesar had continuously been recruiting to
try and contain the situation, reinstituting
36:57
Legions 1, 2, 3 and 4, some of which were
made primarily of ex-Pompeian soldiers, but
37:02
the problems persisted.
37:09
One of the most pressing of these problems
was in Asia Minor.
37:12
Son of the infamous enemy of Rome Mithridates
VI, the king of Bosphorus Pharnaces II was
37:15
eager to return Pontus under his control and
he had seized upon the opportunity presented
37:22
by the Civil War and attacked a number of
Rome’s allies in the area.
37:28
Caesar’s victory could not be so quickly
tarnished by a foreign king, Pharnaces had
37:33
to be dealt with.
37:39
With Caesar trapped in Alexandria, the responsibility
fell to his long-time ally, Gnaeus Domitius
37:41
Calvinus.
37:49
Domitius had distinguished himself in Caesar’s
Greek campaign, keeping Scipio’s army pinned
37:51
and commanding Caesar’s centre at Pharsalus.
37:57
In recognition of this service, he had been
appointed governor of the Roman province of
38:01
Asia.
38:05
Soon after his appointment, Pharnaces had
gone on the warpath, invading Lesser Armenia
38:07
and Cappadocia, lands that belonged to the
allied Roman kings Deiotarus and Ariobarzanes
38:12
respectively.
38:19
Both had previously supported Pompey in the
war against Mithridates and the Civil War,
38:20
but had been allowed to maintain their positions,
so long as they paid tribute to Caesar and
38:26
the Republic.
38:31
In late 48BC Deiotarus came to Domitius, requesting
Rome’s assistance, arguing that he would
38:32
not be able to pay this tribute if Pharnaces
was victorious.
38:40
Domitius immediately sent a delegation to
the king of Bosphorus, demanding that he stop
38:46
his attack and withdraw.
38:52
To reinforce this demand, Domitius also began
raising an army.
38:54
He had originally been assigned 3 Legions
by Caesar, the 35th, 36th and 37, formed from
38:59
some of Pompey’s men after Pharsalus, but
2 of these Legions had already been dispatched
39:06
to reinforce Caesar, leaving just the 36th
in Asia.
39:12
To increase his numbers, Domitius hastily
levied a Legion from Pontus.
39:17
Deiotarus, who had adopted the Roman military
style training his men in the Legionary tradition,
39:22
supplied 2 more Legions of his own plus 100
cavalry, with Ariobarzanes contributing a
39:28
further 10,000 infantry and 100 cavalry.
39:35
In total, Domitius' army numbered around 30,000
infantry and 1,000 cavalry.
39:38
All now marched to Pontus to put pressure
on Pharnaces.
39:45
Pharnaces soon replied to Domitius’ message,
stating that he had withdrawn from Cappadocia
39:50
but had taken Lesser Armenia for himself,
claiming it as his right through his father’s
39:57
conquests, offering to wait until Caesar arrived
to mediate the matter.
40:03
In reality, Pharnaces had only abandoned Cappadocia
because it was too distant from his homeland
40:09
to be practically defended, while Lesser Armenia
was next to his own kingdom.
40:14
Pharnaces had heard that Domitius had sent
2 of his 3 Legions to Caesar and was confident
40:21
that the Roman general would not have the
quality or quantity of army needed to stop
40:27
him.
40:32
Pharnaces’ confidence was well founded;
his army was well trained and experienced,
40:33
many being veterans of over 20 battles.
40:38
Furthermore, though the exact size of his
army is unknown, modern estimates put it at
40:41
around 20,000 and he certainly had a huge
cavalry advantage over Domitius.
40:46
Domitius saw this offer for what it really
was, a façade.
40:51
He mustered his army and marched to Lesser
Armenia, keeping to high ground to prevent
40:58
any potential ambushes.
41:03
As he marched, Pharnaces sent a number of
delegations, hoping to bribe Domitius with
41:06
offers of money and treasure.
41:11
Domitius was resilient, however, replying
to Pharnaces that by attacking Rome’s allies,
41:13
he had insulted the Republic and would now
pay the consequences.
41:19
Domitius pushed his army hard, ordering a
number of long marches, soon arriving in Lesser
41:24
Armenia.
41:29
He encamped seven miles from the city of Nicopolis,
where Pharnaces had gathered his army.
41:31
The city was located on a plain, but encircled
on two sides by mountains.
41:39
In order to reach the city, Domitius would
have to march through a pass in these mountains,
41:45
presenting Pharnaces with an ideal situation
to ambush his enemy.
41:50
Choosing his best infantry and almost all
his cavalry, he had them lie in wait in the
41:55
pass.
42:00
To better conceal his plan, Pharnaces also
ordered cattle and peasants into the defile
42:01
to maintain a look of normalcy.
42:07
He also kept up his façade of finding a diplomatic
solution, sending constant peace envoys to
42:09
Domitius.
42:15
Unfortunately for Pharnaces, these envoys
somewhat backfired, with Domitius staying
42:16
in camp for a number of days attempting to
genuinely negotiate with Pharnaces’ ambassadors.
42:22
As the days passed, Pharnaces grew increasingly
worried that his ambush would be discovered.
42:28
Not wanting to risk his men, Pharnaces ordered
them to withdraw from their positions.
42:34
He would have to wait to fight a battle in
the open.
42:40
He did not have to wait long.
42:45
Domitius saw that peace would be impossible
and marched his force closer to Nicopolis
42:47
and began to fortify a second camp.
42:52
As they began to encamp, Pharnaces’ army
poured out of the city and drew up for battle.
42:56
Pharnaces knew that his cavalry was his greatest
advantage and that they would be wasted in
43:01
the city, but the plains in front of the city
would be ideal terrain for them.
43:07
Hastily, Domitius completed his camp, drawing
his army inside.
43:12
It is probable that Domitius had originally
planned to besiege Pharnaces inside Nicopolis
43:17
and so negate his cavalry advantage; now it
seemed that the tables would be turned and
43:23
Domitius would be the one besieged in the
fort.
43:29
The following night, Pharnaces intercepted
messengers from Caesar telling Domitius of
43:35
his situation in Alexandria and requesting
immediate reinforcements.
43:40
Seeing a golden opportunity, Pharnaces let
these messengers go, sending them to Domitius.
43:45
Domitius was now caught in a dilemma; on the
one hand he could keep his force inside the
43:50
fort, which would better preserve his army
but would mean he would not be able to reinforce
43:57
Caesar possibly jeopardizing the whole Alexandrian
campaign; on the other, he could leave the
44:02
fort to try and force a quick battle against
Pharnaces before rushing to Caesar, but would
44:09
first have to fight in open terrain where
Pharnaces’ cavalry would have an advantage.
44:14
Pharnaces had put Domitius in a dangerous
position.
44:21
Seeking to capitalise on it, Pharnaces ordered
two long trenches to be dug from the walls
44:26
of Nicopolis to the front of his lines, each
4 feet deep.
44:31
He placed his infantry between the two trenches
in one unbroken line, with a further three
44:36
lines of infantry each behind the centre and
flanks.
44:42
His cavalry was put on the extreme flank outside
of the trenches.
44:45
Pharnaces had effectively constructed a funnel
that would force a frontal attack and protect
44:50
the flanks of his infantry, while still allowing
his cavalry room to manoeuvre.
44:56
It was a brilliant tactic and would be very
difficult for Domitius’ army to crack.
45:01
Nevertheless, faced with the option of saving
Caesar or preserving his army, Domitius chose
45:08
Caesar and decamped for battle.
45:15
He drew his force up in the triple axis, the
36th on the right, the rookie Pontic Legion
45:18
on the left, Deiotarus’ Legions in the centre,
and Ariobazarnes’ men making up the back
45:24
lines.
45:30
Domitius gave the order and his army charged.
45:31
The 36th, partly made of Pompeian veterans,
fought brilliantly against the cavalry opposite
45:34
them, forcing a way through to the walls of
Nicopolis and even beginning to cross the
45:40
trench, attacking Pharnaces’ centre.
45:45
However, these were the only men in Domitius’
army having any success.
45:48
It is not entirely clear what happened to
the Pontic Legion, but it seems they tried
45:52
to force a way through the cavalry on their
wing, as the 36th had done, but had not been
45:57
successful and were pushed into the trench,
being attacked from two sides by cavalry and
46:02
infantry.
46:08
The centre was even less successful; Deiotarus’
Legions and Ariozabarnes’ men had put up
46:09
little resistance, breaking soon after engaging
Pharnaces’ infantry.
46:16
With the Roman left and centre now broken,
Pharnaces’ army now started to surround
46:23
the 36th legion.
46:28
Its experience proved invaluable, however.
46:30
Forming a fighting circle called orbis, with
the high ranking officers including Domitius
46:34
in the centre, the 36th cut their way out
of the encirclement, fighting their way to
46:39
nearby rocky hills.
46:44
With his victory secure and given the difficult
terrain, Pharnaces did not press them.
46:47
The 36th had lost just 250 men, but Domitius’
allies had suffered many more, Deiotarus’
46:54
men alone losing around 5,000.
47:01
The Pontic Legion had also taken heavy casualties;
Caesar says that a number of Roman nobles
47:05
were killed in the battle, and it is likely
that they were officers of the Pontic Legion.
47:10
Gathering the remnants of his army, Domitius
retreated back to his province of Asia.
47:17
Pharnaces immediately capitalised on his victory,
seizing his father’s old kingdom of Pontus
47:22
which Pompey had claimed for Rome.
47:29
He stormed a number of Roman-held towns in
early 47BC, putting many Roman citizens to
47:31
death, castrating Roman boys, and plundering
the treasuries.
47:38
He would not be able to enjoy his victory
for long, however.
47:42
Roman Asia was probably saved by a revolt
early in the Summer led by Pharnaces son-in-law
47:46
Asander, which drew Pharnaces north postponing
the invasion.
47:52
Caesar by now had won the battle of the Nile,
received word of Domitius' defeat and was
47:57
en route to personally handle the situation.
48:03
Caesar arrived in Syria, spending a few days
sorting out administrative problems in the
48:08
province, before leaving his kinsman Sextus
Caesar in control and sailing to Cilicia.
48:13
Here, he again spent a few days settling local
problems, before pushing on into Galatia where
48:19
he met Deiotarus.
48:25
The latter was somewhat nervous of Caesar
as he had previously sided with Pompey.
48:27
The king sought forgiveness, explaining that
due to his position in the East, he had little
48:33
choice but to support Pompey.
48:38
With customary clemency, Caesar forgave Deiotarus,
though he did chide him for his decision.
48:41
Caesar mustered the remnants of Domitius’
army in Pontus at the end of July 47BC and
48:50
prepared to march.
48:56
The 6th Legion, that he had brought with him
from Alexandria had taken many casualties
48:58
over the years, and more still had been taken
seasick after sailing from Syria to Cilicia,
49:03
reducing their numbers to less than 1,000.
49:09
The rest of the army was formed by the one
remaining Legion of Deiotarus, the remnants
49:11
of the Pontic Legion and 36th.
49:17
In total, Caesar’s army may have numbered
somewhere around 15,000, with the 6th and
49:19
some of the 36th the only ones who could be
considered veterans.
49:26
With Pharnaces’ army being larger and more
experienced, this would seem likely to be
49:31
a long and difficult campaign for Caesar.
49:36
Caesar’s arrival forced the Bosphoran king
to stop his movement to the north.
49:40
Pharnaces was well aware that Caesar was badly
needed elsewhere, namely in Rome itself.
49:47
Aiming to exploit this, Pharnaces attempted
to stall Caesar, as he had done with Domitius,
49:52
hoping that Caesar would be forced to return
to Rome soon to deal with the turmoil there.
49:59
Numerous peace delegations were sent to Caesar,
highlighting the fact that Pharnaces had not
50:05
provided auxiliaries to Pompey and that Pharnaces
wanted a peaceful resolution.
50:10
In response, Caesar said that he would be
willing to forgive Pharnaces, but in exchange
50:15
demanded his full surrender and the return
of all taken lands and money.
50:21
Still wanting to buy as much time as possible,
Pharnaces initially agreed to these demands,
50:27
but deliberately delayed, pushing back the
date he planned to withdraw his troops.
50:33
Caesar quickly saw through this charade.
50:38
Never one for wasting time, he decided to
follow his tried and tested method; to find
50:41
and engage his enemy as quickly as possible.
50:46
Pharnaces had made camp near the town of Zela,
on the site of a famous victory won by his
50:50
father against the Romans.
50:56
His camp was in a strong defensive position
on high ground, with a track linking his camp
50:58
to the town to maintain his supply line, and
a valley protecting his flank.
51:03
Caesar initially camped 5 miles from this
location, but upon his scouts reporting Pharnaces’
51:09
position, he determined to seize the high
ground opposite Pharnaces on the other side
51:15
of the valley.
51:20
Supplies needed to build ramparts were collected
in the first camp, and then orders given for
51:22
the Legions to march quickly, without baggage,
seizing the new location before Pharnaces
51:27
had a chance to react.
51:32
The supplies were then brought up from the
first camp, and the Legions began work on
51:34
constructing ramparts along the high ground.
51:38
Suddenly, Pharnaces drew his army out of camp.
51:41
Given the terrain between the two camps, Caesar,
in his account, is somewhat baffled by this.
51:47
Nevertheless, he drew up one line of infantry
in front of the workers to protect them, confident
51:52
that Pharnaces would not risk an attack.
51:58
However, Pharnaces suddenly began marching
his men down his side of the valley in battle
52:01
formation.
52:06
Again, Caesar in his account is amazed at
this strategy.
52:07
He suggests that Pharnaces may have been influenced
by advantageous omens, or that he may have
52:12
been overly confident given his recent victory
over Domitius and the size and experience
52:17
of his army.
52:23
When Pharnaces’ men began the climb up the
valley to Caesar’s position, Caesar apparently
52:24
could not help but laugh at the absurdity
of the tactic.
52:29
Nonetheless, Pharnaces’ plan had somewhat
worked.
52:34
Caesar was so astounded, that he had not yet
recalled the majority of his army from their
52:39
construction of the defences.
52:44
Pharnaces men fell upon the thin defensive
line Caesar had placed in front, while Caesar
52:47
hastily ordered the rest of his army to join
the defensive line.
52:53
As his men rushed forwards, some of Pharnaces
scythed chariots broke through the thin line,
52:57
initially wreaking havoc among Caesar’s
men scrambling to get into positions.
53:03
As more of Caesar’s men moved forward however,
these chariots found themselves under intense
53:08
missile fire and were forced to retreat, Caesar’s
men finally forming a complete battle line
53:13
with the sixth on the right, the 36th on the
left and the Pontic and Deiotarian Legion
53:19
in the centre.
53:25
Despite the Legions having the huge terrain
advantage, the fighting against Pharnaces’
53:29
veterans was bitter, with brutal hand-to-hand
fighting across the line.
53:34
Eventually, the 6th, with the height advantage,
began forcing their opponents back.
53:39
Pharnaces line began to buckle, and soon the
centre and left were also being forced down
53:44
the slope.
53:50
As Pharnaces men attempted to retreat, many
lost their footing only to be crushed by their
53:51
comrades with the Legions bearing down upon
them.
53:57
Soon Pharnaces’ entire army broke, throwing
aside their weapons to try and more easily
54:00
climb back up the valley to their camp.
54:06
Caesar ordered his men to pursue, pushing
up the hill and storming the camp, killing
54:09
the few men Pharnaces had left to guard it.
54:13
Almost all of Pharnaces’ army had been killed
or captured though the King himself had managed
54:19
to escape.
54:24
Caesar had only taken light casualties.
54:26
The campaign initially seemed that it could
take months and numerous battles to complete.
54:29
Indeed, the Mithridatic Wars that Rome had
waged against Pharnaces’ father had spanned
54:34
25 years, and Pompey had spent 3 years campaigning
in Asia Minor and securing the region for
54:40
Rome.
54:46
Caesar’s campaign had lasted just 5 days
since he arrived in Pontus with the entire
54:47
enemy force defeated in a day.
54:53
Though the victory was more a result of Pharnaces’
rather baffling strategy than any brilliant
54:56
generalship from Caesar, Caesar was never
one to miss out on a propaganda opportunity.
55:01
A simple message was spread through Rome proclaiming
Caesar’s success: veni, vidi, vici.
55:07
I came, I saw, I conquered.
55:14
After the battle, Pharnaces attempted to retreat
to the north, but was chased by Domitius.
55:19
With few options left, he had to abandon Sinope.
55:25
Pharnaces then sailed to Bosphorus to raise
another army and even had some success before
55:28
he was defeated and killed by Asander.
55:34
In response to the events in Bosphorus, Caesar
appointed Mithridates of Pergamum, who was
55:37
invaluable during the campaign in Egypt, the
king of Bosphorus.
55:43
In the time Caesar had spent in Egypt and
Asia Minor, the situation in Spain and Illyria
55:49
had also improved.
55:54
Lepidus, the future triumvir and current governor
of Hispania Citerior, had intervened in Hispania
55:56
Ulterior, stabilising the region.
56:03
Trebonius had been assigned to replace Longinus
who was dismissed and died in a storm while
56:05
leaving the province.
56:11
Meanwhile, another of Caesar’s lieutenants,
Vatinius, had gathered a fleet and the veterans
56:12
left in Brundisium who had been too sick to
join Caesar in Greece to confront Octavius.
56:18
The veterans had proved their worth, winning
a quick naval victory over Octavius, securing
56:24
Illyricum and forcing Octavius to retreat
to North Africa.
56:29
With these areas secured, Caesar could now
begin to turn his attention to the last remaining
56:36
threat, the Pompeian faction in North Africa.
56:42
But firstly, he was needed in Rome.
56:45
Antony’s governance had been disastrous,
and Caesar could not afford to embark on another
56:48
campaign with Rome in turmoil.
56:53
Caesar left the 36th and Pontic Legion in
Asia Minor, ordering the 6th back to Italy,
56:56
following them shortly afterwards.
57:03
It is now late in 47BC, almost a year and
half since the Battle of Pharsalus.
57:10
Caesar had fought Pharsalus intending it to
be a final killing blow to the Pompeian cause,
57:16
and while it had been successful in severely
handicapping the Pompeians, it had failed
57:22
to destroy them completely.
57:27
While Caesar had spent the last 18 months
campaigning in the East, the Pompeian faction
57:30
had been rebuilding in North Africa.
57:35
Leadership had initially been offered to Cicero,
but he had refused, preferring to use his
57:39
political talents to try and influence the
Senate in Rome.
57:44
Instead, leadership was split between Cato
and Scipio.
57:48
Cato was something of a natural successor;
he had consistently been one of Caesar’s
57:55
most ardent opponents and wielded great influence
and prestige in the party, but he had next
58:01
to no military experience.
58:07
To balance this, Metellus Scipio was appointed
as the overall military commander.
58:10
Scipio had a long political career, had served
as consul alongside Pompey in 52BC, had commanded
58:15
an army in Greece against Domitius Calvinus
and had commanded the centre at Pharsalus.
58:23
Despite these honours, Scipio had not really
proved himself as a talented general.
58:29
A number of his subordinates, most notably
Labienus, were undoubtedly better commanders.
58:35
Nevertheless, Scipio was given command due
to his rank, prestige and, perhaps most of
58:41
all, his name.
58:47
Thanks to Scipio Africanus and Scipio Aemilianus,
it was rumoured that no Scipio could be defeated
58:48
in Africa.
58:56
A new Senate had been created in Utica, and
a total of 14 Legions mustered, 2 belonging
58:58
to the governor of Africa Publius Attius Varus,
8 newly formed consisting of local conscripts
59:06
as well as veterans who escaped from Iberia
and Greece after the defeats at Illerda and
59:13
Pharsalus, and 4 of Juba’s Numidian Legions
who were armed and trained in the Roman fashion,
59:19
plus a huge amount of Numidian light infantry
and cavalry, and 120 elephants.
59:25
Pompey’s son, Gnaeus, had been sent to Spain
to try and capitalise on the pro-Pompeian
59:31
mutiny that had occurred during Longinus’
tenure as governor, and there was rumour that
59:37
the Pompeian faction was planning an invasion
of Italy itself.
59:44
Caesar was aware of the threat and had initially
planned an invasion from both the West and
59:48
East; Longinus would land his Spanish Legions
and attack from the West, while Caesar would
59:54
invade from Italy.
59:59
Longinus’s abysmal administration of his
province had scuppered this plan, however.
00:01
Caesar would need to invade himself and without
the reinforcements from Spain.
00:07
Caesar’s African War was about to begin.
00:12
As Caesar returned to Italy from Asia Minor,
he visited various client kings and rulers
00:17
from in and around Greece, collecting money.
00:23
Caesar had been recruiting massively throughout
the Civil War, spending almost all his personal
00:26
money in the process, and the financial situation
was dire.
00:32
Even with the money collected from these rulers,
he still needed more.
00:36
Upon his arrival in Italy, he borrowed huge
sums from individuals and cities alike.
00:41
Caesar likely had no intention of repaying
these huge debts, but in his opinion, the
00:47
money was being spent on the public good and
so was no different from an official tax or
00:53
levy.
00:59
The money was given, but it cost Caesar popularity.
01:00
Caesar was well aware of this fact, however,
and worked hard to keep the people on side.
01:04
Clearly, Caesar was well aware that to win
any war, it is vital that the population at
01:10
large is kept on side.
01:15
There was one other major issue that Caesar
needed to resolve before he could begin the
01:18
invasion of Africa.
01:22
Four of his veteran Legions left in Campania
and picked to be part of the African campaign
01:24
had mutinied a couple of months before Caesar’s
arrival in Italy.
01:30
These Legions had been campaigning continuously
for 13 years and had been promised payment
01:34
and discharge following the Battle of Pharsalus.
01:40
Caesar’s campaigns in Egypt and the East
had delayed this, and with their general gone
01:43
for almost a year, Antony had lost control,
the Legions going so far as looting wealthy
01:48
estates around Rome and even killing two Senators
who had tried to negotiate with them.
01:54
As a result of his failures as governor, Caesar
stripped Antony of his offices, instead assigning
02:00
Lepidus as his Master of Horse and governor
of Italy by Lepidus.
02:06
Four veteran Legions presented a very serious
threat if they could not be placated; Caesar
02:10
recognised this danger and even garrisoned
Rome.
02:15
He was advised not to risk negotiating in
person, but Caesar knew that these men were
02:19
some of his best soldiers and would be much
needed in the campaigns to come.
02:24
He met them alone at the Campus Martius.
02:29
In reality, the legions were attempting to
bluff Caesar, hoping that Caesar would not
02:33
allow them to be discharged and they could
then push for more pay.
02:37
Caesar called their bluff and disbanded them
on the spot.
02:43
Calling them citizens, rather than soldiers,
he promised they would all be paid in full
02:47
and with interest after his conquest of Africa
and subsequent triumph with other Legions.
02:52
Caesar continued, allotting the men land from
public holdings, as well as from his own.
02:58
Caesar concluded by saying “I really have
no further need of you.
03:04
Yet even so I will pay you the rewards, that
no one may say that after using you in danger
03:08
I later showed myself ungrateful, even though
you were unwilling to join my campaign while
03:14
perfectly strong in body and able to carry
through all the wars that remain".
03:19
The legionaries were stunned.
03:25
They considered themselves indispensable to
Caesar and were shamed by how readily Caesar
03:27
would use other Legions to finish the war
they had helped start, as well as by how generously
03:32
and quickly he would reward them.
03:38
For these men, Caesar was everything.
03:41
They had become wealthy and famous under his
leadership; now they had attempted to blackmail
03:43
him, had their bluff called and were being
put out to pasture.
03:49
The Legions then asked whether they could
volunteer to join Caesar in Africa, but Caesar
03:54
simply turned his back and began to walk away.
03:59
Desperately, the men begged him to stay and
re-enlist them.
04:02
Caesar feigned indifference, before agreeing
to reinstate all but the 10th Legion.
04:06
This Legion was his favourite, and he made
it clear that he was insulted that they in
04:12
particular had joined the mutiny.
04:17
Stung by his words, the 10th requested that
Caesar decimate the Legion, killing 1 in every
04:19
10 men, as punishment so that they might be
taken back into his favour.
04:26
Again, Caesar feigned indifference, before
relenting and accepting the Legion back without
04:30
punishment.
04:36
Caesar did keep a list of the leading figures
of the mutiny, and assigned them to other
04:40
Legions in particularly dangerous provinces,
but overall it had been a brilliant success;
04:45
all 4 Legions were brought back into the fold
without a sesterce being spent, or a drop
04:51
of blood shed.
04:56
It was a prime example of the importance of
the persona and personality of Caesar; no
04:58
other man at the time could have spoken to
the Legions and reached such a conclusion.
05:04
With the Legions once again under control,
Caesar could finally begin his invasion and
05:12
he ordered 10 Legions to gather in Lilybaeum,
Sicily, around late December.
05:17
Word had reached Caesar of the rumour that
no Scipio could be defeated in Africa, and
05:23
to counter these he quickly found a minor
member of the Scipio family to include in
05:29
his officers’ staff; he too now had a Scipio
in his army.
05:34
The veteran Legions in Campania were still
being organised for the campaign, but 6 Legions
05:39
were ready in Lilybaeum; 5 were relatively
recently raised and untested one was Caesar’s
05:45
veteran 5th Legion and some cohorts of the
10th which had been stationed in Brundisium.
05:52
Caesar was eager to sail as soon as possible,
but the mutiny had delayed his plans and he
05:57
was now faced with bad weather.
06:02
Never one for waiting he embarked his men
and ordered them to Africa at the first sign
06:06
of a lull in the storms.
06:11
Caesar spent two days in Sicily giving instructions
for the rest of his army when they arrived
06:13
on the island, before setting sail himself
on the 25th December.
06:18
He reached the African coast on the 28th December,
landing near Hadrumetum.
06:24
In his eagerness to attack quickly, Caesar
had risked the storms, and though most his
06:30
warships had managed to cross safely, many
of his transports had been scattered, leaving
06:36
him with just 3,000 infantry and 150 cavalry.
06:41
Hadrumetum itself was under Optimate control,
garrisoned by 10,000 Romans and Numidians
06:46
under the command of Gaius Considius Longus
and Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso.
06:52
Caesar encamped just outside of the city on
the coast.
06:58
His men’s morale was low due to the uncoordinated
crossing, and they were blaming Caesar because,
07:01
in his haste, he had not issued clear, written
and sealed orders to his lieutenants as he
07:07
usually did.
07:13
They were right: Caesar’s obsession with
being quick had, this time, backfired.
07:14
Caesar was in a dangerous position.
07:22
If the Optimates sallied out of Hadrumetum
or if enemy reinforcements arrived, his small
07:24
force could be caught against the coast.
07:30
Initially, Caesar attempted to negotiate with
Considius, but the messenger was killed and
07:32
the message sent, unread, to Scipio.
07:38
He had now spent a day and a night around
Hadrumetum and no more of his army had arrived.
07:41
Caesar made some minor probing attacks on
the city, but quickly decided he had neither
07:48
the numbers nor amount of veterans needed
to storm the city.
07:53
To make matters worse, his scouts also reported
that a large force of Numidian cavalry was
07:57
closing in.
08:04
With little choice left, Caesar broke camp
and marched away from the city.
08:07
As soon as he did though, the Hadrumetum garrison
sallied out, soon being joined by Juba’s
08:13
cavalry which had just arrived.
08:18
They seized the deserted camp, and the Numidian
cavalry began harassing Caesar’s men, forcing
08:21
Caesar to halt and form a defensive line.
08:27
Clearly, this had been the Optimate plan from
the start; rather than attack Caesar in a
08:30
fortified camp, where he was known to be particularly
dangerous, they had waited for a chance to
08:36
catch him in the open.
08:41
Initially, it looked as though Caesar would
be surrounded and caught just as Curio had
08:43
been years earlier.
08:48
Unlike Curio, however, Caesar refused to allow
his enemy to hold the initiative, ordering
08:50
his small numbers of cavalry to charge the
Numidians.
08:55
Caesar was well aware that they did not have
the numbers to win such a fight, but he was
09:02
also aware that the Numidians would retreat
and skirmish, rather than engage in hand to
09:07
hand fighting.
09:12
It was vital that Caesar keep his men moving,
rather than stop and risk becoming surrounded,
09:14
and with his cavalry having repulsed the Numidians
for the time being, Caesar seized the opportunity
09:20
ordering his Legions to continue their march
with the few veteran cohorts and cavalry at
09:26
the rear.
09:32
His veterans could be counted on to stand
their ground against the incoming missile
09:33
fire, while the cavalry would charge and scatter
the Numidians.
09:37
Though progress was slow, Caesar was able
to continue this fighting withdrawal until
09:42
he reached the safety of the town of Ruspina
on the 29th December.
09:48
Disaster had been averted, but Caesar was
still in a precarious position.
09:53
He next moved to the town of Leptis on 1st
January, where he was joined by some of his
09:59
scattered transports.
10:06
As well as his men being scattered, so too
had his supplies.
10:08
He attempted to forage off the land, but patrolling
Numidian cavalry would ambush his men, making
10:12
the task almost impossible.
10:19
He sent requests to Sardinia, Sicily and other
provinces for more grain and focused on consolidating
10:21
his position.
10:28
He left 6 cohorts in Leptis, 1 Legion in Ruspina,
and took 7 cohorts of veterans from the 5th
10:29
and 10th to the harbour, boarding his warships.
10:37
He did not inform any of his men of what his
plan was, but his veterans were confident
10:40
that Caesar would have a winning strategy.
10:46
In fact, Caesar’s plan was to set sail with
the veterans to find the rest of his scattered
10:48
fleet.
10:54
Caesar had not told his men this, because
he was nervous that the garrisons in Ruspina
10:55
or Leptis might be captured and reveal his
plans.
11:00
Clearly, Caesar was rattled and being cautious.
11:04
Fortunately, the next day, a large number
of the lost transports arrived, bringing much
11:07
needed numbers.
11:13
With this larger force, he could now attempt
to forage in security.
11:15
He made camp at Ruspina, and then, on the
4th January, set out with around 15,000 men,
11:19
approximately half his total force, to forage
for supplies.
11:26
After marching 3 miles from Ruspina, his scouts
brought news that the enemy was close and
11:33
closing in fast.
11:39
Quickly, Caesar ordered his small contingent
of cavalry and archers to join him from Ruspina
11:41
while he rode ahead with his bodyguard to
confirm the information.
11:46
In the distance he saw a huge dust cloud approaching
and ordered his men to prepare for battle.
11:51
In total, he would have 15,000 legionaries,
400 cavalry and 150 archers.
11:56
The Optimate force facing him was significant;
12,000 of mostly light infantry, 8,000 Numidian
12:03
cavalry, and 1,600 heavy cavalry, made from
Gallic and Germanic mercenaries, with a smaller
12:14
force of a further 1,600 Numidian cavalry
close by to reinforce.
12:21
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the Optimate
army, however, was its commanders.
12:27
The main force was commanded by Caesar’s
once right-hand man, Labienus himself, the
12:33
reinforcements by Petreius.
12:38
Labienus was undoubtedly the best general
on the Optimate side and his years of campaigning
12:40
with Caesar had made him familiar with his
tactics.
12:46
Petreius was also talented and experienced,
having 30 years of military experience, including
12:49
having fought Caesar at Ilerda and Pharsalus.
12:55
This would be a difficult fight.
12:58
Looking to make the most of his large number
of cavalry, Labienus deployed his men in a
13:03
long tightly packed line, with infantry interspersed
among cavalry in order to hide his numbers.
13:08
On both flanks, he stationed his heavier cavalry.
13:15
Caesar, aware that he could easily be outflanked,
stretched his line to have as broad a front,
13:18
putting what missiles he had in front and
the small amount of cavalry on the wings.
13:25
He kept his men in position, not wanting to
make the initial move.
13:31
With his smaller numbers, and the enemy’s
cavalry advantage, he thought it best to be
13:36
defensive.
13:41
Labienus, on the other hand, used his cavalry
to quickly seize the nearby highland, at the
13:42
same time forcing Caesar’s cavalry to stretch
thin to try and counter any flanking attacks.
13:48
Labienus was well aware of Caesar’s style
of battle, which relied upon having room to
13:54
manoeuvre and using terrain advantages and
had now denied these to him.
14:00
With these initial moves completed, Labienus
began the battle.
14:05
He ordered his men to charge the length of
Caesar’s line, Caesar’s legions counter
14:12
charging at the last minute.
14:17
As they did though, the Numidian cavalry fell
back, while the infantry hidden among them
14:19
pinned Caesar’s infantry.
14:24
The Numidians then skirmished back and forth,
pelting Caesar’s line with javelins.
14:26
His men attempted to charge the cavalry to
chase them off, but Caesar gave strict orders
14:31
for his men to hold the line.
14:36
Meanwhile, on the flanks, Caesar’s cavalry,
badly outnumbered, had been routed after a
14:39
brief but brave struggle.
14:44
Labienus now had Caesar’s force entirely
surrounded.
14:46
At this point, Labienus removed his helmet
and rode around the surrounded Caesareans,
14:53
encouraging his men and mocking Caesar’s,
attempting to demoralise them.
14:58
He mocked them as being raw recruits, and
for being foolhardy for following Caesar and
15:03
being caught in their current predicament.
15:08
A veteran of the 10th Legion from one of the
cohorts who had crossed with Caesar, recognised
15:11
Labienus.
15:16
Removing his helmet, he threw his javelin,
shouting out that Labienus would know he was
15:17
being attacked by a soldier of the Tenth.
15:23
Labienus’ horse was killed, and Labienus
was taken from the battlefield after it fell
15:25
on him.
15:31
Nevertheless, Caesar’s men were still struggling,
attacked from all sides and they could do
15:32
little except protect themselves from the
hail of missiles from the Numidian troops.
15:37
It was a dire situation and panic was spreading,
and an aquilifer even attempted to flee, forcing
15:43
Caesar to grab him, turn him to face the enemy
and push him forward to the front.
15:50
The day was coming to an end, and Caesar knew
that he needed to reach his defences around
15:57
Ruspina before nightfall or else lose his
army.
16:02
He ordered every other cohort to turn around,
his line now fighting on two fronts, and gave
16:06
the order for them to throw a hail of pila
and charge in both directions.
16:12
It is a testament to the training of the Roman
Legions that such a manoeuvre could be organised
16:17
and executed in the midst of battle.
16:22
Taken by surprise by this sudden attack, the
Numidian light infantry and cavalry pulled
16:25
back to skirmish and avoid hand-to-hand fighting.
16:30
Caesar seized the opportunity and began withdrawing
his force from the battlefield as quickly
16:34
as possible.
16:39
As he did, Petreius arrived with his reinforcements.
16:43
With these fresh troops, the Optimate force
pursued Caesar’s men looking to re-engage.
16:47
This time, Caesar took the initiative, ordering
his men turn and charge their pursuers.
16:51
Petreius was wounded in the skirmish, while
the Numidians once again fell back not wanting
16:57
to be pinned in melee.
17:04
This time, Caesar continued to push them back
over the high ground.
17:06
Caesar paused his men here, waiting to see
if the enemy would attack now that he had
17:11
the terrain advantage.
17:15
The Optimates were exhausted, had both commanders
injured and had inflicted as much damage as
17:17
they could in a day.
17:22
They each withdrew to their camp, Caesar’s
men also withdrawing to Ruspina.
17:24
The casualties for both armies are not known,
but given the encirclement of the Caesarion
17:31
troops, it is likely that they suffered more
than the Optimates.
17:37
Caesar had very nearly lost the entire campaign.
17:41
If Labienus had not been wounded, he may have
been able to better control the Optimate army
17:44
and kept the pressure on Caesar, leaving no
chance for him to escape.
17:50
But Caesar was saved by his own strategic
talent, his men’s training, and luck with
17:55
the wounding of both enemy commanders.
18:01
Nevertheless, Caesar had managed to avoid
having his whole army destroyed as had happened
18:04
to Curio.
18:09
He would be able to consolidate, and seek
a more favourable engagement later.
18:11
Caesar’s first priority was improving the
defences of Ruspina, and creating entrenchments
18:17
from the town to his camp and to the sea.
18:23
In doing so Caesar ensured his communication
lines would be kept safe, while also providing
18:27
a safe landing ground for any reinforcements
and supplies.
18:33
Caesar had been surprised by Labienus’ tactic
of mixing light troops with cavalry and decided
18:37
to mimic it, pulling light marines and Archers
of his ships in order to do so.
18:43
Meanwhile, Scipio was en route to unite his
force with Labienus and Petreius, bringing
18:49
with him almost all of the Optimate leaders,
and the entirety of their army bringing its
18:56
total to more than 60 thousand.
19:02
Such an army would already have been larger
than the one Pompey had, and to make matters
19:05
worse for Caesar, there was also a possibility
that the king of Numidia Juba, would join
19:09
Scipio with his own force, including its famed
elephants.
19:15
With fortifications improved, Caesar turned
his attention to the supplies.
19:21
The Optimates had previously stripped the
area of corn and most of the local workforce
19:27
was pressed into their army, making the harvest
of that year particularly poor.
19:32
Caesar was forced to purchase supplies from
wealthy individuals living in the area and
19:37
rationed them out to his army.
19:42
A number of his scattered transports were
hunted down by the Optimate navy, and were
19:44
captured or burned.
19:49
Caesar ordered the remainder of his vessels
to patrol the harbour of Ruspina, to keep
19:52
the area clear for the anticipated arrival
of troops and supplies from Sicily.
19:56
Just when things were starting to look disastrous,
Caesar had a stroke of luck.
20:04
The Optimate army under Scipio had paused
briefly at Utica where Cato, the figurehead
20:09
and political leader of the faction was based.
20:15
Whilst the army was there Cato began chastising
Pompey’s sons for failing to achieve as
20:18
much as their father had by their age.
20:23
Shamed and hoping to prove himself, Gnaeus
took 2000 slaves and freedmen and attacked
20:26
the nearby kingdom of West Mauretania, ruled
by King Bogud.
20:32
The Mauritanians lured Gnaeus close to the
town of Ascurum, before sallying out and quickly
20:36
defeating the small force.
20:42
Humiliated, Gnaeus withdrew to the Balearic
Islands, but his actions had far reaching
20:44
consequences.
20:49
Having left a sizable garrison at Utica, Scipio
now marched to Labienus and Petreius uniting
20:53
the two armies and establishing camp 5 kilometers
from Caesar's position.
20:59
They immediately begin using their large cavalry
forces to keep Caesar within his fortifications,
21:04
making his supply situation even worse.
21:10
Juba began marching to his allies hoping to
assist in a quick and definitive win over
21:14
Caesar but Gnaeus’ actions now showed their
consequence.
21:21
The King of East Mauritania Bocchus heard
of Juba’s departure and invaded Numidia
21:25
to avenge the Optimate attack on his brother
Bogud.
21:31
Commanding the Mauritanian armies was Publius
Sittius, who had been operating in Africa
21:35
as a mercenary since the Cataline Conspiracy.
21:39
He successfully captured the Numidian city
of Cirta, and then proceeded to pillage and
21:42
sack the surrounding area.
21:47
By this point Juba had almost reached Scipio,
but upon hearing the news pulled back to defend
21:50
Numidia.
21:55
Meanwhile, some of the local citizens had
begun sending messages to Caesar complaining
21:58
of the harsh rule of the Optimates.
22:04
Some towns even requested garrisons, pledging
to feed and house them in return, an offer
22:07
Caesar gladly accepted sending 3 cohorts,
in order to improve his supply situation.
22:12
Initially Caesar planned to wait for better
weather to ensure his troops would make the
22:18
crossing from Sicily safely, but now he ordered
that they be sent no matter the conditions,
22:23
showing how desperate he was.
22:29
Scipio was not idle while all this was going
on.
22:32
Labienus, in command of the majority of the
Optimate cavalry, kept up a relentless harassment
22:37
campaign, fighting a number of skirmishes
with Caesar’s cavalry that ventured out
22:42
to patrol.
22:47
Labienus kept searching for ways of keeping
Caesar’s forces occupied, including attacking
22:48
the towns of Leptis and Acylla, but he was
repelled by Caesar’s cohorts now garrisoned
22:54
there.
22:59
Nevertheless, these attacks were effective
at keeping the pressure on Caesar.
23:00
Similarly, Scipio would march his army out
of camp every day and draw them into battle
23:05
formation, including the elephants, hoping
to intimidate the recruits in Caesar’s army.
23:10
Caesar made a show of indifference, keeping
his men at work on their fortifications, but
23:16
he never drew up his own army for battle.
23:21
He knew that for any chance of victory, he
would need more men, particularly more veterans.
23:23
His best play was to keep his men behind their
fortifications of trenches and palisades and
23:30
bide his time.
23:36
His patience paid off.
23:40
Sallust had arrived in Cercina, the site of
a large Optimate grain supply which was poorly
23:42
defended.
23:48
He easily chased off the garrison and immediately
sent the supplies to Caesar.
23:49
Simultaneously, two experienced legions - 13th
and 14th were finally dispatched from Lilybaeum.
23:54
Good luck with the weather and Caesar’s
patrolling fleet allowed the legions and supplies
24:00
to arrive at Ruspina with relative ease.
24:06
Soon after, Scipio sent two Gaetulian spies
into Caesar’s camp to assess the new situation.
24:09
However, the Gaetuli who had greatly benefited
from the actions of Caesar’s uncle in law
24:16
Gaius Marius, during and after the Jugurthine
War, immediately defected to Caesar.
24:21
They informed him of Scipio’s numbers and
the morale of his men and, in particular,
24:27
that the Optimate 4th and 6th Legions were
wavering and eager to join Caesar.
24:32
Though Scipio and Labienus had done well to
keep up the pressure, they had delayed too
24:37
long and lost the initiative: Caesar now had
the men and supplies he needed to go on the
24:43
offensive and wanted to force a battle with
Scipio before the Numidian army would return.
24:49
On the 25th January, he sent the transports
back to Sicily to get the rest of his army,
24:56
and then marched his full force out of camp.
25:03
His first objective was to take and fortify
the semi-circle ridge of hills that surrounded
25:07
the town.
25:12
Looking to use similar tactics to those at
Dyrrachium, Caesar quickly seized as many
25:14
of these hills as he could, ordering fortifications
to be built to create a line of palisades
25:19
across the tops of the hills.
25:24
Hoping to force Caesar back to his original
position, Scipio marched his full army out
25:27
of camp with Labienus in command of the vast
cavalry force, drawing up for battle.
25:32
Caesar initially thought this was a bluff,
but when the enemy approached in formation
25:38
he drew his Legions up on the hills for battle,
sending a small detachment of Spanish auxiliaries
25:43
to seize the one hill still held by Scipio.
25:48
The Numidians holding the position there were
quickly chased away, and Labienus led the
25:52
majority of his right wing of cavalry to cover
their retreat.
25:57
Caesar noticed that Labienus had moved too
far from the main Optimate battle line, and
26:02
sent his own left wing of cavalry to charge
through the hole, before turning back to attack
26:07
Labienus from the rear.
26:11
A large estate prevented Labienus from seeing
this movement until the enemy cavalry was
26:13
already behind him.
26:19
With the cavalry pushing from his rear, and
the Spanish auxiliaries attacking from the
26:21
front, Labienus was caught in a pincer and
ordered a withdrawal.
26:26
He and the fast Numidian horsemen were able
to extract themselves, but his Gallic and
26:29
Germanic cavalry was slower.
26:34
It was surrounded and, despite brave resistance,
cut down to a man.
26:36
Seeing that his right flank was in shambles,
Scipio quickly ordered a retreat and pulled
26:42
back to his camp.
26:47
Feeling robbed, Caesar did the same.
26:49
However, soon he tried to force a battle again,
this time marching his army towards the town
26:52
of Uzitta, a major water source for Scipio,
which was located just outside the Optimate
26:59
camp.
27:05
Scipio marched his army out of camp, positioning
them on either side of the town in a strong
27:06
defensive position.
27:11
Eagerly, Caesar again drew his men up for
battle, but was reluctant to attack Scipio
27:13
in such a strong location.
27:18
For the remainder of the day the armies stood
opposite each other, until Caesar ordered
27:21
a retreat.
27:26
Frustrated once more, Caesar returned to his
camp and continued to further fortify his
27:28
position on the ridge.
27:33
Scipio had been delaying for a good reason.
27:37
Immediately after the cavalry skirmish where
the Gallic and Germanic cavalry had been lost,
27:40
he had sent word to Juba demanding his help.
27:45
Juba, who owed his kingdom to Pompey, obliged.
27:48
He left his general Saburra, the victor of
Bagradas, to fight Sittius, and marched to
27:51
Scipio with 3 Numidian Legions trained in
the Roman style, 800 heavy cavalry, more light
27:57
infantry and cavalry and 30 more elephants.
28:04
The Optimates now had 8 Roman and 3 Numidian
legions, approximately 55,000 men, almost
28:09
16,000 cavalry, 60 elephants, and perhaps
as many as 20,000 light infantry; a total
28:16
of around 90,000 men, truly a colossal force.
28:22
It was now Scipio's turn to go on the offensive.
28:26
His fleet had been hunting down any of Caesar
ships that had been blown astray in the crossing
28:31
from Sicily, and the prisoners were brought
to him.
28:36
He now displayed a number of captured veterans
of the 14th outside his camp, and had them
28:39
tortured to death there and their bodies left
outside.
28:45
He also once again began drawing his army
out of camp every day to further intimidate
28:49
Caesar and his men.
28:54
These actions had the opposite effect, however.
28:56
The execution of his men enraged Caesar and
he was also encouraged by Juba’s numbers
28:59
– they weren’t as significant as he feared,
which meant that Sittius was distracting much
29:04
of the Numidian force, and confirmed that
Scipio had no more aces left up his sleeve.
29:09
Following this, a deadlock emerged.
29:18
Both sides regularly drew up for battle but
no serious engagement was fought, neither
29:20
wanting to be the one to attack a fortified
opponent.
29:26
A number of cavalry skirmishes were fought,
with neither side able to gain a significant
29:29
advantage over the other.
29:35
Two more veteran legions, the 10th and 9th,
arrived and Caesar attempted to use them to
29:37
break the stalemate, constructing two long
entrenchments from his camp to Utizza, despite
29:43
the constant harassment from Labienus’ cavalry.
29:48
A new camp was made at the end of these entrenchments,
where siege weapons such as scorpions and
29:51
catapults were constructed and began bombarding
Utizza.
29:57
Caesar’s constant pressure and the close
proximity of his new camp to that of Scipio’s
30:01
encouraged some of the Optimate troops, mainly
Gaetulians, but also a number of men from
30:08
the 4th and 6th Legions to change sides.
30:12
Scipio couldn’t allow this to go on and,
once again, ordered his army to get into battle
30:16
formation.
30:20
Caesar did the same, but broken ground in
front of Scipio’s army dissuaded him from
30:22
attacking, despite the two armies now being
less than 200 metres apart.
30:27
After squaring off for half a day, Caesar
withdrew back into camp.
30:33
That is when Labienus launched an attack on
Caesar’s retreating cavalry and light infantry.
30:38
The Legions were close enough to prevent a
complete disaster, but the attack gave Caesar
30:43
food for thought: it was only a matter of
time before Labienus was able to strike a
30:48
deadly blow with his superior cavalry numbers.
30:53
Soon word was sent that the last two Legions
Caesar pegged for this campaign - the 7th
31:00
and 8th, were en route from Sicily.
31:04
He also heard from some deserters that Varus,
who had been stationed at Utica with the Optimate
31:07
fleet, planned to attack them on the crossing.
31:13
Immediately, Caesar rode to Leptis himself,
took command of his fleet and surprised Varus.
31:16
The optimate fleet was chased away and the
Caesarean Legions were guided to land safely.
31:23
Caesar now felt comfortable enough to send
2 Legions out of his fortifications to find
31:29
supplies in the nearby estates.
31:34
At this point, Optimate deserters informed
Caesar of an ambush planned by Labienus and
31:36
Caesar managed to surprise his old ally, killing
500 light infantrymen and routing the Numidian
31:42
cavalry.
31:48
Unfortunately for Caesar, his Legions were
unsuccessful in their foraging, making it
31:50
clear that he needed to move his entire army
to find food.
31:55
Caesar left a garrison in Ruspina, burnt his
camp, and marched out with his full force.
32:01
He foraged the area around Aggar and Zeta,
constantly shadowed by Scipio’s army.
32:07
After foraging around Zeta, Caesar began retreating
to his camp roughly 23 kilometers away, but
32:13
was once again attacked by Labienus and his
Numidian cavalry and light infantry.
32:20
This time, Labienus kept up the attack, retreating
when Caesar’s men turned to confront him,
32:25
and then continuing the harassment as soon
as they began marching again.
32:31
Caesar’s cavalry took the brunt of these
attacks, and he was eventually forced to pull
32:35
them from the rear and use his Legions to
fend off the Numidians.
32:40
His heavy infantry took less damage than his
cavalry, but his army was now moving incredibly
32:44
slowly, only managing to cover 300 meters
in 4 hours.
32:49
Night finally set in and Labienus withdrew
his troops, but he had been successful in
32:54
doing significant damage to Caesar’s already
much smaller cavalry force.
33:00
Impressed by how effective Numidian light
cavalry and light infantry had been against
33:08
him, Caesar began drilling his men in tactics
to combat them, such as how far to retreat
33:12
from them and when they should turn and throw
javelins.
33:18
He was soon met by the last Sicilian reinforcements,
bringing his force to Legions, 5 newly raised
33:21
and 7 veteran, roughly 3,000-5,000 cavalry
and an unknown number of light infantry.
33:28
Caesar veteran Legions had taken casualties,
some might even be only at half strength,
33:35
and so establishing the size of Caesar’s
army is difficult, but a number of around
33:41
60,000-70,000 seems reasonable.
33:46
Though outnumbered overall, Caesar had more
veterans than Scipio, as the optimate army
33:49
was largely made of fresh recruits and conscripts.
33:55
Caesar also brought elephants from Italy.
33:59
Although useless in battle and intended for
the Roman games they allowed Caesar to train
34:02
his troops: his men were taught where the
elephants were vulnerable even in armour and
34:07
his cavalry practiced throwing dummy javelins
at them, familiarising the horses with the
34:12
elephant smell and sound.
34:17
It is a testament to Caesar’s generalship,
that even on a campaign, he still took the
34:19
time to train his troops to address new threats.
34:23
The stalemate continued: Caesar was moving
from town to town looking for supplies with
34:29
Scipio shadowing him.
34:35
Labienus attempted to keep up his skirmishing
campaign while Caesar marched, but Caesar’s
34:37
training had paid off.
34:42
300 men from each Legion were assigned to
not carry any baggage and instead act as a
34:44
quick response rear guard, fending off all
of Labienus harassing attacks.
34:49
Finally, Caesar had enough.
34:54
Time and time again he had formed up his army
for battle, only for Scipio to decline.
34:56
The towns in the area that he raided were
not important enough to force a reaction,
35:02
and Labienus’ attacks remained a constant
source of frustration.
35:07
Caesar needed to be able to force Scipio into
a situation where he had no choice but to
35:12
fight, so on April 4, Caesar abandoned his
camp at night and moved to Thapsus.
35:17
Thapsus was a major city in the area, holding
a large port, supplies and arms and armour;
35:24
it was a target that Scipio would not be able
to ignore a threat to.
35:32
Caesar, having marched through the night,
soon arrived at the city, immediately besieging
35:36
it, and fortifying his own position against
a possible Optimate attack.
35:41
Outside of the city of Thapsus was the Marsh
of Moknine, which effectively forced any approaching
35:46
army to take one of two narrow passes; hugging
either the northern or eastern coast.
35:52
Caesar had chosen his target well.
35:58
He established two forts, one in the Eastern
passage which was garrisoned by 3 cohorts,
36:01
which effectively blocked that pass, and one
surrounding the city of Thapsus.
36:07
His strategy was to force Scipio to take the
northern passage, meaning Scipio would be
36:11
forced to attack him from only one direction.
36:17
Scipio soon arrived on the scene.
36:21
He initially intended to take the eastern
passage, but seeing Caesar’s fort abandoned
36:24
this idea.
36:29
Leaving a small force under Afranius opposite
Caesar’s fort, he ordered Juba, Labienus
36:31
and the Numidian cavalry to encamp in a separate
camp nearby.
36:36
He then commanded a forced march around the
west of the Marsh to the northern pass with
36:41
the rest.
36:46
It seems that Scipio’s strategy was to try
and catch Caesar in a pincer, hoping to eventually
36:47
make a simultaneous push on his position through
both passages.
36:52
Quickly, Scipio ordered part of his men to
begin construction of a second camp, while
36:56
the rest of his army drew up for battle in
front of them, with the elephants on either
37:02
flank in front of his cavalry.
37:06
Caesar could not believe his luck.
37:09
Scipio had taken the bait and was now offering
battle under terrible conditions; his men
37:11
were already fatigued by the long march, part
of his army was building a camp, and a significant
37:17
portion of his army, including most of the
Numidian cavalry, was too far away.
37:23
Leaving two of the rookie Legions encamped
around Thapsus, Caesar eagerly formed up the
37:28
rest for battle.
37:33
He deployed his army in the classic 3 lines.
37:36
The 10th and 7th Legions were stationed on
the right, the 8th and 9th on the left.
37:40
The centre was likely held by two of the other
veteran Legions, the 13th and 14th, with a
37:46
recruit legion on either side of them; mixing
recruit and veteran Legions this was a favoured
37:51
strategy of Caesar’s.
37:58
His last Legion, the 5th, was split into two
and stationed behind each flank, acting as
38:00
a fourth line.
38:05
Their role was specifically to handle the
elephants; in case of a charge from them,
38:06
the front lines would part and it would be
up to the 5th to kill them.
38:12
Archers, slingers, and light infantry mixed
with cavalry held his extreme flanks.
38:16
Caesar and his men noticed a lot of movement
and jostling in Scipio’s line as men moved
38:24
to and from the camp.
38:29
His veterans, many of whom were already supposed
to be retired and who had spent the last couple
38:31
of months frustrated by the lack of a decisive
battle, urged Caesar to attack.
38:36
Caesar was hesitant, perhaps thinking that
it must surely be a trap.
38:42
It is also worth noting at this point that
Plutarch claims that Caesar had an epileptic
38:46
fit before the battle, which perhaps was the
reason for the delay.
38:51
His veterans, however, had had enough.
38:56
A trumpeter of the 10th or 7th, without Caesar’s
orders, sounded the charge, and Caesar’s
38:59
right flank surged forward.
39:04
Realising that there would be no way of restraining
his men, Caesar decided that he must fully
39:07
commit and rode ahead to the 10th and 7th
to take personal command of them.
39:12
He ordered the slingers and archers on the
right to target Scipio’s elephants opposite
39:17
them, panicking the beasts and sending them
rampaging into their own lines.
39:22
At the same time, the elephants on Scipio’s
right charged Caesar’s left, but his Legions
39:26
quickly parted as they were trained to, the
cohorts of the 5th Legion taking the brunt
39:32
of their charge.
39:36
They fought bravely, using spears to jab at
the vulnerable and sensitive points on the
39:38
elephants, blasting trumpets loudly to further
frighten them.
39:43
The elephants were soon panicked, and turned
to run back to Scipio’s army.
39:47
Scipio’s line was now being charged by his
own elephants, with Caesar’s Legions following
39:53
close behind.
39:59
Panic had set in almost immediately.
40:00
The left, fighting Caesar’s 10th and 7th,
was the first to break, the entire line following
40:03
shortly after.
40:08
Some tried to fight, but most were stampeding
towards the camp that was still being built.
40:10
Caesar now had all the momentum, and his men
easily cut down the fleeing and disorganised
40:16
Optimate forces, as well as those who were
constructing the camp.
40:21
The garrison at Thapsus attempted to sally
out to distract Caesar’s army, but the two
40:25
Legions left in the camp easily repelled it.
40:30
These Legions then marched down the eastern
corridor to the camps of Afranius and Juba.
40:34
In a full-scale rout, Scipio’s men fled
around the western edge of the marsh, desperately
40:39
trying to reach these camps, with Caesar’s
men in hot pursuit.
40:44
It was a disaster for the Optimates.
40:48
When Scipio’s men reached the forts, they
found Afranius’ camp already overrun, and
40:51
Juba’s being assaulted by Caesar’s two
other Legions.
40:56
The Numidian king, seeing Caesar’s main
force now approaching, gave up the fight and
41:01
retreated with Labienus, Petreius and what
cavalry he had left.
41:06
Caesar’s force stormed his camp, easily
taking it.
41:10
With no other options left, the remainder
of the optimate army surrendered.
41:14
Caesar’s men massacred many; Dio blames
this on Caesar, however, most sources say
41:15
Caesar ordered the men be spared, but that
his battle frenzied soldiers disobeyed.
41:20
It seems likely that Caesar did not order
the massacre; a master propagandist Caesar
41:26
knew the power of mercy and was renowned,
even in his time, for sparing the vast majority
41:33
of his Roman enemies.
41:39
The battle was over.
41:41
Some sources suggest the Optimates lost 10,000,
others suggest as many as 50,000, while Caesar’s
41:43
losses were as little as 50 or as many as
1,000.
41:50
It was a decisive victory for Caesar.
41:54
Following the battle, the Optimate leadership
was scattered.
42:00
Labienus, Varus and Pompey’s son Sextus
had managed to escape and would eventually
42:03
make it to Spain, where they would continue
to resist Caesar.
42:09
Afranius along with Faustus Cornelius Sulla,
collected the survivors and began pillaging
42:13
Mauritania, planning to gather enough supplies
to then also cross to Spain.
42:18
However, they were caught by Sittius and then
killed.
42:23
Petreius and Juba fled to Numidia, confident
they would find support there.
42:27
Sittius had been successful in defeating and
killing Juba’s general Saburra however,
42:32
and the Numidians now turned on their king,
barring their gates to him.
42:38
With no options left, the two men decided
to commit suicide.
42:42
They had a final dinner and settled on duelling
each other, so that at least one of them may
42:47
die honourably in battle.
42:52
Juba won the duel, killing Petreius, and then
had one of his slaves kill him.
42:53
As for Scipio, he too hoped to retreat to
Spain.
43:00
Gathering a few supporters and a small fleet,
he set sail, but was caught in a storm and
43:05
forced to make port at Hippo.
43:10
Caesar’s fleet, commanded by Sittius found
him and a minor naval battle was fought.
43:12
When defeat here was inevitable, Scipio killed
himself; the last Scipio of any real historical
43:18
note.
43:24
The only Optimate leader left in Africa was
Cato in Utica.
43:28
As Caesar’s army closed in, he made his
final preparations.
43:33
He held a feast with his friends and then
retired to his bedroom, leaving his children
43:37
in the care of Lucius Caesar, a distant cousin
of Caesar’s, though a supporter of Pompey,
43:42
telling his son “I who have been brought
up in freedom, with the right of free speech,
43:47
cannot in my old age change and learn slavery
instead”.
43:53
He then read Plato’s Phaedra, and after
finishing it, stabbed himself in the stomach.
43:57
In death, Cato did rob Caesar of what would
have been one of his greatest triumphs, that
44:02
of being able to claim that he spared the
life of his greatest enemy.
44:08
Caesar was extremely frustrated by Cato’s
suicide apparently saying, “Cato, I begrudge
44:13
thee thy death, for thou didst begrudge me
the preservation of thy life”.
44:19
Caesar spent some time in Africa, fining those
who had funded the Optimate war effort, before
44:27
finally returning to Rome, victorious.
44:32
He retired many of his oldest veterans in
a generous fashion, and held 4 triumphs, one
44:35
for Gaul, Egypt, Asia and Africa.
44:41
Having defeated Cato, his position was now
supreme.
44:45
He was assigned incredible powers by the senate,
including Censorial powers for 3 years, and
44:48
dictatorial powers for 10, a wholly unprecedented
level of power.
44:55
For all intents and purposes, Caesar was now
the sole ruler of the Roman Republic.
44:59
However, though he had now twice won the Civil
War, once at Pharsalus and once at Thapsus,
45:05
the war was not over.
45:12
The sons of Pompey, Varus and Labienus still
resisted him in Spain.
45:14
The political heart of the Optimate faction,
Cato, was dead.
45:22
Cicero, his natural heir as political head
of the faction, had resigned himself to being
45:26
a part of the new order, rather than fighting
against it, hoping that he would be able to
45:32
persuade Caesar to restore the Republic.
45:36
Many other Optimate Senators had similarly
resigned themselves to working with Caesar,
45:40
in part because many of them had been captured
and then spared by him.
45:45
The extent to which Caesar had won politically
can be seen in the powers bestowed on him
45:50
in the immediate aftermath of Thapsus.
45:55
He was made Dictator for the third time, for
a wholly unprecedented 10 years, made Prefect
45:59
of Morals and the Forum of Caesar was completed
and dedicated to him in recognition of his
46:05
achievements.
46:11
Caesar was, for all practical purposes, the
master of Rome.
46:12
However, some of the Optimates still resisted.
46:17
Gnaeus and Sextus Pompey had fled from Africa
and arrived in Baetica.
46:21
With them went survivors of Thapsus, including
two of Caesar’s most active and determined
46:27
opponents Titus Labienus and Attius Varus.
46:33
Baetica had been chosen deliberately, as Pompey
Magnus had been governor of the province in
46:37
the 50s BC and people in the area still respected
him, including legionaries who fought against
46:42
Caesar during the Spanish campaign of 49 BC.
46:48
His sons found plenty of support and managed
to amass one Legion from survivors of Thapsus.
46:52
Shortly after their arrival, 2 Legions under
Trebonius’ command had sided with the brothers
46:59
and they had managed to levy one more from
sympathetic Roman citizens in the area, many
47:05
of whom had previously served under Pompey’s
command.
47:11
Additionally, the brothers made alliances
with some Lusitanian tribes, and had drawn
47:15
a number of deserters and others to their
banners.
47:20
Caesar claimed that they had 70,000, but he
was probably counting garrisons and other
47:23
supporters in that number.
47:29
These events had happened in the summer of
46BC.
47:33
Caesar was, at the time, occupied in Rome
with assigning magistrates, retiring many
47:38
of his longest-serving veterans, holding games
and triumphs, and beginning the reordering
47:43
of the calendar.
47:48
As a result, he had assigned Quintus Pedius
and Quintus Fabius Maximus, along with 4 Legions
47:50
already in the Hispanic provinces to handle
the situation.
47:56
As the months went on however, Caesar heard
of the growing success of the Optimates and
48:01
realised that he would, once again, have to
handle the matter personally.
48:06
He gathered 4 more Legions, his favourite
10th, the veteran 5th and 6th, and the relatively
48:11
new 3rd, and marched to Baetica, arriving
in the area by the end of the year.
48:17
By that point Sextus Pompey had already taken
the main city in the area Corduba, and was
48:25
holding it with a strong garrison, while Gnaeus
was in command of the army alongside Labienus.
48:31
Together, they had laid siege to Ulia, one
of the few cities in the area that had not
48:37
pledged allegiance to them.
48:43
Caesar got to work immediately.
48:45
Lucius Vibius Paciaecus, one of Caesar’s
officers who was known to the Ulians and knew
48:48
the area well, was sent with 6 cohorts and
cavalry to the city, while Caesar began to
48:52
march on Corduba, hoping to draw Gnaeus from
Ulia, which was his favoured tactic.
48:58
Paciaecus approached Ulia during the night,
and a huge storm swept in.
49:05
Seizing his opportunity, Paciaecus calmly
marched his men through Gnaeus’ lines.
49:09
The sentries, unable to clearly distinguish
any of the legionary symbols of Caesar’s
49:15
men in the dark and through the torrential
downpour, simply let them past, allowing Caesar’s
49:20
lieutenant to slip into the town and preparing
his men to defend it.
49:26
Meanwhile, as Caesar was approaching Corduba
he sent a detachment of cavalry and mounted
49:31
legionaries as a scouting party ahead of his
main force.
49:38
They soon ran into a cavalry unit sent out
by Sextus.
49:41
The two forces clashed, Caesar’s legionaries
quickly dismounting to fight on foot.
49:46
Not prepared for fighting heavy infantry,
the Pompeians took heavy casualties before
49:51
breaking and fleeing back to Corduba with
the news that Caesar was near.
49:56
Urgently, Sextus sent messages to his brother
requesting reinforcements.
50:01
Gnaeus quickly agreed, abandoning the siege
of Ulia and marching to Sextus’ aid.
50:06
Caesar approached Corduba from the south.
50:15
It seems that Sextus had either blocked or
destroyed the bridge from Corduba that crossed
50:17
the Baetis, forcing Caesar to create a makeshift
one by lowering baskets piled with stones
50:22
and then laying planks across them.
50:28
Afterwards, he made camp outside Corduba.
50:30
Gnaeus soon arrived, encamping opposite, and
Caesar immediately began erecting a line of
50:34
palisades from his camp to the bridge, cutting
Gnaeus off from the city.
50:39
Similarly, Gnaeus began creating defences
from his camp to the bridge, hoping to cut
50:44
off Caesar’s escape.
50:49
Fierce skirmishes were fought on the bridge
itself, each side trying to force the other
50:51
to concede control of it.
50:56
The narrowness of the bridge made the fighting
particularly brutal and many were either thrown
50:58
into the river during the fighting, or were
killed and their bodies left piled on the
51:03
bridge.
51:08
Caesar was hoping for a quick and decisive
battle, and this was clearly not going to
51:12
be that.
51:17
Accordingly, one night he lit a large number
of campfires to give the impression his camp
51:18
was still garrisoned, and then slipped out
of the fort.
51:23
He carried out a risky, river crossing during
the night, slipping away from the brothers
51:27
and making for the town of Ategua, which had
the strongest Pompeian garrison in the area.
51:31
The next morning, Gnaeus realised what had
happened and Labienus pursued with his cavalry,
51:37
capturing a number of Caesar’s supply wagons,
but withdrawing before they could be caught
51:43
and pinned.
51:48
Caesar, reaching Ategua, began besieging the
city, encamping nearby.
51:49
The terrain around the city was extremely
hilly.
51:55
Many of these had watchtowers already built
on them and, as he had done at Ruspina, Caesar
51:59
quickly assigned pickets to them.
52:04
When Gnaeus and Labienus approached, they
did so under heavy fog and using it, they
52:08
were able to surround and slaughter a number
of Caesar’s pickets, with only some horsemen
52:13
escaping to give Caesar news of their approach.
52:18
Nevertheless, when the fog lifted it became
clear that Caesar’s men had already claimed
52:22
most of the strategically important high ground
in the area.
52:27
With little choice, Gnaeus was forced to make
camp on high ground between Ategua and Ucubi.
52:32
Though he could still see Ategua, he was not
close enough to attack Caesar.
52:38
The Optimates soon noticed that one of the
hills to the south of the town, known as the
52:45
Camp of Postumius, was in an ideal location.
52:50
A river cutting between it and Caesar’s
camp would make it difficult for Caesar to
52:53
reinforce.
52:59
Furthermore, it was close enough to Caesar
to apply pressure and overlooked his supply
53:00
and communication lines.
53:05
Caesar and Labienus had used this same tactic
a number of times in the Gallic Wars, most
53:08
notably at Gergovia. and Labienus sent a detachment
in the night to seize it.
53:13
The Caesareans, however, were alert, and immediately
raised the alarm upon the attack, resisting
53:18
fiercely.
53:24
Caesar sent the 5th, 6th and 10th legions
to reinforce them.
53:26
With their countless experiences of river
crossings, the Legions were able to quickly
53:30
ford the river and come to their allies, forcing
the Pompeian detachment to retreat to their
53:35
camp.
53:42
The following day, a reinforcing detachment
of cavalry and allied kings arrived to join
53:44
Caesar, King of West Mauritania Bogud among
them.
53:50
Gnaeus and Labienus now decided to abandon
their position, marching further West to the
53:54
banks of the River Salsum.
54:00
Though they would be even less able to pressure
Caesar from here, winter was beginning to
54:02
set in and this new position would make it
easier to be supplied from Corduba.
54:07
Caesar, on the other hand, would be forced
to winter around Ategua.
54:13
A stalemate emerged as Gnaeus and Labienus
fortified their camp along the Salsum, while
54:20
Caesar simultaneously harassed supplies being
sent to them from Corduba, and carried out
54:26
several unsuccessful attacks on Ategua.
54:32
This situation greatly benefited the Pompeians.
54:34
With the locals on their side, it was in their
best interest to stall Caesar as long as possible
54:38
and hope to drain his supplies throughout
the winter.
54:45
Caesar, usually known for his clemency, was
notably unmerciful during this period, as
54:48
several prisoners were executed and captured
couriers from Corduba had their hands cut
54:55
off.
55:00
Gnaeus and Labienus kept Caesar under pressure,
attacking his pickets surrounding and killing
55:02
many, forcing Caesar to send more men to dissuade
any other attacks.
55:07
They also continuously attacked Caesar’s
cavalry that ventured out to scout and forage.
55:12
Once again, Caesar had his back against the
wall.
55:18
In early 45 BC, the pro-Caesarean faction
in Ategua sent envoys to Caesar, offering
55:24
to surrender if he agreed to remove the Pompeian
garrison, and not garrison the city himself.
55:31
Caesar refused, and the envoys returned to
Ategua.
55:38
The Pompeian garrison soon found out about
this and rounded up the men responsible and
55:42
murdering them.
55:47
This would prove to be a disastrous decision
for the Pompeians.
55:48
Neither Gnaeus or Labienus had ordered this
massacre; they were outraged, as this could
55:52
have cost them the support of the people.
55:58
Looking to salvage what they could from the
situation, they snuck a messenger into Ategua
56:01
telling the garrison to sally out that night
and force a way through Caesar’s lines to
56:07
their camp.
56:12
The plan went into effect that night, the
garrison rushing out and trying to fight through
56:13
Caesar’s lines.
56:18
Caesar’s men, however, easily beat them
back.
56:19
Gnaeus and Labienus kept their men in battle
formation across the River Salsum.
56:23
In reality, it seems that neither particularly
wanted to help the garrison, as following
56:28
the massacre, Gnaeus and Labienus were not
willing to risk their men’s lives in order
56:34
to save the garrison.
56:39
The Optimates retreated the following night,
abandoning Ategua.
56:41
Soon after, envoys from both the garrison
and townsfolk came to Caesar offering their
56:45
surrender.
56:51
Caesar accepted, taking the city on the 19th
February.
56:52
Following this action, both sides began focusing
on gaining popular support for their cause.
56:58
Caesar sent messengers to other towns in the
area, like Ursao and Ucubi, telling them of
57:05
the massacre of the Ateguans.
57:10
Support for the Pompeians began to waiver,
some deserting to Caesar and the Pompeians
57:13
were forced to take more drastic actions,
executing the political leaders of the pro-Caesarean
57:18
faction in these cities.
57:23
It was now Caesar’s turn to apply pressure.
57:26
He first moved his camp near Gnaeus’ on
the River Salsum, beginning to fortify the
57:29
area.
57:34
Gnaeus attacked quickly, however, throwing
the men working on Caesar’s defences into
57:35
disarray.
57:40
Two centurions of the 5th bravely pushed forward,
both dying in brutal fighting, but their sacrifice
57:41
inspired their cohorts to follow and stabilised
the line.
57:49
Nevertheless, Caesar had gotten the worst
of the fighting, and he relocated to Soricaria,
57:53
establishing a fort there that cut Gnaeus
and Labienus off from Aspavia, an important
57:58
town for supplies.
58:04
Gnaeus gave chase, keeping his men on the
high ground, but some clever maneuvering and
58:06
prediction from Caesar led Gnaeus’ men to
being caught out of position and taking heavy
58:12
casualties.
58:17
Both sides had now had some minor successes,
but neither was close to the decisive victory.
58:20
Gnaeus delaying campaign had been effective
at first, but the loss of Ategua and the skirmish
58:28
at Soricaria had cost him a lot of support.
58:34
Caesar, meanwhile, needed to bring the Civil
War to a conclusive end: the resistance of
58:37
the sons of the Pompey, Labienus and Varus
was undermining his position politically.
58:43
Both needed a quick victory.
58:48
The older generals, including Labienus, urged
Gnaeus to avoid battle and continue his delaying
58:51
campaign, but the latter’s mind was made
up.
58:57
He broke camp at Soricaria and making for
the town of Munda.
59:01
Caesar followed.
59:05
On the 17th March, both drew up for battle.
59:09
Gnaeus and Labienus had chosen a strong position.
59:13
The town of Munda was on high ground, and
they drew up their army in front of the town
59:16
on the hill.
59:21
At the base of the hill was a plain, approximately
5 miles wide, with a stream cutting across
59:23
the middle of it.
59:29
Though Caesar says they had 13 Legions, this
is questioned by other sources some putting
59:30
the number lower than 40,000.
59:36
It is possible that the sources are somewhat
muddled, and that Gnaeus’ full force was
59:39
around 70,000 including auxiliaries and allies,
of which around 30-40,000 were legionaries.
59:44
Caesar was encamped opposite the Pompeians
on the other side of the plain with his army.
59:53
With him were 8 Legions, 3 of whom had fought
with him since the Gallic Wars, the 5th, 6th
59:57
and 10th and 8,000 horsemen, including some
excellent light cavalry brought by Bogud.
00:04
Caesar gives his own numbers as 40,000, but
in reality, his army numbered around 50-60,000
00:11
men.
00:19
Caesar made the first move, marching his army
out of camp and onto the plain, confident
00:21
that the Pompeians would come down from the
hill and fight on the plain so their cavalry
00:26
on the flanks would have room to move.
00:31
The Pompeians held their position.
00:34
Caesar advanced further, to the banks of the
stream.
00:37
Again, the Pompeians did not move.
00:40
Caesar crossed the stream, and still the Pompeians
did not move.
00:43
Gnaeus and Labienus knew the strength of their
position and would force Caesar to fight on
00:48
their terms.
00:53
Having finally brought his enemy to the field
and not wanting to risk missing the chance
00:54
for a final victory, Caesar moved to the base
of the hill, drawing up his force with the
00:59
10th in the position of honour on the right,
the 6th in the centre and the 3rd and 5th
01:05
on the left, the rookie Legions interspersed
between the veterans and behind, and his cavalry
01:11
on the flanks.
01:17
With little room for any elaborate maneuvers,
Caesar ordered his infantry to attack the
01:18
Pompeians head-on.
01:24
The fighting was brutal, Caesar’s men having
the benefit of experience, Gnaeus and Labienus’
01:25
men having the terrain advantage and being
driven by the strongest motivator; desperate
01:34
survival.
01:40
Neither side was making progress.
01:41
The generals and staff officers of both armies
had started the battle on horseback, Caesar
01:44
riding through his lines, urging his men on.
01:50
As the brutal fighting continued Caesar grabbed
a shield from one of his soldiers, saying
01:53
to the other officers “This will be the
end of my life, and your military service”
01:58
and pushed his way through to the front lines,
almost immediately taking a hail of javelins
02:03
on his shield.
02:08
His other officers and legates, also quickly
dismounted and joined him, fighting alongside
02:10
him.
02:15
Gnaeus, Labienus and Varus had also dismounted
and were fighting amongst their men in the
02:16
carnage; it was some of the most brutal fighting
seen in the Civil War.
02:22
Despite being reduced in numbers due to years
of campaigning, the 10th Legion, one of Caesar’s
02:27
favourite and most experienced Legions, finally
managed to turn the tide of battle, pushing
02:33
the Pompeian left hard.
02:38
Gnaeus was forced to move a Legion from his
right to reinforce that wing, and as soon
02:41
as he did, Caesar’s cavalry fell upon the
now weakened right flank.
02:46
The Pompeians started giving ground, being
pushed back to the walls of Munda where they
02:51
finally broke into a general rout, some making
it into the town of Munda, others scattering
02:56
in all directions.
03:02
30,000 Pompeians lay dead on the battlefield,
Caesar having lost 1,000.
03:04
Among the Pompeian dead were Varus, and Caesar’s
one-time friend, ally, and right-hand man,
03:10
Labienus.
03:16
Their heads were brought to Caesar after the
battle, and Caesar ordered their bodies be
03:17
found, and then had them buried with honours
where they had died.
03:22
According to Appian, Caesar would later say
that he had “often fought for victory, but
03:27
that on this occasion he fought for his life”.
03:33
Despite this decisive victory, the campaign
was still not over.
03:39
Gnaeus had escaped the battle and fled to
Carteia with what survivors he could gather,
03:42
many more were either preparing to defend
the town of Munda or retreating to Corduba.
03:48
Caesar’s men blockaded the men in Munda
in a gruesome fashion.
03:53
The bodies of the dead Pompeians were used
to create a palisade and the spears with heads
03:58
of the dead put along with it.
04:03
Meanwhile, messengers reached Sextus in Corduba
of his brother’s defeat, and, after gathering
04:07
a bodyguard, he slipped out of the city at
night.
04:13
Leaving a detachment under Fabius Maximus
to keep the survivors in Munda surrounded,
04:17
Caesar soon arrived at Corduba.
04:22
It had since been reinforced by some who had
escaped Munda, but with the help of the pro-Caesarean
04:24
faction in the city, Caesar quickly stormed
and took the city, 22,000 Pompeian soldiers
04:30
and sympathizers dying in the fighting.
04:36
In Carteia, the pro-Caesarean faction there
detained Gnaeus and sent envoys to Caesar,
04:42
hoping to atone for previously having sided
with the Pompeians.
04:48
However, the pro-Pompeians rescued Gnaeus,
killing the leaders of the Caesarean faction
04:52
and fighting to take the gates of the city.
04:58
Gnaeus was injured in the fighting, but was
able to escape the town with 20 ships before
05:01
Caesar could arrive.
05:06
Didius, in command of the Caesarean fleet,
heard of this and sent ships to give chase,
05:08
stationing men along the coast to watch for
Gnaeus making any landing.
05:14
Having left in such a hurry, Gnaeus did not
have time to stock up on water or food and
05:19
was forced to make land to try and resupply.
05:24
Didius’ men quickly found him, and captured
most of his ships burning the rest.
05:27
Gnaeus once again managed to escape with what
few men he could.
05:34
He and his companions were continually hounded
as they fled, Gnaeus being wounded in the
05:37
shoulder and leg during one of these skirmishes.
05:43
Having been on the run for weeks and now having
to be carried on a litter, Gnaeus arrived
05:46
at Lauro, with probably less than 1,000 men.
05:52
A Lusitanian betrayed him, telling his position
to the Caesareans.
05:56
A force under the command of Lucius Caesennius
Lento soon arrived.
06:02
Badly outnumbered, the Pompeians nonetheless
made what defences they could on the high
06:07
ground and prepared to make a last stand.
06:12
Despite Lento’s larger numbers, he was initially
repulsed, the Pompeians resisting desperately.
06:15
Eventually, the weight of numbers proved too
much, however, and the Pompeians were overrun,
06:22
Lento’s men cutting them down.
06:27
Gnaeus, who had been carried by some of his
men from the battlefield, was finally found.
06:30
Despite his wounds, he bravely tried to fight
back before being cut down.
06:37
Like his father, he too was beheaded, his
head being displayed at Hispalis, before Caesar
06:41
ordered him be buried with honours.
06:48
During this time, the men at Munda had continuously
made sallies against Fabius Maximus and his
06:51
men but were consistently repulsed.
06:56
Soon after Gnaeus’ death, Fabius stormed
the town, killing or capturing all 14,000
07:00
men there.
07:06
All that remained of the Pompeian faction
was Pompey’s son Sextus, who had escaped
07:07
but was now little more than a pirate.
07:13
Meanwhile, Caesar had been travelling throughout
the province, reminding the citizens what
07:18
good he had done for the province while quaestor
and praetor there.
07:23
While he was engaged in these actions, he
was joined by one of his nephews, the grandson
07:27
of his sister Julia.
07:32
This young man was Gaius Octavius.
07:33
It was around April of 45BC, the Great Roman
Civil War was over, and Caesar was on his
07:37
way back to Rome.
07:44
It was around April of 45BC, and the Great
Roman Civil War was over.
07:46
At last, Caesar could turn away from war and
focus on the politics of the Republic.
07:50
A true representative of the Populares, Caesar,
believed that the power of the Republic was
07:54
its common people, rather than the aristocracy
as the Optimates believed.
08:00
The extent to which he really believed in
these ideals has been debated for centuries
08:06
and he has been variously viewed as a military
tyrant, a despotic demagogue, a benevolent
08:11
dictator, a would-be saviour of the Republic,
and a populist champion of the people.
08:17
In this episode, we shall look at the reforms
enacted by Caesar throughout his career and
08:22
allow you to decide which view you agree with.
08:25
By the time of Caesar’s first consulship
in 59BC, Pompey has long struggled to push
08:26
legislation that would give land to his veterans.
08:31
Caesar proposed a bill that would achieve
this, while also including measures that would
08:35
also distribute land to the urban poor of
Rome.
08:40
The Gracchi brothers, almost 70 years earlier,
had tried to carry out a similar proposal,
08:43
distributing “public land” to the poor,
eventually resulting in their deaths at the
08:49
hand of the Senate.
08:53
Caesar, however, had learned from their example.
08:55
His proposal to the Senate would provide land
for 20,000 of Rome’s poor, without any financial
08:59
cost to the Senate or the wealthy landowners.
09:05
The riches Pompey had taken from the East
would be used to fund the reform, and land
09:08
would be bought from the owners at the price
it had been assessed at in the tax lists,
09:14
ensuring fairness.
09:19
A board of 20 would oversee the redistribution,
with Caesar exempting himself from the board
09:20
to ensure it would not be biased.
09:26
When the bill was put to the Senate, it was
apparently so watertight that none could criticise
09:28
it.
09:34
Nevertheless, they did not pass it with stiff
opposition coming from influential men such
09:35
as Cato, Cicero, and Caesar’s consular colleague,
Bibulus.
09:41
Caesar read the bill to the people, where
it received huge public approval.
09:45
Still, the Senate refused to pass the bill,
obfuscating and delaying constantly.
09:50
Eventually, Caesar requested the help of Pompey
and Crassus, both of who publicly supported
09:56
the bill.
10:02
With their support assured, Caesar decided
to bypass the Senate officially proposing
10:03
the bill to the comitia, an assembly of citizens.
10:08
Bibulus tried to use all the political tricks
in the book to stop the assembly but was assaulted
10:12
by the people and forced to retreat to his
house.
10:18
The bill, finally, was passed and all Senators
were bound by oaths to uphold it.
10:22
Shortly after the passing of this bill, according
to both Appian and Cassius Dio, a man called
10:28
Lucius Vettius attempted to assassinate both
Caesar and Pompey.
10:34
He was caught and when interrogated said he
had been put up to it by either Bibulus, Cicero,
10:39
and Cato, or Cicero and Lucullus (depending
on the source) all of whom were adamant Optimates.
10:45
Vettius was then killed in the night while
in prison before any more could be learned
10:52
from him.
10:56
Roman historians were extremely critical of
Caesar for this bill.
10:58
Dio claims that Caesar only proposed it as
a favour to Pompey and Crassus, to help win
11:02
the public support and so lay the groundwork
for the First Triumvirate, while Plutarch
11:08
says the law was “becoming, not for a consul,
but for a most radical tribune of the plebs”.
11:13
They both see the bill as being designed purely
to win popular approval.
11:20
Caesar certainly did want to assure his supporters
that he was a man of action and in control,
11:25
and so the ancient historians are right in
part.
11:30
The bill did indeed win Caesar and his co-Triumvirates
a lot of popular support, thus helping Caesar
11:34
settle political debts with Pompey and Crassus.
11:40
It is also important to note that Caesar did
abuse the Republican system in order to get
11:44
the bill passed, overruling both the Senate
and a fellow consul.
11:49
However, it is also true that this kind of
land reform was badly needed in Rome and did
11:54
benefit thousands of its poorer citizens.
12:00
Furthermore, Caesar already had a history
of supporting land reform, having supported
12:03
a similar but failed bill, in 63BC.
12:08
Caesar was also playing a seriously risky
game by proposing the legislation.
12:13
Similar laws had resulted in the deaths of
the Gracchi and would result in an attempt
12:18
on his own life, and one is forced to wonder
if there was not a less risky way of winning
12:22
public support if that was the only motivation.
12:28
It is also worth noting that the Roman voting
system heavily favoured the rich, the poor
12:32
having a comparatively small amount of influence
in voting.
12:37
As a result, it is debatable just how much
power Caesar would really have achieved by
12:41
passing a bill that would benefit the poorest.
12:46
it is also worth remembering that Dio and
Plutarch were both parts of the aristocracy
12:49
of the Empire, a highly conservative body,
and so criticism of radical populist reforms
12:54
would be expected from them.
13:01
Unfortunately, we do not have any written
histories from people in the class that would
13:03
benefit from Caesar’s reforms, but it is
hard to imagine that they would agree with
13:07
the two historians.
13:12
After the Battle of Thapsus, Caesar was named
Dictator for 10 years, as well as being given
13:14
tribunal and censorial powers, effectively
giving him ultimate power over the Republic
13:20
and he immediately began the tasks of reassuring
the people that the crisis was over and stabilising
13:26
the government.
13:32
Huge games were held, including elephants
and mock naval battles, at colossus expense.
13:33
He received considerable criticism for this
from some of the public, who thought they
13:40
were in poor taste, but they were largely
successful in calming and winning over the
13:44
populace.
13:50
Through his censorial powers, which allowed
him to pass laws regarding morality, he regulated
13:51
the expenditure of the richest of Rome’s
citizens, and gave incentives for people to
13:56
have more children and larger families to
try and boost Rome’s diminished population.
14:01
Augustus would later pass similar legislation,
and Caesar’s passing of these laws can be
14:07
viewed as a precursor to the autocratic regime
of Emperors.
14:13
On the other hand, Republican virtues had
always valued the rejection of luxury goods
14:18
and having large families, and so Caesar can
equally be seen as doing nothing more than
14:23
trying to reinstate core Republic traditions.
14:28
Shortly after this, Caesar would fight the
remnants of the Pompeian faction in Spain,
14:31
before returning to Rome around April 45BC,
finally having won the Civil War.
14:38
Upon his arrival back in Italy, he immediately
retired his favourite 10th Legion, and the
14:44
13th.
14:50
Most of Caesar’s other veteran Legions had
already been retired, but the significance
14:51
of demobilizing these two was vast.
14:56
The 10th was renowned as Caesar’s favourite
and had fought in almost every major battle
14:59
of the Civil War.
15:05
The 13th was no less prestigious and had been
the Legion that had first crossed the Rubicon
15:07
with Caesar.
15:12
His message was clear; the war was over, and
Caesar wanted peace.
15:13
This was reinforced by his rejection of the
offer of having a bodyguard saying “it is
15:19
better to die once, than to be always expecting
death”.
15:25
When he returned to Rome, he assured the Senate
that he would hold no grudges, and that he
15:30
would not carry out the proscriptions that
had defined the Dictatorship of Sulla saying:
15:35
“The man who recklessly abuses his power
on absolutely all occasions finds for himself
15:40
neither genuine goodwill nor certain safety,
but, though accorded false flattery in public,
15:46
is secretly plotted against.
15:52
I shall be…not your master…but your champion,
not your tyrant but your leader”.
15:54
Some Senators and politicians who had been
exiled during the Civil War were recalled
16:02
by Caesar, even some who had been exiled from
crimes such as bribery.
16:07
All those who had taken up arms against him
were publicly forgiven and granted immunity,
16:12
with scrolls that were found in the Pompeian
camps after Pharsalus and Thapsus being burnt,
16:18
along with any copies, to ensure that no later
charges could be brought against him.
16:24
Men who had been in positions of power in
the Pompeian faction were welcomed back into
16:29
the Senate, and some, such as Cassius and
Brutus, were given highly important magisterial
16:34
positions.
16:40
For those that had died in the war with family,
money was given to their wives to ensure that
16:41
they and their children would be able to sustain
themselves.
16:46
He even went so far as to have statues of
Pompey that had been torn down during the
16:50
Civil War restored.
16:55
Regarding these actions, historians have largely
been in agreement; one of Caesar’s most
16:58
admirable traits was his mercy and clemency.
17:03
Dio, often one of his harsher critics, says
that in doing so he put the reputation of
17:06
Sulla to shame and built for himself a reputation
for bravery and goodness.
17:12
Both he and Plutarch also agree that, whether
Caesar was right or wrong in his actions,
17:17
he did bring much-needed peace and stability
to the Republic, even for just a short while.
17:24
Nevertheless, some have been more questioning
of these actions, Cicero in his Second Philippic
17:30
highlighting how Caesar’s clemency effectively
kept his enemies indebted to him.
17:36
Caesar should also perhaps be criticised for
recalling those convicted of bribery.
17:42
An argument could be made that Caesar was
looking to start from a clean slate, but his
17:46
recalling of these men showed a disregard
for the legal jurisdiction of the state, as
17:52
well as fuelling rumours of him being bribed
in turn in order to recall them.
17:57
Though Caesar is occasionally categorised
as a military dictator, the disbanding of
18:03
his Legions and refusal of a bodyguard make
the issue arguable.
18:07
One of the hallmarks of a military dictatorship
is having an armed bodyguard that can then
18:13
be used as intimidation.
18:17
Caesar did not have this and he also did not
use his army as a threat to his rule, another
18:20
hallmark of a military dictatorship.
18:25
To say that Caesar achieved power through
military force is certainly accurate, to say
18:28
that he maintained power through military
force, however, is debatable.
18:33
While Dictator, he also made significant other
reforms that largely benefited the masses.
18:39
The dole had previously been distributed to
320,000, many of whom did not actually need
18:45
it, putting a strain on the supply.
18:51
Caesar reduced this number to 150,000 of Rome’s
poorest citizens.
18:54
He also began the repopulating of Carthage
and Corinth, sending 80,000 citizens there
19:00
with plots of land assigned to them.
19:05
Medics and teachers of arts were given automatic
citizenship to entice more of them to come
19:08
to Rome.
19:14
Debt had been a huge issue in Rome for a while
now, particularly throughout the Civil War.
19:15
To address this, Caesar ordered that all debts
must be repaid, but only at a rate proportional
19:21
to the indebted persons’ wealth to try and
curb any usury.
19:27
Were these the actions of a demagogue or a
man who honestly believed in giving more rights
19:31
and freedoms to the people?
19:37
No one can truly say for sure, and the interpretation
of later historians often reveals more about
19:38
their own politics than Caesar’s; certainly,
arguments for both sides can be made.
19:45
Having served as quaestor, praetor, and propraetor
in Hispania, Caesar was well aware of the
19:52
level of corruption in the governance of the
provinces and knew from personal experience
19:58
how powerful Governors could be.
20:03
As such, while Consul, he also introduced
a bill addressing these issues.
20:06
The bill prohibited governors from accepting
bribes in regards to administering justice,
20:11
fixed the amount of staff they could have
so as to better control their expenses, and
20:17
protected their subjects from having extortionate
tributes demanded of them.
20:22
Furthermore, it required that each governor
produce 3 copies of their financial accounting
20:26
making it harder for the power of a pro-magistrate
to be abused, and easier for it to be found
20:32
out and evidenced if it was.
20:37
As Dictator, he would add a law explicitly
limiting pro-praetors to one year in office,
20:40
and pro-consuls to two.
20:46
Caesar also took steps to integrate the provinces
more into the Republic, extending citizen
20:49
rights to those living in Cisalpine Gaul,
and began the process of fully integrating
20:54
the province.
20:59
Caesar’s motivation for passing these reforms
may have been purely a desire to limit corruption
21:01
of the office.
21:06
At the same time, it can equally be said that
Caesar was trying to stop anyone from following
21:08
in his footsteps and rivaling his own position
of power.
21:13
This is certainly true to some extent, as
is noted by Dio.
21:17
Caesar was right to be cautious though.
21:22
For the past few decades, arguably the biggest
threat that the Republic had faced had come
21:24
from its own governors being vested with too
much power, eventually growing so powerful
21:29
that they could not be controlled.
21:35
Such had been the case with Sulla, Pompey,
and himself; reforms that checked this power
21:37
were long overdue.
21:43
The extension of citizen rights to Cisalpine
Gaul and beginning to integrate the province
21:46
may only have been intended by Caesar to further
increase his base of support or may have been
21:51
more altruistic.
21:57
It is certainly true, however, that these
reforms were, once again, also long overdue.
21:59
Despite its huge gains since the Punic Wars,
the Roman Republic had still not yet adapted
22:05
to its new size, still largely functioning
as the local agrarian-based power it had been
22:11
300 years ago, rather than the Mediterranean-wide
super-power it now was.
22:17
This dissolving of the line between “Romans”
and “provincials” would be continued by
22:22
Augustus and was crucial in providing stability
to the Empire.
22:28
The Senate had been massively depleted, many
of its members dying throughout the Civil
22:33
War.
22:38
Caesar addressed this by enrolling many new
members, increasing the number from around
22:39
400 to 900, including ex-soldiers, sons of
freedmen, and some men from provinces.
22:45
In a similar vein, Caesar also increased the
number of magistrate offices, specifically
22:52
those in the provinces.
22:57
The number of Praetors was increased, eventually
increasing from 8 originally to 16, and increasing
22:59
the number of quaestors from 20 to 40.
23:06
These two magistrates were some of the most
important for provincial governance, praetors
23:09
often being given full control of a province,
while quaestors acted as their assistants.
23:14
The last major reform to magistrates had occurred
under Sulla, almost 40 years earlier.
23:20
Since then, huge expansions had been made,
particularly by Caesar and Pompey, but no
23:26
constitutional changes had been made to accommodate
this growing Empire.
23:32
Caesar’s reforms addressed this, increasing
the pool of candidates for provincial governors,
23:37
as well as further distributing power across
a wider base.
23:43
The number of aediles was also increased,
adding two to specifically oversee the Roman
23:47
grain dole.
23:52
Though nominally these magistrates were voted
for by the public, it was Caesar who nominated
23:53
them.
23:59
This was arguably the clearest example of
tyranny that Caesar manifested while Dictator,
24:00
though it could also be argued that he may
only have planned to nominate magistrates
24:05
in the short term, in order to stabilise politics
after the Civil War, and would have eventually
24:10
abandoned the practice.
24:16
More contemporary historians of Caesar are
critical of a number of these reforms.
24:18
Dio says that many of the men included in
the Senate were “unworthy” of their position.
24:23
He also argues that Caesar’s increasing
the size of the Senate and number of magistrates
24:29
was primarily because it allowed him a longer
list of political positions which he could
24:34
hand out to his allies, cronies, and others
to whom he owed political favours, filling
24:39
positions of power with his partisans.
24:45
He also suggests that the increased number
of governors was to stop any man from gaining
24:48
too much power and challenging his position.
24:53
It is perhaps worth noting here that Dio was
not against the idea of a Dictator per se.
24:56
In his words “Monarchy…has an unpleasant
sound…but is a most practical form of government”.
25:03
However, he did believe that the democratic
elements of the Republic were a weakness and
25:10
that the power of the masses was a dangerous
thing that should be avoided.
25:15
Therefore, while some of Dio’s observations
may be accurate in part, they are also clouded
25:19
by Dio’s inherent cynicism of democratic
government.
25:25
Nonetheless, in some aspects, it could be
argued that on this point Caesar was ahead
25:28
of his time.
25:34
During the Empire, men from all over the Empire
would be inducted into the Senate, no matter
25:35
what province they had come from.
25:41
It was restricted by money, but not by geography.
25:43
Caesar seems to have laid the groundwork for
this being the case, being the first to introduce
25:47
any provincials into the Senate.
25:53
While it is certainly true that Caesar did
put many of his allies into the Senate and
25:56
magistrate positions, it also has to be recognised
that Caesar also inducted many Optimates into
26:01
the same positions, even those who had been
his enemy.
26:07
Cicero’s earlier criticism, that Caesar
did this to keep his enemies on side, does
26:11
hold some weight, but the argument can also
be made that his reasoning is circular, in
26:16
that Caesar would have been equally criticised
for only having allies inducted into positions
26:22
of power.
26:27
Caesar had a number of other huge projects
planned.
26:29
The sources differ slightly on exactly in
what order Caesar planned these campaigns,
26:32
but all agree that he planned invasions of
Parthia and Dacia and had begun the process
26:38
of assembling the supplies and men for this.
26:43
Plutarch claims that he also planned to effectively
circle Europe after campaigning in Parthia,
26:46
fighting through the Caucasus, Scythia, Germany,
and then back to Italy through Gaul.
26:52
He also had huge construction projects planned,
including digging a canal through the Isthmus
26:58
of Corinth, draining the marshes of Pomentium
and Setia, which would provide farmland for
27:03
thousands, as well as expand the harbour at
Ostia and constructing moles to make the approach
27:09
into the port safer.
27:15
Caesar’s reforms had already led some to
see him as a tyrant, and this was compounded
27:17
by rumours that Caesar planned to overthrow
the Republic and become something the Romans
27:24
hated most: a King of Rome.
27:29
These rumours were not unfounded.
27:32
As dictator, Caesar was proclaimed “Father
of the Country”, sacrifices and games were
27:34
given in his honour, and his statue was included
alongside those of the gods in the procession
27:41
before the games.
27:47
He was also given a special chair in the Senate
made of ivory and gold; in effect a throne.
27:49
Furthermore, Cleopatra had recently arrived
in Rome igniting rumours that Caesar wanted
27:56
to install a Hellenistic style monarchy with
himself as king, and Cleopatra as queen.
28:01
Caesar took to wearing triumphal garb, a laurel
crown of victory and red boots, and on one
28:09
occasion, didn’t stand to greet the Senators.
28:16
The Roman kings of the past had worn red shoes
and they combined with the crown, “throne”,
28:19
and perceived disrespect to the Senate made
the rumours look true.
28:25
A small minority liked the idea - they adorned
a statue of Caesar with a crown and even once
28:31
hailed him as a king.
28:37
A plebeian tribune Marullus had them imprisoned
for that and, in response, Caesar accused
28:39
Marullus of having orchestrated the events
in order to damage his political position
28:46
and had the tribune imprisoned.
28:51
Marullus’ office was sacrosanct, so this
was seen as proof of Caesar’s tyrannical
28:53
ways and disregard for the Republic.
28:58
For some, it was also proof that Caesar did
in fact want the title of King, and that he
29:01
punished Marullus because the Tribune had
been imprisoning Caesar’s supporters.
29:07
According to Appian, on one occasion, Caesar
was watching a ceremony for the Lupercal games
29:13
which included Antony, as Consul for that
year, and the other priests running naked
29:19
and anointing people.
29:24
At one point, Antony approached Caesar with
a crown.
29:26
Some in the crowd groaned at this, others
applauded, but Caesar refused the crown, pleasing
29:30
the majority of people.
29:36
Again, Antony tried to crown Caesar, and again
he refused, drawing huge applause from the
29:37
crowd.
29:44
This has often been interpreted as a staged
affair to see how the people would react,
29:45
with Caesar hoping that he would be welcomed
as King.
29:50
Combined with Caesar’s other actions, some
were convinced that Caesar would use his powers
29:54
as Dictator to become a monarch.
29:59
In the ancient sources, it is these reasons
that are given for why the Conspirators decided
30:02
to plot against Caesar and later dub themselves
Liberators.
30:08
However, there is also evidence to counter
these claims.
30:12
Caesar forbade any from calling him king,
saying that he was “not King, but Caesar”,
30:17
and Dio points out that he did not ask for
any honours.
30:23
Some of them were enacted by his past enemies,
like Cicero, eager to curry his favour, while
30:27
many of his allies likely thought that he
really did deserve the honours bestowed on
30:34
him.
30:38
It was in Caesar’s interest to therefore
try to appease both sides accepting some honours,
30:40
while denying the more egregious ones.
30:46
Caesar’s punishment of Marullus, was arguably
overzealous, but it may have been done to
30:49
try and maintain neutrality with the party
that apparently did want him as King.
30:54
According to Dio, Caesar’s wearing of a
triumphal crown was to try and hide his baldness.
31:01
Similarly, Plutarch claims that Caesar not
standing to meet the Senate was due to Caesar’s
31:06
illness which often made him dizzy and faint
if he stood up quickly after being sat for
31:12
too long.
31:17
Lastly, there is the anecdote of Antony crowning
Caesar.
31:19
When one considers the image of a naked, oiled
Antony offering the crown to Caesar, it is
31:23
harder to see it as a cunning political ploy.
31:28
In fact, it is arguably much closer to a joke
in bad taste, or charade to amuse the masses.
31:31
Finally, one must also consider the question
of why Caesar would have wanted to be King?
31:38
As Plutarch and Dio both point out, he effectively
had all the power of a king, so why also have
31:44
a title that carried such heavy political
baggage in Rome?
31:51
It is hard to think that Cesar would not have
known how foolhardy such an idea was.
31:55
Some modern historians have suggested that
the conspirators’ idea that they were saving
32:03
the Republic was mere propaganda, and that
many were motivated by more personal factors.
32:07
In total there were 60 conspirators, all senators.
32:14
We know the names of 20, but only 12 are described
in enough detail in the sources for their
32:18
personal motives to be assumed:
Marcus Junius Brutus had fought with Pompey,
32:24
and was spared after Pharsalus.
32:30
Welcomed by Caesar, he was appointed governor
of Cisalpine Gaul.
32:33
Brutus’ mother was a lover of Caesar, and
the two men were close.
32:37
False, but still humiliating rumours circulated
that he was Caesar’s bastard, and even that
32:42
his mother had prostituted his half-sister
to Caesar.
32:48
Ancient and modern historians have claimed
that they were likely a key motivator for
32:53
him.
32:57
However, Brutus was a supposed descendant
of the semi-legendary Brutus who had ousted
32:58
the last King of Rome, so many insisted that
he be the one to take action against Caesar’s
33:03
kingship.
33:10
He was the conspirator who had the most genuinely
idealistic motive to assassinate Caesar.
33:11
An experienced general with a solid military
career, Gaius Cassius Longinus was also forgiven
33:17
by Caesar in the aftermath of the battle of
Pharsalus.
33:23
He became a legate in Caesar’s army in Egypt,
but refused to fight against Pompeians.
33:26
Nevertheless, he was earmarked by Caesar to
be governor of Syria.
33:33
However, Caesar had hampered his career a
few times, preventing him from becoming aedile,
33:38
and postponing his consulship.
33:43
Though he was made Legate, Cassius probably
deserved a higher command based on experience.
33:45
It is apparent that Caesar never really trusted
him, and he was right not to.
33:51
Cassius had plotted to kill Caesar from as
early as 47BC, and genuinely hated Caesar.
33:57
Certainly, motivated in part by his Pompeian
loyalties, Cassius disliked Caesar for personal
34:04
reasons and was the most active about the
plot.
34:10
Decimus Junius Brutus had fought with Caesar
in Gaul and was one of his most promising
34:14
subordinates.
34:21
He was made Praetor by Caesar and was set
to be the governor of Cisalpine Gaul after
34:22
Marcus Brutus’ term.
34:27
Caesar loved Decimus, as shown in Caesar’s
will that named him as a second-degree heir,
34:29
a fact unknown to Decimus.
34:35
This meant that if Octavian had died before,
Decimus would have been legally adopted by
34:36
Caesar and been his heir.
34:43
His motivation is incredibly difficult to
ascertain, the best argument usually coming
34:45
down to pure greed for power.
34:50
Another veteran of the Gallic Wars Gaius Trebonius
was one of Caesar’s most reliable Legates.
34:54
Caesar had appointed him as Urban Praetor,
then governor of Hispania Ulterior, and finally
35:00
Consul in 45BC.
35:06
However, his year as consul was undermined
by Caesar who appointed a replacement consul
35:08
for Trebonius’ colleague who died just one
day before the end of his term, which was
35:14
considered a mockery of the consulship.
35:19
Trebonius may well have seen this as an insult,
motivating him to join the plot.
35:23
Previously he also participated in a failed
plot against Caesar suggesting to Antony that
35:29
they should murder Caesar.
35:34
The latter rejected the offer, and the plot
had not developed any further.
35:36
One of Caesar’s strongest supporters Tillius
Cimber was rewarded for his loyalty with the
35:41
governorship of Bithynia and Pontus.
35:47
However, he was deeply annoyed that Caesar
did not recall his brother, Publius, who was
35:49
exiled for unknown reasons, possibly leading
to his involvement.
35:55
Publius Servillius Casca was one of the oldest
friends of Caesar.
36:00
Casca appears to have fallen on hard times
financially and may well have been angry that
36:05
his old friend had not helped him more in
this regard.
36:10
His brother Gaius joined the plot to support
Publius.
36:14
A Tribune of the Plebs Pontius Aquila was
publicly mocked by Caesar when he refused
36:19
to stand during one of Caesar’s triumphs.
36:24
He also had some land confiscated and given
to Brutus’ mother, Caesar’s lover, giving
36:27
him a deeply personal motivation for joining
the plot.
36:33
Another man who was Caesar’s legate in the
Gallic Wars, Servius Sulpicius Galba, was
36:37
a thrifty man.
36:42
He had guaranteed a loan of Pompey’s and
when Pompey’s land was confiscated, he inherited
36:44
the debt.
36:49
Galba was annoyed, and had complained to Caesar
who promptly paid the debt himself.
36:51
Another debt later emerged from these same
circumstances, which Caesar was less willing
36:57
to help with, much to Galba’s outrage.
37:02
There were also rumours that Caesar may have
been sleeping with his wife.
37:04
Quintus Ligarius’s life was spared by Caesar
after the battle of Thapsus, but he was later
37:09
put on trial for apparently conspiring with
Juba of Numidia, and threatened with exile.
37:16
Cicero defended him, and Caesar pardoned him.
37:22
Nevertheless, he had been deeply depressed
at the idea of being exiled.
37:25
Furthermore, Caesar had executed a relative
of his for taking up arms against Caesar despite
37:31
already having been pardoned.
37:37
These reasons and friendship with Brutus likely
brought him into the conspiracy.
37:39
Another Caesarian legate Lucius Minucius Basilus
– who served in the Gallic Wars was made
37:45
praetor in 45BC, but instead of being given
a province afterwards, was given a huge sum
37:51
of money.
37:58
This apparently deeply insulted him, motivating
him to join the conspirators.
37:59
The last in this group was Quintus Antistius
– who seems to have joined the plot purely
38:05
out of devotion to his close friend Brutus.
38:10
Little to nothing is known of the other 8
named conspirators.
38:13
In all likelihood, some really did believe
that they were ridding Rome of a tyrant, as
38:17
they would later claim.
38:23
However, modern historians are also right
to suggest that it is equally likely that
38:24
a good many of them were involved either based
on personal grudges or wanting to be a part
38:29
of the creation of the new order.
38:35
The sources vary on precisely who was the
instigator, but Cassius and Brutus were the
38:38
ringleaders.
38:43
The former doing much of the recruiting, with
the latter being more of a figurehead, his
38:44
name and reputation crucial in convincing
many others to join.
38:49
Gradually, they convinced the 58 other conspirators
to join the plot.
38:53
The Conspirators did consider one of the most
influential Senators - Cicero, but concluded
38:59
that he would not commit or would simply slow
things down.
39:04
At first, it was proposed that they kill Caesar,
Antony, and Lepidus.
39:08
The latter two were the next most powerful
Caesareans, so killing them would effectively
39:13
remove all the faction’s significant leadership.
39:19
Brutus, however, opposed this.
39:22
He argued that this was to be surgical removal
of a tyrant, not a widespread political purge.
39:24
The other conspirators relented.
39:31
Caesar would soon be leaving on his Parthian
campaign, where, surrounded by soldiers, he
39:34
would be untouchable, so they had to strike
while he was in Rome.
39:39
When Caesar announced a Senate meeting on
the Ides of March, just 4 days before he was
39:44
scheduled to leave, the Conspirators decided
that this would be the perfect opportunity.
39:49
Caesar would be separated from his entourage,
the Conspirators could all be in the same
39:55
place without raising suspicion, and they
were confident that, when the attack began,
40:00
other Senators would quickly come to help
them.
40:05
Gladiators were scheduled to fight in the
Theatre adjacent to the Senate chamber the
40:08
day of the meeting, and this would give the
conspirators the perfect excuse to have armed
40:13
soldiers nearby, as Decimus Brutus owned many
gladiators.
40:18
The night before the session, Caesar invited
Lepidus and Decimus to his house for dinner.
40:24
They talked long into the night, and, eventually,
the philosophical question was asked: “What
40:30
is the best way to die?”, to which Caesar
responded without hesitation that a sudden
40:35
death was best.
40:40
Throughout the night, Caesar’s wife Calpurnia
is said to have had dreams of Caesar’s death,
40:42
and in the morning, when Caesar was making
his sacrifices, they were all foreboding.
40:48
A superstitious man, Caesar decided to cancel
the meeting, sending Antony to dismiss the
40:54
Senate.
40:59
Caesar had also been drinking late the previous
night, and a hangover might have been influencing
41:01
his decision.
41:05
When the Conspirators heard of this, they
sent Decimus to convince Caesar to come to
41:06
the Senate.
41:11
Decimus told Caesar that the Senate would
be insulted unless he dismissed them in person,
41:12
and Caesar relented, trusting his friend’s
judgment.
41:18
Meanwhile, word of the conspiracy had started
to leak.
41:22
A friend of Caesar’s had heard of the plot
but didn’t know the details.
41:26
He immediately ran to Caesar’s house to
warn him but finding Caesar had already left
41:30
for the Senate decided to wait at his house.
41:35
Another friend would also find out about it
that same day, and ran to the Theatre of Pompey
41:39
to try and warn Caesar but would arrive too
late.
41:44
Lastly, as Caesar was making his way to the
Theatre, someone slipped him a message.
41:48
Surrounded by crowds of supporters, and constantly
having messages passed to him, Caesar slipped
41:54
it into his robes without reading.
41:59
Later found on his body, it was a warning
of the upcoming assassination.
42:02
When Caesar arrived at the Theatre, Antony,
the Conspirators, and other Senators were
42:08
all there.
42:13
The Conspirators were acting casual despite
the daggers hidden under their togas, but
42:14
they were secretly nervous.
42:19
A man approached Casca and said “Brutus
has told me everything!” which shocked Casca
42:21
before he realised that the man was referring
to his intention to run for aedile.
42:27
Another Senator approached Caesar, talking
to him in hushed tones.
42:33
The Conspirators grew anxious, Brutus subtly
signaling that they were to kill themselves
42:37
rather than be captured before it became clear
that the Senator had simply been petitioning
42:42
Caesar on another matter.
42:47
Despite more bad sacrifices, Caesar was convinced
to go ahead with the meeting and entered the
42:50
Chambers.
42:55
The Senators followed, but Antony was quickly
pulled aside by Trebonius.
42:56
Caesar, a veteran with 35 years of experience,
was in good shape despite his age.
43:01
Although Antony was known as a hedonist, he
was also a veteran of 10 years, strong, quick
43:07
to anger, and an incredible soldier.
43:13
Together, the two of them might have been
able to fight a way out, so the Conspirators
43:16
had entrusted Trebonius, one of Antony’s
closest friends, with keeping him out of the
43:20
way.
43:25
Caesar was seated at the front of the Senate
under a statue of Pompey.
43:27
Cimber approached Caesar, petitioning him
to recall his brother from exile.
43:31
The other Conspirators gathered around, encircling
Caesar, and suddenly Cimber pulled Caesar’s
43:36
toga down, exposing his shoulder, the signal
for the attack.
43:42
Caesar, who as Dictator was protected by law,
pushed Cimber back saying “This is violence!”.
43:46
Casca, Caesar’s childhood friend, then attacked
the seated Caesar, but missed only cutting
43:53
his shoulder.
44:00
Caesar grabbed Casca’s hand, shouting “Casca
what are you doing?!” while Casca simultaneously
44:01
shouted “Brother help me!”.
44:07
Caesar was able to rise and violently throw
Casca away from him, but by the time he did,
44:10
Casca’s brother Servillius had attacked,
stabbing him in the side.
44:15
Caesar continued to fight back but was attacked
from all directions, Cassius slashing his
44:20
face, Bucolianus stabbing him in the back,
and Decimus slicing his thigh.
44:25
Still, Caesar fought back as much as he could.
44:31
Brutus was the next to approach him, and Caesar
sunk down, either due to blood loss, or having
44:34
now lost the will to fight and Brutus stabbed
him in the groin.
44:40
Caesar pulled his toga over his head to hide
his face, just as Pompey had done when he
44:45
had been betrayed and murdered.
44:50
Caesar resigned to his fate and died in a
pool of blood at the base of the statue of
44:53
Pompey.
44:59
Suggestions that his last words were either
“And you, Brutus?” or “And you, my son?”
45:00
are largely disproven by the ancient sources,
most simply saying he groaned in pain.
45:06
His body had 23 stab wounds, many of which
happened after his death when the Conspirators
45:12
had gathered around to stab his body, some
even wounding each other.
45:18
Only the 6 mentioned senators stabbed him
while he was alive, which means that less
45:23
than 1% of the Senate had actually taken part
in the assassination.
45:28
Furthermore, the analysis of his corpse at
the time determined that only one, the attack
45:32
from Servillius, was fatal.
45:38
The fact that they could not strike a fatal
blow on an unarmed, already wounded man, perhaps
45:41
tells us something about quite how panicked
they were.
45:47
Out of 60 Conspirators, most did not even
take part in the stabbing, suggesting that
45:50
many had joined simply out of political opportunism.
45:56
Gaius Julius Caesar had been assassinated
by men who had either been spared by him or
45:59
trusted as friends.
46:05
Dio later wrote of Caesar that if he could
have chosen, he probably would have wished
46:07
he could have died at Munda, as a soldier.
46:12
Even the ancient historians who are critical
of Caesar, such as Dio, recognise that such
46:15
a death was somewhat of a tragic end.
46:20
For some, Caesar was a war-mongering tyrant
driven by a lust for personal glory.
46:23
To others, Caesar was a leader who tried to
fix a system that was clearly broken and was
46:30
killed before that goal could be reached.
46:35
Some see Caesar as a combination of both or
something in between.
46:39
What all can agree on, however, is that Caesar
changed the world.
46:43
By accident or design, his actions ultimately
led to the rise of the Roman Empire and all
46:48
the effects, good and bad, that would bring.
46:54
Two of the most interesting things that Caesar
has left us today are two questions.
46:57
Did Caesar make the world a better place?
47:03
And what would have happened if he had survived?
47:06
We are currently working on the third season
of this series that will cover the events
47:09
that happened after the assassination of Caesar,
including various civil wars and the so-called
47:14
Last War of the Republic that allowed the
Roman Republic to transform into the Principate.
47:20
If you don’t want to miss our future episodes
and get notified, subscribe and press the
47:26
bell button.
47:30
Please, consider liking, commenting, and sharing
- it helps immensely.
47:32
Our videos would be impossible without our
kind patrons and youtube channel members,
47:35
whose ranks you can join via the links in
the description to know our schedule, get
47:40
early access to our videos, access our discord,
and much more.
47:44
This is the Kings and Generals channel, and
we will catch you on the next one.
47:48
歌词与翻译
即将推出！
我们正在更新此部分，敬请期待！
重点词汇
开始练习
| 词汇 | 含义 |
|---|---|
|
civil /ˈsɪvəl/ B2 |
|
|
battle /ˈbætl/ A2 |
|
|
defeat /dɪˈfiːt/ B1 |
|
|
political /pəˈlɪtɪkl/ B1 |
|
|
power /ˈpaʊər/ A2 |
|
|
ships /ʃɪps/ A1 |
|
|
death /dɛθ/ A2 |
|
|
relations /rɪˈleɪʃənz/ B1 |
|
|
capture /ˈkæptʃər/ B2 |
|
|
news /njuːz/ A1 |
|
|
general /ˈdʒɛnərəl/ A2 |
|
|
emergency /ɪˈmɜːrdʒənsi/ B1 |
|
|
army /ˈɑːrmi/ A1 |
|
|
royal /ˈrɔɪəl/ B1 |
|
|
secret /ˈsiːkrɪt/ A2 |
|
|
influence /ˈɪnfluəns/ B2 |
|
重点语法结构
即将推出！
我们正在更新此部分，敬请期待！
相关歌曲